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SPOUSES PRISCO P. CAL, JR. and Petitioners, -versus- MARIANO A. ZOSA, substituted by FILOMENA REYES-ZOSA,
WINFRED R. ZOSA, GLORIA ZOSA-SENO, EMMANUEL R. ZOSA, ZELDA ZOSA-VILLALON, and
MARGARET ZOSA-COLE, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 152518 Present: pUNO, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA, and GARCIA,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution
is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the February 11, 2002 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65860, entitled “Spouses Prisco, Jr. and
Alice Cal, petitioners, versus Mariano
A. Zosa, respondent.”
Vidal Jimeno, a resident of Barili,
On September 17, 1949, Salud filed
with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu a Petition for Letters of Administration
over the estate of her husband, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 570-R.
Thereafter, Salud
died intestate and was survived by her four children. On May 28, 1952, they filed with the then CFI
of Cebu a Petition for Letters of Administration
over the estate of their parents, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 932-R.
Later, the two cases were consolidated
in one branch of the court.
Thereafter, Atty. Mariano A. Zosa, the
herein original respondent, was hired by the four children as their counsel. On
On various dates, the four siblings
again sold their pro-indiviso shares in the same lot to spouses Felix
and Pacita Barba.
In the meantime, the Bureau of Lands effected
a cadastral survey of the lots located in
The
Director of the Bureau of Lands then filed with the
Respondent Atty. Zosa filed an answer[3]
claiming ownership of
Felix Barba, also filed his answer,[4] opposing
respondent’s claim. He alleged that he
is the owner of the lot by virtue of the various Deeds of Absolute Sale
executed in his favor by the Jimeno children. Despite his adverse claim, Felix Barba still
sold the same lot to spouses Crispin Tango-an and Conchita Dacalus,
who in turn, sold it to spouses Prisco Cal, Jr. and
Alice Canoy, herein petitioners.
Meanwhile,
on
The Court finds merit in Zosa’s application.
First and foremost to be considered is that
when the deeds of sale were executed by the Heirs of Vidal Jimeno in favor of
Barba the administration proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Vidal Jimeno
and Salud Montemayor has not yet been terminated. In fact, the deeds of sale required approval
of the court in order that it could be registered. The administration proceedings not having
been terminated yet, there was no summation of the estate of Vidal Jimeno minus
the obligations both from private persons and from the government. In other words, there was no total settlement
yet of the obligations left by the estate of the deceased and residue been
fully determined which the heirs may inherit.
Moreover, the sale to Barba by the heirs of Vidal Jimeno failed to
comply with the requirements laid down by Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Claimant Zosa, being the lawyer of the
administration case should be considered as one of the creditors of the estate
of Vidal Jimeno. The order which
approved the cession and assignment executed by the heirs of Jimeno in favor of
Zosa in consideration of his services is already final and executory. Necessarily, therefore, claimant Zosa has a
better right over and above the claim of Barba.
Felix
Barba interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 22941,
entitled “Director of Lands v. Felix Barba.”
On
On
On
On
On
Petitioners
alleged that respondent Atty. Zosa acquired the Decree through extrinsic fraud;
and he failed to adduce evidence to prove his claim.
After
hearing, or on
Petitioners interposed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 65860.
On
We do not agree with the appellants. Central to the issue is Section 38 of Act
496, as amended, quoted, infra:
SEC. 38. x x x Such decree shall not be opened by
reason of the absence, infancy or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decree,
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any state
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the
competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after
entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. x x x (idem, supra)
A re-opening or review of a
“Decree,” issued by the trial court, on the ground of fraud is allowed,
provided that the following elements are present, namely:
x x x (1) that the petitioner has real or dominical
right; (2) that he has been deprived thereof; (3)
through fraud; (4) that the petition is filed within one year
from the issuance of the decree;
and (5) that the property has not as yet been
transferred to an innocent purchaser.’ (Pascual
Libudan v. Heirs of Jose Palma Gil, 45 SCRA 17, at page 27, supra)
Our Supreme Court emphasized
in the above case that “fraud” envisaged in the law is extrinsic or
collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, x x x
x x x
The “fraud” is that which
affects and goes into jurisdiction of the court. And the reason d’etre of the principle
is that “equity will enjoin a party from enforcing a judgment which he has
obtained by means of fraud. Fraud will
vitiate a judgment and a court of equity may declare it a nullity. Equity has so great an abhorrence of fraud
that it will set aside its own decrees if founded thereupon.
x x x
“Intrinsic fraud,”
in contrast, does not go into or affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. Where the fraud, alleged or invoked by a
losing party, is based on facts which were controverted and litigated by the
parties and resolved by the court after due trial, such fraud does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court. Whether
the resolution of the court on the issue of fraud is correct or not and, in the
meantime, the “Decision” of the court has become final and executory and a
“Decree” had already been issued, the same cannot be impugned in a separate or
collateral proceeding. x x x
x x x
In the present
recourse, the issue of whether or not Felix Barba and his successor-in-interest
or the appellee was in actual or constructive possession of the property and
the lawful owner of the property was posed to the court a quo for resolution
and litigated by the parties. Felix
Barba filed his “Answer/Claim” and adduced evidence. Hence, he was not deprived of an opportunity
to oppose the claim of the appellee and
adduce evidence in support of his claim.
After calibration of the evidence of the parties, the court a quo
decreed the property to and under the name of the appellee. The Order of the court a quo was appealed to
the Court of Appeals and the latter affirmed the Order of the court a quo x x x
“
Hence,
the present petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER
OR NOT DECREE NO. N-199584 ISSUED OUT OF CADASTRAL CASE NO. N-2-T, LRC RECORD
NO. 585, CADASTRAL CASE 3, TOLEDO CADASTRE, INVOLVING LOT 3616 SITUATED AT
BULONGAN, TOLEDO CITY, THAT LED TO THE ISSUANCE OF OCT NO. O-203 IN HEREIN
RESPONDENT’S NAME, WAS ATTENDED WITH ACTUAL FRAUD WITHIN THE LEGAL
CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 32, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE (P.D.) NO. 1529 (FORMERLY
SECTION 38 OF ACT 496) OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE BOUND BY THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IN CA-G.R.
CV No. 22941, THUS MAKING THE PROCEEDINGS AT BAR ALREADY BARRED LEGALLY.
In
their Comment, the lawful heirs of Atty. Zosa, now herein respondents, maintain
that their father did not commit any extrinsic fraud; that petitioners were not
deprived of their day in court; that their predecessor, Felix Barba, ably
opposed Atty. Zosa’s claim in the cadastral proceedings; and that their
conflicting claims were fully ventilated as they were allowed by the cadastral
court to present their respective evidence.
The right of a person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual or extrinsic fraud is
recognized by law under Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529,[9]
thus:
Review of decree of registration; Innocent
purchaser for value.
— The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of
absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject,
however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches
thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such
adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance
(now the Regional Trial Court) a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the
entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the
land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. x x x (emphasis
supplied)
Fraud is of two kinds:
actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from
an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or
concealment of a material fact. Constructive
fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public
interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done
with an actual design to
commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.[10]
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic.
Fraud is regarded as intrinsic
where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action,
or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated
therein. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic
where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire
case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not
a fair submission of the controversy.[11] Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the
transaction sued upon.[12]
The "fraud"
contemplated by Section 32, P.D. No. 1529 is extrinsic. For fraud to justify a
review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.[13]
Thus, relief is granted to a party
deprived of his interest in land where
the fraud
consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when
in fact, they are; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other
claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or
in inducing him not to oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about the
identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to
withdraw his application. In all these examples, the overriding consideration is
that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and
goes into the jurisdiction of the court.[14]
On the
other hand, we have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not
be granted where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic
and not collateral, and has been controverted and decided, [15] like what is very much
obtaining in the present case.
Here, petitioners failed to prove that then respondent
Atty. Zosa committed acts constituting extrinsic fraud in obtaining OCT N0.
O-203. Indeed, there is no showing how Felix Barba, petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest, was prevented by the said respondent from presenting his
case.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr. (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando
and Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria-Tirona (retired).
[2] Records, p. 135.
[3]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[9] Property Registration Decree (Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes).
[10] Heirs of Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118436, March 21, 1997, 270 SCRA 309.
[11]
[12]
[13] Director of Lands v. CFI of Rizal,
G.R. No. L-31681,
[14] Republic
of the
[15]