RURAL BANK OF SIATON, G.R. No. 152483
(
Petitioner, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
and
Chico-Nazario,
JJ.
FELIX
MACAJILOS and
QUIRICO
MACAJILOS, JR., Promulgated:
Respondents.
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This petition for review on
certiorari assails the April 18, 2001 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51290, which affirmed the July 12, 1995 Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 39 in Civil
Case No. 9049, and the November 12, 2001 Resolution[3] denying
petitioner Rural Bank of Siaton, Inc.’s (RBSI) motion for reconsideration.
The controversy arose from the
complaint for removal of cloud over title to and/or recovery of real property and
damages filed by Felix Macajilos and Quirico Macajilos, Jr. (Macajilos) against
RBSI and Fidela Macalipay (Fidela) on July 27, 1987.
In their complaint,[4] Macajilos
alleged that they are the children of the late Gregoria Macalipay Macajilos who
during her lifetime owned and possessed a parcel of residential land situated
at Poblacion, Siaton, Negros Oriental with an area of 441 square meters; that
upon Gregoria’s death on July 25, 1959, Macajilos inherited the subject property
as compulsory heirs of Gregoria, their father Quirico Macajilos, Sr. having predeceased
Gregoria; that in 1975, Macajilos allowed Juanito Macalipay, a nephew of
Gregoria to build a house on the subject property where he lived together with his
wife Fidela, and their son, Lamberto; that Fidela and Lamberto continued to
live in the house even after the death of Juanito; that on February 12, 1975,
Fidela executed an “Affidavit of Heirship” before a Notary Public at Dumaguete City
falsely claiming to be the sole heir of Gregoria Macalipay and adjudicating to
herself the subject property; that the tax
declaration in the name of Gregoria Macalipay was cancelled and transferred to
the name of Fidela under Tax Declaration No. 022478; that Lamberto was the
manager of RBSI when Fidela obtained a loan using as collateral the subject
property; that Fidela defaulted thus the subject property was foreclosed and sold
at public auction with RBSI as the only and highest bidder; that Fidela failed
to redeem the property thus RBSI was able to transfer the tax declaration to
its name; that Macajilos have always been in actual possession under claim of
ownership of the subject property from the time of their mother’s death up to
the present; that RBSI knew that Fidela did not own the subject property; that
Macajilos filed a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document (Criminal Case No. 9096 before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Dumaguete City, Branch I) against Fidela and Lamberto immediately upon
discovery of the foreclosure sale; that in
her counter affidavit in the preliminary investigation of that criminal case,
Fidela denied that she signed the “Affidavit of Heirship”.
In
its answer,[5] RBSI claimed
it considered Fidela to be the owner of the subject property as she was in
actual physical possession thereof when she applied for a loan; that Macajilos maliciously
built a house on the subject property pretending to be the owners thereof; that,
if they owned the subject property, they are already in estoppel since the mortgage
document was duly registered with the Register of Deeds and they have
constructive notice thereof; that the extrajudicial foreclosure and the public
auction proceedings were duly published and that the Sheriff’s Certificate of
Sale in favor of RBSI and the final deed of sale were registered with the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Negros Oriental.
On
the other hand, Fidela averred in her answer[6]
that the property belonged to her late husband, Juanito Macalipay; that she
lacks formal education and anything she did was the work of her son, Lamberto,
who was at the time the manager of RBSI.
After trial, the trial court found in
favor of Macajilos, thus:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the
foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the foreclosure of the
mortgaged property null and void ab initio;
2. Declaring [Macajilos] the rightful
owners of the land subject matter of this case;
3. Ordering the Provincial Assessor’s
Office to cancel Tax Dec. No. 022478 in the name of Fidela Macalipay and issue
another Tax Declaration in the name of Felix Macajilos and Quirico Macajilos
covering the same property;
4. Ordering the Rural Bank of Siaton, Inc.
to immediately release from mortgage the land covered by Tax Dec. 022478 in the
name of Fidela Macalipay; and
5. Ordering the Rural Bank of Siaton, Inc.
to pay [Macajilos] the following:
a. P10,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
d. costs of the suit.
SO
ORDERED.[7]
The trial court noted that RBSI failed
to ascertain whether Fidela was the lawful owner of the property being
mortgaged. Rather, it relied on the tax
declaration in Fidela’s name and the “Affidavit of Ownership and Possession” that
she executed. No investigator inspected
the premises. Thus, the trial court ruled
that RBSI must suffer for its failure to investigate and determine the lawful
owner of the subject property who turned out to be Macajilos.
The
Court of Appeals denied RBSI’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto. Hence, this petition.
The assigned errors revolve around four
principal issues: (1) who between Macajilos and RBSI has a superior right over
the property, (2) assuming the Macajilos brothers have a better right, whether RBSI
was a mortgagee-buyer in good faith of the subject property, (3) assuming the Macajilos
brothers have a better right, whether they are barred from recovering the
subject property due to estoppel and laches, and (4) whether the award of
damages in favor of Macajilos was proper.
RBSI principally raises questions of
fact that have been settled by the court a
quo. As a general rule, questions of
fact are not covered by a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court because it is limited to a review of errors of law committed by the appellate
court especially so in the case at bar where the findings of fact of the trial
court and Court of Appeals coincide and are, thus, binding on this Court.[8] However, RBSI claims that the instant case
falls under recognized exceptions to this general rule because the lower courts’
conclusions are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures,[9] and are based on a misapprehension of facts.[10]
After a review of the records, we rule
that RBSI failed to impugn the ruling of the lowers courts on the main issue of
ownership over the subject property. However,
the award of damages should be modified by deleting the award of exemplary
damages for lack of factual and legal bases.
Anent
the first issue, RBSI contends that Fidela owned the mortgaged property based
on her answer to the complaint where she asserted that she inherited the
subject property from her late husband, Juanito Macalipay. It argues that the lower courts should not
have given credence to the subsequent repudiation by Fidela of her ownership
over the subject property during the pre-trial conference as the same was done
allegedly in exchange for her being dropped from the instant case.
The contention lacks merit.
To begin with, Fidela was not dropped
from the case. During the hearing on
Moreover, RBSI has failed to produce
evidence to show that Fidela’s admission was not freely and knowingly given. While it is true that Fidela was no longer
presented as a witness after the pre-trial conference for reasons not borne out
by the records, this does not necessarily mean that her repudiation of
ownership over the subject property was prompted by ill-will against RBSI. The pre-trial order dated
2. Co-defendant Fidela Macalipay’s
claims: that the property in question
did really belong to plaintiffs [herein respondents Macajilos brothers] by virtue of their rightful succession to
the same; that it was her own son, Lamberto Macalipay, who subsequently
became an officer-in-charge as manager of co-defendant Rural Bank of Siaton,
who so maneuvered her into signing certain documents, in effect making her a
debtor of Rural Bank of Siaton, which circumstances were never explained to her
by her son Lamberto Macalipay; and that as a consequence of it, said Rural Bank
of Siaton did grant a loan to her although the proceeds of said loan only went
into the hands of Lamberto Macalipay, her son; that Fidela Macalipay recognizes the fact that she absolutely had
nothing, and in fact still has nothing, to do with the property in question,
the same property’s ownership being always that of plaintiffs, which ownership
she recognizes;[12] (Italics
supplied)
Although the records do not contain
the transcript during the pre-trial conference, it should be noted that on
COURT:
Then, what happened
now[?] Did you convince Fidela that she was just a daughter-in law? In this
case, Fidela was a daughter-in-law of…
Logronio:[13]
The first cousin of
the plaintiffs.
COURT:
Fidela Macalipay
whom you are representing is merely the daughter…
Ybañez:[14]
Is the mother of
Lamberto…
COURT:
Wait a minute, … is
the wife of the plaintiff’s cousin?
Ybañez:
Yes, your honor.
COURT:
And even her husband, the
plaintiff’s cousin, had nothing to do with this property, right?
Ybañez:
Yes, that is what the defendant…
COURT:
And even your
client, the co-defendant Fidela Macalipay, admits that it was only her son,
Lamberto, who soon became OIC…
Logronio:
Who was the OIC at
the time.
COURT:
Yes, who soon
became the OIC of the Rural Bank who did something using Fidela’s name. Is that
correct?
Logronio:
Yes, your honor.
x x x x
COURT:
But Fidela said, “Yes, the plaintiff really
owned this property,” admitting it.
Ybañez:
Yes, your honor.
COURT:
What is the problem
of this case now?
Logronio:
So, we have no more
problem with Fidela, as far as ownership is concerned. Our target now is the
Rural Bank of Siaton who appears to have purchased this property and the
foreclosure, and have it transferred to their name and even threatening to
eject the plaintiffs who are the real owners x x x.[15] (Emphasis
supplied)
As regards Fidela’s initial assertion
of ownership over the subject property, we agree with the findings of the Court
of Appeals that the same should not be given weight. It bears stressing that only a thumb mark
appears on top of her printed name at the last page of her answer and the name
of the lawyer who prepared the same was not even indicated. The records also show that Fidela’s answer was
belatedly filed with the trial court. In
her opposition[16] to the
motion to have her declared in default, there was a plea for understanding and
a statement that the attached answer was prepared by an unnamed lawyer, without
being formally engaged, out of pity and compassion for Fidela who was an
indigent. Thus, as between the
allegations in the answer which was merely thumbmarked by Fidela and prepared
by an unknown lawyer, and her admissions in open court with the assistance of her
counsel of record, Atty. Rosalinda Ybañez, during the pre-trial conference of
this case, the lower courts correctly gave weight to the latter.
At any rate, the lower courts’
finding that the subject property rightly belonged to Macajilos was not principally
grounded on Fidela’s admission. Rather,
this admission merely confirmed the undisputed documentary evidence which
showed Gregoria Macalipay as the owner of the subject property and the same
passed on to her two sons upon her death. The records show that Tax Declaration No. 858[17] covering the period prior to the year 1949,[18]
Tax Declaration No. 13895[19] for
the year 1949, Tax Declaration No. 25864[20] for the year 1969 and Tax Declaration No.
10651[21]
for the year 1974 over the subject property were all in the name of Gregoria
Macalipay. It is true that tax
declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
however, they constitute good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject
property.[22] Coupled with her uncontested actual possession
of the subject property, these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of
ownership over the subject property by Gregoria Macalipay,[23]
the mother of herein respondents Macajilos.
The tax declarations in the name of
Gregoria Macalipay takes on great significance because Fidela tacked her claim
of ownership to that of Gregoria Macalipay. In 1975, Fidela had Tax Declaration No. 10651 in
the name of Gregoria Macalipay cancelled through the execution of an “Affidavit
of Heirship” where she claimed to be the sole heir of Gregoria Macalipay. Yet,
she was merely the wife of Juanito who was a nephew of Gregoria. Neither she nor Juanito could inherit from
Gregoria whose compulsory heirs are respondents Macajilos. Clearly, the “Affidavit of Heirship” was fraudulent
and could never be Fidela’s source of ownership over the subject property. Neither could Tax Declaration No. 022478 in
the name of Fidela and the “Affidavit of Ownership and Possession” be the
source of any derivative right of ownership of RBSI over the subject property
considering that these documents were the products of the aforementioned fraudulent
scheme. Thus, the trial court correctly
ruled that the mortgage over the subject property and the foreclosure
proceedings were a nullity, and that respondents Macajilos brothers should be
declared the lawful owners of the subject property.
We
note that in its Memorandum,[24] RBSI
contended, among others, that should this Court rule in favor of Macajilos, the
mortgage should be declared valid insofar as the one-half portion of the
subject property is concerned, based on the alleged admission by respondent Quirico
Macajilos, Jr. on cross-examination that there was an oral settlement of the
estate of Gregoria Macalipay where respondents Macajilos brothers agreed that
the subject property should be apportioned between respondent Quirico Macajilos,
Jr. and Fidela Macalipay.
This
issue is being raised by RBSI for the first time on appeal and only belatedly
in its memorandum before this Court. Well-settled
is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will
not be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.[25] An issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process.[26] Thus, we cannot bend backwards to examine this
issue raised by RBSI at this late stage in the proceedings.
Be that as it may, even if we were to
consider RBSI’s new theory and, thus, assume that the aforementioned oral
settlement did take place, the relinquishment of respondent Felix Macajilos’
one-half share in the subject property in favor of Fidela would amount to an
oral donation of real property which, under Article 749[27]
of the Civil Code, is null and void.[28] This void donation to Fidela did not ripen
into ownership through acquisitive prescription because, as will be discussed
in detail shortly, RBSI was a mortgagee-buyer in bad faith. Only six years had elapsed from the auction
sale to the filing of the instant case, which is less than the required 30-year-period
for extraordinary acquisitive prescription[29] to
set in.
Anent the second issue, we agree with
the trial court and the Court of Appeals that RBSI was a mortgagee-buyer in bad
faith. The subject property was
mortgaged three times by Fidela to RBSI, to wit: in 1975 for P2,000.00, in 1976
for 10,000.00, and in 1978 for P12,300.00. After fully paying the first two mortgage
debts, Fidela failed to pay the third thus the property was extrajudicially
foreclosed and sold at public auction with RBSI as the only and highest bidder.
However, in contracting the aforesaid
mortgages, RBSI failed to exercise the proper diligence in verifying the true
owners of the subject property. Certainly,
a mortgagee is not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the
history of the mortgagor’s title but RBSI, especially because it is a banking
institution, must have at least exercised due diligence before entering into
said contract. Banks are expected to
exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealings
because their business is impressed with public interest.[30]
It is a standard practice for banks
before approving a loan to send representatives to the premises of the land
offered as collateral and to investigate who are the real owners thereof.[31] However, in the case at bar, no investigator
was sent to the location of the subject property to verify the real owners
thereof. Instead, RBSI relied solely on Tax
Declaration No. 022478 in the name of Fidela as well as the “Affidavit of
Possession and Ownership” that RBSI required her to execute.[32] Atty. Teodoro Singson, a witness for RBSI,
explained that when RBSI was established in 1974, there was so much money
coming from the Central Bank that the bank was in a hurry to grant loans and was
not strict with the documents presented by prospective borrowers as collateral.[33]
What is more, Atty. Singson admitted
that RBSI was aware that Tax Declaration No. 022478 in the name of Fidela was previously
in the name of Gregoria Macalipay and that the tax declaration was transferred
to the name of Fidela through the “Affidavit of Heirship” she executed naming
her as the sole heir of Gregoria Macalipay.[34] However, it did not take steps to ascertain
whether Fidela was, indeed, the sole heir of Gregoria Macalipay. Rather, it placed full faith on the false
representation of Fidela that her husband, Juanito Macalipay, was the son of
Gregoria Macalipay.[35] To make matters worse, neither did it inquire from
Lamberto, son of Fidela, who was then the manager of the bank when the first
loan was granted to her in 1975, as to whether his father, Juanito Macalipay,
was the son of Gregoria Macalipay.[36]
As its defense, RBSI dwells on the alleged
error of the trial court in finding Lamberto as the manager of RBSI when the mortgage
debts were contracted when in fact Lamberto was a mere clerk-typist. However, the records show that RBSI
categorically admitted during the pre-trial conference that Lamberto was the
manager of the bank when the loan transactions took place.[37] Even in its Reply[38]
dated June 21, 2002 filed before this Court, RBSI admitted that Lamberto was
the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the bank prior to 1978 or when the first two
mortgage debts were contracted by his mother, Fidela, and that Lamberto was
demoted to the rank of a clerk-typist only in 1978.[39]
At any rate, we need not belabor this
point because whether Lamberto was an OIC or a mere clerk-typist of the bank when
the mortgage debts were contracted will not excuse RBSI from exercising prudence
in verifying the true owners of the subject property. The fact that Lamberto was the son of its
prospective debtor, Fidela, should have prompted RBSI to be more cautious in
granting the loan.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear
that RBSI chose to close its eyes to facts which should have put a reasonable
man on his guard.[40] Far from being prudent, RBSI hastily granted
the loan without investigation, and placed full faith on the false documents
submitted by Fidela. Consequently, it cannot now claim that it acted in good
faith on the belief that there was no defect in the title of Fidela.
While
the findings of the lower courts that RBSI was a mortgagee-buyer in bad faith
is in accord with the evidence on record, we must point out, however, that they
overlooked the fact that the subject property is an unregistered piece of land.
As we ruled in David v. Bandin,[41] which
was reiterated in Sales v. Court of
Appeals,[42] “the issue
of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the
sale is a registered land but not where the property is an unregistered land. One
who purchases an unregistered land does so at his peril. His claim of having bought the land in good
faith, i.e., without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, the property, would not protect
him if it turns out that the seller does not actually own the property.” Nevertheless, the application of this doctrine
will not affect the outcome of this case. RBSI bought the property during the auction
sale at its own peril and must suffer the consequences of its failure to
investigate the true owners of the subject property who turned out to be
respondents Macajilos brothers. Although
the discussion on RBSI’s bad faith would now seem superfluous given the application
of this doctrine, the finding of bad faith is still relevant in the resolution
of the last issue with respect to the award of damages.
Anent
the third issue, we likewise agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondent Macajilos brothers are not barred by laches or estoppel from
recovering the ownership of the subject property. They are not estopped from denying the
representations of Fidela that she owns the subject property because they were
never privy to the loan agreements between the bank and Fidela. The fact that the mortgages and subsequent
foreclosure proceedings were duly registered with the register of deeds will
not cure their nullity because Fidela never owned the subject property.
Neither can respondent Macajilos
brothers be said to have slept on their rights. Essentially, laches is the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by the
exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or
declined to assert it.[43]
In the case at bar, respondents Macajilos
brothers performed acts which showed their intent to assert their rightful
ownership over the subject property. Specifically,
in 1980, respondent Quirico Macajilos, Jr. came across the notice of public
auction of the subject property in the public market.[44] Upon investigation with the provincial assessor’s
office, he discovered that Fidela had mortgaged the subject property to RBSI by
transferring the tax declaration to her name after falsely claiming in the
“Affidavit of Heirship” that she was the sole heir of Gregoria Macalipay.
Consequently, in 1981 or within a
year from the discovery of the fraudulent scheme perpetuated by Fidela, respondents
Macajilos brothers filed a criminal case against Fidela and Lamberto for estafa
through falsification of public document.[45] After knowing about the foreclosure of the subject
property, respondent Quirico Macajilos, Jr. took possession of the subject
property[46] and
demanded Fidela to vacate. In 1987, the
instant case to remove cloud over the title and/or recovery of real property
and damages was filed by respondents Macajilos brothers against RBSI as an off-shoot
of the latter’s demand on respondent Quirico Macajilos to vacate the subject
property. All in all, these acts show
that respondents Macajilos brothers did not sleep on their rights but reasonably
took steps to assert their ownership over the subject property.
Anent
the fourth issue, we note that the task of fixing the amount of damages primarily
rests with the trial court as the circumstances of each case may warrant
provided that the bases therefor are fully established.[47] In the case at bar, the trial court awarded
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees in view of its finding
that RBSI acted in bad faith.[48] As previously discussed, this finding of bad
faith by the trial court is sufficiently supported by the evidence on record. However, the award of exemplary damages should
be deleted since there is no clear and convincing proof that RBSI acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner to warrant the
imposition of the same.[49]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The April 18, 2001 Decision and November 12,
2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51290 which affirmed
the July 12, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Dumaguete City, Branch 39 in Civil Case No. 9049 declaring respondents Felix
Macajilos and Quirico Macajilos, Jr. the rightful owners of the subject
property, are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
exemplary damages is DELETED for
lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 30-39. Penned by Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate
Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
[2]
Records, pp. 146-153. Penned by Judge
Teopisto L. Calumpang.
[3] Rollo, p. 29. Penned by Associate
Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T.
Reyes and Alicia L. Santos.
[4]
Records, pp. 1-5.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] First Philippine International Bank v. Court
of Appeals, 322 Phil. 280, 340 (1996).
[9] Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257, 270
(1953).
[10] De la Cruz v. Sosing, 94 Phil. 26, 28
(1953).
[11]
TSN,
[12]
Records, p. 33.
[13]
Counsel for Macajilos.
[14]
Counsel for Macalipay.
[15]
TSN,
[16]
Records, pp. 16-17.
[17]
Exhibit “H,” records, p. 63.
[18]
The records are not clear as to what period Tax Declaration No. 858 covers but
it can be reasonably presumed that it covers the period prior to 1949 since
this tax declaration contained an annotation that it was canceled by Tax
Declaration No. 13895 which covered the period starting 1949. Both tax
declarations are in the name of Gregoria Macalipay.
[19]
Exhibit “H-4,” records, p. 66.
[20]
Exhibit “H-2,” id. at 64.
[21]
Exhibit “H-3,” id. at 65.
[22] Tan v. Mueco,
420 Phil. 497, 503 (2001).
[23] Development Bank of the
[24] Rollo, pp. 111-130.
[25] Tay Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 93640, January 7, 1994, 229 SCRA 151, 165.
[26] Gevero v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 77029,
[27] In order that the donation of an immovable
may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The
acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of
the donor.
If the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified
thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
[28] Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530, 534
(1953).
[29]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith.
[30] Tomas v. Tomas,
G.R. No. L-36897,
[31]
[32]
TSN,
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
Records, p. 34. The pre-trial order
dated
3. Co-defendant Rural Bank of Siaton Incorporated’s
claims. That the property in question was legitimately collateraled by loan
applicant Fidela Macalipay; that a loan agreement indeed materialized with the
same property as collateral therefor; that
indeed Lamberto Macalipay, son of co-defendant Fidela Macalipay, when these
transactions were undertaken, had served as OIC manager of said Rural bank; that
per documents introduced to the bank, the bank had no way of determining the
veracity of the claim of plaintiffs because it was only relying on the documents
presented to it by then loan applicant Fidela Macalipay. (Italics supplied)
[38] Rollo, pp. 81-90.
[39]
[40] Embrado v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51457,
June 27, 1994, 233 SCRA 335, 344-345.
[41]
G.R. Nos. L-48322, L-49712, L-49716 & L-49687,
[42]
G.R. No. 40145,
[43] Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 236, 244 (1999).
[44]
TSN,
[45]
[46]
TSN,
[47] Air France v. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 722,
742 (1966).
[48]
Records, p. 152.
[49]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 2232.