TRIPLEX
ENTERPRISES, INC., G.R. No. 151007
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J.,
Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
PNB-REPUBLIC BANK and
SOLID BUILDERS, INC.,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
July 17, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the May 29, 2001
decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53033 which dismissed the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner Triplex Enterprises, Inc. for lack of
merit.
The case stemmed from an action for
annulment of contract, mandamus and damages filed by petitioner against
Leverage & Services Group, Inc.[2]
and respondents PNB-Republic Bank and Solid Builders, Inc. before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 153. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 64941.
Petitioner sought to annul the sale
of two parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City by
PNB-Republic Bank to Solid Builders, Inc. and to compel PNB-Republic Bank to
award instead the sale to it as the highest bidder. Petitioner’s claim was
rejected by PNB-Republic Bank due to the sale of the properties to Solid
Builders, Inc. After the rejection of petitioner’s bid, Atty. Romeo Roque, the real estate broker whose services were engaged
by petitioner for its negotiations with PNB-Republic Bank concerning the Tagaytay properties, obtained a legal opinion[3]
from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC):
xxx xxx xxx
In summary therefore, … (b) the authority given
to the Committee/SMCC to dispose of and approve the sale of acquired assets
under Board Resolution No. 000231-1993 is subject to Board approval if the
amount is over P3 Million. The absence therefore of the required Board
approval on the sale of the subject properties to Solid Builders did not
perfect the contract to sell the subject properties; (c) it follows therefore
that the Bank may now entertain other offers to purchase the subject properties
but any disposition of the subject properties must be with the prior approval
of the Board of Directors of the Bank.[4]
During the pre-trial conference,
petitioner marked the December 7, 1994 opinion of the OGCC as Exhibit “C” and
offered the matter of its existence for stipulation between the parties.
Respondents admitted the existence of the opinion but manifested their
disagreement with its contents.
During
trial, petitioner called Atty. Roque to testify. When
Roque’s testimony was offered specifically with
respect to the legal opinion of the OGCC, counsels for respondents objected to
its admission for being violative of the rule on
attorney-client privilege between the OGCC and PNB-Republic Bank. The trial
court sustained the objection.
Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the court a quo’s refusal to admit its evidence but
it was denied in an order dated February 26, 1999. The order disallowed the
presentation and admission in evidence of any testimony referring to the December
7, 1994 opinion of the OGCC. The prohibition was based on the ground that the
testimony was in violation of the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client, i.e., the OGCC and PNB-Republic Bank.
Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. However,
the appellate court dismissed the petition. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of
Appeals erred when it ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in disallowing the presentation and admission in evidence of Roque’s testimony.
The
petition has no merit.
Certiorari
as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.[5]
The writ may be issued only where it is convincingly proved that the lower
court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or that the trial court exercised its
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.[6]
While certiorari may be maintained as
an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order in cases where the
tribunal has issued an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, it does not lie to correct every controversial
interlocutory ruling. In this connection, we quote with approval the
pronouncement of the appellate court:
In this jurisdiction, there is an
“erroneous impression that interlocutory [orders] of trial courts on debatable
legal points may be assailed by certiorari. To correct that impression and to
avoid clogging the appellate court with future certiorari petitions it should
be underscored that the office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to
the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for
any other purpose.”[7]
The writ of certiorari is restricted
to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void.[8]
Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in
judgment.[9]
The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed.[10]
Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment will be a void judgment.[11]
When
the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any
mistake in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence
committed by a court may be corrected only by appeal.[12]
The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of
evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have
perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in judgment, not of
jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on
procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a
trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate
appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as errors and reviewed in
the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the
merits of the case.[13]
Here, petitioner assails the order of
the trial court disallowing the admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on the opinion of the OGCC. By that fact alone, no
grave abuse of discretion could be imputed to the trial court. Furthermore, the
said order was not an error of jurisdiction. Even assuming that it was
erroneous, the mistake was an error in judgment not correctable by the writ of
certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZAssociate Justice
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
|
CANCIO C. GARCIA
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona and concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (now retired) and Teodoro P. Regino (now retired) of the Former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 31-37.
[2] Leverage & Services Group, Inc. failed to appear during the pre-trial conference and was declared as in default.
[3] Dated December 7, 1994.
[4] Annex “E,” Petition for Review, rollo, pp. 64-73.
[5] Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr, G.R. No. 152716, 23 October 2003, 414 SCRA 288.
[6] Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 233 (2002).
[7] Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 53033 citing Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, vol. III, 1999 edition, p. 222, Annex “A,” Petition for Review, rollo, pp. 31-37, p. 36.
[8] J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 25 (2000).
[9] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, 25 August, 2003, 409 SCRA 455.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Cruz v. People, 363 Phil. 156 (1999).
[13] Gatdula v. People, G.R. No. 140688, 26 January 2001, 350 SCRA 382.