Republic of the
Supreme Court
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Alberto Herbon, Margarito |
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G.R. No. 149542 |
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Herbon and Gabino
Herbon, |
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Petitioners, |
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Present: |
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PANGANIBAN,
CJ., Chairperson, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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- versus - |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CALLEJO,
SR. and |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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Leopoldo T. Palad
and |
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Promulgated: |
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Helen P. Cayetano, |
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Respondents. |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before
the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[1]
dated August 22, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57719
which set aside the Decision dated July 22, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan (RTC) in Civil Case No. 6223 and ordered Alberto
Herbon, Margarito Herbon and Gabino Herbon (petitioners) to vacate the subject
premises in favor of Leopoldo T. Palad and Helen P. Cayetano (respondents).
The
factual background of the case is as follows:
In his lifetime, Gonzalo Palad
(Gonzalo) was a co-owner of a parcel of agricultural land located in Poblacion,
Bagac,
Sometime during the Japanese
Occupation, Alejandra died. On
On
During the trial, respondents presented
oral evidence to show that Gonzalo expressed his intentions regarding the
disposition of his properties, which included his share in Lot 421 and a 173-square
meter lot in Pag-asa, Bagac, Bataan (Pag-asa property); that Gonzalo intended
that the Pag-asa property would be given to Remedios and the same would be left
to her granddaughter, Merlita Herbon Espiritu (Merlita),[11]
eldest daughter of petitioner Gabino Herbon; that Gonzalo’s share in Lot 421
should be left to Ignacio; that the Pag-asa property has already been
transferred to Merlita in accordance with the wishes of Gonzalo; that it was
the Palad tradition that land inherited by members of the clan shall be
disposed only to the clan and to no other person.
On the other hand, petitioners
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 9, 1957 executed by Jacinto selling
his shares in Lot 421 to Gonzalo, Adelaida and Ignacio,[12]
as well as a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 16, 1957 executed by sisters
Modesta and Concordia selling their separate shares in Lot 421 in favor of Gonzalo,
Adelaida and Ignacio.[13] They submit that since the shares were
acquired during the marriage of Gonzalo and Remedios, said shares form part of
the conjugal property and Remedios was entitled to a part thereof as her
conjugal share. Moreover, as surviving heir of Gonzalo, Remedios inherited Gonzalo’s
shares in
As
rebuttal witnesses, Bayani M. Palad (Bayani) and Maria A. Gallego (Maria) testified
that Benjamin, Gonzalo’s son, paid for Jacinto’s shares in the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated
On
P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.[14] The RTC
held that the action for recovery of possession cannot prosper since
petitioners proved that they are co-owners of the subject property based on the
two deeds of absolute sale; that Remedios inherited a portion of Gonzalo’s
share in Lot 421; that when Remedios died in 1992, her shares in Lot 421 were
inherited by her three sons, herein petitioners; that being co-owners, petitioners
cannot be ejected since no definite portion of Lot 421 was allotted to
petitioners and respondents.
Dissatisfied,
respondents filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57719. On
No
motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners. Instead, they filed the present petition anchored
on the following grounds:
1.
THE
2.
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
3.
EVEN WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF THE TWO
DEEDS OF ABSOLUTE
As
to the first ground, petitioners take exception from the CA’s finding of
implied trust. They contend that Maria’s
testimony regarding Benjamin’s alleged payment of Jacinto’s shares should not
be given credence since she did not give details of the transaction which she
witnessed.
Anent the second ground, petitioners argue
that Concordia failed to convincingly deny the genuineness of her signature on
a public instrument; that, even if the sale by Concordia is void, the sale by
Modesta is valid since Concordia merely declared in court that she did not sign
the deed, without saying that her sister did not sign the same.
With respect to the third ground,
petitioners aver that, even without the benefit of the two deeds of sale, they
cannot be ousted from
Respondents
counter that the CA correctly held that an implied trust was created when
Benjamin paid for Jacinto’s share in Lot 421 in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 9, 1957 and petitioners failed to controvert Maria’s testimony on this
matter; that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 16, 1957 is void because Concordia
disowned having sold her share and that of her sister to any person and the
signatures of sisters Modesta and Concordia are forgeries.
The Court rules in favor of the
petitioners.
As a general rule, in petitions for
review, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA
is limited to reviewing questions of law which involves no examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[19] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; it
is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[20] Accordingly,
findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on the Supreme
Court.[21]
Nevertheless, jurisprudence has
recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this
Court, such as: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making
its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[22] The Court finds that exceptions (2), (4),
(5), and (7) apply to the present petition.
On the matter of implied trust, Article
1448 of the Civil Code provides:
Art.
1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial
interest of the property. The former
is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to
whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one
paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably
presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
The trust created under the first
sentence of Article 1448 is sometimes referred to as a purchase money
resulting trust, the elements of
which are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an
equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration
must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust.[23]
As a rule, the burden of proving the
existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof
must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its
elements.[24] While implied trusts may be proved by oral
evidence,[25] the
evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution,
and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral
evidence can easily be fabricated.[26] Thus, in order to establish an implied
trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be
as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are
proven by an authentic document.[27] An implied trust, in fine,
cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof.[28]
In the present case, the parol
evidence offered to prove the existence of an implied trust is lean, frail and
far from convincing. The testimonies of Bayani
and Maria that Benjamin, instead of Gonzalo, paid for Jacinto’s shares in
The hornbook rule on interpretation
of contracts gives primacy to the intention of the parties, which is the law
among them. Ultimately, their intention is to be deciphered from the
language used in the contract, not from the unilateral post facto
assertions of one of the parties, or even third parties who are strangers to
the contract. And when the terms of the agreement, as expressed in such
language, are clear, they are to be understood literally, just as they appear
on the face of the contract.[30]
In this case, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
Without any doubt, oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does exclusively
on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.[32]
As Judge Limpkin of
As to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
Mere denial by Concordia that she signed
the deed[40] cannot
prevail over the positive presumption enjoyed by a notarial document. Negative and self-serving, denial deserves no weight in law when unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence. No other
witness or evidence was presented to corroborate Concordia’s testimony. Settled is the rule that forgery cannot be
presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence.[41]
Moreover, the similarity of
signatures of Modesta and Concordia in the deed is not proof of forgery. The fact of forgery can only be established
by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and
genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been
forged.[42] No standard or specimen signatures of
Concordia and Modesta were offered to compare with the signatures appearing in
the questioned deed of sale. Comparison
of signatures cannot be made from two signatures appearing on the same
document.
Having failed to present strong, complete, and
conclusive proof that the notarized deed of sale was false, the presumption of
regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its execution, as well as the
statements and the authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand.
All the foregoing considered, respondents’
claim for recovery of possession of real property must fail. In the absence of Gonzalo’s written last will
and testament, the law on intestate succession applies in the disposition of his
estate.[43] The so-called Palad tradition that the
property in question should belong only to the Palad clan cannot supersede the
law on intestate succession.
The ¼ and 1/14 shares in
Lot 421 Gonzalo acquired during his marriage to his first wife, Alejandra, are conjugal shares,[44]
such that upon the death of Alejandra,
one-half of the subject shares were automatically reserved to the surviving
spouse, Gonzalo, as his share in the conjugal partnership.[45] Alejandra’s rights to
the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon her death to her legitimate children
and surviving spouse Gonzalo.[46] Under the Old Civil Code
which was then in force, Gonzalo
was entitled only to the usufruct of the land equal to that corresponding by
way of legitime to each of the legitimate children[47]
who has not received any betterment.[48] Gonzalo’s share in the conjugal partnership and
his usufructory right were brought into his second marriage with Remedios.
As to the shares in
Thus, petitioners, as co-owners, have
the right to posses and occupy
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice B. A. Adefuin-De la Cruz (now retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Josefina Guevara-Salonga.
[2] Exhibit “B”, records, p. 156.
[3]
[4]
[5] TSN, Testimony of Severino Herbon,
[6] TSN, Testimony of Bayani Palad,
[7] Exhibit “1”, records, p. 247.
[8] Exhibit “C”, id. at 157.
[9]
[10]
[11] Also known as “Merly”.
[12] Exhibit “2”, records, p. 248.
[13] Exhibit “3”, id. at 249.
[14]
[15] CA rollo, p. 132.
[16] Rollo,
p. 11.
[17]
[18]
[19] Spouses Hanopol v. Shoemart, Incorporated, 439 Phil. 266, 277 (2002); St. Michael’s Institute v. Santos, 422 Phil. 723, 737 (2001).
[20] Go
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158922, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 358, 364; Spouses Hanopol v. Shoemart,
Incorporated, supra.
[21] Custodio
v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 500, 511; Spouses Hanopol v. Shoemart,
Incorporated, supra.
[22] The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 86; Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
122249, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 310, 319.
[23] Tigno v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 486, 499 (1997); Morales v. Court of Appeals, 340 Phil. 397 (1997).
[24] 76 Am Jur. 2d Trusts §688.
[25] Civil Code, Art. 1457.
[26] Tigno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Morales v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[27] Heirs
of
[28] Heirs
of Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra; Suarez v. Tirambulo, 59 Phil. 303, 306 (1933).
[29] TSN,
[30] Berman Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cheng, G.R. No. 154630, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA 112, 127; Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 1036, 1050 (1998).
[31] Light Rail Transit Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 139275-76 and 140949, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 125, 138; Berman Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cheng, supra.
[32] Gener v. De Leon, 419 Phil. 920, 935 (2001); Abapo v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 933, 942-943 (2000).
[33] Gener v. De Leon, supra; Abella v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 272, 276 (1996).
[34] Mendezona v. Ozamiz, 426 Phil. 888, 905 (2002).
[35] Tigno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 129416,
[36] Mendezona v. Ozamiz, supra Note 33 at 903-904; Lao v. Villones-Lao, 366 Phil. 49, 58 (1999).
[37] Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 171, 181 (2000); Garrido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101262, September 14, 1994, 236 SCRA 450, 457.
[38] Loyola v. Court of Appeals, supra; Ramirez v. Ner, 128 Phil. 221, 224 (1967).
[39] Yason v. Arciaga, G.R. No. 145017, January 28, 2005, 449 SCRA 459, 471-472; Chilianchin v. Coquinco, 84 Phil. 714, 718 (1949).
[40] TSN,
[41] Domingo
v. Robles, G.R. No. 153743,
[42] Ulep v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125254, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 241, 255; Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753, 763 (1998).
[43] Article 960 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity; x x x
[44] Articles 1401 and 1407 of the Old Civil Code (Spanish Civil Code of 1889) provide:
Art. 1401. To the conjugal partnership belong:
1. Property acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only; x x x
Art. 1407. All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
[45] Article 1392 of the Old Civil Code. By virtue of the conjugal partnership the earnings or profits obtained by either of the spouses during the marriage belong to the husband and the wife, share and share alike, upon its dissolution.
[46] Article
807 of the Old Civil Code.
The following are forced heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants.
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants.
3. The widower
or widow, natural children legally acknowledged, and the father or the mother
of the latter, in the manner, and to the extent established by Articles 834,
835, 836, 837, 841, 842 and 846.
[47] Article 808 of the Old Civil Code. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of two-thirds of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. …
[48] Article 834 of the Old Civil Code. A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not divorced, or should be so by the fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants who has not received any betterment.
If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widower or widow shall have the usufruct of the third available for betterment, such child or descendant to have the naked ownership until, on the death of the surviving spouse, the whole title is merged in him. …
[49] Articles 143, 153 and 160 of the New Civil Code state:
Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.
Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; …
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
[50] Article 142 of the New Civil Code.
By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their
work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or
of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.
[51] Article 996 of the New Civil Code. If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.
[52] Article 887 of the New Civil Code. The following are
compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants.
x x x
x