SECOND DIVISION
CONCEPCION PARAYNO, G.R.
No. 148408
Petitioner,
Present:
-
v e r s u s - PUNO,
J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
JOSE
JOVELLANOS and the
MUNICIPALITY
OF CALASIAO,
PANGASINAN,*
Respondents. Promulgated:
July
14, 2006
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D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court questioning the resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a preliminary and
mandatory injunction, filed by petitioner Concepcion Parayno against respondents Jose Jovellanos
and the Municipality of Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner
was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao,
Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang
Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or
transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the
Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of
Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise,
the Sangguniang Bayan
recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner’s
gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared:
a)
xxx the existing
gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law to wit:
The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44,[1] the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989.
b)
The gasoline
station remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential
buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers
the lives and safety of the people in case of fire. Moreover, additional
selling and storing of several LPG tanks in the station (sic).
c)
The residents of
our barangay always complain of the irritating smell
of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose
residents especially children to frequent colds, asthma, cough and the like
nowadays.
d)
xxx the gasoline station violated Building and Fire
Safety Codes because the station has 2nd floor storey building used
for business rental offices, with iron grilled windows, no firewalls. It also
endangers the lives of people upstairs.
e)
It hampers the
flow of traffic, the gasoline station is too small and narrow, the entrance and exit are closed to the street property
lines. It couldn’t cope situation (sic) on traffic
because the place is a congested area.[2]
Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the SB resolution but it was denied. Hence, she filed a
special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44 against respondents.
The case, docketed as SP Civil Case No. 99-03010-D, was raffled to the sala of Judge Crispin Laron.
Petitioner claimed that her gasoline
station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code since it was
not a “gasoline service station” but a “gasoline filling station” governed by
Section 21 thereof. She added that the decision of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB),[3]
in a previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos
against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno), barred the
grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50. In the HLURB
case, respondent Jovellanos opposed the establishment
of the gas station on the grounds that: (1) it was within the 100-meter
prohibited radius under Section 44 and (2) it posed a pernicious effect on the
health and safety of the people in Calasiao.
After the hearing on the propriety of
issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, the trial
court ruled:
There
is no basis for the court to issue a writ of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction. Albeit, Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of
respondent municipality does not mention a gasoline filling station, [but]
following the principle of ejusdem generis, a gasoline filling station falls within the
ambit of Section 44.
The gasoline filling station of the petitioner is
located under the establishment belonging to the petitioner and is very near
several buildings occupied by several persons. Justice dictates that the
same should not be allowed to continue operating its business on that
particular place. Further, the gasoline filling station endangers the lives and
safety of people because once there is fire, the establishment and houses
nearby will be razed to the ground.[4]
(emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
of the decision but it was denied by the trial court.
Petitioner elevated the case to the
CA via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,[5]
with a prayer for injunctive relief. She ascribed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of Judge Laron who dismissed her case.
After the CA dismissed the petition, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence,
this appeal.
Before us, petitioner insists that
(1) the legal maxim of ejusdem generis did not apply to her case; (2) the
closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was
an invalid exercise of the latter’s police powers and (3) it was the principle
of res judicata
that applied in this case.[6]
We find merit in the petition.
The
Principle of Ejusdem Generis
We hold that the zoning ordinance of
respondent municipality made a clear distinction between “gasoline service
station” and “gasoline filling station.” The pertinent provisions read:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other motor vehicles
with gasoline and oil only.[7]
xxx xxx xxx
Section 42. Service Station. A
building and its premises where gasoline oil, grease, batteries, tires and car
accessories may be supplied and dispensed at retail and where, in addition, the
following services may be rendered and
sales and no other.
a.
Sale and
servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor parts;
b.
Tire servicing
and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;
c.
Replacement of
mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts, brake fluids, light bulbs,
fuses, floor mats, seat covers, windshield wipers and wiper blades, grease
retainers, wheel, bearing, mirrors and the like;
d.
Radiator
cleaning and flushing;
e.
Washing and
polishing, and sale of automobile washing and polishing materials;
f.
Grease and
lubricating;
g.
Emergency wiring
repairs;
h.
Minor servicing
of carburators;
i.
Adjusting and
repairing brakes;
j.
Minor motor
adjustments not involving removal of the head or crankcase, or raising the
motor.[8]
xxx xxx
xxx
It is evident from the foregoing that
the ordinance intended these two terms to be separate and distinct from each
other. Even respondent municipality’s counsel admitted this dissimilarity
during the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Counsel
in fact admitted:
1.
That there exist[ed]
an official zoning code of Calasiao, Pangasinan which [was] not yet amended;
2.
That under
Article III of said official zoning code there [were] certain distinctions made
by said municipality about the designation of the gasoline filling station and
that of the gasoline service station as appearing in Article III, Nos. 21 and
42, [respectively];
3.
That the
business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined
in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as
differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code;
4.
That under
Section 44 of the official zoning code of Calasiao,
the term filling station as clearly defined under Article III, Section 21, [did]
not appear in the wordings thereof;[9] (emphasis
supplied)
The foregoing were judicial
admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them.[10]
Respondent municipality thus could not find solace in the legal maxim of ejusdem generis[11]
which means “of the same kind, class or nature.” Under this maxim, where
general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or
things, the general words will apply only to persons or things of the same
general nature or class as those enumerated.[12]
Instead, what applied in this case was the legal maxim expressio
unius est
exclusio alterius which
means that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others.[13]
Hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms
by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that “gasoline service
station” under Section 44 necessarily included “gasoline filling station” under
Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken
in a “gas service station” did not automatically embrace those in a “gas
filling station.”
The Exercise of Police Powers
Respondent municipality invalidly
used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner’s
gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160,[14]
the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general
welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and
the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to
have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are
met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive.[15]
The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to
the due process clause of the Constitution.[16]
Respondent municipality failed to
comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it
maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100
meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that
it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance
was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44.
The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an
investigation never conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioner’s business could
not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily
abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance
without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se.
A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate
safety of persons and property,[17]
hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.
As a rule, this Court does not pass
upon evidence submitted by the parties in the lower courts.[18]
We deem it necessary, however, to recall the findings of the HLURB which
petitioner submitted as evidence during the proceedings before the trial court,
if only to underscore petitioner’s compliance with the requirements of law
before she put up her gasoline station.
Another factor that should not be left unnoticed is
the diligence exercised by [petitioner] in complying with the requirements of
the several laws prior to the actual implementation of the project as can be
attested by the fact that [petitioner] has secured the necessary building
permit and approval of [her] application for authority to relocate as per the
letter of the Energy Regulatory Board xxx.[19]
On the alleged hazardous effects of
the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note:
Relative to the allegations that the project
(gasoline station) is hazardous to life and property, the Board takes
cognizance of the respondent’s contention that the project “is not a fire
hazard since petroleum products shall be safely stored in underground tanks and
that the installation and construction of the underground tanks shall be in
accordance with the Caltex Engineering Procedures
which is true to all gasoline stations in the country. xxx
Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the
project being hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual.
For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander, after studying the plans and
specifications of the subject proposed construction, recommended on 20 January
1989, “to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements
of PP 1185.” It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed
location is “in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao.” Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the
allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the
Zoning Ordinance. xxx[20]
(emphasis supplied)
The findings of fact of the HLURB are
binding as they are already final and conclusive vis-ŕ-vis the evidence
submitted by respondents.
The Principle of Res Judicata
Petitioner points out that the HLURB
decision in the previous case filed against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) by respondent Jovellanos
had effectively barred the issues in Resolution No. 50 based on the principle
of res judicata. We agree.
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on
all points and matters determined in the former suit.[21]
For res judicata
to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) the judgment or order
must be final; (2) the judgment must be on the merits; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties
and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.[22]
Respondent municipality does not
contest the first, second and third requisites. However, it claims that it was not a party to
the HLURB case but only its co-respondent Jovellanos, hence, the fourth requisite was not met. The argument is
untenable.
The absolute identity of parties is not
required for the principle of res judicata to apply.[23]
A shared identity of interests is sufficient to invoke the application of this
principle.[24]
The proscription may not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an
additional party.[25]
Res judicata may lie as long as there is a community of
interests between a party in the first case and a party in the second case
although the latter may not have been impleaded in
the first.[26]
In the assailed resolution of
respondent municipality, it raised the same grounds invoked by its
co-respondent in the HLURB: (1) that the resolution aimed to close down or
transfer the gasoline station to another location due to the alleged violation
of Section 44 of the zoning ordinance and (2) that the hazards of said gasoline
station threatened the health and safety of the public. The HLURB had already
settled these concerns and its adjudication had long attained finality. It is
to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the
parties over a subject matter already fully and fairly adjudged. Furthermore, an
individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is
hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against
petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station
to another location.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice
* Hon. Crispin C. Laron, of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, was impleaded as respondent. Under Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, lower courts or judges thereof need not be impleaded either as petitioners or respondents.
[1] Section 44. Gasoline Service Stations:
In business or industrial zones, no gasoline service station, commercial gasoline bus station or public parking lot shall be allowed within one hundred (100) meters away from any public or private school, public library, playground, church, and hospital based on the straight line method measured from the nearest side of the building nearest the lot if there are no intervening buildings to the nearest pump of the gasoline station; records, pp. 69-70. (italics supplied)
[2] Rollo, pp. 9-10.
[3] HLURB Case No. TPZ-C-01-9-0003, entitled “Jose Jovellanos v. Dennis Parayno.”
[4] Rollo,
pp. 72-75.
[5] CA-G.R.
SP No. 61838.
[6] Rollo,
p. 7.
[7] Rollo,
p. 39.
[8] Id.,
p. 40.
[9] Annex
“E,” rollo, p. 70.
[10] Section 4, Rule 129, Rules of Court; see also Evidence, by R.J. Francisco, 1996 Edition.
[11] Memorandum of Respondent, rollo, p. 125.
[12] Ching
v. Salinas, G.R. No. 161295, 29 June 2005.
[13] NFA v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 163448, 8 March 2005, 453 SCRA 70; Strong v. Repide, 6 Phil. 680 (1906).
[14] The Local Government Code of 1991; Section 16. General Welfare.― Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents xxx.
[15] Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., G.R. No. 148339, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 174.
[16] Id.
[17] Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 (1982).
[18] Factual issues are not within the province of the Supreme Court, as it is not a trier of facts and it is not required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence de novo. Nevertheless, the Court has the authority to review, even reverse, the factual findings of lower courts in exceptional instances. (Lagon v. Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 135657, 17 January 2001, 349 SCRA 363.)
[19] Rollo, p. 66.
[20] Id., p. 65.
[21] Taganas v. Emuslan, G.R. No. 146980, 2 September 2003, 410 SCRA 237.
[22] Development Bank of the Philippines v. La Campana Development Corporation, G.R. No. 137694, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 384.
[23] Carlet v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 99 (1997).
[24] Id.
[25] Heirs of the Late Faustina Adalid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122202, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 27.
[26] Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 627 (1998).
[27] Id.