FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 146874*
Petitioner, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
SOCORRO
P. JACOB,
Respondent. Promulgated:
July
20, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before this
Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed by the Republic of the
The antecedents
follow:
On
Nevertheless,
on
The
Republic of the
3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on
the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
applicant/s who have failed to file an appropriate application for registration
within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by P.D.
No. 892. From the records, it appears
that the instant application was filed on
4. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions
of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Private
respondent appended to her application the tracing cloth plan of the property
under the name of Sotero Bondal.
The blue print,[3]
dated
Private
respondent adduced the following evidence and factual allegations to support
her application before the RTC:
The previous
owner of Lot No. 4094, Sotero Bondal,
sold the property to Macario Monjardin,[7]
a brother of private respondent’s mother, Josefa Monjardin Patricio. Macario
declared the property in his name under Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. 18854[8]
in 1930, superseding T.D. No. 15956, and again in 1949 under T.D. No. 7117.[9]
Since Macario was residing in
Sometime in
1946, Macario decided to marry. On P400.00. The spouses thereafter received their share of the
produce as owners, but failed to declare the property for taxation purposes
under their names.
In 1947, Josefa Patricio died intestate and was survived by her
husband Igmedio and private respondent. T. D. No. 7117
was cancelled effective 1960 by T.D. No. 11602[11]
under the name of “Egmidio A. Patricio.” The realty
taxes due on the property from 1949 to 1959 were paid on
Lot No. No.
4094 was declared for taxation purposes under the name of Socorro under T. D.
No. 00530[14] effective
1985. On
When
cross-examined, private respondent admitted that she had no copy of the deed of
sale executed by Sotero Bondal
in favor of Macario Monjardin.[16]
The
Republic of the
On
WHEREFORE,
Lot No. 4094 of Plan Ap-05-002078, Cad-249, Malinao
Cadastre, more particularly in the corresponding plan and technical description
(Exhibits “O” and “N”), is hereby ordered REGISTERED and CONFIRMED in the name
of Socorro Jacob, of legal age, married to Elias Jacob, and a resident of Barangay 7, Balintawak Street, Albay District, Legazpi City
pursuant to paragraph (1), Section 14 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
Once
this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree and Original
Certificate of Title be issued in favor of said applicant.
SO
ORDERED.[17]
The
Republic of the
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
APPELLEE HAS A REGISTRABLE RIGHT OVER
The OSG averred
that private respondent failed to prove her claim that the original owner of
the property, Sotero Bondal,
sold the property to her uncle Macario Monjardin. It was likewise pointed out that private
respondent admitted that she had no copy of any such deed of sale. The fact
that the property was declared under the name of Sotero
Bondal in 1991 (as shown by the tracing cloth plan approved
by the Land Registration Authority on
Private
respondent opted not to file any brief.
On
The
Republic of the
A
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT RESPONDENT HAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE HER
POSSESSION AND THAT OF HER PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST WITHIN THE PERIOD AND IN THE
CONCEPT REQUIRED BY LAW.
B
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT RESPONDENT ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND
EVEN BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF PROCLAMATION NO. 739 OF
The parties
reiterated their arguments in the CA to support their respective claims in this
Court.
The
petition is meritorious.
Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, reads:
Section
48. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in-interest therein have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
This
provision was further amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1903 by
substituting the phrase “for at least thirty years” with “since
Sec.
4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and
Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the
sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession, and occupation by the applicant himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945 (emphasis supplied).
Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, likewise provides:
SEC.
14. Who
may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier (emphasis
supplied).
Applicants
for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a)
that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either
since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.[21]
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The presumption is that lands of whatever
classification belong to the State.[22] Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not
susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title.[23]
The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not
operate against the State unless the occupant proves possession and occupation
of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State.[24]
No public
land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from the government,
whether express or implied. It is
indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the State. The rationale for the period “since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945” lies in the presumption that the land
applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants or possessor claim an
interest thereon only by virtue of their imperfect title as continuous, open
and notorious possession.
In the case
at bar, when private respondent filed her application with the RTC on May 6,
1994, Lot No. 4094 was no longer alienable and disposable property of the
public domain, since as of August 14, 1970, by virtue of Proclamation No. 739,
it was segregated from the public domain and declared part of the reservation
for the development of geothermal energy.[25]
Private respondent filed her application for confirmation 24 years after the said
proclamation was issued; thus, the period of her possession and occupancy after
such proclamation can no longer be tacked in favor of the claimant.[26]
The Court
notes that on
As pointed
out by petitioner, private respondent failed to adduce clear and convincing
evidence that by
Indeed, the
law speaks of “possession and occupation.” Possession is broader than occupation because
it includes constructive possession.
Unless, therefore, the law adds the word “occupation,” it seeks to
delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words “continuous,” “exclusive”
and “notorious,” the word “occupation” seems to highlight the facts that for an
applicant to qualify, her possession of the property must not be a mere
fiction.
Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion of such
a nature as a party would naturally exercise over her own property.[28]
A mere casual cultivation of portions of land by the claimant does not
constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership. Such possession is not
exclusive and notorious as it gives rise to a presumptive grant from the State.[29]
The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim over the land.[30]
The good faith of the person consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom she received the property was the owner thereof and could transfer
ownership.[31]
While tax
receipts and tax payment receipts themselves do not convincingly prove title to
the land,[32]
these are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in
his right mind would pay taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at
least, constructive possession.[33] They constitute, at the least, proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property, particularly when accompanied by
proof of actual possession.[34]
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes not only
manifests one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but
also announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.[35]
In this
case, however, private respondent failed to offer in evidence the deed of sale
purportedly executed by Sotero Bondal
in favor of Macario Monjardin
as vendee. On cross-examination, she admitted that the only deed of sale she
had was the deed of absolute sale Macario Monjardin executed in favor of her parents, the spouses Igmedio Patricio. The documentary evidence adduced by private
respondent even belies her claim that Sotero Bondal sold the property to her uncle. She even failed to identify “B.C. Monjardin,” much less explain whether such person was really
her uncle.[36] She
even failed to adduce in evidence any tax declaration over the property under his
name and that he paid the realty taxes for the property from 1930 to 1946.
Of great
significance is private respondent’s “promise” to submit proof based on the
records in the Register of Deeds and other government agencies showing that Sotero Bondal sold the property
to Macario Monjardin; and that
if such records had been destroyed during the Second World War, she would submit
proof of said destruction:
Q Who
is this Sotero Bondal?
A The
original owner of the lot from whom my uncle bought the property.
Q Do
you have any document that your uncle Macario Monjardin acquired this property from Sotero
Bondal?
A None. That was the only document executed both by
my parents and my uncle.
Q So,
there is a gap now to prove that your uncle, Macario Monjardin was able to acquire this from Sotero
because it appears from the survey that the owner is still Sotero
Bondal.
A Yes,
sir.
Q So,
as of now you do not have any document?
A You
know during the war years everything was disturbed. So that is the only document that I have
found.
Q So,
there is a need for you to submit that to the Court because official documents
show that the property is still in the name of Sotero
Bondal. Are
you going to prove that before this Court?
A I
have to get from the cadastral office?
PROS. BOCALBOS:
It
is up to your counsel to secure that.
Just to show continuity of ownership of the land from the original
owner, Sotero Bondal.
As
far as this witness is concerned, Your Honor, no more cross-examination except
to submit the document which we require to show contin[u]ous possession and ownership of the land.
ATTY. RAÑESES:
Your
Honor please, we want to manifest before this Court that as far as that sale is
concerned we cannot assure the Court that we can produce that document. So I’m already manifesting this so that the
distinguished Prosecutor, Your Honor, will not oblige us to produce that. If we cannot produce that we will leave our
evidence to the Honorable Court.
COURT:
It
is the observation that most of the records especially those that have been
archived were lost during the war.
PROS. OCALBOS:
Yes,
Your Honor. But it is a suggestion that
in cases like this, you have to secure a certification from different agencies
that all the records were already destroyed because of the war or
whatever. So, they are going to execute
again an affidavit of ownership of the property tracing all the dates from the
predecessor, how this property was acquired by Macario
Monjardin.
That is an affirmation of the ownership of the land. As of this date there are still documents
showing that the property is owned by Sotero Bondal otherwise from the date of sale,
ATTY. RAÑESES:
Your
Honor please, we agree with counsel. If
I can only have a copy of that it will be the best evidence to prove
possession. But I must be frank, because
pf the years that have passed and because of the Pacific War that occurred in
the
PROS. BOCALBOS:
There
is even a gap from that statement, “from 1936”, wherein the property was sold
in 1946.
COURT:
That
was sold to the uncle.
PROS. BOCALBOS:
But
prior to that date there was no mention of Macario Monjardin how he was able to acquire this property. So, he could have executed some document that
he was the owner at that time when he sold the property. So, there is a gap from the possession and
ownership of the property from Sotero Bondal to Macario Monjardin.
ATTY. RAÑESES:
The
requirement in the application is to show that there is a continuous, exclusive
possession of the land.
PROS. BOCALBOS:
We
are tracing this, Your Honor, to protect the interest of the previous owner,
not only the government. That is only a
suggestion. If they could secure from
the Bureau of Lands or from any other agency that the records were already lost
from the time Sotero Bondal
owned the property so that they can execute another document an affidavit of
ownership tracing the date and how Sotero Bondal acquired the property.[37]
However, private
respondent failed to comply with her undertaking and rested her case without presenting
said evidence.
Significantly,
the spouses Igmedio Patricio applied for a free
patent over the property after the Second World War, which, according to
private respondent, was rejected by the Bureau of Lands.[38]
Private respondent’s testimony is further belied by the request to withdraw her
application for a free patent over Lot No. 4094 which she made on
Furthermore,
the fact that the blue print copy of the tracing cloth plan covering the
subject lot as of 1991 was still in the name of Sotero
Bondal is proof that not all the records of the Land
Management Authority relative to the property had been lost. Unless and until
respondent offered credible evidence that Monjardin had
purchased the property from Bondal, it cannot be said
that the spouses Igmedio Patricio acquired the rights
and interests of Bondal over the property through Monjardin; private respondent cannot even tack her own possession
of the property to that of her parents. In fact, she failed to adduce evidence
that her uncle had been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the
property. While she claimed that her mother was designated as encargado, private
respondent failed to even mention the portion of the property that was
cultivated, or at least where and who planted the palay. Such declaration (that Macario
designated her mother as encargado)
without more does not constitute preponderant evidence to prove adverse,
continuous, open, public, and peaceful possession in the concept of owner. Private
respondent’s testimony that after her parents purchased the lot, they began receiving
the share of the produce of the property does not in itself constitute proof of
such adverse possession.
There is
thus no evidence that the parents of private respondent ever had open,
continuous, adverse and actual possession of Lot No. 4094.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is GRANTED. The appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53606 is SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to DISMISS private respondent’s
application for confirmation of title over Lot No. 4094.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* Transferred to
the Present First Division on
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice) with Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.
[2] Records, p. 76.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] TSN,
[8] Exhibit “U,” records, p. 127.
[9] Exhibit “T,” id. at 126.
[10] Exhibit “I,” id. at 116.
[11] Exhibit “J,” id. at 117.
[12] Exhibit “S,” id. at 125.
[13] Exhibit “H,” id. at 115.
[14] Exhibit “L,” id. at 119.
[15] Exhibit “S,” supra note 12.
[16] TSN,
[17] Records, p. 134.
[18] CA rollo, p. 22.
[19]
[20] Rollo, p. 15.
[21] Republic v. Alconaba,
G.R. No. 155012,
[22] Diaz-Enriquez v. Republic, G.R. No. 141031,
[23] Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 377,
389-390.
[24] Gordula v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 670,
686-687 (1998).
[25] Records, p. 60.
[26] Collado v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 149
(2002).
[27] Gordula v. Court of Apeals,
348 Phil. 670 (1998).
[28] Republic v. Alconaba,
supra note 21.
[29] Del Rosario v. Republic, 432 Phil. 824,
838 (2002).
[30] Republic v. Alcanaba,
supra note 21.
[31] Raz v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 710
(1999).
[32] Diaz-Enriquez v. Republic, supra note
22, at 324.
[33] Republic v. Kalaw,
G.R. No. 155138,
[34] Republic v. Court of Appeals, 216 Phil.
500, 508-509 (1984).
[35] Republic v.
Alconaba, supra note 21, at 620.
[36] Exhibit “I,” records p. 116.
[37] TSN,
[38] TSN,
[39] Exhibit “R.”