SECOND DIVISION
|
JOHN ABING, Petitioner, - versus - JULIET WAEYAN, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 146294
Present: PUNO, J.,
Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: July
31, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O
N
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner John Abing (John, hereafter)
seeks to set aside the Decision[1] dated October 24, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675, reversing that of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Benguet, Branch 64, which affirmed an
earlier decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mankayan,
Benguet in an ejectment
suit thereat commenced by the petitioner against the respondent.
In
the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman who, during the good old
days, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
During their cohabitation, they acquired properties. Later, they parted ways,
and with it this litigation between them involving one of their common
properties.
The
facts:
Sometime
in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet,
for short) met and fell in love with each other. In time, the duo cohabited as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, the couple bought a
2-storey residential house from one Benjamin Macua
which was erected on a lot owned by a certain Alejandro Diño
on
On
In
1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it was
annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari
store. This new structure and the sari-sari
store thereat are the properties involved in this case.
In
1994, Juliet returned from
In
1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse. Hence, they
decided to partition their properties. For the purpose, they executed on P428,870.00 representing John’s share in all their properties.
On the same date – P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with the
balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly
installment beginning November 1995.
Juliet,
however, failed to make good the balance. On account thereof, John demanded of
her to vacate the annex structure housing the sari-sari store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her before the MTC of Mankayan, Benguet.
In
his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the
annex structure with his own funds and thru money he borrowed from his relatives.
In fact, he added that the tax declaration for the structure was under his
name. On this premise, John claimed exclusive ownership of the subject
structure, which thereby gave him the right to eject Juliet therefrom
upon the latter’s failure to pay the agreed balance due him under the
aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement.
In
her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was renovated thru their
common funds and that the subject structure annexed thereto was merely an
attachment or an extension of their original residential house, hence the same
pertained to the two of them in common.
In
a decision[2]
dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the money used in the construction
of the structure in question solely came from John, ruled that the same
exclusively pertained to the latter, and accordingly ordered Juliet’s eviction therefrom, including the sari-sari store thereat, and required her to surrender possession
thereof to John, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff
(John) and against the defendant (Juliet).
Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the
store in litigation covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-001-00445 in the name of
the Plaintiff and turn over possession thereof to the latter.
Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of P2,500.00
a month from the time she withheld possession of the store in litigation in
June 1996 until she vacates the same and turn over possession thereof to the
Plaintiff.
Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to the Plaintiff by way of Attorney’s fees; and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On Juliet’s appeal to
the RTC, the latter, in its decision of
As stated at the
threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby reversed and set aside.
Petitioner, Juliet Waeyan is entitled to possess the
property and maintain therein her business.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:
It is undisputed that
the parties lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
from 1986 to 1995 and that they acquired certain properties which must be
divided between them upon the termination of their common law relationship.
xx xxx xxx
. . . their
property relations cannot be governed by the provision of the Civil Code on
conjugal partnership... but by the rule on co-ownership.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the
parties’ share in respect of the properties they have accumulated during their
cohabitation shall be equal unless there is proof to the contrary.
To the CA, John’s
evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for the construction of the
annex structure. Hence, the same pertained to both, and being a co-owner
herself, Juliet cannot be evicted therefrom, adding
that if ever, John’s cause of action should have been for a sum of money
“because he claims that Juliet still owes him the payment for the extension.”
According to the CA, ejectment cannot lie against
Juliet because Juliet’s possession of the premises in dispute was not by virtue
of a contract, express or implied, nor did she obtain such possession thru
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Hence, John’s present recourse, submitting that the
CA erred in –
1. not giving effect to
the parties’ Memorandum of Agreement which
should have been binding between them albeit unsigned by both;
2. in holding that the
subject premises (annex structure housing the sari-sari store) is owned by the two of them in common;
3. in ruling that the parties
should settle their common properties in a separate action for partition even
as the community character of the subject premises has not been proven.
We AFFIRM with modification.
Essentially,
the issues raised center on the core question of whether or not the property
subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner, John.
Departing from the factual findings of the two courts before it, the CA found
that the premises in dispute is owned in common by Juliet and John, the latter
having failed to establish by the required quantum of proof that the money
spent for the construction thereof solely came from him. Being a co-owner of
the same structure, Juliet may not be ejected therefrom.
While the
question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court normally eschews
from, yet, given the conflicting factual findings of the three courts below,
the Court shall go by the exception[4]
to the general rule and proceed to make its own assessment of the evidence.
First
and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived together as
husband and wife from 1986 to 1995 without the benefit of marriage. Neither is
it disputed that sometime in December 1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked
thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint account. In fact, Juliet was still in
Other than John’s bare allegation that
he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent
for the construction of the annex structure, evidence is
wanting to support such naked claim.
For sure, John even failed to reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither
did he divulge the names of the alleged relatives from whom he made his
borrowings, let alone the amount of money he borrowed from them. All that petitioner could offer by way of
reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed money in putting
up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a certain Manuel Macaraeg to the effect that petitioner borrowed P30,000.00
from him. Even then, Macaraeg
stated in his affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said amount from him. With the petitioner’s own admission that the
subject structure was constructed only in 1992,
or two years after he borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the amount he
allegedly borrowed from the latter went into the construction of the structure
in dispute. More, it is noted that while
petitioner was able to present in evidence the Macaraeg
affidavit, he failed to introduce similar affidavits, if any, of his close
relatives from whom he claimed to have made similar borrowings. For sure, not a
single relative came forward to confirm petitioner’s tale. In short, there is a paucity of evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to support petitioner’s self-serving allegation
that the annex structure which housed the sari-sari
store was put up thru his own funds and/or money borrowed by him. Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax
declaration covering the subject structure.
We have, however, ruled time and again that tax declarations do not
prove ownership but at best an indicia of claims of
ownership.[5] Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, any
more than indicating possession in the concept of an owner.[6] Neither tax receipts nor declaration of
ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.[7]
In
this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. It reads:
Art. 147. When a
man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of
this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other party
of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
The
law is clear. In the absence, as here,
of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during
their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint
efforts and is owned by them in equal shares.
Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their
properties in common “in equal shares.”
Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as
correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
True
it is that under Article 487[8]
of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment
against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive
ownership of a common property. It bears
stressing, however, that in this case, evidence is totally
wanting to establish John’s or Juliet’s exclusive ownership of the property
in question. Neither did Juliet obtain
possession thereof by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or thru
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
As borne by the record, Juliet was in possession of the subject
structure and the sari-sari store thereat
by virtue of her being a co-owner thereof.
As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership
as John.
We,
however, disagree with the ruling of the CA that the subject Memorandum of Agreement, being unsigned
by Juliet and John, has no binding effect between them.
It
is a matter of record that pursuant to said Agreement, Juliet did pay John the
amount of P232,397.66, as initial payment for
John’s share in their common properties, with the balance of P196,472.34
payable in twelve monthly installments beginning November 1995. It is also a matter of record that the
Agreement was signed by the witnesses thereto.
Hence, the irrelevant circumstances that the Agreement was left unsigned
by Juliet and John cannot adversely affect its binding force or effect between
them, as evidently, Juliet’s initial payment of P232,397.66
to John was in fulfillment of what the parties had agreed upon thereunder. However, and as correctly held by the CA, Juliet’s failure
to pay John the balance of the latter’s share in their common properties could
at best give rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for
rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED and the
assailed CA Decision is AFFIRMED, except
that portion thereof denying effect to the parties’ Memorandum of Agreement for
being unsigned by both.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. Delos Santos with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria (ret.) and Eloy R. Bello (ret.), concurring; Rollo, pp. 16-23.
[2] As reproduced in the Petition, p.1, Rollo, pp. 9-12, at p. 9.
[3] Supra note 1.
[4] Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
118749,
[5]
[6] Arambulo v. CA, G.R.
No. 120166, August 3, 1998, 293 SCRA 567.
[7] Cruz v. Miguel,
G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506.
[8] Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.