PEPITO CAPILA Y YRUMA,
Petitioner, -
versus - THE PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. No. 146161
Present: PUNO,
J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
|
|
|
|
D E C I S I O N
|
|
|
|
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: |
|
|
For
our resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] dated
On
The
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-7117, is quoted as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of August 1993, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together with alias Jose and alias Gil, whose true
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to P1.3
million and three (3) caliber paltik firearms in the total amount of P18,000.00,
belonging to Pilipinas Bank represented by Juan Iglesia y Orgil and Lanting Security Agency represented by Edgar Lucero y Iribayen, respectively, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainants in the aforementioned amount of P1.3 million and P18,000.00,
respectively.
Upon being
arraigned, all the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial
commenced thereafter.
The evidence
for the prosecution, as culled from the testimonies of Edgardo
Irigayen, Ariel Arellano, SPO2 Dioscorro
Asinas, Jr., and SPO4 Romualdo
Maximo, is summarized as follows:[2]
Petitioner Pepito Capila was a security
guard of the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency assigned
in the Meralco Collection Office on
On May 9, 1992, Ariel Arellano and Lani
Imperio, both employees of the Pilipinas
Bank, Libertad Branch in Pasay
City, went to the Meralco Collection Office to receive
and deposit cash collections from Meralco’s 27
collectors. The total collection for
that day amounted to P1,292,991.12. They then placed the money inside a duffle bag
table and had it padlocked. Then they waited for the Pilipinas
Bank’s armored car to arrive. The
security guard posted at the Meralco Collection
Office at the time was Dimas dela Cruz, also from the
Lanting Security and Watchman Agency.
Before the armored car could arrive, two armed men suddenly
entered the Meralco Collection Office. They hit Dimas on
the nape with a handgun. Then they
ordered Ariel and Lani to lie on the floor face down
and immediately took the duffle bag containing Meralco’s
cash collections. They also seized three .38 caliber revolvers, valued at P6,000.00
each, owned by the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency,
including the service handgun issued to Dimas.
After the malefactors fled, Dimas
told Ariel that petitioner was one of those who robbed the office. Then Dimas called
the Makati Police Sub-Station 9, the Meralco Security Division, and the Lanting
Security and Watchman Agency to report the incident. The Makati
Police dispatched SPO4 Romualdo Maximo
to investigate the robbery, while the Lanting
Security and Watchman Agency instructed its intelligence officer, Edgardo Irigayen, to talk to the
guard on duty.
SPO4 Maximo, accompanied by a
police photographer, a fingerprint technician, and another policeman, arrived within
ten minutes at the Meralco Collection Office. He questioned Ariel and Lani,
but they could not identify the robbers as they were lying face down on the
floor. Upon inquiry by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas told him that one
of the robbers is petitioner, also a security guard of the Lanting
Security and Watchman Agency assigned in the Meralco
Collection Office. Thereafter, SPO4 Maximo invited Dimas, Lani and Ariel to the police station for the purpose of
taking their sworn statements.
Irigayen, the intelligence officer
of the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency, also questioned
Dimas. The
latter reported that Pepito Capila
is one of the robbers.
After the incident, petitioner fled to his hometown in Palapag,
In P5,000.00 in
possession of petitioner allegedly part of the loot. All the suspects were arrested without warrants.
SPO4 Maximo interrogated petitioner
who admitted that he participated in the commission of the crime; that his
share of the loot is P45,000.00; and that Dimas
is the mastermind.
After the prosecution had rested its case, all the accused,
through counsel, filed a Demurrer to Evidence but it was denied by the trial
court.
When the case was called for the continuation of the
hearing on
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered:
1.
And finding that the prosecution failed to prove the
guilt of accused Bonifacio Capila, Deogenes Caparoso, and Dimas dela Cruz beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby
acquitted.
2.
And finding Pepito Capila guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery defined under Article 293 and penalized under Article 294 par. 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, with the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of confidence, use of a firearm, and betrayal of trust, he is hereby sentenced
to an indeterminate prision term of from EIGHT (8) years as minimum to TEN (10)
years as maximum.
Pepito Capila is also ordered to pay:
1.
Lanting Security Agency the
sum of P18,000 for the value of the three firearms not recovered and
belonging to said agency;
2.
The sum of P1,292,991.12 to Pilipinas
Bank, the amount taken and not recovered.
With costs against accused Pepito Capila.
In his
appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner alleged that the trial court erred
in admitting in evidence the statement of Dimas that
he (petitioner) is one of the robbers.
He was denied due process because he was not able to cross-examine Dimas as the latter did not testify.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated January
3, 1995) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 148) in Makati, Metro Manila in
Criminal Case No. 93-7217 is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against the
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Hence,
the instant petition for Review on Certiorari.
The fundamental
issue for our resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt
of herein petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
A careful scrutiny of the records shows that the
prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of SPO4 Maximo
that immediately after the incident, Dimas reported
to him that one of the robbers is petitioner.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the court a quo’s judgment
convicting petitioner, ruled that Dimas’ statement is
part of the res gestae.
In the appellee’s brief,
the Solicitor General reiterated the appellate court’s ruling.
Res gestae is a Latin phrase which literally
means “things done.” As an exception to the hearsay rule, it refers to those
exclamations and statements by either the participants, victims, or spectators
to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of
the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as spontaneous reactions or utterances inspired
by the excitement of the occasion, and there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and fabricate a false statement.[3] The
reason for the rule is human experience. It has
been shown that under certain external circumstances of physical or mental
shock, the state of nervous excitement which occurs in a spectator may produce
a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions
produced by the external shock. As the
statements or utterances are made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination
of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, such statements or utterances
may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts he
just observed. The spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration
itself may be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant
rather than the declarant speaking for himself.[4]
The
rule on res gestae
is provided under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
For
the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be
met: (1) that the principal act or the res gestae be a startling
occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise, and the statement is made during the occurrence
or immediately or subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.[5]
The
Court of Appeals found that all the above requisites are present, thus:
First. The principal act is a startling occurrence which is the robbery in question.
Second. Dimas Dela Cruz informed the investigating officers that it was appellant who robbed the Meralco office immediately after the incident occurred and before he had the time to contrive a story.
The robbery happened at around
Further, immediately after the robbers fled, dela
Cruz informed Ariel Arellano (the bank representative detailed at the Meralco office) that appellant was one of those who robbed
the office (pp. 15-17, TSN,
In other words, statement of dela Cruz was
spontaneous as correctly observed by the trial court.
Third. The statement of dela Cruz refers to the robbery or incident subject matter of this case.
We are
in accord with the Court of Appeals in its conclusion that all the requisites of
the rule on res gestae are present.
The principal act, which by any measure is undoubtedly a startling occurrence,
is the robbery of which petitioner is being charged. Immediately after the robbery, Dimas dela Cruz, the security guard
then on duty, informed Ariel that one of the perpetrators is herein
petitioner. Dimas
likewise reported at once the incident to the police and to the security
agency. When questioned by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas, who was still shocked,
named petitioner herein as one of the robbers. His statements to Ariel and SPO4 Maximo were made before he had the time and opportunity to
concoct and contrive a false story. We
note that Dimas personally knows petitioner considering
that both worked in the same security agency and assigned in the same office.
Petitioner
contends that since Dimas dela
Cruz did not take the witness stand, he (petitioner) was deprived of his right
to cross-examine him. Thus, the Court of
Appeals should not have considered Dimas’ statement
as part of the res gestae. Our
ruling in Ilocos Norte Electric Company v.
Court of Appeals[6] is
relevant.
In
this case, it appears that in the evening of June 28 until the early morning of
Applying
the above ruling on the instant case, we cannot consider the testimony of SPO4 Maximo as hearsay since the statement of Dimas that petitioner is one of the robbers is part of the res gestae.
Moreover,
despite the damaging testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution,
petitioner did not testify to rebut them.
Such posture is admission in silence.
Section 32, Rule 130 of the New Rules on
Evidence provides:
Sec. 32. Admission by silence . – An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
Another
factor that militates against petitioner’s innocence is his flight to
Verily,
we hold that the prosecution, by its evidence, has established the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the petition.
The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18903 finding petitioner PEPITO CAPILA y YRUMA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery is AFFIRMED.
With costs
de oficio.
SO
ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 33-55. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Mabutas, Jr.,(retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios and Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. (retired).
[2] Based on the findings of the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals.
[3] People v. Sanchez, G.R. No.
74740,
[4] People v. Sanchez, id., citing Wharton, op. cit., Section 280, p. 632.
[5] People v. Queliza,
G.R. No. 124135,
[6] G.R. No. 53401,