Republic of the
Supreme Court
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EPITACIO
SIALANA, |
G.R.
No. 143598 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
PANGANIBAN,
C.J., (Chairperson) |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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MARY
Y. AVILA (deceased) |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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substituted by her heirs, JAMES |
CALLEJO,
SR. and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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JEORGE
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MILAGROS
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Respondents. |
Promulgated: July 20, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Annexed to the great and sacred
charge of protecting the weak is the diametric and functional approach to weigh
all considerations of social advantage,[1]
to inquire into the overlapping social interests in the adjustment of
conflicting demands and expectations of the people,[2]
and to recognize the social interdependence of these interests,[3]
ultimately with a view to arrive at an equitable solution for all parties
concerned. The resolution over the
tragedies of social unrest that have no doubt checkered the past bears
significantly upon the social order.[4] In the adjudication of agrarian disputes, this
Court has always been mindful of the jural postulates of social justice
especially where doubts arise in the interpretation of the law. But the same edicts cannot oblige the Court
to shield illegal acts, nor do they sanction false sympathy towards a certain class,
nor yet should they deny justice to the landowners who, under the Constitution
and laws, are also entitled to protection.[5]
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 questioning the Decision[6]
dated
The antecedents of the case follow:
On
In
their Answer, Mary, James, Edward, Jeorge and Milagros, all surnamed Avila (respondents),
the successors-in-interest of Rafael Avila, then the naked owner of the
landholding in question and who allegedly instituted petitioner and his spouse
as tenants on the landholding, averred that the latter are mere usurpers; that
they never consented to the alleged tenancy; that they never received any share
in the produce; and that, in view of these reasons, petitioner and his spouse
should be ejected.
On
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
reasons, the instant suit is hereby DISMISSED for want of merit.
Accordingly, [petitioner and his spouse] are directed to give the amounts of P6,094.29, P859.00 and the undeposited amount of P238.60, and P360.65 to the respondents to whom it is rightfully due for the mere use of the land in question.[7]
The Regional DARAB found that although the petitioner and his
spouse occupied the property in question, they failed to prove by substantial
evidence that the landowners had given their prior consent; that the
self-serving statements of petitioner cannot establish the tenancy
relationship; and that the petitioner and his spouse delivered the shares of
the produce not to respondents but to Alfonso Canoy and her mother, a certain
Diosdada “Nang Daday” Canoy, the overseers appointed by respondents; that
Alfonso Canoy turned over the shares to his mother and no other.
Aggrieved,
petitioner and his spouse appealed to the DARAB. On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a new
judgment rendered:
1. Declaring [petitioner and his spouse] as de jure tenants in the questioned
landholding; and
2. Ordering [respondents] to refrain from
committing any act/acts that will disturb the peaceful possession of the [petitioner
and his spouse] over the landholding in controversy or dispossess them from the
same.
SO
ORDERED.[8]
In
brief, the DARAB held that Rafael Avila constituted the petitioner and his
spouse as tenants sometime in 1958; and that the doctrine enunciated in
Respondents
appealed to the CA. On
WHEREFORE,
foregoing considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The decision of the DARAB,
Region VII,
Costs against [the petitioner
and his spouse].
SO ORDERED.[10]
In
affirming the Decision of the Regional DARAB, the CA, in addition, held that
although the Santos case may provide
the basis for the institution of the tenancy relationship by implication
through the overseer of the landlord, there was no showing that the overseer,
Diosdada Canoy, or her son and grandson who succeeded her, were ever duly authorized
to represent respondents or their predecessors-in-interest; that, instead, the
overseers acted in their own names; that the juridical relationship between
respondents or their predecessors-in-interest and the overseers is a lease of
services and not one of agency; that the fact that the overseers were allowed
to gather fruits for their livelihood does not mean that they possessed any
special power of attorney for purposes of carrying out acts of dominion or
creating real rights over immovable property, the authority of which petitioner
failed to show; that petitioner failed to ascertain the extent and limits of
the authority of the overseers; and that respondents cannot be estopped from
alleging lack of authority of the overseers since there was no evidence to
indicate any notice or knowledge on their part over the occupancy of petitioner
and his spouse, nor did respondents ratify the transaction entered into by the
overseers.
Petitioner
is now before this Court via Rule 45 and assigns the following errors:
I.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, Seventeenth Division,
erred in applying the law on lease of services on the status of Diosdada Canoy
and Alfonso Canoy, Jr., as overseers.
II.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, Seventeenth Division,
erred in not applying the law on Security of Tenure of agricultural tenant
[sic] and the law on Succession in agrarian matters.
III.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, Seventeenth Division,
erred in not applying the equitable doctrine in agrarian matters that any doubt
shall be resolved in favor of the tenant-farmer, agricultural lessee, etc.[11]
The petition has no merit.
The
principal question is whether the petitioner is an agricultural tenant in the landholding
owned by respondents. The corollary
issue is whether the tenancy was deemed to have been impliedly instituted.
Petitioner
insists that Rafael Avila, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents, gave his
express consent in the establishment of the tenancy, and, as a consequence,
petitioner is entitled to security of tenure which respondents are bound to
respect. But this Court in the case of Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[12]
the doctrine of which has been affirmed in a long line of cases, held that self-serving statements regarding tenancy relations cannot establish the claimed relationship. There must
be substantial evidence on the record
adequate enough to
prove all the elements of tenancy,[13]
to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is
sharing of the harvests.[14] The principal factor in determining whether a
tenancy relationship exists is intent.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land. It is
also a legal relationship.[15]
Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he
covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy
laws.[16]
We agree with the findings of the CA and
the Regional DARAB that aside from his testimony that he was expressly instituted
as tenant by Rafael Avila, petitioner was unable to buttress that claim with
other evidence which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.[17]
Nor could this Court agree with the holding
of the DARAB that an implied contract of tenancy had been established. As stated above, the DARAB, ostensibly
borrowing the language of
This Court must underscore that the aforequoted
excerpt does not accurately reflect the ratio
of the
x x x x The main
contention of petitioner as may be gleaned from the records of this case is
that the relationship of landholder and tenant terminated upon the death of
respondent Cerdenola's husband in November, 1952. While this may be true, the fact that respondent, assisted by members
of her immediate farm household, was allowed to continue to cultivate the land
under the same terms of tenancy from 1952 up to 1958 when she was ejected,
made her, in her own right, a tenant by virtue of Section 7 of Republic Act
1199 which provides that tenancy relationship may be established either
expressly or impliedly. In this case, such
tenancy relationship resulted from the conduct of both the tenant and the
landholder represented by his overseer in permitting the tilling of the soil
for a period of 6 years. Hence an implied contract of tenancy was created.
And the law provides that once such relationship is established, the tenant
shall be entitled to security of tenure as provided in the law. Therefore, the
respondent's ouster in 1958 for no reason other than the supposed termination
of the tenancy relationship as a result of the death of her husband, is
contrary to the provisions of the tenancy law x x x x[20] (Emphasis supplied)
It
is evident from the foregoing declarations in Santos that, for an implied tenancy to come about,[21]
the actuations of the parties taken in their entirety must be demonstrative of
an intent to continue a prior lease established by the landholder, and the
conduct of the overseer in permitting the lease, whose representative capacity
to enter or continue the leasehold had not at all been questioned or put
squarely in issue in that case, must be taken into account. Additionally, the Court must note that the
pronouncement in
In
this case, no evidence was submitted to prove that Diosdada Canoy or her son
and grandson, who took over the overseeing the farmholding, were ever
authorized by [respondents] or their predecessor[s]-in-interest to represent
the [respondents].
x x
x x
Since
the overseers were merely appointed to take care of the farmholding, the
overseers cannot act in behalf of the [respondents]. The acts of the overseers cannot be
considered as the acts of [respondents].
Hence,
when the overseers allowed [petitioner and his spouse] to occupy the land and
when the overseers received the share in the produce of the land from
[petitioner and his spouse], the overseers acted on their own and not in
representation of the [respondents] x x x
x x
x x
Assuming
arguendo that the overseers were
indeed appointed as agents of [respondents] and were capable of representing
the latter, [petitioner and his spouse] cannot still be considered as tenants
in the farmholding.
x x
x x
The
authority given to the overseers to gather fruits for their livelihood does not
include the authority to create a real right over the immovable owned by the
[respondents] x x x.[22]
To
do acts which are strictly acts of dominion, as in this case, in order that the
tenancy over the farmholding is created, the agent must possess a special power
of attorney showing his authority to do such act x x x.
It
was not shown that the overseers of [respondents] have this special power of
attorney to create a real right in favor of [the
petitioner or his spouse] over the farmholding x x x.
x x
x x
The
fact that [petitioner and his spouse] were allowed to occupy and till the land
for years does not estop [respondents] from alleging lack of authority of the
overseers.
[Petitioner
and his spouse] have not shown any evidence that will indicate notice or
knowledge on the part of the [respondents or their predecessors] and the
latter’s consequent ratification of the transaction entered into with the
overseers.
In
fact, it was established that overseer Alfonso Canoy never delivered the
supposed share of the landlord to the [respondents]. Admittedly by Alfonso Canoy, the share[s]
were delivered to Diosdada Canoy.[23]
The
factual background of the instant case is also markedly similar to the recent
case of Reyes v. Reyes,[24]
the relevant discussion of which this Court reaffirms:
Respondents
aver that an implied tenancy existed in view of the fact that Duran was undisputedly
the overseer of the landowner. They add that Duran, as overseer, accepted 20
cavans of palay as rentals on October 17, 1990 and another 20 cavans on April
1, 1991 from Ricardo x x x Duran then delivered the rentals to Elena Castro,
sister of Ramon, who in turn delivered the rentals to the latter. An implied tenancy was created between
respondents and Ramon, said the respondents, since Duran as overseer of the
landholding was the extension of the personality of the landowner. They aver
that in effect, a delivery of rentals to Duran was a delivery to an agent of
the landowner. They argue that having accepted the rental payments made to his
agent, Ramon is now estopped from denying the existence of an implied tenancy
between him and respondents.
We
find respondents’ contentions far from persuasive.
x x
x x
Respondents’
reasoning is flawed. While undoubtedly
Duran was an agent of Ramon, he was not a general agent of the latter with
respect to the landholding. The record shows that as overseer, Duran’s duties
and responsibilities were limited to “issu(ing) receipt(s), selling mangoes and
bamboo trees and all other things saleable.”
Thus, by his own admission, Duran was a special agent under Article 1876
of the Civil Code. Duran’s duties and responsibilities as a special agent do
not include the acceptance of rentals from persons other than the tenant so
designated by the landowner. Duran’s authority as a special agent likewise
excludes the power to appoint tenants or successor-tenants. Clearly, Duran
acted beyond the limits of his authority as an agent. We cannot agree with the
Court of Appeals [ ] that since Duran had been the overseer of the Castros for
16 years, he thereby made respondents believe he had full authority from the
Castro family relative to the administration of the subject property.
Regardless of the number of years that Duran had been the overseer of the
Castros, there is absolutely no showing that he was ever authorized to appoint
tenants or successor-tenants for the Castros, nor to accept rentals from the
persons he would appoint. Absent substantial evidence to show Duran’s authority
from the Castros to give consent to the creation of a tenancy relationship, his
actions could not give rise to an implied tenancy x x x.
Respondents
contend, however, that Ramon Castro, having received the 40 cavans from Duran,
is now estopped to deny the existence of an implied tenancy. We find nothing in
the records, however, to support respondents’ stance. Duran testified that he
did not deliver the palay rentals to Ramon, but to his sister, who in turn told
him that she had forwarded the palay to Ramon.
Duran had no personal knowledge that Ramon received the rentals which
the former had allegedly delivered to the latter’s sister. His testimony with
respect to the receipt by Ramon of the rentals is hearsay and has no probative
value. The receipts issued to respondents do not bear the name and signature of
Ramon Castro. Given these circumstances, Ramon Castro cannot be deemed estopped
from denying the existence of a tenancy relationship between him and respondents.[25]
There
being no proof that the landowners, herein respondents and their
predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Avila, expressly or impliedly created the
tenancy relationship with the petitioner, the latter therefore cannot be
considered a de jure tenant, nor can
petitioner claim, with more reason, any entitlement to security of tenure under
agrarian reform laws.
Petitioner, furthermore, contends
that he was “directly and actually giving shares of harvests to Mrs. Avila at
her residence;” and that he also turned over the proceeds of the shares of the
harvests to the household helper of respondent Mary Y. Avila (now deceased) as
evidenced by receipts which, petitioner argues, had not been controverted.
His contentions are factual in
nature. In agrarian cases, when the
appellate courts confirm that the findings of fact of the agrarian courts are
based on substantial evidence as borne out by the record, such findings are
conclusive and binding on the appellate courts.[26] Accordingly, this Court will not disturb the
factual findings of the Regional DARAB, as affirmed by the CA, that the shares
were delivered to the overseers only, and who, as stated, lacked the requisite
authority to bind their principals, considering that this conclusion was
supported by substantial evidence.
And last, petitioner theorizes that
the overseers had been granted usufructuary rights. While it is established in civil law that a
usufructuary may in certain cases lease the property under his stewardship to
another,[27] suffice
it to say that this is a matter which was raised for the first time on appeal[28]
and cannot be considered for review—to consider questions belatedly raised
tramples on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[29]
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1]
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457
(1897).
[2]
See Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1943); Eugene Ehrlich,
Montesquieu and Sociological
Jurisprudence, 29 Harv. L. Rev.
582 (1916).
[3]
Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 47
(Yale University Press, 1954)
[4] See Eduardo F. Hernandez, et al., Landowners’ Rights Under the Agrarian Reform Program 21 (2004) citing Yujiro Hayami, et al., Toward an Alternative Land Reform Paradigm: A Philippine Perspective (1990); Rodolfo V. Romero, Missed Opportunities: The Philippine Economy 1970-1994 (1995); Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., A Living Constitution: The Cory Aquino Presidency (2000).
[5] Land Bank of the
[6] Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (now retired), with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring.
[7] CA rollo, p. 15.
[8] DARAB Decision, pp. 3-4; CA rollo,
pp. 25-26.
[9] 115 Phil. 813 (1962).
[10] CA Decision, pp. 9-10, rollo,
pp. 22-23.
[11] Rollo, pp. 2-3.
[12] No. L-60287,
[13] Sumawang
v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 150106, September 8, 2004, 437 SCRA 622, 628; VHJ
Construction and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 128534, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 392, 398-399; Valencia v. Court of
Appeals, 449 Phil. 711, 736 (2003); Bunye v. Aquino, 396 Phil. 533,
542 (2000); Bejasa v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 499, 507 (2000).
[14]
Sumawang v. De Guzman, id.;
Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 97, 106; Laresma
v. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 156, 171; Mon
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118292, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 165, 175; Valencia
v. Court of Appeals, id.
[15]
VHJ Construction and
Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. citing Chico v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 800 (2000). Cf. Deloso
v. Marapao, G.R. No. 144244,
[16] Sumawang
v. De Guzman, id.
[17] CA Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 17.
[18] Supra
note 9.
[19] DARAB Decision, p. 3; rollo, p.
25.
[20]
[21] See also the doctrines on the institution of an implied civil law lease for purposes of comparison. Civil Code (1950), Arts. 1670 & 1672.
[22] Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
x x x x
(8) To lease any real property to another person for more than one year;
x x x x
(12) To create or convey real rights over immovable property;
x x x x
[23] CA Decision, pp. 5-9; rollo, pp.
18-22.
[24] 437 Phil. 274 (2002).
[25] Supra at 481-483.
[26] Planters
Development Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 147081, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA
185; Mon v. Court of Appeals, supra; Valencia v. Court of Appeals,
supra; Milestone Realty and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 431 Phil.
119,130 (2002). But see Rivera v. Roman, G.R. No. 142402, September 20,
2005, 470 SCRA 276, 287; The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 86; Aguirre v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 310, 319; C
& S Fishfarm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 279, 288 (2002)
(recognizing several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved in proceedings
before the Supreme Court).
[27]
Civil
Code (1950), Arts. 568 & 572.
[28]
The petitioner introduced his
theory on usufructuary in his Memorandum filed with the Court. Memorandum for Petitioner dated
[29] Cruz v.
Fernando, G.R. No. 145470, December
9, 2005, 477 SCRA 173, 182; Department of Agrarian Reform v. Franco,
G.R. No. 147479, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 74, 92-93; Gualberto v. Go,
G.R. No. 139843, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA 671, 678; Philippine Banking Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 487, 503-04; De
Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA
94; Caltex (Phils), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97753, August 10,
1992, 212 SCRA 448, 461.