ARMITA B. RUFINO, G.R. No. 139554
ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO,
LORENZO CALMA,
BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA,
MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO,
PATRICIA C. SISON,
IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO,
and DOREEN FERNANDEZ,
Respondents.
BALTAZAR N.
ENDRIGA, G.R. No. 139565
MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO,
PATRICIA
C. SISON, Present:
IRMA
PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO,
and
DOREEN FERNANDEZ, PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
Petitioners,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
ARMITA
B. RUFINO, GARCIA, and
ZENAIDA
R. TANTOCO, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
LORENZO
CALMA,
RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and
FREDDIE GARCIA, Promulgated:
Respondents. July
21, 2006
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CARPIO,
J.:
Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15)
created the
PD 15 created a Board of Trustees
(“Board”) to govern the CCP. PD 15
mandates the Board to draw up programs and projects that (1) cultivate and enhance public
interest in, and appreciation of, Philippine art; (2) discover and develop
talents connected with Philippine cultural pursuits; (3) create opportunities
for individual and national self-expression in cultural affairs; and (4)
encourage the organization of cultural groups and the staging of cultural exhibitions.[3] The Board administers and holds in trust real
and personal properties of the CCP for the benefit of the Filipino people.[4] The Board invests income derived from its
projects and operations in a Cultural Development Fund set up to attain the
CCP’s objectives.[5]
The consolidated petitions in the
case at bar stem from a quo warranto proceeding involving two sets of
CCP Boards. The controversy revolves on
who between the contending groups, both claiming as the rightful trustees of
the CCP Board, has the legal right to hold office. The resolution of the issue boils down to
the constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the manner of filling
vacancies in the Board.
The Case
Before
us are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In G.R.
No. 139554, petitioners Armita B. Rufino (“Rufino”), Zenaida R. Tantoco
(“Tantoco”),[6] Lorenzo
Calma (“Calma”), Rafael Simpao, Jr. (“Simpao”), and Freddie Garcia (“Garcia”),
represented by the Solicitor General and collectively referred to as the Rufino
group, seek to set aside the Decision[7]
dated 14 May 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50272 as well as
the Resolution dated 3 August 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the appellate
court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1) Declaring petitioners [the Endriga group] to have a clear right to their respective offices to which they were elected by the CCP Board up to the expiration of their 4-year term,
2) Ousting respondents [the Rufino group], except respondent Zenaida R. Tantoco, from their respective offices and excluding them therefrom, and
3) Dismissing the case against respondent Zenaida R. Tantoco.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In G.R. No. 139565,
petitioners Baltazar N. Endriga (“Endriga”), Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo (“Lagdameo”),
Patricia C. Sison (“Sison”), Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano (“Potenciano”), and
Doreen Fernandez (“Fernandez”), collectively referred to as the Endriga group,
assail the Resolution dated
The Antecedents
On 25 June 1966, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural
Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven
members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original founding trustees, who were all
appointed by President Marcos, were Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, Juan Ponce-Enrile,
Andres Soriano, Jr., Antonio Madrigal, Father Horacio Dela Costa, S.J., I.P.
Soliongco, and Ernesto Rufino.
On
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board. Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili (“Cabili”), and Manuel T. Mañosa (“Mañosa”).
On
1. Armita B.
Rufino - President, vice Baltazar N. Endriga
2.
Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen Fernandez
3. Federico
Pascual - Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili
4. Rafael
Buenaventura - Member, vice Manuel T. Mañosa
5. Lorenzo Calma -
Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo
6. Rafael Simpao, Jr. - Member, vice Patricia C. Sison
7. Freddie Garcia - Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile
Potenciano
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and assumed the performance of their duties in early January 1999.
On
The Endriga group asserted that when former
President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to
the expiration of Mañosa’s term. The CCP
Board then had 10 incumbent trustees, namely, Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison,
Potenciano, Fernandez, together with Cabili, Father Bernardo P. Perez (“Fr.
Perez”), Eduardo De los Angeles (“De los Angeles”), Ma. Cecilia Lazaro (“Lazaro”), and Gloria M. Angara
(“Angara”). President Estrada retained
Fr. Perez, De los Angeles, Lazaro, and Angara as trustees.
Endriga’s term was to expire on
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.”
The Court referred the Endriga group’s petition to the Court of Appeals “for appropriate action” in observance of the hierarchy of courts.
On
In their motion for reconsideration,
the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the
power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on the CCP
trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the
latter would be officers of equal rank
and not of lower rank. Section 6(b)
of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be
declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of “officers lower in rank” than the appointing power.
On
Hence, the instant consolidated
petitions.
Meanwhile,
The Court of Appeals held that
Section 6(b) of PD 15 providing for the manner of filling vacancies in the CCP
Board is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity.
Section 6(b) of PD 15 mandates the remaining trustees to fill by
election vacancies in the CCP Board.
Only when the Board is entirely vacant, which is not the situation in
the present case, may the President exercise his power to appoint.
The Court of Appeals stated that the
legislative history of PD 15 shows a clear intent “to insulate the position of
trustee from the pressure or influence of politics by abandoning appointment by
the President of the
The Court of
Appeals denied the Rufino group’s motion for reconsideration for failure to
raise new issues except the argument that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is
unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals
declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 6(b) of PD 15 since the
Rufino group raised this issue for the first time in the motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals also held, “Nor may the President’s
constitutional and/or statutory power of supervision and control over
government corporations restrict or modify the application of the CCP Charter.”[12]
The Court of
Appeals, moreover, denied the Endriga group’s motion for immediate execution of
judgment on the ground that the reasons submitted to justify execution pending
appeal were not persuasive.
In G.R. No. 139554, the Rufino
group, through the Solicitor General, contends that the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error:
I
x x x in
holding that it was “not actuated” to pass upon the constitutionality of Section
6(b) of PD 15 inasmuch as the issue was
raised for the first time in [Rufino et al.’s] motion for reconsideration;
II
x x x in
not holding that Section 6(b) of PD
15 is unconstitutional considering that:
A. x x x [it] is an invalid delegation of the President’s appointing power under the Constitution;
B. x x x [it] effectively deprives the President
of his constitutional power of control
and supervision over the CCP;
III
x x x in
declaring the provisions of PD 15 as clear and complete and in failing to apply
the executive/administrative construction x x x which has been consistently
recognized and accepted since 1972;
IV
x x x in
finding that [Endriga et al.] have a clear legal right to be the incumbent trustees
and officers of the CCP considering that:
A. Endriga et al. are estopped from instituting the quo
warranto action since they recognized and benefited from the administrative
construction regarding the filling of vacancies in the CCP Board of Trustees x
x x;
B. x x x [Endriga et al.’s] terms did not legally
commence as [they] were not validly elected under PD 15;
C. assuming that [Endriga et al.] were validly
elected, they lost their right to retain their offices because their
terms as trustees expired on
D. [Endriga et al.] assumed positions in conflict x x
x with their offices in the CCP and were
thus not entitled to retain the same;
V
x x x in not
dismissing the quo warranto petition for being moot x x x;
VI
x x x in holding that [Rufino et al.’s] prayer [that
the] disputed offices [be declared]
entirely as vacant is bereft of
basis and amounts to “an admission of
their lack of right to the office they claim.”[13]
In G.R. No. 139565, the Endriga
group raises the following issue:
whether a writ of quo warranto involving a
public office should be declared a self-executing judgment and deemed
immediately executory under Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.[14]
The petition in G.R. No. 139554 has merit.
The battle for CCP’s leadership between the Rufino and Endriga groups dealt a blow to the country’s artistic and cultural activities. The highly publicized leadership row over the CCP created discord among management, artists, scholars, employees, and even the public because of the public interest at stake.
Subsequently, the assumption to
office of a new President in 2001 seemingly restored normalcy to the CCP
leadership. After then Vice-President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the Presidency on
1. Baltazar N. Endriga - Chairman
2. Nestor
O. Jardin - President
3. Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo
- Member
4. Teresita O. Luz -
Member
5. Irma P.E. Potenciano - Member
6. Eduardo D. De los Angeles -
Member
7. Patricia C. Sison -
Member
8. Benjamin H. Cervantes -
Member
9. Sonia M. Roco -
Member
10. Ruperto S. Nicdao, Jr. -
Member
11. Lina F. Litton -
Member
In its special meeting on
On 21 December 2001, the Solicitor
General submitted to this Court a manifestation stating that the “election of
the trustees was made without prejudice to the resolution of the constitutional
issues before this Honorable Court in G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, x x x.”[15]
We first consider the Rufino group’s contention that the
Endriga group’s quo warranto suit should have been dismissed for being
moot. The Rufino group argued that when
the Endriga group’s terms subsequently expired, there was no more actual
controversy for the Court to decide.
For
the Court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case
or controversy — one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.[16] The case must not be moot or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by courts of
justice.[17] A case becomes moot when its purpose has
become stale.[18]
The purpose of the quo warranto
petition was to oust the Rufino group from the CCP Board and to declare the
Endriga group as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board. It may appear that supervening events have
rendered this case moot with the resignation of the Rufino group as well as the expiration of the terms of the
Endriga group based on their appointments by then President Ramos.
A “new” set of CCP trustees had been appointed by President Macapagal-Arroyo and subsequently elected by the CCP Board.
However, there are times when the controversy is of such character that to prevent its recurrence, and to assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the merits of a case. This is one such case.
The issues raised here are no longer
just determinative of the respective rights of the contending parties. The
issues pertaining to circumstances personal to the Endriga group may have
become stale. These issues are (1)
whether the Endriga group is estopped from bringing the quo warranto for
they themselves were appointed by the incumbent President; (2) whether they
were validly elected by the remaining
CCP trustees; (3) whether their
terms expired on 31 December 1998 as specified in their appointment papers; and
(4) whether they are entitled to immediate execution of judgment.
However, the constitutional question that gave rise to these issues will continue to spawn the same controversy in the future, unless the threshold constitutional question is resolved — the validity of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the CCP Board. While the issues may be set aside in the meantime, they are certain to recur every four years, especially when a new President assumes office, generating the same controversy all over again. Thus, the issues raised here are capable of repetition, yet evading review if compromises are resorted every time the same controversy erupts and the constitutionality of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is not resolved.
The Court cannot refrain from passing
upon the constitutionality of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 if only to prevent a repeat of this
regrettable controversy and to protect the CCP from being periodically wracked
by internecine politics. Every
President who assumes office naturally wants to appoint his or her own trustees
to the CCP Board. A frontal clash will
thus periodically arise between the President’s constitutional power to appoint
under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and the CCP trustees’ power to elect
their fellow trustees under Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15.
This Court may, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, brush aside procedural barriers[19]
and take cognizance of constitutional issues due to their paramount
importance. It is the Court’s duty to
apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in
accordance with how the Legislature or the Executive would want it interpreted.[20] This Court has the final word on what the law
means.[21] The Court must assure respect for the
constitutional limitations embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
At the heart of the controversy is
Section 6(b) of PD 15, as amended, which reads:
Board of Trustees. — The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in, and exercised by, a Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without compensation.
x x x x
(b) Vacancies in the Board of Trustees due to
termination of term, resignation, incapacity, death or other cause as may be provided
in the By-laws, shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the
trustees held at the next regular meeting following occurrence of such vacancy. The elected trustee shall then hold office
for a complete term of four years unless sooner terminated by reason of
resignation, incapacity, death or other cause.
Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the
surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the Center. Such officers shall be designated in the
Center’s Code of By-Laws. Should for any
reason the Board be left entirely vacant, the same shall be filled by the
President of the
Inextricably related to Section 6(b) is Section 6(c) which limits the terms of the trustees, as follows:
(c)
No person may serve as trustee who is not a resident of the
The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15
states that vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote
of the remaining trustees.
Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the
surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the
CCP. Should the Board become
entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the President
of the
The
source of the President’s power to appoint, as well as the Legislature’s
authority to delegate the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
The
President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in
the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
The power to appoint is the
prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides
otherwise. Usurpation of this
fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates
the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican
government.[22]
Under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, the
President appoints three groups of officers.
The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint.
The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a
fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law
vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation
of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of
this fourth group of officers.[23]
The President appoints the first group of officers with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent
on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared
unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b)
and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the
trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of
officers.
Departments, Agencies, Commissions,
or Boards
The original text of Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as written in Resolution No. 517[24]
of the Constitutional Commission, is almost a verbatim copy of the one found in
the 1935 Constitution. Constitutional
Commissioner Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., explains the evolution of this
provision and its import, thus:
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16 x x x is a relic from the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, x x x.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the
provision was: “but the Congress may by
law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments.”
As already seen, it meant that, while the general rule was that all
presidential appointments needed confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, Congress could relax this rule by vesting the power to appoint
“inferior officers” in “the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.” It also meant that while, generally,
appointing authority belongs to the President, Congress could let others share
in such authority. And the word
“inferior” was understood to mean not petty or unimportant but lower in rank
than those to whom appointing authority could be given.
Under the 1973 Constitution, according to which the power of the President to appoint was not limited by any other body, the provision read: “However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in members of the Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their respective offices.” No mention was made of the President. The premise was that the power to appoint belonged to the President; but the Batasan could diffuse this authority by allowing it to be shared by officers other than the President.
The 1987 provision also has the evident intent of allowing Congress to give to officers other than the President the authority to appoint. To that extent therefore reference to the President is pointless. And by using the word “alone,” copying the tenor of the 1935 provision, it implies, it is submitted, that the general rule in the 1935 Constitution of requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments had not been changed. Thereby the picture has been blurred. This confused text, however, should be attributed to oversight. Reference to the President must be ignored and the whole sentence must be read merely as authority for Congress to vest appointing power in courts, in heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards after the manner of the 1973 text.
Incidentally, the 1987 text, in order to eschew any pejorative connotation, avoids the phrase “inferior officers” and translates it instead into “officers lower in rank,” that is, lower in rank than the courts or the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.[25] (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly
intended that Congress could by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked
officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. The deliberations[26] of the
1986 Constitutional Commission
explain this intent beyond any doubt.[27]
The framers of the 1987 Constitution
changed the qualifying word “inferior” to the less disparaging phrase “lower in
rank” purely for style. However, the
clear intent remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the
power to appoint. The express
language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only
one conclusion — the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards may appoint must
be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint.
Only in the Heads of the Named
Offices
Further,
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest “in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards” the power
to appoint lower-ranked officers.
Section 16 provides:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. (Emphasis supplied)
In a department in the Executive
branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary,
acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the
Executive department. In an agency, the
power is vested in the head of the
agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson
of the commission. In a board, the head
is also the chairperson of the board. In
the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than
the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board.
This is in contrast to the
President’s power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the
Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or
conditions.[28] The power to appoint conferred directly by
the Constitution on the Supreme Court en
banc[29] and on the Constitutional Commissions[30]
is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or
conditions.
The Constitution authorizes Congress
to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the “heads” of the specified offices, and in no other person.[31] The word “heads” refers to the
chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for several
reasons.
First, a plain
reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution shows that the word “heads” refers to all the offices succeeding that
term, namely, the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. This plain reading is consistent with other
related provisions of the Constitution.
Second,
agencies, like departments, have no collegial governing bodies but have only
chief executives or heads of agencies.
Thus, the word “heads” applies to agencies. Any other interpretation is untenable.
Third, all
commissions or boards have chief executives who are their heads. Since the Constitution speaks of “heads” of
offices, and all commissions or boards have chief executives or heads, the word
“heads” could only refer to the chief executives or heads of the commissions or
boards.
Fourth, the
counterpart provisions of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
uniformly refer to “heads” of offices.
The 1935 Constitution limited the grant of the appointment power only to
“heads of departments.”[32] The 1973 Constitution expanded such grant to
other officers, namely, “members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, heads of agencies,
commissions, and boards x x x.”[33]
If the 1973 Constitution intended to extend the grant to members of commissions or boards, it could have followed the same language used for “members of the Cabinet” so as to state “members of commissions or boards.” Alternatively, the 1973 Constitution could have placed the words commissions and boards after the word “courts” so as to state “members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, commissions and boards.” Instead, the 1973 Constitution used “heads of agencies, commissions, and boards.”
Fifth, the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions make a clear distinction whenever granting the power to appoint
lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial body or to the head of that
collegial body. Thus, the 1935
Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint “in the courts, or in the heads of departments.” Similarly, the 1973
Constitution speaks of “members of the
Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards.”
Also, the 1987 Constitution speaks of
vesting the power to appoint “in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.” This is consistent with Section 5(6),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that the “Supreme Court
shall x x x [a]ppoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law,” making the Supreme Court en
banc the appointing power. In
sharp contrast, when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the power to appoint
lower-ranked officers in the Executive branch, it vests the power “in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.”
In addition, the 1987 Constitution
expressly provides that in the case of the constitutional commissions, the
power to appoint lower-ranked officers is vested in the commission as a body. Thus,
Section 4, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides, “The Constitutional
Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with
law.”
Sixth, the last clause of the pertinent
sentence in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is an enumeration of offices whose heads may be vested by law with the
power to appoint lower-ranked officers.
This is clear from the framers’ deliberations of the 1987 Constitution,
thus:
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE: On page 8, line 3, change the period (.) after “departments” to a comma (,) and add AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS. This is just to complete the enumeration in the 1935 Constitution from which this additional clause was taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
x x x x
MR. SUMULONG: We accept the amendment.
MR. ROMULO: The Committee has accepted the amendment, Madam President.
THE
PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to
the addition of the words “AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS” on line 3, page 8?
(Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.[34] (Italicization in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the
enumeration also applies to the succeeding offices mentioned in the
enumeration. Since the words “in the heads of” refer to “departments,”
the same words “in the heads of”
also refer to the other offices listed in the enumeration, namely, “agencies,
commissions, or boards.”
The Chairperson of the CCP Board is
the Head of CCP
The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board. PD 15 and its various amendments constitute the Chairperson of the Board as the head of CCP. Thus, Section 8 of PD 15 provides:
Appointment of Personnel. — The Chairman, with the confirmation of the Board, shall have the power to appoint all officers, staff and personnel of the Center with such compensation as may be fixed by the Board, who shall be residents of the Philippines. The Center may elect membership in the Government Service Insurance System and if it so elects, its officers and employees who qualify shall have the same rights and privileges as well as obligations as those enjoyed or borne by persons in the government service. Officials and employees of the Center shall be exempt from the coverage of the Civil Service Law and Rules.
Section 3 of the Revised Rules and
Regulations of the CCP recognizes that the head of the CCP is the Chairman of
its Board when it provides:
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD. — The Board of Trustees shall elect a Chairman who must be one of its members, and who shall be the presiding officer of the Board of Trustees, with power among others, to appoint, within the compensation fixed by the Board, and subject to confirmation of the Board, remove, discipline all officers and personnel of the Center, and to do such other acts and exercise such other powers as may be determined by the Board of Trustees. The Chairman shall perform his duties and exercise his powers as such until such time as the Board of Trustees, by a majority vote, shall elect another Chairman. The Chairman shall be concurrently President, unless the Board otherwise elects another President.
Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the “head” of the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
Under PD 15, the CCP is a public
corporation governed by a Board of Trustees.
Section 6 of PD 15, as amended, states:
Board of Trustees. — The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in, and exercised by, a Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without compensation.
The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section
6(b) and (c) of
PD 15 Repugnant to
Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus
irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c)
of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees
of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect
their fellow trustees. On the other
hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only “officers lower in rank”
than such “heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.” This excludes a situation where the
appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees
of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
It does not matter that Section 6(b)
of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to “elect” and not “appoint” their
fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the
CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent
the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in
a public office through election by the co-workers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public
office has no constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President’s power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office.
In the present case, the incumbent
President appointed the Endriga
group as trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga group to the same positions. This has been the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing the
President to appoint and the CCP
Board to elect the trustees. In effect, there are two appointing powers
over the same set of officers in the
Executive branch. Each appointing
power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are
irreconcilable. The Court must put an
end to this recurring anomaly.
The President’s Power of Control
There is another constitutional impediment to
the implementation of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15. Under our system of
government, all Executive departments, bureaus, and offices are under the
control of the President of the Philippines.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied)
The presidential power of control
over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from
the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.[35] This constitutional power of the President is
self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the
President’s power of control over the Executive branch.[36]
The 1987 Constitution has established
three branches of government — the Executive, Legislative and Judicial. In addition, there are the independent
constitutional bodies — like the Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit,
Civil Service Commission, and the Ombudsman.
Then there are the hybrid or quasi-judicial agencies,[37]
exercising jurisdiction in specialized areas, that are under the Executive
branch for administrative supervision purposes, but whose decisions are
reviewable by the courts. Lastly, there are the local government units, which
under the Constitution enjoy local autonomy[38]
subject only to limitations Congress may impose by law.[39] Local government units are subject to general
supervision by the President.[40]
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the
Legislative or Judicial branches of government.
The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor
a local government unit. Thus, the CCP
must fall under the Executive branch.
Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency “not placed by
law or order creating them under any specific department” falls “under the
Office of the President.”[41]
Since the President exercises control over
“all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices,” the President
necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive
branch. In mandating that the President
“shall have control of all executive x x x offices,” Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office — one performing
executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies — from the
President’s power of control. There is
no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or
quasi-judicial functions.
The President’s power of control applies
to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true
whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or
decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.[42]
In short, the President sits at the
apex of the Executive branch, and exercises “control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices.”
There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the
Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there
is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the
entire Executive branch.[43] Any office in the Executive branch that is
not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is
without any legal or constitutional basis.
The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over “all the executive x x x offices.” If the Legislature can do this with the Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.
Of course, the President’s power of control does not extend to quasi-judicial bodies whose proceedings and decisions are judicial in nature and subject to judicial review, even as such quasi-judicial bodies may be under the administrative supervision of the President. It also does not extend to local government units, which are merely under the general supervision of the President.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which
authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs
afoul with the President’s power of control under Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. The intent of
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence
and pressure, specifically from the President.[44] Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a
self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally
exist under the 1987 Constitution.
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.”[45] This provision does not free the CCP from the President’s control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President’s power of control.
The CCP is part of the Executive
branch. No law can cut off the President’s control over the CCP in the guise of
insulating the CCP from the President’s influence. By stating that the “President shall have
control of all the executive x x x offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers the
President not only to influence but
even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including the
CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in
G.R. No. 139554. We declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Section 6(b) and (c) of Presidential Decree No. 15, as amended, insofar as
it authorizes the remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies in the Board
of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. In view of this ruling in G.R. No. 139554,
we find it unnecessary to rule on G.R. No. 139565.
SO
ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice
|
|
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice
|
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
|
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] See Section 2 of PD 15.
[2] PD 15, Sec. 2(b).
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Zenaida R. Tantoco had expressed “utter lack of interest” in the case since she did not take her oath of office or assumed the position of CCP trustee at any time.
[7] Penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (now Associate Justice of this Court), with Associate Justices Artemon D. Luna and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring.
[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 139554), pp. 100-101.
[9] Later amended by Presidential
Decree Nos. 179, 1444, 1815, 1825, and Executive Order No. 1058 dated
[10]
CA rollo, p. 331-A.
[11]
Id.
[12]
[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 139554), pp. 28-31.
[14] Rollo (G.R. No. 139565), p. 19.
[15] Rollo (G.R. No. 139554), p. 714
[16] Joya
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541,
[17]
[18]
[19] The requisites before courts will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question are (1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case. (Board of Optometry v. Hon. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187 [1996])
[20] See
Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636,
[21] Endencia v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953).
[22] See
[23] There is a fifth group of officers whose appointments are vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Commissions. (Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5[6] and
Art. IX-A, Sec. 4)
[24] It
reads:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments and bureaus, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may by law vest
the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of departments. (Emphasis supplied)
[25] II J. Bernas,
The Constitution of the Republic of the
[26] THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bennagen is recognized.
MR. BENNAGEN. Anterior amendment on page 8, line 1, Madam President, which I indicated during the period of interpellations regarding the use of the word “inferior.” I understand from the Commissioners that we can delete “inferior” without sacrificing its meaning.
MR. REGALADO. So line 1 would now read: “of OTHER officers LOWER IN RANK.”
MR. BENNAGEN. Thank you, Madam President.
MR. REGALADO. The Committee accepts the amendment.
THE PRESIDENT. The Committee has accepted the amendment.
Is there any objection to change “inferior” to “OTHER officers “LOWER IN RANK”? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.
Let us go back to the amendment of Commissioner de los Reyes.
MR. DE LOS REYES. Does the Committee accept my proposed amendment?
MR. REGALADO. The amendment of Commissioner de los Reyes is to change “courts” to “MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY.”
FR. BERNAS. It is a little vague if we just say “in the MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY” because we have collegiate and noncollegiate bodies. So for instance, if we take the case of the Supreme Court when we say “MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY,” which of the members of the Supreme Court would have the appointing authority?
MR. DE LOS REYES. But the point is that the first sentence refers to the President alone; it does not say “executive.” And the last portion refers to “the heads of departments” because these are persons who appoint, but the middle portion refers to “courts” which do not appoint. How can the courts appoint?
FR. BERNAS. How about “in the HEADS OF courts”?
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is here now, may we seek his opinion on this matter? May we ask Commissioner Regalado to kindly inform Commissioner Concepcion of the issue.
Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. I suppose that insofar as collegiate courts are concerned, certain rules will be adopted by the Supreme Court. Under the present setup, court employees are actually appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. I suppose in this case, when we speak of courts, it refers to the judges presiding in courts. After all, the presiding judge acts in behalf of the court. These are court employees, and whoever presides performs the administrative functions corresponding to his particular station. Insofar as clerks of courts are concerned, generally, they are appointed by the Supreme Court in agreement with collegiate courts through the passage of a resolution that is deemed to be an appointment by the court concerned. So I think we can retain the word “courts” since it has been used for so long in the past, and it has an established connotation.
MR. DE LOS REYES. I submit if that is the explanation, although I find the wordings inconsistent. It refers to the President and heads of departments as officers, but it does not say “or in the Executive Department.” The middle portion refers to courts, and I do not think the courts can appoint. But if the Committee wants to retain this in this particular Article, I submit.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Thank you.
Is Commissioner de los Reyes insisting on his amendment?
MR. DE LOS REYES. I am not insisting, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. On page 8, line 3, change the period (.) after “departments” to a comma (,) and add AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS. This is just to complete the enumeration in the 1935 Constitution from which this additional clause was taken.
THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept?
MR. SARMIENTO. Just a point of clarification, Madam President. I think this was taken from the 1973 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution speaks only of “heads of departments.”
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, it is the 1973 Constitution rather.
THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee need time to consider?
MR. SUMULONG. We accept the amendment.
MR. ROMULO. The Committee has accepted the amendment, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the addition of the words “AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS” on line 3, page 8? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved. (II Record, Constitutional Commission 522-523 [31 July 1986])
[27] For the role of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission in determining the framers’ intent, see Development Bank of the Philippines v. COA, 424 Phil. 411 (2002).
[28] Bermudez v. Executive Secretary Torres, 370 Phil. 769 (1999).
[29] Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
[30] Section 4, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law.”
[31] See note 26.
[32] Constitution (1935), Art. VII, Sec. 10(3).
[33] Constitution (1973), Art. VII, Sec. 10.
[34] Supra
note 26 at 523.
[35] National Electrification Administration v. COA, 427 Phil. 464 (2002).
[36] Id.
[37] Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) v. Lubrica, G.R. No. 159145, 29 April 2005, 457 SCRA 800; San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, No. L-39195, 16 May 1975, 64 SCRA 56.
[38] Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 2.
[39] Id., Secs. 3 and 5.
[41] Administrative Code, Book III, Title II, Chapter 8, Section 23.
[42] Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955); Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word “control” shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
[43] Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1; Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939).
[44] Supra note 10.
[45] “Nature. — The corporation
hereby created shall be a non-municipal public corporation. Its property, real
and personal, shall belong to and be managed exclusively by the corporation for
the benefit of the Filipino people. Any income that may be derived from its
projects and operations and any contributions it may receive shall be invested
in a Cultural Development Fund set up to attain the objectives of this Act, or
utilized for such purposes as its governing board may decide upon, consistent
with the purposes herein provided. It shall enjoy autonomy of policy and
operation but may seek the assistance and cooperation of various government
offices in pursuit of its objectives.” (Emphasis supplied)