SECOND DIVISION
MA. CHONA M.
DIMAYUGA, G.R. No.
129099
FELIPE T.
AGUINALDO, AND
NOEL C.
INUMERABLE,
Petitioners, Present:
- versus - PUNO,
J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, AZCUNA, and
Respondent. GARCIA,
JJ.
Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AZCUNA,
J.:
This
is a petition for certiorari with a plea for temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners, Ma. Chona M. Dimayuga,
Felipe T. Aguinaldo and Noel C. Inumerable,
seek to enjoin respondent, Office of the Ombudsman, from conducting a preliminary
investigation and any further proceedings in OMB 0-95-0430. Petitioners likewise seek to annul the
following: an order dated
The
factual antecedents are not in dispute:
Petitioners Maria Chona
Dimayuga, Noel Inumerable
and Felipe Aguinaldo were employees of the Traffic
Regulatory Board (TRB) of [the] Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Petitioner Dimayuga
used to be the TRB’s executive director.
In June 1992, an anonymous complaint was
filed against petitioners concerning certain transactions of the TRB from 1989
to May 1992. Consequently, a special
audit was conducted by the Special Audit Office (SAO) of the Commission on
Audit (COA).
The SAO report, detailing the audit of
selected transactions of the TRB was finalized on
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of said report on
Meanwhile, the audit report was forwarded to
the DPWH Secretary, who then indorsed the same to respondent Ombudsman for
appropriate action on
Respondent, however, denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration on
x x
x
Unsatisfied with the said Order, petitioners
filed an “Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration” dated
On
x x
x
Subsequent to these Motions, petitioners
likewise filed a “Letter-Appeal” dated
On
Petitioners raise the following
issues:
I
The
investigation of the charges in the complaint filed by the SAO-COA against
petitioners is premature, because their appeal from the findings of the SAO-COA
is still pending resolution before the Commission Proper. In the exactly similar case of COA v. Gabor,
OMB 0-93-0714, respondent Ombudsman had dismissed and considered undocketed the
complaint on the same grounds.
II
Respondent
Ombudsman violated petitioners’ constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws, guaranteed under Section 1 of Article II of the Constitution, in not
affording petitioners the same relief it afforded to the public official
involved in COA v. Gabor,
supra.[6]
As to the first issue: In deference to the virtually unlimited
investigatory and prosecutorial powers granted to the Ombudsman by the
Constitution and by law, the Court has maintained a policy of non-interference
with such powers. Sections 12 and 13,
Article XI of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government–owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants
of the action taken and results thereof.
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1)
Investigate
on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
states:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.—The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate
and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise
of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases;
x x
x.[7]
This Court in Quiambao v. Desierto[8] stated that:
As a rule, we have consistently adopted a
policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations and
provided sufficient latitude of discretion to the investigating prosecutor to
determine what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause. As we held in the case of The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto (418 Phil. 715; 362 SCRA 730, 735-736 [2001]):
The
prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of
the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper
influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide
latitude of investigatory and prosecutor[ial] powers
virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This court
consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and
respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who,
"beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver
of the integrity of the public service.[9]
In Kara-an v. Office of the
Ombudsman,[10]
this Court further expounded, thus:
x x
x The consistent policy of the Court is not to
interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers. We held in Alba v. Nitorreda that:
x x
x this Court has consistently refrained from
interfering with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated
investigatory and prosecutor[ial] powers. Otherwise
stated, it is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed
before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who,
beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the
integrity of the public service.
The Court explained the
rationale underlying its policy of non-interference in this wise:
x x
x The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutor[ial] powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before
it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they
would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information
in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[11]
It is thus the practice of this Court to uphold
the constitutionally conferred investigatory and prosecutorial independence of
the Ombudsman. It is precisely this
independence that allows the Office of the Ombudsman to achieve its
constitutional purpose and objective.
Furthermore, although the Commission
on Audit (COA) report may aid the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting its
preliminary investigation, such report is not a prerequisite. Both the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act
of 1989 state that the Office of the Ombudsman may undertake an investigation
on complaint or on its own initiative.
Therefore, with or without the report from COA, the Ombudsman can
conduct a preliminary investigation.
This Court has declared that the findings in a COA report or the
finality or lack of finality of such report is irrelevant to the investigation
of the Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of probable cause. In Cabrera v. Marcelo,[12]
this Court declared:
Petitioners
cannot fault the Ombudsman for relying on the COA Audit Report, notwithstanding
that it had not yet attained finality. The initial basis for the Ombudsman's
investigation was not the COA Audit Report, but the complaints filed by
Casanova. While the allegations in the complaint happened to be similar with
those contained in the COA Audit Report, the Ombudsman could very well conduct
an independent investigation based on the complaints for the purpose of whether
criminal charges should be filed against the petitioners. The Ombudsman is
reposed with broad investigatory powers in the pursuit and of its
constitutional mandate as protector of the people and investigator of
complaints filed against public officials. It is even empowered to request from
any government agency such as the COA, the information necessary in the
discharge of its responsibilities and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents.
It should be borne in mind that the
interest of the COA is solely administrative, and that its investigation does
not foreclose the Ombudsman's authority to investigate and determine whether
there is a crime to be prosecuted for which a public official is answerable.
In Ramos v. Aquino, the Court ruled that the
fact that petitioners' accounts and vouchers had passed in audit is not a
ground for enjoining the provincial fiscal from conducting a preliminary
investigation for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of petitioners
for malversation. Clearly then, a finding of
probable cause does not derive its veracity from the findings of the COA, but
from the independent determination of the Ombudsman.[13]
Further,
this Court in Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan[14]
said:
Therefore,
as correctly stated by the Sandiganbayan in its order
of
And
Layus v. Sandiganbayan[16]
pronounced:
The contention that a prior COA Report is
necessary to determine LAYUS' culpability is without merit. Under R.A. No.
6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute individuals on
matters and complaints referred to or filed before it. Such power is plenary.
We likewise disagree with LAYUS' reliance on
the regularity of her COA Report. A COA approval of a government official's
disbursement only relates to the administrative aspect of his accountability,
but it does not foreclose the Ombudsman's authority to investigate and
determine whether there is a crime to be prosecuted for which such official may
be answerable. For, while the COA may regard a government official to have
substantially complied with its accounting rules, this fact is not sufficient
to dismiss the criminal case.[17]
Therefore, the investigation of the
charges in the complaint filed by the Special Audit Office-COA against
petitioners is not premature.
Regarding the second issue:
As stated, the Office of the Ombudsman has been
granted virtually plenary investigatory powers by the Constitution and by
law. Thus, as a rule, the Office of the Ombudsman
may, for every particular investigation, whether instigated by a complaint or
on its own initiative, decide how best to pursue each investigation. This power gives the Office of the Ombudsman
the discretion to dismiss without prejudice a preliminary investigation if it finds
that the final decision of COA is necessary for its investigation and the
future prosecution of the case. In another
case with similar factual antecedents, it may pursue the investigation because
it realizes that the decision of COA is irrelevant or unnecessary to the
investigation and prosecution of the case.
Since the Office of the Ombudsman is granted such latitude, its varying treatment
of similarly situated investigations cannot by itself be considered a violation
of any of the parties’ rights to the equal protection of the laws.
Thus, petitioners have not shown that
respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying their motions to dismiss the case or to suspend the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
and the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued through
the resolution dated
No
costs.
SO
ORDERED.
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C.
GARCIA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Republic Act No. 6770.
[8]
G.R. No. 149069,
[9]
[10]
G.R. No. 119990,
[11]
[12]
G.R. Nos. 157419-20,
[13]
[14] 332 Phil. 896 (1996).
[15]
[16] 377 Phil. 1067 (1999).
[17]