EN BANC
|
NORIEL MICHAEL J. RAMIENTAS,
Petitioner, - versus - ATTY. JOCELYN P. REYALA,
Respondent. |
|
A.C. No. 7055 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and GARCIA, VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: July 31, 2006 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before
Us are Manifestations[1]
filed by the abovequoted parties in response to Supreme Court (SC) En Banc Resolution[2]
dated 7 March 2006, wherein we resolved to require them to manifest, within ten
(10) days from notice, whether they are willing to submit the case at bar for
decision/resolution on the basis of the pleadings already on record.
The present
controversy stemmed
from an Administrative Complaint[3] filed
by Noriel Michael J. Ramientas on
Hearing
on the merits thereafter ensued.
In
its Resolution No. XVII-2005-171 passed on 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt the recommendation of Atty. Edmund T. Espina,
Investigating Commissioner, finding respondent Reyala guilty of the
abovementioned violative acts. It, however, modified the recommended penalty to
be imposed from six (6) months suspension (from the practice of law) to two (2)
years, with the corresponding warning that a repetition of any breach of her
professional duties will be dealt with more severely.[8]
On
We are transmitting herewith the following documents
pertaining to the above[9]
case pursuant to Rule 139-B:
1. Notice of
the Resolution;
2. Records of the case consisting of Volume
I 1-185 pages.
In
the interregnum, however, respondent
Reyala submitted[10] to
the IBP an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution suspending her.
On
Both
parties submitted their compliance thereto.
In
his Manifestation,[11]
complainant Ramientas acceded to the
submission of the case for decision/resolution based on the pleadings already
on record.
Respondent
Reyala, on the other hand, demurred[12]
to such submission for the meantime considering that the Motion for Reconsideration she earlier filed before the IBP remained
unresolved to date. Further, she stated
that when she scheduled said motion for hearing, she was informed[13]
by the IBP that it was precluded from acting on the aforesaid motion as it had
already transmitted to this Court the whole records of the particular case
together with Resolution No. XVII-2005-171, which recommended that she be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Thus, she prayed that her
motion for reconsideration be decided first by the IBP Board of Governors
before submitting the case for decision/resolution to this Court.
Prefatorily,
a reading of the By-Laws of the IBP will reveal that a motion for
reconsideration of its resolution or order is a prohibited pleading. § 2 of
Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP provides that:
SEC. 2. Prohibited
Pleadings. The following pleadings shall not be allowed, to wit:
x x x
x
c. Motion
for new trial, or for reconsideration of resolution
or order.
x x x
x
Parenthetically, at first glance, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court, the rules governing the disbarment and discipline of attorneys, shows
that there is no provision regarding motions for reconsideration of resolutions
of the IBP Board of Governors suspending respondent lawyers. However, worth
noting is the fact that neither does it particularly proscribe the filing of
such motions. §12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. – x x x
x x x x
(b) If
the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that
the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it
shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together
with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action. (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x x
Hence, this impasse.
A judicious
review of our current jurisprudence will reveal that said impasse is more
ostensible than real. Our pronouncement in the case of Halimao v. Villanueva,[14]
promulgated close to two decades after the effectivity
of the IBP By-Laws,[15]
effectively amended the latter in so far as motions for reconsideration of IBP
resolutions in disciplinary cases against lawyers are concerned.
In the
Halimao
case, we took the occasion to articulate our stance respecting motions for
reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in disciplinary
cases against lawyers. This Court was confronted therein with somewhat the same
set of circumstance as the case at bar in that after the IBP Board of Governors
transmitted to us its resolution adopting the recommendation of the
investigating commissioner dismissing the disbarment complaint against
respondent Villanueva for being barred by res judicata, complainant Halimao filed a motion for reconsideration. The latter opposed
such motion on the ground that Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court does not
provide for such a possibility of review. In resolving the issue, this Court, through Mr. Justice Mendoza, held
that:
Although Rule 139-B, §12 (c) makes no mention of a motion
for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such
motion is prohibited. It may
therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of
such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a
matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency
rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have
committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation
of the evidence.[16] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly,
the aforequoted ruling amended the IBP By-Laws in
that it effectively removed a motion for reconsideration from the roster of
proscribed pleadings in the level of the IBP. It must be remembered that it is
well within the Court’s power to amend the By-Laws of the IBP – § 77 of the
same vests in this Court the power to amend, modify or repeal it, either motu proprio or
upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
Prescinding from the above,
though the aforequoted ruling involves §12 (c)[17]
of Rule 139-B, nothing in the decision contradicts its application to §12 (b) of
the same rule, thus, it now stands
that a motion for reconsideration of IBP resolutions may be filed by an
aggrieved party within the period stated.
A
point of clarification, however, is in order. While in the Halimao
ruling we nevertheless treated the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty.
Villanueva as his Petition for Review
before this Court within the contemplation of Rule 139-B, § 12 (c), such action
on our part was necessitated by “expediency.” In the case at bar, acknowledging
the raison d'être for the allowance
of motions for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP in disciplinary cases
against lawyers, which is the exhaustion of administrative remedies as
expressly recognized by the same Halimao
ruling, the remand of the case at bar back to the IBP is in order. This course
of action rests upon the presumption that when the grievance machinery is
afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly,[18]
Certainly,
prudence dictates that the IBP be given the opportunity to correct its
mistakes, if any, by way of motions for reconsideration before this Court takes
cognizance of the case. This is to further insure that the grievance procedure
will be allowed to duly run its course – a form of filtering process,
particularly respecting matters within the competence of the IBP, before we
step in.
In
fine, though such remand will hold back the advancement of the case, nevertheless,
it bears emphasizing that it is equally important that the IBP be afforded the
opportunity to set things as it should be. Observance of this basic principle
is a sound practice and policy and should never be compromised at the altar of
expediency.
In concurrence with the above, now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED,
as it is hereby resolved, that in accordance with our ruling in Halimao v. Villanueva,[19]
pertinent provisions of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Bar Discipline, as contained in the By-Laws of the IBP, particularly § 1 and §
2, are hereby deemed amended. Accordingly, § 1 of said rules now reads as
follows:
SECTION. 1. Pleadings.
– The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified answer,
verified position papers and motion
for reconsideration of a resolution. [Emphasis supplied.]
And in § 2, a motion for reconsideration is, thus, removed
from the purview of the class of prohibited pleadings.
Further,
the following guidelines shall be observed by the IBP in respect of
disciplinary cases against lawyers:
1. The IBP must first afford a chance to
either party to file a motion for reconsideration of the IBP resolution
containing its findings and recommendations within fifteen (15) days from
notice of receipt by the parties thereon;
2. If a motion for reconsideration has been timely
filed by an aggrieved party, the IBP must first resolve the same prior to
elevating to this Court the subject resolution together with the whole record
of the case;
3. If no motion for reconsideration has been
filed within the period provided for, the IBP is directed to forthwith transmit
to this Court, for final action, the subject resolution together with the whole
record of the case;
4. A party desiring to appeal from the
resolution of the IBP may file a petition for review before this Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of said resolution sought to be reviewed; and
5. For records of cases already transmitted
to this Court where there exist pending motions for reconsideration filed in
due time before the IBP, the latter is directed to withdraw from this Court the
subject resolutions together with the whole records of the cases, within 30
days from notice, and, thereafter, to act on said motions with reasonable
dispatch.
Consistent
with the discussions hereinabove set forth, let the whole record of this case
be immediately remanded to the IBP for the proper disposition of respondent
Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala’s motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice |
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
|
|
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
|
[1] Dated
[2] Rollo, p. 199.
[3]
[4] Falsification
by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.
[5] False
testimony in civil cases.
[6] Offering
false testimony in evidence.
[7] Libel
by means of writings or similar means.
[8] Rollo, pp. 185-198.
[9] Re: CBD Case No. 04-1200 “Noriel Michael J. Ramientas v. Atty.
Jocelyn P. Reyala.”
[10] On
[11] Dated
[12] Manifestation
dated
[13] Respondent
Reyala’s Manifestation;
see note 10.
[14] 323 Phil. 1 (1996).
[15] The IBP By-Laws took effect on
[16]
[17] SEC. 12. Review and
decision by the Board of Governors. – x x x
x
x x x
(c)
If the respondent is exonerated by
the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed
terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party
filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
x
x x x
[18] Union
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 808, 829-830 (1998);
University of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal,
Jr., 338 Phil. 728, 745 (1997).
[19] Ibid., see Note 14.