CATALINA JANDOC-GATDULA G.R. No. 139503
as
Successor-in-Interest of the Late
MANUELA JANDOC, Present:
Petitioner,
Panganiban, CJ,
Chairperson,
Ynares-Santiago,
-
versus - Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ
JULIO DIMALANTA as
Successor-in-Interest
of VICENTA Promulgated:
Vda. DE NATIVIDAD,
Respondent.
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---- -- -- -- -- x
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
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U |
nder the peculiar factual circumstances of the present case, laches
bars the recovery of a piece of real property, even if the mode of transfer
used by an alleged member of a cultural minority lacks executive approval.
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the November 25, 1998 Decision[2] and June 28, 1999 Resolution[3] rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 47405. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the
appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the
The assailed
Resolution denied reconsideration.
The
progenitor of this case was an original action for specific performance filed
by respondent’s predecessor, Vicenta Dimalanta, against petitioner’s
predecessor, Manuela Jandoc, before Branch 1 of the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of
Manuela then
filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the issuance of a Writ of Execution in
Civil Case No. 1365 and a Writ of Possession in Land Registration Case No.
N-78. This Motion was denied by the RTC of
General Santos City, Branch 22. On
appeal,[6] the
appellate court[7] found
neither error nor abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC.[8]
According to
the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), Manuela must seek her remedies in
an appropriate action, in which the issues concerning the ownership and
possession of the portion claimed and occupied by Vicenta may be properly
litigated.
On
“ACCORDINGLY,
judgments are hereby rendered dismissing [petitioner’s] complaint and upholding
the [Respondent] Dimalanta’s counterclaim declaring him absolute owner of the
disputed property and directing the [petitioner] to convey Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-19812 to said [respondent]; Ordering the deeds of mortgage over
the property executed by [petitioner] and the third-party defendants cancelled
and of no force and effect; Ordering the [petitioner] jointly and severally
with third-party defendant Ricardo Yap to pay to the [Respondent] Dimalanta
moral damages in the sum of P500,000,00 lawyer’s fees of P100,000,00
plus costs.”[10]
The
Facts
The CA adopted the trial court’s narration of the events leading to
this case, as follows:
“Way back on December 6, 1948, when General Santos City was still a
rustic, backwater community and sparsely populated, Manuela Jandoc sold to
Vicenta Aguilar de Natividad [a] portion of an unregistered land with an area
of 1,680 square meters, more or less, situated at Dadiangas, Buayan, Cotabato.
(now Dadiangas, General Santos City).
The instrument of sale was crafted in Tagalog (Pilipino) and notarized
by then Justice of the Peace Gavino Yapdiongco[11] of the P1.00 per square meter.
“A decade later, on
“On
“Demands
were made of Manuela Jandoc to honor the promised conveyance but in vain. So on
“On
“The judgment
was appealed and in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
56268-R, this court’s judgment was reversed and set aside and the action of the
plaintiff-appellee [Natividad] was dismissed.
“In the interim, before the appeal was decided by the Court
of Appeals on December 29, 1981, the plaintiff-appellee Vicenta Natividad
passed away on October 5, 1977 and on October 14, 1982 Julio Dimalanta was
appointed as representative of deceased Vicenta Natividad after notice of death
and motion for [substitution] of party was filed on June 2, 1982. The defendant-appellant Manuela Jandoc died
on
“The decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated by the
losing party to the Supreme Court by appeal on certiorari but was dismissed on
“Catalina Jandoc in her capacity as sole heir of the estate
of the late Manuela Jandoc filed an Omnibus [M]otion praying for the issuance
of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1365 and a writ of possession in Land
Registration Case No. N-78. Julio
Dimalanta as successor-in-interest of deceased Vicenta Natividad, opposed the
motion.
“On
‘Indeed,
a close scrutiny of the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be
executed does not have any mandate whatsoever to be executed. The dispositive portion merely dismissed the
complaint for Specific Performance, which was really an action for
reconveyance. [x x x]. The issue of possession was never ventilated,
much less, included in the dispositive portion for [plaintiff] to vacate the
property by reason thereof and/or surrender possession thereof to the
defendant. While the remedy of
reconveyance and/or specific performance does not insure in favor of the
plaintiff by reason of the dismissal thereof, there appears nothing more to be
done by the plaintiff after the complaint was dismissed. The portion of the Court of Appeal’s decision
declaring the deed of sale executed by defendant in favor of the plaintiff on
December 6, 1948 x x x was null and void, for non-compliance with Sections 145
and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, is not part of the
dispositive portion of the decision but only considered as part of the reasons
or conclusions of the Court or as guide or enlightenment to determine the ratio
decidendi of the case which is not controlling.
While ownership may be considered in favor of defendant after
reconveyance and/or specific [performance] was dismissed, yet such ownership
and possession are not one and the same thing.
A person may be declared owner, but he may not be entitled to
possession.’
“The motion for a writ of possession in Land Registration
Case No. N-78 was also denied to wit:
‘Under
the foregoing consideration and as explicitly observed by plaintiff, the writ
of possession is not available against one who has been legitimately given
possession like the oppositor (Julio Dimalanta) and the predecessor-in-interest
(Vicenta Natividad). Besides a writ of
possession cannot be issued by virtue of a counterclaim in an ordinary action
for specific performance [or] action for reconveyance. x x x.’
“Two motions for reconsideration were
filed by Jandoc and both were denied by this court prompting the movant to
challenge the actions by mandamus and certiorari before the Court of Appeals
which ruled in AC-GR SP No. 05406 on
‘The petition for
certiorari may not prosper. No
jurisdictional issue is raised by the petition.
Since the jurisdiction of the lower court in both Civil Case No. 1365
and Land Registration Case No. N-78, is admitted, and as ‘the function of the
writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within its jurisdiction and not
to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge’s findings or
conclusions’, the petition for certiorari must be dismissed. x x x.
‘Similarly, the petition for
mandamus cannot succeed. As correctly
observed by respondent Judge, no writ of execution may issue upon the decision
of this Appellate Court dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 1365. The Supreme Court in Casilan v. De Salcedo, x x x ruled that ‘the only portion of the
decision that becomes the subject of execution is what is ordained or decreed
in the dispositive part. Whatever may be
found in the body of the decision can only be considered as part of the reasons
or conclusions of the court, and while they may serve as guide or enlightenment
to determine the ration decidendi, what is controlling is what appears in the
dispositive part of the decision.
‘Since the dispositive part of the
decision of this Appellate Court in CA-GR No. 56268-R, December 29, 1981 x x x
merely ‘set aside the appealed decision of the trial court and dismissed the
complaint of the plaintiff-appellee [Vicenta] with costs against said plaintiff
appellee’, respondent Judge correctly concluded that there is ‘nothing more to
be done by the plaintiff after the complaint was dismissed.’
‘There is no merit in petitioners’
contention that because the ‘Appellate Court found that the deed of sale
executed by defendant Jandoc was null and void, a mutual restitution of the
subject of the contract and its fruits, and the price with interest, as
provided in Article 1398 of the Civil Code, should be deemed included in the
dispositive part of the judgment[.] Such
an inference is untenable for, as a matter of fact, Jandoc’s answer to the
complaint in Civil Case No. 1365 did not ask for that relief. Her counterclaim sought only the payment to
her or attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and moral damages. Her prayer was:
‘That
the complaint be dismissed with costs taxed against plaintiff, and on the
counterclaim, that judgment be rendered in favor of defendant and against
plaintiff, ordering the latter to pay unto the former, (1) P1,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, (2) P300 as actual and litigation expenses and such
amount as may be deemed reasonable by way of moral damages. x x x.’
“By
the dismissal of the complaint, she obtained exactly what she prayed for,
except damages.
‘The dispositive part of the
decision of this Appellate Court in CA-GR No. 56268-R is neither obscure nor
carelessly prepared. We think that this
court was deliberately restrained and circumspect in limiting its adjudication
of the case to a declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale without
touching on the ownership and possession of the property subject thereof, nor
on the effects of the vendor-applicant’s undertaking (in her two affidavits) to
convey the title of the vendee’s portion upon the registration in her name of
the area of which it was a part. Neither
did this court [attempt] to determine what rights, if any, the vendee and her
successors-in-interest may have acquired as a result of their over-30-years-possession
of the land as owners under the voided deed of sale; nor did it ascertain
the nature of their rights in the ‘Pioneer Hotel’ (‘the newest and most modern
hotel as of this date [at] General Santos City,’ according to the trial judge)
which they built on the land with the knowledge and conformity of the vendor
during the pendency of the land registration proceeding. We therefore find neither error nor abuse of
discretion in respondent Judge’s denial of her motion for execution in Civil
Case No. 1365 and her motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in Land
Registration Case No. N-78. She must
seek her remedies in an appropriate action where the issues concerning the
ownership and possession of the portion claimed and occupied by the private
respondent may be properly litigated.
x x x x x x x x x
“The decision of the Court of Appeals was brought up on a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court and was denied for
lack of merit on
As stated earlier, petitioner instituted the present case for
recovery of possession and/or ownership of real property, with damages and
attorney’s fees. In turn, respondent
filed a Third-Party Complaint against Teodulo Yap, Ricardo Yap and Marcelo Yap,
who were mortgagees of the subject property by virtue of the Deeds of Mortgage
executed in their favor by petitioner.[15]
In its Decision[16] dated November 29, 1993, the RTC of General Santos City, Branch 22,
ruled against petitioner and declared
respondent the lawful owner of the disputed property. While acknowledging that petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest (Manuela) might have been of native origin, it held
that -- based on the overwhelming evidence presented -- she grew up, lived and
died a Christian. This fact, noted the
trial court, had not only been admitted by Manuela herself in other judicial
proceedings, but was also generally known to several prominent residents of the
place. Moreover, the evidence showed
that, aside from being a registered voter of the place, she signed important
documents with apparent ease and familiarity and retained the services of
well-known lawyers in the locality in dealing with others.
The trial court also considered the 10 documents of sale[17] covering different portions of the same two-hectare land, subject of
the registration proceedings in LRC No. N-78.
Manuela had executed those documents in favor of several persons[18] without the approval of the Commission on National Integration
(CNI). In several of those sales, she
honored her obligations. Other sales[19] that had reached the courts were eventually sustained as valid.
Taking all the foregoing facts into consideration, the RTC concluded
that the Deed of Sale executed 45 years earlier by petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest was valid. That
Deed of Sale effectively transferred ownership of the land in question to
Vicenta, respondent’s predecessor.
Further, the trial court found that the mortgages executed by petitioner
over the property had been executed in bad faith, because the parties to those
transactions were aware of the existence of the hotel, other improvements, and
the pending case over the property at the time.
Hence, the RTC invalidated the mortgages.
Petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal on
In the earlier case denominated as CA-GR No. 56268-R, the appellate court ruled that the decedent Manuela Jandoc was a member of the B’laan cultural community.[22] Accordingly, the Contract of Sale between Manuela and Vicenta was declared void.[23] Having become final in that prior case, the Decision therein became conclusive on the instant case and could no longer be opened. The matter raised in this second suit was identical in all respects with that decided in the first proceeding.
Nonetheless, the CA declared that in the instant proceeding, whether under estoppel or laches, Manuela should not be allowed to circumvent her long overdue obligations by the simple expedient of allowing her claim of membership in the cultural community; or, in the case of her successor-in-interest, by hiding under the doctrine of res judicata.
The CA
also rejected the claim of petitioner that, on the assumption that the sale was
valid, the transaction pertained only to the 510-square-meter portion of the
property, as can be gleaned from the
When the Affidavit was executed, respondent was not yet the owner, but a mere lessee, of a meager portion of the lot -- a portion over which he needed an assurance before he could put in his investments. Hence, nothing in this document should mean that, of the 1,480-square-meter lot covered by TCT No. T-19812 and presently claimed by respondent, only 510 square meters should be rightfully claimed.
Finally, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court that the Yaps were mortgagees in bad faith. However, it removed the award for damages and attorney’s fees for not being warranted under the circumstances. According to the CA, the institution of the instant case by petitioner was pursuant to the pronouncements of the CA in AC-GR SP No. 05406: that she should seek her remedies in an appropriate action; hence, she should not be penalized. Penalizing the right to litigate is not a sound policy. The anxiety and mental anguish suffered by respondent were usual and natural consequences in long drawn-out litigations.
Hence, this Petition.[24]
Petitioner raises this lone issue for
our consideration:
“Whether or not the rights of petitioner over the property are rendered stale by laches x x x.”[25]
Otherwise stated, the question is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to ownership and possession of the subject land.
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Ownership and Possession
We find no
compelling reason to deviate from the findings of fact and the conclusion
reached by the appellate court which, in turn, affirmed those of the trial
court. Between Manuela (petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest) and Vicenta (respondent’s predecessor-in-interest), we
believe and hold that ownership and possession of the subject property covered
by TCT No. T-19812 properly belongs to Vicenta.
Undisputed is
the existence of the Deed of Sale[26]
executed by Manuela on
From
1948 until around 1972, when Manuela obtained OCT No. 0-2677 over her entire
two-hectare property, she never intimated to Vicenta that she was a
B’laan. Neither did Manuela deny the
validity of the sale for lack of approval by the CNI. It is also a fact borne out by the evidence
on record that, in her transactions regarding other portions of her land
covered by OCT No. 0-2677, she did not regard herself as a non-Christian who should be assisted
by the CNI. Several of those contracts
had long been executed and titles[31]
issued to the respective vendees. As
regards the others that had reached litigation, the courts ordered her to honor
her commitment to convey title to the property, thus rejecting her claim of
being a B’laan.
Under these
circumstances, Manuela is estopped from assailing, on the basis of her
membership in a cultural minority, the validity of the sale to Vicenta; and from
invoking Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu.[32] As correctly contended by respondent, Manuela
never raised, at the earliest opportunity, the nullity of the sale on the basis
of her alleged B’laan origin. On the
contrary, she raised her belated claim only in 1973, when Vicenta filed an
action for specific performance, docketed as Civil Case No. 1365. By then,
almost twenty-five years had lapsed.
Laches, or staleness of demand, had
likewise set in. It arises when there is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier.[33] When there is laches, there is a presumption that the party entitled to assert
a right has either abandoned or declined to assert that right. Indeed, by her silence for 25 years -- coupled with
her Affidavits executed in 1969, in which she acknowledged her promise to
convey a portion of her two-hectare property to Vicenta -- she effectively induced Vicenta to feel
secure that no action, or adverse claim for that matter, would be foisted upon
her.
In several
decisions, this Court has held that laches
will bar recovery of a property, even if the mode of transfer used by an
alleged member of a cultural minority lacks executive approval.
Miguel
v. Catalino[34] held that, even granting the
proposition raised by the heirs -- that there was no prescription against their
father’s recorded title -- their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years
(1928-1962) justified the defendant’s equitable defense of laches. Despite the invalidity of his sale to
Catalino Agyapao, the vendor suffered the latter to enter, possess and enjoy
the land in question without protest from 1928 to 1943, when the seller died. In
turn, while succeeding the deceased, the heirs also remained inactive. They did not take any step to reivindicate
the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the suit was commenced in court. By their passivity, the defendant was made to
feel secure in the belief that -- even if not deemed barred -- no action would
be filed that would plainly be prejudicial to him. Said the Court:
“x
x x. Courts can not look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and
inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in
cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long
years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts
and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense.
x x x
x x x x x x x x x
“x x x. In the case at bar, Bacaquio
sold the land in 1928 but the sale is void for lack of the governor's
approval. The vendor, and also his heirs
after him, could have instituted an action to annul the sale from that time,
since they knew of the invalidity of the sale, which is a matter of law; they
did not have to wait for 34 years to institute suit.”[35]
In Heirs
of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan,[36] a similar
case in which the original contracting parties were both members of a
non-Christian tribe, this Court applied the equitable principle of laches.
It
ruled that the heirs of the vendor of the land could no longer question
the validity of the sale for not bearing the official approval of the director
of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes.
The Court explained:
“Laruan's
sale of the subject lot to Lacamen could have been valid were it not for the
sole fact that it lacked the approval of the Director of the Bureau of
Non-Christian Tribes. There was impressed upon its face full faith and credit
after it was notarized by the notary public.
The non-approval was the only ‘drawback’ of which the trial court has
found the respondents-appellants to ‘have taken advantage as their lever to
deprive [petitioners-appellants] of this land and that their motive is out and
out greed.’ As between Laruan and
Lacamen, the sale was regular, not infected with any flaw. Laruan's
delivery of his certificate of title to Lacamen just after the sale symbolizes
nothing more than a bared recognition and acceptance on his part that Lacamen
is the new owner of the property. Thus, not any antagonistic show of ownership
was ever exhibited by Laruan after that sale and until his death in May
1938.
“From
the transfer of the land on
In upholding the title of Lacamen and
his heirs despite the invalidity of the sale, the Court explained in this wise:
“x x x. It has been held that
while a person may not acquire title to the registered property through
continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original
registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to
recover back the possession of such
property and the title thereto, by reason of laches. Much more should it be in the instant case
where the possession of nearly 30 years or almost half a century now is in
pursuance of sale which regrettably did not bear the approval of the executive
authority but which the vendor never questioned during his lifetime. Laruan’s laches extends to his heirs,
the respondents-appellants herein, since they stand in privity with him.”[38]
In Lucenta v. Court of First Instance of
Bukidnon,[39] the parties
admitted that they had entered into an oral contract of barter. Both of them also
belonged to a cultural minority group. Initially,
the petitioner insisted that only 600 square meters of his lot had been offered
in the barter agreement; after trial, he filed a Memorandum adopting a different
theory of his case.
He attacked
the legality of the barter itself on the ground that it had not been made in
accordance with Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and
Sulu. The trial court did not pass upon
the legality of this transaction, because the issue had not been raised in the
pleadings during either the pretrial or the trial. Instead, the RTC upheld the oral contract of
barter and ruled that, based on the preponderance of evidence presented, what
the petitioner had bartered was his whole lot. On appeal, this Court held thus:
“x x x. This Court is not unmindful of the fact that,
as a matter of public policy, there are laws specifically enacted to govern
members of cultural minorities like the parties in this case. However, the
circumstances of the present litigation dictate that it would be more in
keeping with justice and equity if the equitable principle of estoppel is
applied.
“x
x x. It is quite obvious that the petitioner's purpose is to profit from the
land which was a mere garbage dump before the barter but which is now traversed
by part of the national highway. The petitioner can realize this profit only if
he could get back the land by taking inconsistent positions from initially
attempting to prove that he bartered only 600 square meters of the said land to
suddenly attacking the legality of the very barter which he himself, entered
into. Aside from being in pari delicto with the private
respondent, the petitioner is now estopped from assailing the validity and
legality of the barter agreement which he entered into eight (8) years prior to
his filing of an action and which action was initially anchored on the validity
of said barter agreement.[40]
“x x x. In the case of Depositario v. Hervias, we
ruled:
"Appellant's
duplicity deserves the outright rejection of his claim. A party will not be
allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions which, if
allowed, would result in brazen deception. The doctrine of estoppel bars a
party from trifling with the courts and flaunting the elementary rules of right
dealing and good faith."[41]
The principle enunciated in the
foregoing cases is even more applicable to the present case. There is no imposition, fraud, or unfair
advantage of any sort in this case. Manuela was fully aware of what she was doing. Besides, it was a fact that she had
entered into the Contracts in the presence of petitioner, who was her
stepdaughter, and of petitioner’s husband.[42]
Given the
circumstances of this case, the Court is constrained to apply the doctrine of
estoppel and laches against petitioner, insofar as the requirement of government
approval is concerned. Since Manuela is
barred from setting up the plea of invalidity of sale, also barred is that same
plea on the part of petitioner.
Manuela’s heirs, privies and successors in interest can have no better
rights than her.
Petitioner argues that, being a
member of a cultural community, Manuela thus
becomes the less guilty party and deserves outright protection. In this instance, her contention cannot be
countenanced.
Sections 145[43] and 146[44] of the Administrative
Code of Mindanao and Sulu aims to safeguard the patrimony of the less developed
ethnic groups in the
provisions. This aim is in line with the
public policy stated in Article 24 of the Civil Code, which enjoins courts to
be vigilant in protecting parties who -- in all contractual, property or other
relations -- are at a disadvantage on account of their moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age, or some other handicap.[46]
The court’s duty
to protect the native vendor, however, should not be carried out to such an
extent as to deny justice to the vendee when truth and justice happen to be on the
latter’s side. The law cannot be
used to shield the enrichment of one at the expense of another. More important, the law will not be applied
so stringently as to render ineffective a contract that is otherwise valid,
except for want of approval by the CNI.
This principle holds, especially when the evils sought to be avoided are
not obtaining.
In Cunanan v. CA,[47] the Compromise Agreement involving a
member of a cultural minority was considered valid and binding between the
parties, notwithstanding lack of approval of the
agreement by the provincial governor or an authorized representative. The Court elucidated thus:
“x x x. The evils sought to be avoided can hardly
exist in compromise agreements, like the one under consideration, the parties
thereto having had the assistance of their respective counsel, and the benefit
of judicial scrutiny and approval. In
fact, the Justice of the Peace considered, not only whether the parties fully
understood their commitment under the agreement, but, also, whether the same
infringed any existing laws or violated any ‘customs or usages observed in the
locality.’ Besides, both parties
forthwith took possession of the portions respectively allotted to them,
thereby leaving no room for doubt that they were well aware of the nature of
their undertakings and that the same reflected their true intent.”[48]
Similarly, the
present Deed of Sale, notarized by then Justice of the Peace Yapchiongco, was
worded in Tagalog. Clearly, Manuela
fully understood her commitment under the deed, because possession and
ownership of the property were immediately turned over to Vicenta, who
instituted improvements on it.
Interestingly, neither in the Answer to the Complaint in Civil Case No.
1365 nor in the present case was it ever alleged and proven that Manuela had
been exploited in any way by Vicenta.
On the other hand, it is evident
that Manuela did not observe honesty and good faith,[49]
because it was she who misled Vicenta by giving the assurance that the subject
property would be reconveyed to the latter, as soon as it was titled. After obtaining the title, Manuela reneged on
her promise, justifying her action by stating that she was a B’laan. She thus manifested her lack of good faith by
taking an unconscionable advantage of Vicenta through forms or technicalities
of the law.
Furthermore,
taking into consideration the other sales previously executed by Manuela, it
would clearly be unjust to allow her to repudiate the legality of her
conveyance to Vicenta. As found by the
Office for Southern Cultural Communities, Manuela cannot be selective and inconsistent
in exercising her rights as a member of a cultural minority, if she is truly
one.[50]
While the
purpose of the law in requiring executive approval of contracts entered into by
cultural minorities is indeed to protect them, this Court cannot blindly apply
that law without considering how the parties exercised their rights and
obligations. The strict letter of the
law can never be at the expense of fairness, equity and justice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
challenged Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chairperson, First Division
W E C O N C U R:
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-19.
[2] Annex “A” of Petition; rollo, pp. 21-34. Seventh Division. Penned by Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., and concurred in by Justices Salome A. Montoya (Division chair) and Ruben T. Reyes (member, now presiding justice of the CA).
[3] Annex “B” of Petition; id. at 35-36.
[4] Assailed CA Decision, p. 13; id. at 33.
[5] Docketed as Civil Case No. 1365.
[6] Docketed as AC-GR SP No. 05406.
[7] Then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); First Special Cases Division.
[8] Exhibits for the Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3662; records pp. 254-260.
[9] Docketed as Civil Case No. 3662; records, p. 1.
[10]
RTC Decision dated
[11] “Yapchiongco” in some parts of the records.
[12]
The property subject of this case
is now covered by TCT No. T-19812, after the subdivision of Manuela’s entire
property covered by OCT No. 0-2677. See Complaint,
p. 2, CA rollo, p. 72, records, p. 2; See also Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19812, Exhibits for the Defendant/Third Party
Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3662; records, pp. 292-293.
[13] “B’laan” in some parts of the records.
[14] Assailed CA Decision, pp. 2-6; rollo, pp. 22-26.
[15]
See RTC Decision dated
[16] CA rollo, pp. 71-83; records, pp. 278-290.
[17]
Exhibits for the Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff in Civil Case No.
3662, Exhibits “4,” “5,” “6,” “7,” “8,” “9,” “65”; records, pp. 327, 344, 395, 417-418.
[18] Different portions of the same two-hectare property were sold to different vendees; namely, Genaro B. Valencia, Jr. (Deed of Sale dated April 10, 1972), Felix Enojado (Deed of Sale dated August 4, 1972), Fevi V. Purisima (Deed of Sale dated May 5, 1972), Victorio L. Velasquez (Deed of Sale dated June 28, 1972), Armie E. Elma (Deed of Sale dated April 7, 1972), Priscilla P. Abrasaldo (Deed of Sale dated January 8, 1973), Jose C. Catolico (Deed of Sale dated July 31, 1963), Johnny Ang (Deed of Sale dated January 22, 1970), Eustaquio S. Panlaque (Deed of Sale dated August 4, 1951) and Francisco Laiz (dated February 2, 1970).
[19]
See Civil Case No. 1361, 1315, 1348; records, pp. 1-6, 7-12 &
332-334, 13-22 & 329-331.
[20] Records, p. 294.
[21]
[22] Exhibits for the Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3662; records, pp. 600-602.
[23]
[24] To
resolve old cases, the Court created the Committee on Zero Backlog of Cases on
[25] Petition, p. 3; rollo, p. 6.
[26]
Exhibits for the Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff in Civil Case No.
3662, Exhibit “28”; records, p. 59.
[27]
Exhibits for the Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3662,
RTC Decision dated
[28]
[29] Records, p. 29.
[30]
[31] See Exhibits; records, pp. 296-299, 301-302, 307-309, 311, 315-316, 317 and 320-321.
[32]
See Mabale v. Apalisok, 88 SCRA
234,
[33]
Avisado v. Rumbaua, 354 SCRA 245,
[34]
26 SCRA 234,
[35]
[36]
65
SCRA 605,
[37]
[38]
[39]
162 SCRA 197,
[40]
[41]
[42] Exhibits For the Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3662, RTC Decision, Civil Case No. 1365, p. 16; records, p. 590.
[43]
“Sec. 145. Contracts with non-Christians: requisites. — Save and
except contracts of sale or barter of personal property and contracts of
personal service comprehended in chapter seventeen hereof no contract or
agreement shall be made in the Department by any person with any Moro or other
non-Christian inhabitant of the same for the payment or delivery of money or
other thing of value in present or in prospective, or any manner affecting or
relating to any real property, unless such contract or agreement be executed
and approved as follows:
(a) Such
contract or agreement shall be in writing, and a duplicate thereof delivered to
each party.
(b) It shall be
executed before a judge of a court of record, justice or auxiliary justice of
the peace, or notary public, and shall bear the approval of the provincial
governor wherein the same was executed or his representative duly authorized in
writing for such purpose, indorsed upon it.
(c) It shall
contain the names of all parties in interest, their residence and occupation; x
x x
(d) It shall state
the time when and place where made, the particular purpose for which made, the
special thing or things to be done under it, and, if for the collection of
money, the basis of the claim, the source from which it is to be collected and
the person or persons to whom payment is to be made, the disposition to be made
thereof when collected, the amount or rate per centum of the fee in all cases;
and if any contingent matter or condition constitutes a part of the contract or
agreement, the same shall be specifically set forth.
(e) x x x
(f) The judge,
justice or auxiliary justice of the peace, or notary public before whom such
contract or agreement is executed shall certify officially thereon the time
when and the place where such contract or agreement was executed, and that it
was in his presence, and who are the interested parties thereto, as stated to
him at the time; the parties making the same; the source and extent of
authority claimed at the time by the contracting parties to make the contract
or agreement, and whether made in person or by agent or attorney of any party
or parties thereto.” (Cited in Cunanan v. CA, 134 Phil. 338,
341-342, September 28, 1968).
[44]
“Sec. 146. Void contracts. — Every contract or agreement made in
violation of the next preceding section shall be null and void; x x x[.]” (
[45]
Cunanan v. CA, supra; Madale
v. Sa Raya and Alonto, 92 Phil. 558,
[46]
See also Amarante v. CA, 155 SCRA 46,
[47]
134 Phil. 338,
[48]
[49] Civil Code, Art. 19 states:
“Art. 19 - Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”
[50]
See Letter dated