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WESTMONT PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., UNITED
LABORATORIES, INC., and/or JOSE YAO CAMPOS, CARLOS EJERCITO, ERNESTO SALAZAR,
ELIEZER SALAZAR, JOSE SOLIDUM, JR.,
Petitioners, -
versus - RICARDO C. SAMANIEGO,
Respondent. x ------------------------------------------ x RICARDO C. SAMANIEGO,
Petitioner, - versus
- WESTMONT
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. and UNITED LABORATORIES, INC.,
Respondents. |
G.R. Nos. 146653-54
Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, * AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. G.R. Nos. 147407-08 Promulgated: February 20, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.: |
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Before us are consolidated petitions
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, filed by both contending parties assailing the Decision[1]
dated
The factual antecedents as borne by
the records are:
On
The complaint alleges that Unilab initially hired Samaniego
as Professional Service Representative of its marketing arm, P13,194.00 to P2,299.00 only.
On
Samaniego filed an Opposition to the motion to which
On
The Labor Arbiter then set the case for preliminary
conference during which
On
On
On
On December 16, 1998, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a Decision finding that Samaniego was “illegally and unjustly
dismissed constructively” and ordering his reinstatement to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and privileges; and payment of his full
backwages from the date of his dismissal from the service up to the date of his
actual reinstatement, as well as per diem differential, profit share, and actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus 10% attorney’s fees.
On
In the same Resolution, the NLRC declared the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision null and void, finding that:
x x x the Executive
Labor Arbiter below only allowed the transmittal of the official records of the
instant case to the Commission. Throwing
caution into the wind, he retained complete duplicate original copies of the
same, conducted further proceedings and rendered his now contested Decision
despite the pendency of the appeal-treated Urgent Petition for Change of Venue.
As a consequence,
respondents-appellants were deprived of their opportunity to be heard and
defend themselves on the issues raised in the instant case. They were therefore denied of their right to
due process of law in violation of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
which provides: “No person shall be deprived of his....property without due
process of law.”
The dispositive portion of the NLRC Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the main Appeal and Motion to Quash are hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED
and the appeal-treated Petition for Change of Venue DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction and/or merit. Accordingly,
the Decision appealed from is declared NULL and VOID and the Order appealed
from SUSTAINED insofar as the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is concerned. The entire records of the instant case are
DIRECTED to be immediately remanded to the Executive Labor Arbiter of origin
for immediate conduct of further proceeding.
The respondents-appellants are DIRECTED to pay complainant-appellee the
amount of Two Hundred Thirty Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Pesos and Thirty
Centavos (P230,720.30) representing his salary from January 1, 1999 to
August 31, 1999, the date of issuance of this Resolution less any salary
collected by him by way of execution pending appeal.
SO ORDERED.
The parties separately filed their
motions for reconsideration but were both denied by the NLRC in its Resolution
dated
On January 8, 2001, the Court of Appeals, acting on the
parties’ petitions for certiorari, rendered its Decision setting aside the NLRC
Resolutions and affirming with modification the Labor Arbiter’s Decision in the
sense that the award of moral damages was reduced from P5,000,000.00 to P500,000.00;
and the exemplary damages from P1,000,000.00 to P300,000.00,
thus:
x x x
While this Court concurs with the ruling of the Executive
Labor Arbiter that there was constructive dismissal committed against Ricardo
Samaniego, this Court finds the award on moral and exemplary damages
unconscionable.
x x x
WHEREFORE, the NLRC’s resolutions dated P500,000.00 and P300,000.00,
respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
filed by the opposing parties.
In their petition,
For his part, Samaniego maintains that the Court of Appeals
did not err in its ruling. However, he
claims that the Appellate Court should not have reduced the Labor Arbiter’s
award for moral and exemplary damages.
The petition to change or transfer
venue filed by
SECTION
3. Motion to Dismiss. On or
before the date set for the conference, the respondent may file a motion to
dismiss. Any motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or that the
cause of action is barred by prior judgment, prescription or forum shopping, shall
be immediately resolved by the Labor Arbiter by a written order. An order denying the motion to dismiss
or suspending its resolution until the final determination of the case is
not appealable.
In Indiana Aerospace University v.
Commission on Higher Education,[3] we
held:
An
order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy
in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.
Assuming
that the petition to change or transfer venue is the proper remedy, still we find
that the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the Labor Arbiter’s Order
denying the motion to dismiss.
Section 1(a), Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended,
provides:
SECTION 1. Venue. – (a) All cases which Labor
Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may
be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the
workplace of the complainant/petitioner.
For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as
the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the
cause of action arose. It shall
include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a
temporary detail, assignment or travel.
In the case of field employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant
workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they
are supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages or work instructions
from and report the results of their assignment to, their employers.
In
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. NLRC,[4] we held:
The question of venue essentially relates
to the trial and touches more upon the convenience of the parties, rather than
upon the substance and merits of the case.
Our permissive rules underlying provisions on venue are intended to
assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the ends
of justice. This axiom all the more
finds applicability in cases involving labor and management because of the
principle, paramount in our jurisdiction, that the State shall afford full
protection to labor.
x x x
This provision is obviously permissive,
for the said section uses the word "may," allowing a different venue
when the interests of substantial justice demand a different one. In any case,
as stated earlier, the Constitutional protection accorded to labor is a
paramount and compelling factor, provided the venue chosen is not altogether
oppressive to the employer.
Here, it is undisputed that
Samaniego’s regular place of assignment was in Isabela when he was transferred
to Metro Manila or when the cause of action arose. Clearly, the Appellate Court was correct in affirming
the Labor Arbiter’s finding that the proper venue is in the RAB No. II at
On the
contention of
As
shown by the records, the Labor Arbiter gave
The ultimate
issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
Samaniego was constructively dismissed by
To
recapitulate, Samaniego claims that upon his reassignment and/or transfer to
Metro Manila, he was placed on “floating status” and directed to perform functions
not related to his position. For their
part,
In
constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the
transfer of an employee is for just and valid grounds, such as genuine business
necessity. The employer must be able to
show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the
employee. It must not involve a
demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other benefits. If the employer cannot overcome this burden
of proof, the employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive
dismissal.[6]
There
may also be constructive dismissal if an act of clear insensibility
or
disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that
it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.[7] This
was what happened to Samaniego. Thus, he
is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.[8]
However, the circumstances obtaining
in this case do not warrant the reinstatement of Samaniego. Antagonism caused a severe strain in the
relationship between him and his employer.
A more equitable disposition would be an award of separation pay
equivalent to at least one month pay, or one month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher (with a fraction of at least six [6] months being
considered as one [1] whole year),[9] in
addition to his full backwages, allowances and other benefits.[10]
Records show that Samaniego was
employed from October 1982 to P25,000.00. Hence, he is entitled to a separation pay of
P425,000.00.
WHEREFORE,
the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 60400 and CA-G.R. SP No. 60478 are AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION in
the sense that Westmont and Unilab are ordered to pay Samaniego his separation
pay equivalent to P425,000.00, plus his full backwages, and other
privileges and benefits, or their monetary equivalent, from the time of his
dismissal up to his supposed actual reinstatement. The award for moral and exemplary damages is
deleted.
Costs
against
SO
ORDERED.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson |
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(On leave) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
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I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1]
Penned by Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Justice Eloy
R. Bello, Jr. and Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (all retired), Annex “A,”
Petition for Review (in G.R. Nos. 146653-54), Rollo, pp. 60-74.
[3]
G.R. No. 139371,
[4]
G.R.
No. 117650,
[5] Mariveles Shipyard Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144134, November 11, 2003, 415 SCRA 573.
[6]
Globe
Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, G.R. No. 150092,
[7]
Hyatt
Taxi Services, Inc. v. Catinoy, G.R. No. 143204,
[9]
Ibid.,
citing Bolinao Security and Investigation Service, Inc. v. Toston, ibid.,
Jardine Davies, Inc. v. NLRC, 311 SCRA 289 (1999) and Lopez v. NLRC,
297 SCRA 508 (1998).
[10]
Ibid., citing Cebu Marine Beach Resort v. NLRC, id., Samarca
v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 146118, October 8, 2003 and Philippine
Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corp. v. NLRC, et al., 300 SCRA 37 (1998).
[11]
On