Republic of the
Supreme Court
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MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, |
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G.R. No. 168696 |
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JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR., JADELSON PETER P.
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Present: |
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FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES |
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and PERFECTO NIXON C. |
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PANGANIBAN,
CJ., Chairperson, |
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TABORA, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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Petitioners, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CALLEJO,
SR. and |
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- versus - |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY, |
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AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and |
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Promulgated: |
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MA. THELNA P. MALLARI, |
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Respondents. |
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February
28, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
This resolves the petition for review
on certiorari assailing the Order[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 (RTC-Br. 58) issued on
The
antecedent facts are as follows.
On
On
The
RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners
(respondents below). Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer dated
On
It
is undisputed that the plaintiffs’ cause of action involves controversies
arising out of intra-corporate relations, between and among stockholders,
members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc. which originally under PD
902-A approved on March 11, 1976 is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission to try and decide in
addition to its regulatory and adjudicated functions (Section 5, PD
902-A). Upon the advent of RA 8799
approved on July 19, 2000, otherwise known as the Securities and Regulation
Code, the Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in Section 5,
Presidential Decree 902-A were transferred [“]to the Court of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the
“Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases.” Pursuant to this mandate of RA 8799, the
Supreme Court in the exercise of said mandated authority, promulgated on
November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC which took effect 15 December 2000
designated certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to try and decide
Securities and Exchange Commission Cases arising within their respective
territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Region and within
the respective provinces in the First to Twelve Judicial
Region. Accordingly, in the
Subsequently,
on
On
From the foregoing discussion and historical background relative to the venue and jurisdiction to try and decide cases originally enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A and later under Section 5.2 of RA 8799, it is evident that the clear intent of the circular is to bestow the juridiction “to try and decide these cases to the “special courts” created under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. . . .
Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings. On the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer from the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide intra-corporate dispute.
In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.
The
scheduled hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction set on
For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy is better left to the court of competent jurisdiction to rule upon.
SO ORDERED. [2]
Petitioners
no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead,
immediately elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The
petition raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE A CASE HAS AUTHORITY TO
REMAND THE SAME TO ANOTHER
II
WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 8-01 DATED
In their
Comment, respondents argue that the present petition should be denied due
course and dismissed on the grounds that (1) an appeal under Rule 45 is
inappropriate in this case because the Order dated July 13, 2005 is merely an
interlocutory order and not a final order as contemplated under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 is the wrong remedy under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides
that “all decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules
of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable
to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court;” and (3) the petition was intended merely to delay the
proceedings in the trial court because when the case was transferred to Branch
21 of the Regional Trial Court, said court granted petitioners’ motion to hold
the proceedings in view of the present petition pending before this Court.
Subsequently,
petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante, alleging
that on P400,000.00.
The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners
chose the wrong remedy to assail the Order of
In the case of Bangko Silangan Development Bank vs. Court of Appeals,
the Court reiterated the well-settled rule that:
. .
. an order denying a motion to
dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable,
nor can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the
ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that
event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse,
reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.[6]
It appears,
however, that the longer this case remains unresolved, the greater chance there
is for more violence between the parties to erupt. In Philippine Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking,[7]
the Court proceeded to give due course to a case despite the wrong remedy
resorted to by the petitioner therein, stating thus:
While a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be inappropriate to
assail an interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting the
perpetuation of an apparent error committed below that could only serve to
unnecessarily burden the parties, the Court has resolved to ignore the
technical flaw and, also, to treat the petition, there being no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, as a special civil action for certiorari. Not much,
after all, can be gained if the Court were to refrain from now making a
pronouncement on an issue so basic as that submitted by the parties.[8]
In this
case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously
cognizable by the SEC under Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. No. 902-A),
and the propensity of the parties to resort to violence behoove the Court to
look beyond petitioners’ technical lapse of filing a petition for review on certiorari
instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
proper court. Thus, the Court shall
proceed to resolve the case on its merits.
It should
be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto
that certain persons usurped the offices, powers and functions of duly elected
members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an
intra-corporate controversy.[9] Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the
Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view,
declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals
[10]
that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is “limited to
actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their
office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally
incorporated,” while “[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who
usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended).”[11]
However,
R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:
5.2. The
Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial
Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx
Therefore,
actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a
corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of general
jurisdiction. But, this does not change
the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo
warranto cases against persons who usurp an
office in a private corporation.
Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. –
An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
x x x x
As explained in the Unilongo[12]
case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the
phrase “or an office in a corporation created by authority of law” which was
found in the old Rules. Clearly, the
present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto
against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public
officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations
without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799
(hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court
since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume
the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital,
Incorporated.
The Interim
Rules provide thus:
Section 1. (a) Cases covered. – These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in civil cases involving the following:
x x x x
(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates, and between, any or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively;
(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations;
x x x x
SEC. 5. Venue. – All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation, partnership, or association concerned. xxx (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the Supreme
Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC (effective December 15, 2000)
designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to try and decide
cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission. For the Fifth Judicial Region, this Court
designated the following branches of the Regional Trial Court, to wit:
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Camarines Sur ( |
Branch 23, Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. |
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Albay ( |
Branch 4, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta |
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Sorsogon (Sorsogon) |
Branch 52, Judge Honesto A. Villamor |
Subsequently, the Court
promulgated A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, effective
1. The
Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a)
Resolutions of this Court dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November
2002, and 9 July 2002, all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, (b)
Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution
dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED
and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial Courts to try and decide
cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall
within their jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange Commission;
x
x x x
4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have
jurisdiction over cases arising within their respective territorial
jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and
within the respective provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial
Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk
of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court;
(Emphasis ours)
The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the present action for quo warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that
the petition should be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court that has
jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed that the principal office of
the corporation is situated at
Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in
Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite
authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the
Regional Trial Court. The only action
that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack
of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction
and Development Corp. v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners’ Association,[13] the Court held that the
trial court, having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint,
should dismiss the same so the issues therein could be expeditiously heard and
resolved by the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.
Note, further, that respondents’ petition for quo warranto was filed as late as 2005. A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC took effect as early as
The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular
No. 08-2001 authorized said trial court to order the transfer of respondents’
petition to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City is
specious because as of the time of filing of the petition, A.M. No.
03-03-03-SC, which clearly stated that cases formerly cognizable by the SEC
should be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official
station of the designated Special Commercial Court, had been in effect for
almost two years. Thus, the filing of
the petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines
Sur, which had no jurisdiction over those kinds of
actions, was clearly erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Camarines Sur dated
SO ORDERED.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Presiding Judge Eufronio K. Maristela.
[2] Rollo, pp. 32-34.
[3]
[4] See Gallardo v. People,
G.R. No. 142030,
[5] G.R. No. 135441,
[6]
[7] 438 Phil. 375 (2002).
[8]
[9] Unilongo v. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 105 (1999).
[10]
[11]
[12] Supra. at 119.
[13] G.R. No. 139360.