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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES as represented by its Secretary General, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, Petitioner, -versus- ATTY. VICTORIA V. LOANZON, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 168267 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR.,* AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: February 16, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On challenge is the Court of Appeals October 28,
2004 Decision and May 20, 2005 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 75944, “House of
Representatives as Represented by its Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno v. Atty. Victoria V. Loanzon.”
Atty.
Victoria V. Loanzon (respondent) was appointed on
On
After Jose de Venecia, Jr. assumed office
as Speaker on
Respondent was, however, advised on
On
Respondent thus sought clarification on
In the meantime or on
Speaker de Venecia later approved on
October 25, 2001 Mayor Belmonte’s request for respondent’s
detail to the latter’s office effective
By Resolution No. 02-0224 issued on
x x x [T]his Commission finds . . .
the subsequent appointment of Emmanuel A. Albano
as Deputy Secretary General, Public Relations and Information Department
(PRID), as per Special Order No. 35-01, in Loanzon’s
stead, in order. And the issuance thereof signals the expiration
of the term of office of Loanzon. For this reason, the
approval of her detail by Speaker De Venecia can no
longer be implemented as she no longer holds the position of Deputy Secretary
General.
WHEREFORE, the
Commission rules that with the
appointment of Emmanuel A. Albano in Loanzon’s stead, the latter’s appointment as Deputy
Secretary General expired.[2] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent
moved to reconsider CSC Resolution No. 02-0224.
By Resolution No. 021103[3]
dated
The
Commission agrees that when Speaker De Venecia appointed
Emmanuel A. Albano as Deputy Secretary General, PRID,
on
x x x
x
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, Victoria V. Loanzon should be rightfully holding her position as Deputy
Secretary General until
As to Emmanuel A. Albano,
he is considered a de facto officer from July 25 to
However, as to the request of Mayor Belmonte for the extension of her detail which was approved
by Speaker De Venecia to take effect on [
Finally, Loanzon’s
allegation that since she was occupying a permanent position, the Commission has
no power to change the nature of her appointment, the same is devoid of merit.
It must be stressed that the Commission did not change her appointment from
permanent to temporary, because in reality
her appointment although proposed as permanent is with a colatilla
that “the appointee does not
have security of tenure unless he obtains CES eligibility.” This colatilla makes the
appointment temporary for lack of the appropriate eligibility required
for the position. Said annotation is a notice to the holder thereof that
the appointment extended is merely temporary, hence without security of
tenure. Since the nature of the appointment extended to Loanzon
was merely temporary, the same cannot acquire permanence simply because the
item occupied is a permanent position, for “what characterizes an
appointment is not the nature of the item filled but the nature of the
appointment extended.” (University of the
x x x x[4]
On
On
Petition for Review[7] before
the Court of Appeals, petitioner raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE RIGHTFUL HOLDER
OF THE POSITION OF DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT UNTIL
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPOINTMENT OF EMMANUEL A. ALBANO,
VICE THE RESPONDENT, ON
By Decision[9] of
October 28, 2004,[10] the
appellate court found that the position of Deputy Secretary General, PRID pertains
to the non-career service; respondent held a primarily confidential
position and her tenure was thus coterminous with and subject to the pleasure
of the appointing authority, and her termination could be justified only on the
ground of loss of confidence; and respondent’s
removal was without cause, as petitioner itself made no pretense about the absence
of said ground.
The appellate court thus affirmed CSC Resolution Nos.
021103 and 030065 with modification in that it declared the removal of Loanzon and the appointment of Emmanuel Albano
in her place null and void.
Hence, the present petition submitting that the appellate
court gravely erred in:
I
x x x
CLASSIFYING THE POSITION OF DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND
INFORMATION DEPARTMENT AS A PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL POSITION BELONGING TO THE
NON-CAREER SERVICE.
II
x x x
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT’S TERMINATION OF HER TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT AS DEPUTY
SECRETARY GENERAL, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT IS IL[L]EGAL AND
THE APPOINTMENT OF MR. EMMANUEL ALBANO IN HER PLACE, NULL AND VOID.[11]
Petitioner
contends that contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, the position of Deputy
Secretary General, PRID belongs to the career
service, as the appointee to said
position is chosen only if he or she meets the qualification standards for the
position including eligibility requirement;
and respondent’s appointment was made on the basis of the usual test of
merit and fitness for the career service because she was required to have
either Career Service Executive (CSE) or Career Executive Service (CES)
eligibility, which explains why her appointment was denominated permanent with
a colatilla,
however, that she did not have security of tenure until she obtained a CES
eligibility.
Petitioner also asseverates that respondent’s tenure cannot
be considered coterminous with the appointing authority as she held the same
position under Speakers Villar, Fuentebella
and Belmonte, all of the Eleventh Congress, and was even
allowed to serve under the Twelfth Congress. If respondent’s appointment was
highly confidential and coterminous, then, concludes petitioner, her term
should have ended when Speaker Villar ceased to hold
the speakership.
Petitioner further contends that although respondent’s
appointment was denominated as permanent, it was in reality temporary because
of the express qualification that she did not have security of tenure unless
she obtained a CES eligibility; and that
following the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 which provides that temporary
appointments shall not exceed twelve months, respondent’s appointment ceased on
March 8, 2000, citing Pangilinan v. Maglaya.[12]
The petition is impressed with merit.
Paragraph 6 of CSC Resolution No. 967961[13]
furnishes the qualification standards for Deputy Secretary General of the House
of Representatives, thus:
6. DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (SG – 30)
Education : Bachelor’s degree
Experience : 3 years supervisory experience
Training : None required
Eligibility : Career Service Executive (CSE)
Career
Executive Service (CES)[14]
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly,
the position of Deputy Secretary General of the House of Representatives
belongs to the career service which
is, so the Civil Service Law provides, characterized, among other things, by
entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications and
security of tenure. The holder of the position
can only enjoy security of tenure if he or she possesses the qualifications and
eligibility prescribed for it.[15]
In respondent’s case, although respondent’s appointment was
denominated as “permanent,” it having been “proposed as permanent,” it was in
reality temporary for, so her CSC appointment paper clearly stated, she did not
enjoy security tenure as she lacked the eligibility requirement for the
position. Thus the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987 provides:
Section
27. Employment Status. – Appointment in the career service
shall be permanent or temporary.
(1)
Permanent status. – A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person
who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed,
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the
provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.
(2)
Temporary appointment. – In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest
to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except
the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such
temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the
appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes
available.[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In
fine, respondent’s appointment was merely temporary, not to exceed twelve
months. Since she was appointed on
Respondent
argues that
On
a petition for quo warranto
filed by Roco, the Court of Appeals nullified
General’s appointment.
When
the case reached this Court, this Court, ruling in favor of General, held that
the law allows the appointment of those who are not CES eligible, subject to
the obtention of said eligibility, in the same manner
that the appointment of Roco, who did not possess the
required CES rank level V for the position of LTO Regional Director, was
allowed in a temporary capacity.
Even
if
CSC
Resolution No. 021103 which subsequently held that Speaker De Venecia should not have issued an appointment to Albano on July 25, 2001 until after the expiration on July
31, 2001 of respondent’s detail on the Quezon City
Mayor’s Office does not thus lie. As
correctly pleaded by petitioner before the appellate court, when Nazareno approved Mayor Belmonte’s
request for respondent’s detail until July 31, 2001, Speaker de Venecia had not yet been elected and assumed office as
speaker. With Speaker de Venecia’s subsequent election and assumption of office as
speaker, Nazareno’s action as secretary-general
became subject to supervision and control, hence, it could be revoked anytime.
By
thus appointing
As
for the Speaker’s approval on October 25, 2001 of Mayor Belmonte’s
second request for respondent’s detail to his office effective August 1, 2001,
the same may be taken as mere oversight on the part of the Speaker.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution
are SET ASIDE. Civil Service Commission Resolution No.
02-0224 dated
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice
* On Leave.
[1] Court of Appeals (CA) rollo, p. 319.
[2] Quoted on page 1 of CSC Resolution No. 021103, CA rollo, p. 122-129.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 122-129.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Penned by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
[11] Rollo, p. 9.
[12] G.R. No. 104216,
[13] CA rollo, pp. 302-304.
[14]
[15] Erasmo v. Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation, 436 Phil. 689, 694-695 (2002).
[16] Administrative Code, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Sec. 27.
[17] G.R. Nos. 143366 & 143366,