JUANITA NAVAL, G.R.
No. 167412
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
COURT
OF APPEALS, JUANITO
CAMALLA, JAIME NACION, Promulgated:
CONRADO BALILA, ESTER MOYA
and
PORFIRIA AGUIRRE,
Respondents. February
22, 2006
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This petition for review
assails the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated December 14, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 86736, which
reversed the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch
26, in Civil Case No. 2004-0054 affirming the Decision[3] of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Magarao-Canaman,
Camarines Sur, as well as
the Resolution[4]
dated February 17, 2005 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are
as follows:
On
Subsequently, Gregorio
sold portions of the land to respondents Conrado
Rodrigo Balilla[6]
on
The controversy arose
when petitioner Juanita Naval, the great granddaughter of Ildefonso,
was issued on April 1, 1975 by the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Sur an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
RP-5386 (29791), covering 733 sq. m. of the subject land.[11] She claimed that she bought the subject land
from Ildefonso in 1972.[12]
On
Almost 20 years later, or
on
After trial, the MCTC
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing consideration, decision is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants:
1) Declaring
the plaintiff to be the legal owner of the land as described in paragraph
2 of the complaint;
2) Ordering
defendants Juanito Camalla,
Diosdado Balila, Conrado Balila, Porferia Aguirre and Jaime Nacion
to vacate the property in question and to deliver its possession to the
plaintiff;
3) Ordering
Ester Moya to vacate the fifty (50) square meters
occupied by her and to relinquish its possession to the plaintiff;
4) Dismissing
the respective claims for damages of the parties.
Pronouncing no costs.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Aggrieved, respondents
appealed the decision to the RTC of Naga City, which
affirmed in toto the assailed decision.[20]
Respondents thereafter
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court. Finding the prior registration of the deed of sale between Ildefonso and Gregorio with the Register of Deeds as a
constructive notice to subsequent buyers, the appellate court reversed the
decision of the RTC. Thus,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby GRANTED. The appealed decision of the court a quo is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby entered dismissing
respondent's complaint for recovery of possession with damages. Petitioners'
counterclaim for damages is likewise dismissed for lack of legal and factual
bases.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Hence, this petition
assigning the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT GREGORIO
GALAROSA HAS RIGHTFULLY ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT COVERED BY OCT RP #5386
(29791) AND DECLARING HIM TO HAVE POSSESSED THE LOT BEFORE THE ALLEGED SALES TO
RESPONDENTS.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF
TAXES BY RESPONDENTS WERE (sic) EVIDENCE OF LAWFUL POSSESSION AND
OWNERSHIP.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE LOTS
CLAIMED BY THE RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN POSSESSED BY THEM IN GOOD FAITH DESPITE THEIR
KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OCT RP #5386(29791).[22]
Petitioner claims that
she has superior rights over the subject land because the sale between Ildefonso and Gregorio and the subsequent registration
thereof with the Register of Deeds had no legal effect since the subject land
was declared in the name of Agrifina Avila while the
tax declaration cancelled by Gregorio’s was that of Gregorio Bońaga. Petitioner
thus assails the right claimed by Gregorio over the subject land from which the
respondents derived their respective claims.[23]
On the other hand,
respondents contend that the registered sale by Ildefonso
to Gregorio in 1969 of the subject land, from whom they derive their claims,
vests them with better right than the petitioner; that registration under Act
No. 3344 served as constructive notice to the whole world, including the
petitioner, who claimed to have purchased the subject land from Ildefonso in 1972, but failed to present evidence to prove
such acquisition.[24]
We deny the petition.
Prefatorily, a perusal of
the records reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that
the subject land was the exclusive property of Ildefonso
who sold it to her in 1972.[25] However, in this appeal, petitioner assails
the ownership not only of Gregorio but also of Ildefonso
by alleging that at the time the latter sold the land to Gregorio, the same was
declared in the name of Agrifina Avila. When a party adopts a certain theory in the
court below, he is not allowed to change his theory on appeal, for to allow him
to do so would not only be unfair to the other party, but it would also be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[26]
In this appeal, the issue
for resolution is who has the superior right to a parcel of land sold to
different buyers at different times by its former owner.
It is not disputed that
the subject land belonged to Ildefonso and that it
was not registered under the Torrens System[27]
when it was sold to Gregorio in 1969 and to the petitioner in 1972. Further, the deed of sale between Ildefonso and Gregorio was registered with the Register of
Deeds of Camarines Sur
pursuant to Act No. 3344, as shown by Inscription No. 54609 dated
In holding that
respondents have a better right to possess the subject land in view of the bona
fide registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur by Ildefonso and Gregorio, the Court of Appeals applied
Article 1544 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 1544. If the
same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong
to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry
of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain
to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
While we agree with the appellate court that respondents have
superior right over the petitioner on the subject property, we find Article 1544
inapplicable to the case at bar since the subject land was unregistered at the
time of the first sale. The registration
contemplated under this provision has been held to refer to registration under
the Torrens System, which considers the act of registration as the operative
act that binds the land.[28] Thus, in Carumba
v. Court of Appeals,[29]
we held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not
registered under Torrens System.
The law applicable therefore is Act
No. 3344, which provides for the registration of all instruments on land
neither covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System. Under this law, registration by the first
buyer is constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as
such buyer in good faith.
Applying the law, we held
in Bautista v. Fule[30]
that the registration of an instrument involving unregistered land in the
Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person who may
subsequently deal with the same property.
We also held in Bayoca v. Nogales[31] that:
Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As stated in the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On account of the undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by [the first buyers], necessarily, there is absent good faith in the registration of the sale by the [second buyers] for which they had been issued certificates of title in their names. It follows that their title to the land cannot be upheld. x x x.
Even if petitioner argues
that she purchased and registered the subject land in good faith and without
knowledge of any adverse claim thereto, respondents still have superior right
over the disputed property. We held in Rayos v. Reyes[32] that:
“[T]he issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is
relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the
purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the land
is clean x x x in such case
the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is
protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.” Since the properties in question are
unregistered lands, petitioners as subsequent buyers thereof did so at their
peril. Their claim of having bought the
land in good faith, i.e., without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest in the property, would not protect them if it turns out,
as it actually did in this case, that their seller did not own the property at
the time of the sale.
It is an established
principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo
dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one
owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the
seller can transfer legally.[33] In the case at bar, since Ildefonso
no longer owned the subject land at the time of the sale to the petitioner, he
had nothing to sell and the latter did not acquire any right to it.
Even if we apply Article
1544, the facts would nonetheless show that respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest registered first the source of their ownership and
possession, i.e., the 1969 deed of sale, and possessed the subject land
at the earliest time. Applying the
doctrine of “priority in time, priority in rights” or “prius tempore, potior
jure,” respondents are entitled to the
ownership and possession of the subject land.[34]
True,
a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned,
altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in a direct
proceeding permitted by law.[35] Moreover, Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides
that “[u]pon the expiration of said period of one
year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall become
incontrovertible.”
However, it does not
deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not
the title or ownership which is represented by such certificate. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title.[36] The fact that petitioner was able to secure a
title in her name did not operate to vest ownership upon her of the subject
land. Registration of a piece of land
under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein.[37] It cannot be used to protect a usurper from
the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud;
neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others.[38] Its issuance in favor of a particular person
does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with
persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for
another person by the registered owner.[39]
As correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the
Finally, the Court of
Appeals correctly held that an action for reconveyance
does not prescribe when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, as in this case. Thus, in Leyson
v. Bontuyan:[41]
x x x
[T]his Court declared that an action for reconveyance
based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff
is in possession of the property subject of the acts. In Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, the
Court held:
... [A]n action for reconveyance
of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this
rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is
not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the
owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in
the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The
reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land
claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or
his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason
for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing
right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title,
which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
Similarly, in the case of David v. Malay, the same
pronouncement was reiterated by the Court:
... There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in
actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait
until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps
to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of the court of equity
to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and
its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply
this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose ... possession of the
litigated property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with a
claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was
titled in the name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the
right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance
and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the time the
one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only
then that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such
possessor.
The paramount reason for this exception is based on the
theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for
fraud. Moreover, to hold otherwise would
be to put premium on land-grabbing and transgressing the broader principle in
human relations that no person shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] CA rollo, pp. 153-171. Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Records, p. 253.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
CA rollo, p. 155.
[11]
Rollo, p. 57.
[12] CA rollo, p. 111.
[13] Referred to as Conrado Balilia in some parts of the records.
[14]
CA rollo, p. 112.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id.
[17] Referred to as Juanito Camalla in some parts of the records.
[18] Referred to as Porferia Aguirre in some parts of the records.
[19] CA rollo, pp. 94-95.
[20]
[21]
[22] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[23]
[24]
[25] CA rollo, p. 111.
[26] Homeowners Savings & Loan
Bank v. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802,
[27] Act No. 496 (1903) or the Land Registration Act, now Presidential Decree No. 1529 (1978) or the Property Registration Decree.
[28]
Abrigo v. De Vera, G.R.
No. 154409, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 544, 557.
[29] G.R. No. L-27587,
[30] 85 Phil. 391, 393 (1950), cited in Naawan Community Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 443 Phil. 56, 64 (2003).
[31] 394 Phil. 465, 479-480 (2000).
[32] 446 Phil. 32, 50 (2003).
[33] Consolidated Rural Bank (
[34]
Rayos v. Reyes, supra at 51.
[35] De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 158002, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 564, 575.
[36] Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 556, 561 (1998).
[37] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, 451 Phil. 368, 377 (2003).
[38] De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation, supra at 577.
[39] Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, supra at 561-562.
[40] Heirs of Pomposa Saludares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128254, January 16, 2004, 420 SCRA 51, 56.
[41] G.R. No. 156357,