EN BANC
REPUBLIC OF THE
Represented by
Executive Secretary
Eduardo R.
Ermita, the DEPARTMENT
OF
TRANSPORTATION AND Present:
COMMUNICATIONS
(DOTC), and the
MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PANGANIBAN,
C.J.,
AUTHORITY
(MIAA), PUNO,
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
-versus- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO-MORALES,
CALLEJO,
SR.,
AZCUNA,
HON.
HENRICK F. GINGOYON, TINGA,
In
his capacity as Presiding CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, GARCIA, JJ.
Branch 117,
PHILIPPINE
INTERNATIONAL AIR
TERMINALS CO.,
INC.,
Respondents. Promulgated:
February 1, 2006
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x
R E S O
L U T I ON
TINGA, J.:
This
Resolution treats of the following motions:
(a)
MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION, dated
(b) MOTION
FOR LEAVE (To File Motion for Partial Reconsideration-in-Intervention), dated 5
January 2006 filed by counsel for petitioner-intervenor Asahikosan Corporation
praying that the attached Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Intervention
dated January 5, 2006 be admitted;
(b-1)
Aforesaid MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION-IN-INTERVENTION, dated
(c) MOTION
FOR LEAVE (To File Motion for Partial Reconsideration-in-Intervention), dated 5
January 2006 filed by counsel for petitioner-intervenor Takenaka Corp.;
(c-1) Aforesaid MOTION FOR PARTIAL
RECONSIDERATION-IN-INTERVENTION, dated
(d) MOTION
FOR INTERVENTION – and – MOTION TO ADMIT THE ATTACHED MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION-IN-INTERVENTION (of the Decision dated 19 December 2005), dated
6 January 2006 filed by counsel for movant-in-intervention Rep. Salacnib F.
Baterina; and
(d-1)
Aforesaid MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION-IN-INTERVENTION (of the Decision dated
We first dispose of the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by
On the newly
raised arguments, there are considerable
factual elements brought up by the Government. In the main, the Government
devotes significant effort in diminishing PIATCO’s right to just compensation
as builder or owner of the NAIA 3. Particularly brought to fore are the claims
relating to two entities, Takenaka Corporation (Takenaka) and Asahikosan (Asahikosan) Corporation, who allegedly claim
“significant liens” on the terminal, arising from their alleged unpaid bills by
virtue of an Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contract they had with
PIATCO. On account of these adverse claims, the Government now claims as
controvertible the question of who is the builder of the NAIA 3.
The Government likewise claims as “indispensable” the need
of Takenaka and Asahikosan to provide the necessary technical services and
supplies so that all the various systems and equipment will be ready and
operational in a manner that allows the Government to possess a fully-capable
international airport terminal.
The
Government’s concerns that impelled the filing of its Motion for
Reconsideration are summed up in the following passage therein: “The situation
the Republic now faces is that if any part of its Php3,002,125,000 deposit is
released directly to PIATCO, and PIATCO, as in the past, does not wish to
settle its obligations directly to Takenaka, Asahikosan and Fraport, the
Republic may end up having expropriated a terminal with liens and claims far in
excess of its actual value, the liens remain unextinguished, and PIATCO on the
other hand, ends up with the Php3,0002,125,000 in its pockets gratuitously.”
The Court is
not wont to reverse its previous rulings based on factual premises that are not
yet conclusive or judicially established. Certainly, whatever claims or
purported liens Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO or over the NAIA 3 have
not been judicially established. Neither Takenaka nor Asahikosan are parties to
the present action, and thus have not presented any claim which could be acted
upon by this Court. The earlier adjudications in Agan v. PIATCO made no
mention of either Takenaka or Asahikosan, and certainly made no declaration as
to their rights to any form of compensation. If there is indeed any right to
remuneration due to these two entities arising from NAIA 3, they have not yet
been established by the courts of the land.
It must be emphasized that the conclusive ruling in the Resolution dated
While the Government refers to a judgment rendered by a
Assuming that
PIATCO indeed has corresponding obligations to other parties relating to NAIA
3, the Court does not see how such obligations, yet unproven, could serve to
overturn the Decision mandating that the Government first pay PIATCO the amount
of 3.02 Million Pesos before it may acquire physical possession over the
facilities. This directive enjoining payment is in accordance with Republic Act
No. 8974, and under the mechanism established by the law the amount to be
initially paid is that which is provisionally determined as just compensation.
The provisional character of this payment means that it is not yet final, yet
sufficient under the law to entitle the Government to the writ of possession
over the expropriated property.
There are other judicial avenues outside of this Motion for
Reconsideration wherein all other claims relating to the airport facilities may
be ventilated, proved and determined. Since such claims involve factual issues,
they must first be established by the appropriate trier of facts before they
can be accorded any respect by or binding force on this Court.
The other
grounds raised in the Motion for Reconsideration are similarly flawed.
The
Government argues that the 2004 Resolution in Agan did not
strictly require the payment of just compensation before the Government can
take over the airport facilities. Reliance is placed on the use by the Court of
the word “for”, instead of “before.” Yet the clear intent of that ruling is to
mandate payment of just compensation as a condition precedent before the
Government could acquire physical possession over the airport facilities. The
qualification was made out of due consideration of the fact that PIATCO had
already constructed the facilities at its own expense when its contracts with
the Government were nullified.
Even assuming that “for” may be construed as not necessarily
meaning “prior to”, it cannot be denied that Rep. Act No. 8974 does require
prior payment to the owner before the Government may acquire possession over
the property to be expropriated. Even Rule 67 requires the disbursement of
money by way of deposit as a condition precedent prior to entitlement to a writ
of possession. As the instant case is
one for expropriation, our pronouncement is worthily consistent with the
principles and laws that govern expropriation cases.
The Government likewise adopts the position raised by the
Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Corona that Rep. Act No. 8974 could not
repeal Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, since the deposit of the assessed value
is a procedural matter. It adds that otherwise, Rep. Act No. 8974 is
unconstitutional.
Of course it is too late in the day to question the
constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8974, an issue that was not raised in the
petition. Still, this point was already addressed in the Decision, which noted
that the determination of the appropriate standards for just compensation is a
substantive matter well within the province of the legislature to fix.[3]
As held in Fabian v. Desierto, if the rule takes away a vested right, it
is not procedural,[4]
and so the converse certainly holds that if the rule or provision creates a
right, it should be properly appreciated as substantive in nature. Indubitably,
a matter is substantive when it involves the creation of rights to be enjoyed
by the owner of property to be expropriated. The right of the owner to receive
just compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the
property is a proprietary right, appropriately classified as a substantive
matter and, thus, within the sole province of the legislature to legislate on.
It is possible for a substantive matter to be nonetheless
embodied in a rule of procedure[5],
and to a certain extent, Rule 67 does contain matters of substance. Yet the
absorption of the substantive point into a procedural rule does not prevent the
substantive right from being superseded or amended by statute, for the creation
of property rights is a matter for the legislature to enact on, and not for the
courts to decide upon. Indeed, if the position of the Government is sustained,
it could very well lead to the absurd situation wherein the judicial branch of
government may shield laws with the veneer of irrepealability simply by
absorbing the provisions of law into the rules of procedure. When the 1987
Constitution restored to the judicial branch of government the sole prerogative
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it should be
understood that such rules necessarily pertain to points of procedure, and not
points of substantive law.
The Government also exhaustively cites the Dissenting
Opinion in arguing that the application of Rule 67 would violate the 2004
Resolution of the Court in Agan. It claims that it is not possible to
determine with reasonable certainty the proper amount of just compensation to
be paid unless it first acquires possession of the NAIA 3. Yet what the
Decision mandated to be paid to PIATCO before the writ of possession could
issue is merely the provisionally determined amount of just compensation which,
under the auspices of Rep. Act No. 8974, constitutes the proffered value as
submitted by the Government itself. There is thus no need for the determination
with reasonable certainty of the final amount of just compensation before the
writ of possession may be issued.
Specifically in this case, only the payment or release by the Government
of the proffered value need be made to trigger the operability of the writ of
possession.
Admittedly, the 2004 Resolution in Agan could be
construed as mandating the full payment of the final amount of just
compensation before the Government may be permitted to take over the NAIA 3.
However, the Decision ultimately rejected such a construction, acknowledging
the public good that would result from the immediate operation of the NAIA 3.
Instead, the Decision adopted an interpretation which is in consonance with
Rep. Act No. 8974 and with equitable standards as well, that allowed the
Government to take possession of the NAIA 3 after payment of the proffered
value of the facilities to PIATCO. Such a reading is substantially compliant
with the pronouncement in the 2004 Agan Resolution, and is in accord
with law and equity. In contrast, the Government’s position, hewing to the
strict application of Rule 67, would permit the Government to acquire
possession over the NAIA 3 and implement its operation without having to pay
PIATCO a single centavo, a situation that is obviously unfair. Whatever
animosity the Government may have towards PIATCO does not acquit it from
settling its obligations to the latter, particularly those which had already
been previously affirmed by this Court.
We now turn to the three (3) motions for intervention all of
which were filed after the promulgation of the Court’s Decision. All three (3)
motions must be denied. Under Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure the motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the court.[6]
Since this case originated from an original action filed before this Court, the
appropriate time to file the motions-in-intervention in this case if ever was
before and not after resolution of this
case. To allow intervention at this
juncture would be highly irregular. It is extremely improbable that the movants were unaware of the pendency
of the present case before the Court, and indeed none of them allege such lack
of knowledge.
Takenaka and
Asahikosan rely on Mago v. Court of Appeals[7]
wherein the Court took the extraordinary step of allowing the motion for
intervention even after the challenged order of the trial court had already
become final.[8]
Yet it was apparent in Mago that the movants therein were not impleaded
despite being indispensable parties, and had not even known of the existence of
the case before the trial court[9],
and the effect of the final order was to deprive the movants of their land.[10]
In this case, neither Takenaka nor Asahikosan stand to be dispossessed by
reason of the Court’s Decision. There is no palpable due process violation that
would militate the suspension of the procedural rule.
Moreover, the requisite legal interest required of a party-in-intervention has not been established so as to warrant the extra-ordinary step of allowing intervention at this late stage. As earlier noted, the claims of Takenaka and Asahikosan have not been judicially proved or conclusively established as fact by any trier of facts in this jurisdiction. Certainly, they could not be considered as indispensable parties to the petition for certiorari. In the case of Representative Baterina, he invokes his prerogative as legislator to curtail the disbursement without appropriation of public funds to compensate PIATCO, as well as that as a taxpayer, as the basis of his legal standing to intervene. However, it should be noted that the amount which the Court directed to be paid by the Government to PIATCO was derived from the money deposited by the Manila International Airport Authority, an agency which enjoys corporate autonomy and possesses a legal personality separate and distinct from those of the National Government and agencies thereof whose budgets have to be approved by Congress.
It is also
observed that the interests of the movants-in-intervention may be duly
litigated in proceedings which are extant before lower courts. There is no
compelling reason to disregard the established rules and permit the
interventions belatedly filed after the promulgation of the Court’s Decision.
WHEREFORE,
the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners is DENIED WITH
FINALITY.
The motions respectively filed by Takenaka Corporation, Asahikosan Corporation
and Representative Salacnib Baterina are DENIED.
SO
ORDERED.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
|
REYNATO S.
PUNO Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING Associate
Justice |
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAG0 Associate Justice |
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice |
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES Associate
Justice |
|
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate
Justice |
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C.
GARCIA Associate Justice |
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN.
Chief Justice
[2]“Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or
contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the
said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.” Bank of America v.
American Realty Corp., 378 Phil. 1279, 1296 (1999); citing Philippine
Conflict of Laws, Eight
Edition, 1996, Paras, page 46. See also Querubin v. Querubin, 87 Phil. 124,
133. (1950), Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325,
[5]“[A] particular rule may be procedural in
one context and substantive in another.” Fabian v. Desierto, id.