FIRST
DIVISION
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. No. 165546
Petitioner,
Present:
-
versus - PANGANIBAN,
C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET CALLEJO,
SR., and
H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
H. AGUAS, represented by her
Legal Guardian, ROSANNA Promulgated:
H. AGUAS,
Respondents. February 27, 2006
x - -
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D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66531 and its Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The antecedents are as follows:
Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and
a pensioner, died on
Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter[4] dated
As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and
Jeylnn’s monthly pension in September 1997. It also conducted an investigation to verify
Leticia’s allegations. In a Memorandum[6]
dated
On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a
certain Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile, the SSS denied
Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of their pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within
30 days the amount of P10,350.00 representing the total death benefits
released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to
August 1997 at P1,150.00 per month.[8]
Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a
reconsideration of the said decision.[9] However, in its Letter dated
This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for
the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC)
on
The claimants appended to their petition, among others,
photocopies of the following: (1) Pablo and Rosanna’s marriage certificate; (2)
Janet’s certificate of live birth; (3) Jeylnn’s certificate of live birth; and
(4) Pablo’s certificate of death.
In its Answer, the SSS averred that, based on the sworn
testimonies and documentary evidence showing the disqualification of the
petitioners as primary beneficiaries, the claims were barren of factual and
legal basis; as such, it was justified in denying their claims.[12]
In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was
a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate bearing
Pablo’s signature as Jeylnn’s father. They asserted that Rosanna never left Pablo and
that they lived together as husband and wife under one roof. In support thereof, they attached a Joint
Affidavit[13]
executed by their neighbors, Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu, where they
declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until the
latter’s death. In Janet’s birth
certificate, which was registered in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, it
appears that her father was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna. As to the alleged infertility of Pablo, the
claimants averred that Dr. Macapinlac denied giving the opinion precisely because
he was not an expert on such matters, and that he treated the deceased only for
tuberculosis. The claimant likewise claimed
that the information the SSS gathered from the doctor was privileged
communication.[14]
In compliance with the SSC’s order, the SSS secured
Confirmation Reports[15]
signed by clerks from the corresponding civil registers confirming (1) the fact
of marriage between Pablo and Rosanna on December 4, 1977; (2) the fact of
Jefren dela Peña’s birth on November 15, 1996; (3) the fact of Jeylnn’s birth
on October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of Pablo’s death on December 8, 1996.
The SSC decided to set the case for hearing. It also directed the SSS to verify the
authenticity of Pablo’s signature as appearing on Jeylnn’s birth certificate
from his claim records, particularly his SSS Form E-1 and retirement benefit
application.[16] The SSS complied with said directive and
manifested to the SSC that, based on the laboratory analysis conducted, Pablo’s
signature in the birth certificate was made by the same person who signed the
member’s record and other similar documents submitted by Pablo.[17]
The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu and
Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac for clarificatory questions with regard to their
respective sworn affidavits.[18] Vivencia testified that she had known Pablo
and Rosanna for more than 30 years already; the couple were married and lived
in Macabacle, Dolores,
On the other hand, Carmelita testified that she had been a
neighbor of Pablo and Rosanna for 15 years and that, up to the present, Rosanna
and her children, Janet, Jeylnn and Jefren, were still her neighbors; Janet and
Jeylnn were the children of Pablo and Rosanna but she did not know whose child
Jefren is.[20]
According to Leticia, Janet was not the real child of Pablo
and Rosanna; she was just taken in by the spouses because for a long time they
could not have children;[21] however,
there were no legal papers on Janet’s adoption.[22] Later on, Rosanna got pregnant with Jeylnn; after
the latter’s baptism, there was a commotion at the house because Romeo dela
Peña was claiming that he was the father of the child and he got mad because
the child was named after Pablo; the latter also got mad and even attempted to
shoot Rosanna; he drove them away from the house; since then, Pablo and Rosanna
separated;[23] she
knew about this because at that time their mother was sick, and she would often
visit her at their ancestral home, where Pablo and Rosanna were also staying;
Rosanna was no longer living in their ancestral home but Janet resided therein;
she did not know where Rosanna was staying now but she knew that the latter and
Romeo dela Peña were still living together.[24]
Subsequently, Mariquita Dizon and Jessie Gonzales were also
summoned for clarificatory questions.[25]
During the hearing, Mariquita brought with her photocopies of two baptismal
certificates: that of Jeylnn Aguas,[26]
child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez born on
On P10,350.00 erroneously paid to her and Jeylnn as
primary beneficiaries of the deceased. The
SSC likewise directed the SSS to pay the death benefit to qualified secondary
beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their absence, to his legal heirs.[28]
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary
beneficiary, it appearing that she had contracted marriage with Romeo dela Peña
during the subsistence of her marriage to Pablo. The SSC based its conclusion on the birth
certificate of Jefren dela Peña stating that his mother, Rosanna, and father,
Romeo dela Peña, were married on
more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child. The SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn
and Jenelyn was one and the same person and
concluded, based on the latter’s baptismal certificate, that she was the
daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. It also gave credence to the testimonies of
Leticia and Mariquita that Jeylnn was the child of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña.
As for Janet, the SSC relied on
Leticia’s declaration that she was only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna.[29]
The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision but their motion was denied by the SSC for lack of merit and for
having been filed out of time.[30] The claimants then elevated the case to the CA
via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On
WHEREFORE, the resolution and order
appealed from are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new one is
entered DECLARING petitioners as ENTITLED to the SSS benefits accruing
from the death of Pablo Aguas. The case is hereby REMANDED to public respondent for purposes of computing the benefits
that may have accrued in favor of petitioners after the same was cut and
suspended in September 1997.
SO ORDERED.[31]
In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of
Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were the children of the deceased. According to the appellate court, for judicial
purposes, these records were binding upon the parties, including the SSS. These entries made in public documents may
only be challenged through adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may
not be altered by mere testimonies of witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found no evidence to show
that she ceased to receive support from Pablo before he died. Rosanna’s alleged
affair with Romeo dela Peña was not properly proven. In any case, even if Rosanna married Romeo
dela Peña during her marriage to Pablo, the same would have been a void
marriage; it would not have ipso facto
made her not dependent for support upon Pablo and negate the presumption that,
as the surviving spouse, she is entitled to support from her husband.[32]
The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision,
which the CA denied for lack of merit.[33] Hence, this petition.
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the appellate
court, contending that it
I
GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT ROSANNA AGUAS IS ACTUALLY DEPENDENT FOR SUPPORT UPON THE MEMBER
DURING HIS LIFETIME TO QUALIFY AS PRIMARY BENEFICIARY WITHIN THE INTENDMENT OF
SECTION 8(e), IN RELATION TO SECTION (k) OF THE SSS LAW, AS AMENDED.
II
ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT JANET AGUAS AND JEYLNN AGUAS ARE ENTITLED TO THE PENSION BENEFIT ACCRUING
FROM THE DEATH OF PABLO AGUAS.[34]
Petitioner invokes Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 735, which defines a dependent spouse as “the legitimate spouse dependent for support
upon the employee.” According to
petitioner, Rosanna forfeited her right to be supported by Pablo when she
engaged in an intimate and illicit relationship with Romeo dela Peña and
married the latter during her marriage to Pablo. Such act constitutes abandonment, which
divested her of the right to receive support from her husband. It asserts that her act of adultery is evident
from the birth certificate of Jefren H. dela Peña showing that he was born on
As for Janet and Jeylnn, petitioner maintains that they are
not entitled to the pension because, based on the evidence on record,
particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, they are not the legitimate
children of Pablo. It argues that, in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial authority under Section 5(a) of the Social
Security Act, the SSC can pass upon the legitimacy of respondents’ relationship
with the member to determine whether they are entitled to the benefits, even
without correcting their birth certificates.[36]
Respondents, for their part, assert that petitioner failed to
prove that Rosanna committed acts of adultery or that she married another man
after the death of her husband. They
contend that Janet and Jeylnn’s legitimacy may be impugned only on the grounds
stated in Article 166 of the Family Code, none of which were proven in this
case.[37]
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rosanna, Jeylnn
and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of
Pablo.
The petition is partly meritorious.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised
by the parties and passed upon by the Court in petitions for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.[38] In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings of the
CA.[39] It is not the Court’s function under Rule 45
to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented.[40] However, the Court may review findings of
facts in some instances, such as, when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of
the trial court or quasi-judicial agency, or when the findings of facts of the
CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence
on record.[41] The Court finds these instances present in
this case.
At the time of Pablo’s death, the prevailing law was Republic
Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law enumerates those who are
entitled to death benefits:
Sec.13.
Death benefits. – Effective July 1,
1975, upon the covered employee’s death, (a) his primary beneficiaries shall be
entitled to the basic monthly pension, and his dependents to the dependent’s
pension: Provided, That he has paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions
prior to the semester of death: Provided, further, That if the foregoing
condition is not satisfied, or if he has no primary beneficiaries, his
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to
thirty times the basic monthly pension: Provided, however, That the death
benefit shall not be less than the total contributions paid by him and his
employer on his behalf nor less than five hundred pesos: Provided, finally,
That the covered employee who dies in the month of coverage shall be entitled
to the minimum benefit.
Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary
beneficiaries of an SSS member as follows:
SECTION
8. Terms defined. – For the purposes
of this Act the following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise,
have the following meanings:
x
x x x
(e)
Dependent. – The legitimate,
legitimated, or legally adopted child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed,
and not over twenty-one years of age provided that he is congenitally
incapacitated and incapable of self-support physically or mentally; the
legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the employee; and the legitimate
parents wholly dependent upon the covered employee for regular support.
x x x x
(k)
Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse
until he remarries and dependent children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries.
In their absence, the dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate
children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the
foregoing, any other person designated by the covered employee as secondary
beneficiary.
Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish
his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence
required to establish a fact in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion.[42]
The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that
only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth
certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the
certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was born on
It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code,
children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. This Court, in De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon,[43]
extensively discussed this presumption –
There
is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in
the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the
spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes
the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife
are living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in
Article 170,[44] and in
proper cases Article 171,[45]
of the Family Code (which took effect on
Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.[47] In this case, there is no showing that Pablo
challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child
of Pablo can no longer be contested.
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed
by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his
specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a
competent evidence of paternity.[48]
The presumption of legitimacy under
Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet because her date of birth was not
substantially proven. Such presumption
may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were
legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the
subsistence of that marriage.[49] It should be noted that respondents likewise
submitted a photocopy of Janet’s alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate
the same probative weight as Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way by
the civil register. It stands as a mere
photocopy, without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by
the civil register of the fact of Janet’s birth on the date stated in the certificate.
In any case, a record of birth is
merely prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein.[50] Here, the witnesses were unanimous in saying
that Janet was not the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janet’s adoption
did not undergo any legal proceedings; hence, there were no papers to prove it.
Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No.
1161, as amended, only “legally adopted” children are considered dependent
children. Absent any proof that the
family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot consider her a dependent
child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears
stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must prove that
she was “the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the employee.” The claimant-spouse must therefore establish
two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she
is dependent upon the member for support. In this case, Rosanna presented proof to show
that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage
certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently
established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death
remains to be resolved. Indeed, a
husband and wife are obliged to support each other,[51]
but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is something
that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.
In a parallel case[52]
involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court defined a dependent as “one who derives his or her
main support from another. Meaning,
relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or
sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power, or aid of
someone else.” It should be noted that
the GSIS law likewise defines a dependent
spouse as “the legitimate spouse dependent for
support
upon the member or pensioner.” In that
case, the Court found it obvious that a wife who abandoned the family for more
than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with other men, was not
dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that
entire period. Hence, the Court denied
her claim for death benefits.
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already
separated de facto from her husband
cannot be said to be “dependent for support” upon the husband, absent any
showing to the contrary. Conversely, if
it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the time
of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband
for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory
requirements have been complied with, particularly her dependency on her
husband for support at the time of his death. Aside from her own testimony, the only
evidence adduced by Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo lived together as
husband and wife until his death were the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and
Carmelita Yangu where they made such declaration.
Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their
testimonies before the SSC will not prevail over the categorical and
straightforward testimonies of the other witnesses who testified that Rosanna
and Pablo had already separated for almost six years before the latter died. Except for the bare assertion of Carmelita
that the couple never separated, there was no further statement regarding the
witnesses’ assertion in their affidavits that the couple lived together until
Pablo’s death. On the contrary, Leticia
narrated that the two separated after Jeylnn’s baptism as a result of an
argument regarding Romeo dela Peña. According to Leticia, there was a commotion at
their ancestral house because Romeo dela Peña was grumbling why Jeylnn was
named after Pablo when he was the father, and as a result, Pablo drove them
away. The SSC’s observation and
conclusion on the two baptismal certificates of Jeylnn and Jenelyn
convinces this Court to further believe Leticia’s testimony on why Pablo and
Rosanna separated. As noted by the SSC:
It
appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H. dela Peña are one and
the same person. Jeylnn Aguas, born on
On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that
Rosanna was no longer living at Pablo’s house even before he died, and that she
is still living with Romeo dela Peña up to the present. Mariquita testified as follows:
Hearing Officer:
Nagsama ba si Rosanna at Romeo?
Mrs. Dizon:
Ngayon at kahit na
Hearing Officer:
Kailan namatay si Pablo?
Mrs. Dizon:
1996.
Hearing Officer:
Noong bago mamatay si Pablo?
Mrs. Dizon:
Nagsasama na sila Romeo at Rosanna
Hearing Officer:
So, buhay pa si Pablo ……
Mrs. Dizon:
….
nagsasama na sila ni Romeo.
Hearing Officer:
Kailan nagkahiwalay si Romeo at Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon:
Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay.
Hearing Officer:
Hindi, ibig ko sabihin si Pablo at
Rosana?
Mrs. Dizon:
Hindi ko alam kasi
hindi ako madalas pumunta sa kanila eh, dahil namatay na yung nanay ni Kuya
Pabling, yung tiyahin ko, kapatid ng nanay ko.
Hearing Officer:
Bago namatay si Pablo, nagsasama
ba sina Romeo at Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon:
Oo.
Hearing Officer:
Sa ngayon, may alam ka pa ba kung
nagsasama pa sila Romeo at Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon:
Oo, nagsasama sila, may bahay sila.
Hearing Officer:
Saan naman?
Mrs. Dizon:
Doon
sa malapit sa amin sa may riles ng tren.[54]
In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn
is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it
was established that she is his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet
was merely “adopted” by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it;
hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife
of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she
failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was
still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared
entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
On leave
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
* On leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola
(deceased), with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F.
Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp.
22-29.
[2] Records, p. 27.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Referring to Jeylnn.
[8] Records, p. 34.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] Rollo, pp. 49-50.
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160890, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 637.
[39] Siasat v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 139, 144 (2002).
[40] Asia Trust Development Bank v. Concepts Trading Corporation, 452 Phil. 552, 567 (2003).
[41] Tugade, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 258 (2003).
[42] Anflo Management & Investment Corp. v. Bolanio, 439 Phil. 309, 316 (2002).
[43] 418 Phil. 768 (2001).
[44] Article 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
[45] Article 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
[46] De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, supra note 43, at 773-774.
[47]
[48]
See Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798,
[49] Angeles v.
Maglaya, supra.
[50]
[51] Article 195, Family Code.
[52] Re: Application for Survivor’s Benefits of Ms. Maylenne G. Manlavi, Daughter of the Late Ernesto R. Manlavi, A.M. No. 10019-Ret., February 22, 2001, 352 SCRA 518.
[53] Rollo, pp. 48-49.
[54] Records, pp. 222-223.