FIRST
DIVISION
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INTERNATIONAL
EXCHANGE BANK, Petitioner,
- versus - HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, THE HON. ANTONIO M. ESTEVES, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge of RTC Branch V, Baguio City, and AYALA LAND
INCORPORATED, Respondents. |
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G.R.
No. 165403 Present: PANGANIBAN, CJ Chairman, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: February
27, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us
is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul the Court of Appeals’ Decision[1]
for having been issued in excess of its jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which affirmed the assailed
Orders[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City,
Branch V, dated 30 April 2003 and 18 June 2003, respectively, denying
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and granting private respondent Ayala Land
Inc.’s application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Ostensibly
appearing from the records is a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on
On
Meanwhile,
sometime in March 2001, International Exchange Bank (iBank)
filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 64, an
action for sum of money against CIPI with an application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment. Upon
hearing, the Makati RTC issued the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment directing its Sheriff to levy on attachment properties
registered in the name of CIPI. Since
the TCTs of the two parcels of land supposedly bought
by ALI from CIPI in June 2000 were still registered under the latter’s name,
the Sheriff of the Makati RTC levied the said
property on
On
Herein
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss ALI’s action as
well as an opposition to the latter’s application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. It is iBank’s contention, among other things, that the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction is improper because the levy on
attachment is superior to the deed of sale as said levy was registered ahead of
ALI’s deed of sale. Furthermore, iBank
maintains that the annotation of lis pendens availed of by ALI is already adequate remedy to
protect its interest over the disputed properties.
After both
parties presented their respective evidence, the court a quo issued the Order dated
The Court finds petitioner ALI’s
application for injunction to be primarily based on its apprehension that
execution sale may proceed if not restrained as there might be potential buyers
or third parties who may bid and purchase at the auction the subject properties. The Court is not oblivious of the fact that
ALI itself caused the annotation of lis pendens. To the
mind of the Court, lis pendens
sufficiently protects petitioner’s interests.
With lis pendens, any
potential buyer or third party is adequately informed that the disputed
properties are subject of an on-going litigation. In other words, a third party who buys the
properties can not invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith and he takes
them at peril since whatever judgment will be rendered in this instant case
will affect and bind the properties.
Nevertheless, notice of lis pendens will not prevent a disposition of the
properties to third persons who will now be free to develop and transform its
present character and the use thereof which might be entirely different from
what might be intended by ALI and which might give rise to other graver
consequences, e.g. multiplicity of
suits. Thusly, to prevent the occurrence
of such other consequences, the parties are hereby enjoined to maintain the status quo over the subject properties
until after the proper determination of the case in chief.
x
x x x
As
for the other grounds for the dismissal of this case, the Court deems it proper
to deny the same as it raises material issues, both legal and factual, which is
evidentiary in nature and to be presented during the hearing of the merits of
the case itself. It would be prudent for
the Court to accord more time and opportunity for both parties to litigate, or
present further evidence in support of their respective positions. That way, the Court will be more apprised of
the veracity and tenability of their respective claims.
WHEREFORE,
the motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED; and the respondents are hereby directed
to file their answer in the above-entitled case within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.
Further,
the parties, their assigns, representatives, agents and successors-in-interests
are hereby enjoined to maintain the status
quo over the subject properties until after the determination of the merits
of the petition.[3]
After receipt of the foregoing Order,
iBank immediately filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was subsequently denied by the lower court in the Order dated
x x x
However, the Court notes in Ayala’s Opposition and Rejoinder, that aside from
defending the status quo Order, it
asks that the Court issue the writ of preliminary injunction it had originally
sought. Pursuant to this Court’s power
to control and amend its processes so as to make them conformable to law and
practice (Rule 135, Sec. 5 (g), it has decided to squarely rule on the
application.
With respect to the plaintiff’s application for a writ
of preliminary injunction, the requisites are: 1) a right in esse (or the existence of a right to
be protected); 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is violative of such right (Buayan
Cattle Co. vs. Quintillan, 128 SCRA 276; Sales vs.
SEC, G.R. No. 54330, 13 January 1989); and 3) irreparable damage. A trial is allowed to determine the foregoing
from a “sampling” of the evidence (Olalia vs. Hizon, 196 SCRA 665).
This Court is convinced, from the evidence so far presented, of the prima facie presence of the requisites.[4]
x
x x x
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Motion for Reconsideration of
defendant International Exchange Bank is DENIED for lack of merit.
The petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary
injunction is GRANTED. Upon posting by
petitioner and approval by the Court of a bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00
in favor of International Exchange Bank, let a writ of preliminary injunction
issue enjoining:
a)
Private
respondent International Exchange Bank and public respondent Sheriff of RTC-Makati, and all those acting on their behalf, or under
their instructions, from doing any act committed or intended to be committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, pursuant to, or
which would otherwise implement the sale of the lands under Ayala’s TCT Nos. T-78276
and T-78277, such as but not limited to i) annotating
or causing the annotation of the judgment or the writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 01-537 on said TCT Nos. T-78276 and T-78277; ii) posting of notices
within Baguio City; iii) advertising the sale in a
newspaper of general circulation; iv) issuing and presenting for registration,
any certificate of sale or deed of sale intended to be registered before with
the respondent Register of Deeds of Baguio City; and
b)
Public respondent
Register of Deeds of Baguio City from registering any
sale, conveyance or encumbrance based on the Notice of Levy on Attachment or
any execution made by respondent Sheriff of Makati-RTC.[5]
Thus, on
On
With regard to the issue raised by petitioner
regarding the status quo order, we find no reason to discuss the same
considering that it has become moot and academic with the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction. The court
should refrain from expressing its opinion in a case in which no practical
relief may be granted in view of a supervening event. x x
x
x x x
x
x x x In the instant case, we find
nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in the trial court’s Order directing
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court found the requisites for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be attendant after its
evaluation of the evidence presented by both contending parties. The same has been sufficiently discussed in its
Order granting the same and we find no reason to disturb such findings.
x x x
x
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.[6]
Petitioner iBank’s Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
decision was consequently denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
Hence the
instant petition for certiorari
alleging that:
I.
Public respondent
judge and the Court of Appeals gravely abused their discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction for issuing and allowing the issuance,
respectively, of the status quo order dated April 30, 2003, and for
subsequently allowing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
without basis and without Ayala Land moving for the reconsideration of the
status quo order;
II.
Public respondent
judge and Court of Appeals gravely abused their discretion when they granted
and/or allowed injunction to remain by ascribing bad faith to petitioner bank,
where there is none, while exempting
The
petition must fail.
Petitioner’s
Petition for Certiorari should be
dismissed for adopting the wrong mode of appeal. Petitioner received the Court of Appeals’
resolution denying its Motion for Reconsideration on
This Court
has already elucidated in numerous cases that the special civil action for certiorari cannot be used as a
substitute for an appeal which the petitioner already lost.[8] We have time and again reminded members of
the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when “there is no appeal nor
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”[9] Certiorari
cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment to the
proper forum despite the availability of that remedy,[10]
certiorari not being a substitute for
lost appeal.[11]
Furthermore,
there is no reason why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition, could not have
been raised on appeal.[12] Mere errors of judgment cannot be the proper
subject of a special civil action for certiorari.[13] Where the issue or question involved affects
the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the jurisdiction of the
court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province of a special
civil action for certiorari.[14] Erroneous findings and conclusions do not
render the appellate court vulnerable to the corrective writ of certiorari, for where the court has
jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct, they would,
at the most, constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible
by certiorari.[15]
Admittedly,
this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court
and in the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, especially if
filed within the reglementary period for filing a
petition for review.[16] However, the circumstances in the instant
case do not justify the liberal application of the rules. Notably, the instant petition was filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period provided for
under Rule 45 without any justifiable explanation being presented by
petitioner. In fact, petitioner even
prayed for an extension of time to file its petition after 55 days had already
lapsed from its receipt of the appellate court’s resolution denying its Motion
for Reconsideration. Clearly,
petitioner’s resort to this special civil action as a substitute for its lost
appeal cannot be countenanced.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. With
costs.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] CA-G.R. SP No. 78691, dated
[2] Civil Case No. 5451-R, penned by Judge Antonio M. Esteves.
[3] Rollo, pp. 88-89.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo, p. 41.
[8] The President, Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 151280, 10 June 2004, 431 SCRA 682, 688, citing Conejos v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil.
849, 855 (2002); Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Continental Watchman Agency Incorporated, G.R. 136114, 22
January 2004, 420 SCRA 624, 630, citing Bernardo
v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 413, 425 (1997); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 97 (2000).
[9] Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 413, 425 (1997); Dela Paz v. Panis, 315 Phil. 238, 248 (1995).
[10] Bernardo
v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 413,
425 (1997).
[11] Republic
v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 97 (2000); Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 413, 425 (1997); Felizardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112050,
15 June 1994, 233 SCRA 220, 224.
[12] The
President, Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 151280, 10 June 2004, 431 SCRA 682, 688, citing Conejos v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 849, 855 (2002); Land Bank of the Philippines v. Continental
Watchman Agency Incorporated, G.R. 136114, 22 January 2004, 420 SCRA 624,
630, citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,
341 Phil. 413, 425 (1997); Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 97 (2000).
[13] Zapata
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 77827,
[14] New
York Marine Managers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 538, 542-543
(1995).
[15] New
York Marine Managers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 538, 542-543
(1995), citing Planters Products, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76591, 6 February 1991, 193 SCRA 563, 569.
[16] Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Continental Watchman Agency Incorporated, G.R.
136114, 22 January 2004, 431 SCRA 682, 688, citing Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066, 1075
(1997); The President, Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151280, 10 June 2004,
431 SCRA 682, 688, citing Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 97 (2000).