FIRST DIVISION
|
JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO, Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 164953
Present: Panganiban, CJ, Chairman, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo,
Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ Promulgated: February 13, 2006 |
|
- versus - |
|
|
Hon. EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., in His Capacity
as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court (Branch 13), Manila, Respondent. |
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
|
V |
exatious, oppressive,
unjustified and capricious delays in the arraignment violates the
constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy case disposition, particularly
when the accused is detained. Under the
circumstances of the present case, mandamus is a proper remedy for relief from
prolonged detention. This Court safeguards
liberty and will therefore always uphold the basic constitutional rights of the
people, especially the weak and the marginalized.
The Case
Before us is a
Petition for Mandamus[1]
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) the dismissal of the Information
filed against Petitioner John Joseph Lumanlaw y Bulinao; and (2) his release from the
Manila City Jail.
The Facts
Culled from the
parties’ pleadings are the following undisputed facts.
Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by
the Western Police District near
“That on or about November 24, 2002, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess
any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession, custody and control one
(1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero one one (0.011) grams of white crystalline substance known as
SHABU containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[3]
A Commitment
Order[4]
was consequently issued by Presiding Judge Luis J. Arranz
directing the detention of petitioner in the Manila City Jail and setting the
latter’s arraignment on
The resolution
of these matters was overtaken by Judge Arranz’s
retirement from public service. Thus, the arraignment scheduled for
On
On
The arraignment was postponed again,
this time due to the absence of petitioner’s counsel. According to him, he requested the court to
proceed with the arraignment, with the public defender assisting the accused, but
that respondent judge denied the request on the ground that petitioner was already
represented by a counsel de parte.[12]
The trial court then re-scheduled the
arraignment on
In what was beginning to be a pattern
of laxity, the September 24 arraignment was likewise postponed in view of the
scheduled meeting of presiding judges with accredited newspaper publishers and
was thus reset to
On the latter
date, respondent judge issued the following Order:[15]
“In view of the draft Order dated
August 6, 2003 which impeded the Produce Order for the arraignment and
pre-trial conference this afternoon of defendant John Joseph Lumanlaw in
relation to Criminal Case No. 02-208426, the arraignment and pre-trial
conference are hereby reset on December 10, 2003 at 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, on the date amenable to Atty. Ernesto Delfin,
as well as the defendant.”
Again, the arraignment did
not occur on
Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet
Lumanlaw remained uninformed of the charges against him, while continuing to be
in detention and despair all throughout that period of limbo. Owing to this insufferable state of affairs, petitioner’s
counsel manifested his intention to file a motion to dismiss on account of the
violation of his client’s right to a speedy trial.[17] Accordingly, an Urgent Motion to Dismiss[18]
was filed on
The arraignment did not
take place, however, because the accused was not produced in court by the jail
wardens concerned. It turned out that
the trial court had not issued a “produce order” to the Manila City Jail. Another resetting was ordered for
Now frustrated with the
repeated postponements, petitioner filed a Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss[21]
on
On
“Inasmuch as the Trial Prosecutor has just furnished a copy
of her Comment dated
“Meanwhile,
without prejudice to the resolution of the pending motion, the arraignment and
pre-trial conference of John Joseph Lumanlaw are hereby tentatively
scheduled on
On
On this date, it was respondent
judge’s absence that caused the postponement of the arraignment, which was
reset to
Hence, the
present Petition.[30]
The Issues
Petitioner raises the
following issues for our consideration:
“Whether or not the failure of public respondent to conduct
the arraignment of the petitioner despite the delay of one (1) year, nine (9)
months and four (4) days constitute undue and unjustifiable delay in violation
of his constitutional right to speedy trial.
“Whether or not such undue and unjustifiable delay would
warrant the dismissal of the Information filed against the petitioner.
“That should the decision by the Honorable Supreme Court be
one finding merit in this Petition, whether or not the said decision is binding
upon the newly appointed presiding judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 13,
Manila, as successor of public respondent.”[31]
On the other
hand, respondent asks whether the Petition for Mandamus should be given due
course. [32]
On the whole, the
issues may be reduced to the following: 1) whether there was a violation of the
right to speedy trial, warranting a quashal of the Information
against petitioner; and 2) whether mandamus is the proper remedy.
The Court’s
Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Arraignment is a vital stage in
criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally informed of the charges
against them.[33] The proper conduct of the arraignment is
provided in Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment
is not a mere formality, but an integral part of due process.[34]
Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right
to speedy trial.
On this point,
petitioner argues that, by respondent’s failure to act expeditiously on his
arraignment, his right to speedy trial was violated. He points out the fourteen postponements that
resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two years. Moreover, he cites Section 2 of Supreme Court
Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as “The
Speedy Trial Act of 1998”), which provides that arraignment shall be held
within thirty days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the
accused.
On the other
hand, respondent counters that there were no capricious and oppressive delays that
would justify a dismissal of the Information.
The Office of the Solicitor General points to the participation of
petitioner himself in the protracted proceedings, such as his filing of a Motion
for Preliminary Investigation and his counsel’s absence from one of the scheduled
hearings.[35]
Speedy Trial
Construed
The
thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was construed in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.[36] It
was held in that case that the period was not absolute. Certain delays were allowed by law and excluded
from the computation of the time within which trial must commence. The Court ruled that those exclusions should “reflect
the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of ‘speedy trial’ is a
‘relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.’”[37] It held further that courts must strive to maintain
a delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of
speedy trial, on the one hand; and, on the other, the right of the State to
prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals.
Indeed, judicial proceedings do not
exist in a vacuum. They must contend
with the realities of everyday life.
Thus, a sensible assessment of their conduct must consider several
factors, rather than a mere mathematical calculation of periods that have elapsed
between stages. Jurisprudence has set forth
the following guidelines:
“x x x. [T]he right to a
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial
are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right
to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which
the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such
factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion
or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are
considered.”[38]
Reasonable Postponements
It
should be stressed that petitioner never acquiesced to the seemingly endless
postponements of the arraignment. He
asserted his right to speedy trial twice,
but was denied by respondent in both instances. Considering that petitioner has been under
detention since December 2002, we need not belabor the prejudice, distress, and
anxiety he suffered as a result of the delayed arraignment.
We
concede that the bases for some of the delays were completely sound, such as the
retirement of Judge Arranz[39]
and the manifestation of petitioner that the latter would be filing a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation.[40] Those matters were manifestly not intended to
delay the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 02-208426.
The
delay caused by Judge Arranz’s retirement may be
deemed a normal part of the ordinary conduct of court business and was not necessarily
unreasonable. The second ground was the
right of the accused accorded by Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.[41]
Verily, petitioner’s request for a
preliminary investigation before arraignment was well-advised, in view of the
rule that failure to do so would constitute a waiver of the right.[42] Thus, it has been held that though the
conduct of a preliminary investigation may hold back the progress of a case, such
investigation is necessary so that the defendant’s right will not be
compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.[43]
Unjustified
Delay
This
Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds
them far from being reasonable. There were
fourteen postponements in all. Going
over the causes for the delays, we see the lack of earnest effort on the part
of respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as the court calendar would
allow. Most of the postponements could
have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting and upholding
petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition.
Given
the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a violation
of the right of petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost two years[44]
elapsed from the filing of the Information against him until the filing of this
Petition; incredibly, he has not been arraigned. An arraignment takes, at most, ten minutes of
the court’s business and does not normally entail legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to the accused
the charges leveled against them, ensuring their understanding of those charges,
and obtaining their plea to the charges.
A prudent and resolute judge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the
accused are presented before the court.
In
fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the information
to the conduct of an arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes that this fundamental
right should and can be done with minimal delay. For this reason alone, we are astonished that
the court a quo could not complete
such a simple but fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay became all the more oppressive
and vexatious when viewed from the perspective that the liberty of the accused was
being curtailed for the entire duration.
Postponement Due
to
Absence of
Counsel
It
will be recalled that the arraignment set for
The
appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the defendant’s counsel de parte is
not prohibited,[46] not
even by the Constitution,[47]
especially when the accused themselves request that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to
appoint a counsel de oficio
when the accused have no counsel of choice at
the time of their arraignment.[48] People
v. Serzo[49] held thus:
“x x x [A]n accused may exercise his right to counsel by
electing to be represented either by
a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be
represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of
counsel de parte,
however, is not absolute. The court
is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the
state's and the offended party's equally
important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may
restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if
the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is
not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for
a valid reason, e.g. conflict of
interest and the like.”[50]
Like other personal
rights, the right to a counsel de parte is waivable, so long as
1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law; and 2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and
intelligently made.[51]
Applying
these principles, it would have been more prudent for respondent judge to have
appointed a counsel de oficio for purposes of arraignment only. This course of action became more compelling
in the instant case when petitioner himself requested the appointment.[52] To be sure, he would not have been prejudiced
by that action, provided there was a proper observance of Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under
Section 8 of this rule, before proceeding with the arraignment, the court is
mandated to give the appointed counsel de
oficio reasonable time to consult with the
accused as to the latter’s plea.[53]
Clearly,
respondent judge’s postponement of the arraignment on
Responsibility
of Judges
in Minimizing
Delay
The foremost
cause for the lengthy delay in this case was the repeated failure of the jail
wardens to bring the accused to court. No
less than four court settings,[54]
spanning seven months, were postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this recurring circumstance was
caused, in different instances, by the failure of the court personnel to issue
the produce order on time and by the dereliction of the jail wardens. Remarkably, although respondent judge was
justified in deferring the arraignment until the accused was presented,[55]
the problem could have been easily averted by efficient court management.
In
his role as administrator, respondent should have supervised his clerk of court
to ensure a timely service of the produce order on the wardens of the Manila
City Jail. Judges must keep a watchful
eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under their
immediate supervision, who are primarily employed to aid in the administration
of justice. Judges who set the pace for greater
efficiency, diligence and dedication, could prompt their personnel to be more
diligent and efficient in the performance of official duties. For certain,
leniency in the administrative supervision of court personnel must be avoided.[56]
We
stress the need to remind judges to exhibit more diligence and efficiency in
the performance of their judicial duties to avoid loss of faith and confidence
in the administration of justice. Rule 3.09 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires them to “organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure
the prompt and efficient dispatch of business x x x.” Additionally, Section 5(d) of Rule 135 confers upon
every court the power to control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of
all other persons who in any manner are connected with a case before it.
Respondent
did not exercise his prerogatives in administering speedy justice. Instead, he
was content with issuing reminders[57]
that miserably failed to resolve the problem expeditiously. We can only conclude from the distinct
circumstances of the case that he failed to assert actively his authority to
expedite the proceedings.
Instead
of being proactive and steering the course of the proceedings with deliberate
dispatch, respondent tended to be passive and reactive by allowing the pace of
the proceedings to be dictated by the listlessness of the parties, his staff,
and the jail wardens. Judges should be
more deliberate in their actions and, within the bounds of law, make full use
of their authority to expedite proceedings while continuing to respect the
rights of parties to ventilate their respective causes fully.
Indeed,
judges are required to dispose of the court’s business expeditiously, in
accordance with Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which we
quote:
“A judge shall dispose of the
court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required period.”
This
Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to act promptly on their
cases. Delay in the disposition of cases
erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards,
and brings it into disrepute.[58]
In the
light of the numerous and unreasonable delays in the arraignment of petitioner,
the sought for dismissal of the Information filed against him is in order.
Second Issue:
Propriety of a Petition for Mandamus
Respondent
maintains that mandamus is not the proper remedy, because he did not
neglect his duties. Considering the above findings of inordinate delay,
respondent’s contention evidently has no leg to stand on.
It is
established that a writ of mandamus may be issued to control the exercise of
discretion[59] when,
in the performance of duty, there is undue delay that can be characterized as a
grave abuse of discretion resulting in manifest injustice.[60] In view of our finding of unwarranted delays
in the conduct of the arraignment of petitioner, he has indeed the right to demand
-- through a writ of mandamus -- expeditious action from all officials tasked
with the administration of justice.
Thus, he may not only demand that his arraignment be held but,
ultimately, that the information against him be dismissed on the ground of the violation
of his right to speedy trial.
Mandamus is a
proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel
the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right
involved is mandated by the Constitution.[61]
Besides, it has long been established in
this jurisdiction that the writ of mandamus is available to the accused to
compel a dismissal of the case.[62]
Respondent
argues for the dismissal of the instant Petition on the ground that petitioner
did not move for a reconsideration of the trial court’s Order dated
In the face of
extraordinary and compelling reasons, it has been held that the availability of
another remedy does not preclude a resort to a special civil action under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. These reasons arise when, among others, the assailed
order issued with grave abuse of discretion is null,[64]
when the available remedy will not afford expeditious relief,[65]
and when a motion for reconsideration will be useless.[66]
The instant case
falls under these exceptional cases. To begin with, the numerous and unreasonable
postponements displayed an abusive exercise of discretion. The delays were ordered in total disregard of
the constitutional right of petitioner.
In fact, the Orders denying his motions to dismiss did not even bother
to explain the reasonableness of the bases for the postponements. The Order dated
“Pending resolution of certain
incidents as chronicled by the Court in open court, and given the Trial
Prosecutor’s objections thereto lifted from the record as to why the
arraignment and pre-trial conference of the [petitioner] John Joseph Lumanlaw y
Bolinao were not scheduled forwith (sic) as expected
by counsel for the defense, the Court opted to DENY the ‘Urgent Motion to Dismiss’ dated December 17, 2003 in
Criminal Case No. 02-208426.”[67]
After
enumerating all the causes for the postponements, the Second Urgent Motion to
Dismiss was denied by respondent in the Order dated
“Based on the foregoing
chronological backdrop, there were causes that justified the suspension of the
arraignment that shall be excluded in computing the period for arraignment per
Section 1 (g), Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
thusly:
‘Unless a shorter period is provided by special law
or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The time of the pendency of a
motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying
suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period.’
“Accordingly, the Second Urgent
Motion to Dismiss dated
The Orders did
not even discuss why the postponements were justified, or which of them could be
excluded from the computation of the prescribed period. Absent any discussion of these matters, baseless
was the court a quo’s conclusion that
there was no violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial. A veritable display of capriciousness cannot
be countenanced when weighed against an immutable right protected by the
Constitution.
As further
aggravation, respondent did not exert any effort to expedite the arraignment
even after petitioner had filed two urgent motions to dismiss. Indeed, there was basis for the latter’s belief
that filing a motion for reconsideration would have been only an exercise in
futility.[69]
Respondent also
contends that the instant Petition should be dismissed for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts. This Court has full
discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it.[70] In the interest of speedy justice, the Court deemed
it best to take cognizance of the present Petition, notwithstanding the
hierarchy of courts. Remanding the legal issues to the Court of Appeals would have
only exacerbated the violation of petitioner’s rights.
It is the policy
of this Court not to deny a writ of mandamus on purely technical matters, if a
party would be deprived of substantive rights.
Procedural rules should not be strictly enforced when their enforcement would
result in a miscarriage of justice. This
principle holds, especially when a petition is meritorious and the trial judge clearly
violated petitioner’s constitutional right.
The protection of our people’s civil liberties overwhelms all rules of
procedure. These rules are mere tools for
facilitating the attainment of justice. As explicitly provided in the Rules of
Court itself, they “shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.”[71]
Let it be known
that this Court will not shirk from the responsibility -- nay, the duty -- to
set aside all obstacles to the fortification of every citizen’s
constitutionally enshrined rights. We will not condone or give our imprimatur
to the sluggish pace of the proceedings below. The Court has the duty to safeguard liberty; hence,
it will always uphold the basic constitutional rights of our people, especially
the weak and the marginalized.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
Criminal Case No. 02-208425-26
pending before Branch 13 of the Manila Regional Trial Court is DISMISSED.
Petitioner is hereby ordered RELEASED
from the Manila City Jail, where he is currently detained, unless he is being
held for any other lawful cause.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairman,
First Division
W E C O N C U R:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 3-27.
[2]
[3] Bold types in original.
[4] Rollo,
p. 31.
[5] Petition,
p. 5; rollo, p. 7.
[6] Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[7]
[8] Petition, p. 6; rollo, p. 8.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[10]
[11]
[12] Petition, p. 8; rollo, p. 10.
[13] Rollo, p. 48.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 134.
[18] Rollo, pp. 52-56.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 135.
[26] Rollo, pp. 75-77.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
This case was deemed submitted
for resolution on
[31] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 137. Original in uppercase.
[32] Respondent’s
Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 120.
[33] Agpalo, Handbook on Criminal Procedure (2001), p. 331.
[34]
See People v. Estomaca, 326 Phil 429,
[35] Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 121.
[36]
338 SCRA 511,
[37]
[38]
Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, 307,
[39]
Judge Arranz’
retirement resulted in the postponement of the arraignment scheduled for
[40]
This manifestation caused the
postponement of the arraignment scheduled on
[41] “SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. -- x x x
x x x x x
x x x
x
“After
the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of
its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce
evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule.”
[42]
People v. Cubcubin, 413 Phil 249, July
10, 2001; Yusop v. Sandiganbayan, 352 SCRA 587,
February 22, 2001 (citing Go v. CA, 206
SCRA 138, February 11, 1992).
[43]
Matalam v. Second Division Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165751,
[44]
The Information against
petitioner was filed before the court a
quo on
[45] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 4; rollo, p. 133.
[46]
See Eballa v. Paas, 362 SCRA 389,
[47]
See People v. Larrańaga, 421 SCRA 530,
[48]
Sayson v. People, 166 SCRA 680,
[49]
274 SCRA 553,
[50]
[51]
Ibid.
[52]
In Eballa v. Paas, supra at note 46, we upheld the
judge’s decision to appoint a counsel de oficio to represent the defendant during her
arraignment despite vehement
objections from the defendant. We ruled
that the judge’s action did not violate the defendant’s right to have counsel
of her own choice.
[53] §8 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[54]
The accused was not brought
before the court on
[55] §1(b) of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[56]
Shan Jr. v. Aguinaldo, 117 SCRA 32,
[57] Rollo, pp. 45, 50, and 60.
[58]
Atty. Ng v. Judge Ulibari, 355 Phil 76,
[59]
Kant Kwong v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, 156 SCRA 222,
[60]
See Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, 370 SCRA 394,
[61] Ibid.
[62]
See Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538, October 7, 1994; Acebedo v. Hon. Sarmiento, 146 Phil 820,
December 16, 1970; Esguerra v. De la
Costa, 66 Phil 134, August 30, 1938.
[63] Respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 122-123.
[64]
National Electrification Administration, 211 Phil. 551, December
29, 1983; Marcelo v. Hon. de Guzman, 200
Phil. 137, June 29, 1982; Pineda &
Ampil Manufacturing Co., v. Bartolome, 95 Phil 930, September 30, 1954.
[65] Marcelo v. Hon. de Guzman, ibid.
[66]
See National Electrification Administration, supra at note 64.
[67] Rollo, p. 59.
[68]
[69] Petitioner’s Reply, p. 11; rollo, p. 111.
[70]
See Ark Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, 410
SCRA 148, August 29, 2003; Nala v. Judge Barroso Jr., 455
Phil 999, August 7, 2003; Del Mar v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 346 SCRA 485, November 29,
2000.
[71] §6 of Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.