FIRST DIVISION
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JOSEFINA M. CRUZ
and ERNESTINA M. CONCEPCION, Petitioners, - versus - THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION,
MARIANO “BOY” BUNAG and ROLANDO BUNAG, Respondents. |
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G.R. No.
164797 Present: PANGANIBAN,
C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to
reverse and set aside the decision[1] of public respondent Court of
Appeals dated 19 March 2004 which dismissed the petition for certiorari asking for the nullity of the
13 May 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 35,
in Civil Case No. 2583-02, and its Resolution[2]
dated
The
antecedents are substantially stated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
There are four (4) cases involved in
this controversy. The first case that
was filed between the parties is Civil Case No. 4365 for Unlawful Detainer
litigated before the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija entitled “Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M.
Concepcion, plaintiffs, vs. Mariano `Boy’ Bunag, Rolando Bunag, Remedios Bunag,
et al., Defendants.” This case was
decided on
The second case is Civil Case No.
1600 for Quieting of Title, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 with “Carlos L.
Bunag, Elias Bunag Natividad, Mariano Bunag, Salud Bunag Clanaoc and Juliana
Bunag Arevalo, as Plaintiffs and Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M. Concepcion
as Heirs of Sps. Carlos Maniquis and Marina Bunag, as Defendants.” This case was dismissed for failure to
prosecute as evidenced by the Regional Trial Court Order dated
The third case is Civil Case No.
2573-02 for Injunction, with “Mariano
`Boy’ Bunag and Rolando Bunag as
Petitioners against Carlos Bunag, Elias
Bunag Natividad, Mariano Bunag, Salud Bunag Clanaoc and Juliana Bunag Arevalo
as Defendants.” This case, which was
filed before the
The fourth case is the instant controversy for Annulment of Title With Damages. Docketed as Civil Case No. 2583-02, it was lodged by herein private respondents Mariano “Bo[y]” Bunag and Rolando Bunag against herein petitioners Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M. Concepcion before the sala of Branch 35, Regional Trial Court of Gapan City.
It appears that herein petitioners interposed a Motion for Outright Dismissal of Civil Case No. 2583 which was granted by the Court a quo as evidenced by an Order dated 18 February 2003, ratiocinating:
x x x x x x x x x
After a careful study of the
arguments of both parties, the Court has found that herein case (2583) involve
the same parties, subject matter and issue as that in Civil Case No. 1600 which
has become final and executory and Civil Case No. 2573-02 which was already
dismissed by this Court on the ground of res
judicata. In all three cases,
Mariano Bunag was included as party-plaintiff and Ernestina Concepcion as
party-defendant. The subject matter involves
a parcel of land located in San Nicolas,
Moreover, the Certification against forum shopping does not only refer to final and executory actions but also to pending controversies. Considering that plaintiffs have been represented by the same counsel in Civil Case No. 2573 and herein case (Civil Case No. 2583-02), it is very clear that plaintiffs counsel is appraised (sic) of the existence of Civil Case No. 1600 and Civil Case No. 2573.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Motion for Outright Dismissal is granted by reason of res judicata and accion
pendente lite and the plaintiffs and their counsel are declared guilty of
indirect Contempt of Court by reason of non-disclosure of Civil Case No. 1600
and Civil Case No. 2573 as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules
of Court and ordered them to pay a fine of P1,000.00
each.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 36)
x x x x x x x x x
However, when herein private respondents interposed their Motion for Reconsideration, the court a quo reversed itself and reinstated the present case, the fallo of the herein assailed Order reads:
x x x x x x x x x
In the light of the foregoing, the
Order dated
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 11-13)[3]
Via petition for review, petitioners
went to the Court of Appeals. The latter
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
It ruled that one of the elements of res
judicata, i.e., that there must be, between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action, is
lacking. It explained:
First. The issue in the Injunction case is the propriety of the demolition order; while in the present action (Petition for Annulment of Title With Damages), the pivot of inquiry is the ownership of the controversial estate.
Second. Private respondent Mariano Bunag denied that he authorized Carlos Bunag to sign the Verified Complaint in his behalf. Because of this, Mariano Bunag cannot be considered as a party litigant in the Injunction case. Concomitantly, there is no identity of parties between the present case and in Civil Case No. 2573-02 (Injunction). As correctly ruled by the trial court, thus:
“x x x x x x x x x
While
it is true that this Court has earlier made a declaration in Civil Case No.
2573 that Carlos Bunag was authorized by his co-plaintiffs to file Civil Case
No. 1600 including herein plaintiff Mariano Bunag, against herein defendants,
such declaration was based on the verified complain[t] signed by Carlos
Bunag. In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, the Court has to assume that indeed Carlos Bunag was authorized
by his co-plaintiff Mariano Bunag to file Civil Case No. 1600. However, with the submission of the affidavit
of Mariano Bunag on
The categorical denial of Mariano Bunag that he was not aware that Carlos included him as one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1600 for quieting of title has disputed the verified complaint of Carlos Bunag. What is more, Rolando Bunag, one of the herein plaintiffs was never made a party in the said Civil Case No. 1600 for quieting of title. Since Mariano Bunag did not authorize nor give his consent to Carlos Bunag to include him as one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1600 and that herein plaintiffs Rolando Bunag is not a party to the said case, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1600 will not bind them. Hence, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1600 will not bar the filing of the instant complaint as one of the requisites of res judicata is absent. There is no identity of parties between Civil Case No. 1600 and the instant case for the simple reason that herein plaintiffs were not parties in Civil Case No. 1600 as discussed above. Consequently, plaintiffs and their counsel can not be said to have violated the rule against forum shopping. Plaintiffs and their counsel did not file Civil Case No. 1600 and therefore they are not obligated to inform this Court that they have filed a similar action involving the same issue with other court.
x x x”
Third. As the court of justice abhors the disposition of the case based on technicalities, this Court further concurs with the trial court’s disquisition, to quote:
x x x x x x x x x
Moreover, substantial justice demands that technicalities should not be allowed to prevail over the substantive rights of a party-litigant. If the subject property is really owned by the plaintiffs, then it would be the height of injustice if they are not allowed to prove their cause of action because of mere technicality. It would amount to deprivation of their property without due process.[4]
Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration[5]
which was denied in a resolution dated
Dissatisfied,
petitioners are now before us charging that the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the assailed decision and resolution.[7]
Petitioners
contend that all the elements of res
judicata are present in the instant case.
They argue that the shuffling of parties should not prevent the
application of res judicata
considering that three prior cases (Civil Case No. 4365 for Unlawful Detainer,
Civil Case No. 1600 for Quieting of Title and Civil Case No. 2573 for
Injunction) against substantially the same parties over the same subject matter
and cause of action have all been decided in their favor. They point out that private respondent
Mariano “Boy” Bunag was one of the parties in the Ejectment and Quieting of
Title cases (and Injunction), and that his allegation in his affidavit that he
neither authorized Carlos Bunag to include him in the Quieting of Title case
nor was he (Mariano) informed thereof, leaves too much to be desired and that
same was merely intended for delay. As
regards the non-inclusion of private respondent Rolando Bunag in the case for
Quieting of Title but who was a party in the Ejectment case (as well as in the
Injunction case), they claim that same was in preparation for this stage of the
proceedings. They added that insofar as
identity of causes of action is concerned, it cannot be denied that the
ownership and its concomitant right of possession are the issues in the cases
for Quieting of Title, Injunction and Annulment of Title.
In their comment,[8]
private respondents Rolando Bunag and Monina Luzong Vda. de Bunag[9]
maintain that the public respondent did not err when it held that there was no res judicata in the instant case and
that the disposition of the case should not be based on technicalities.
The question to be resolved is: Does res judicata apply in the case at bar?
Under the rule of res
judicata, also known as “bar by prior judgment,” a final judgment or order
on the merits, rendered by a Court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties
and their successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity. The
requisites essential for the application of the principle are: (1) there must
be a final judgment or order; (2) said judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) the Court rendering the same must have jurisdiction on the subject matter
and the parties; and (4) there must be between the two cases identity of
parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.[10]
Petitioners claim res judicata applies in this case
because all the elements thereof are present.
On the other hand, private respondents argue the contrary alleging that
the second and fourth elements are lacking.
There being no dispute as to the presence of the first and third
elements, we now determine if the second and fourth elements are attendant in
the case.
On the second element, private
respondents argue that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1600 (for Quieting of
Title) was not a dismissal on the merits.
The dismissal of this case, they claim, will not bar the filing of the
instant case (Civil Case No. 2583-02 for Annulment of Title) because there was
neither litigious consideration of the evidence nor any stipulations submitted
by the parties at the trial. In fact,
there was no pre-trial conference and that after four years of court
inactivity, the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute.[11]
Their argument does not hold
water. Section 3
of Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 3. Dismissal
due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in
chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint
may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim
in the same or in a separate action.
This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.[12]
The rule enumerates the
instances where the complaint may be dismissed due to plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the
presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the rules
or any order of the court. Once a case
is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with
prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the
order of dismissal. In other words, unless there be a
qualification in the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the
dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with
prejudice.[13] The order dismissing Civil Case No. 1600
reads:
For
failure of the plaintiffs as well as counsel to appear on several settings
despite due notices, precisely for the reception of plaintiffs’ evidence, upon motion
of the defendant through Atty. Mark Arcilla, this case is dismissed for failure
to prosecute.[14]
It
is clear from the afore-mentioned order that said case was dismissed, upon
petitioners’ motion, for failure of private respondents and their counsel to
attend several scheduled hearings for the presentation of their evidence. Since the order did not contain a
qualification whether same is with or without prejudice, following Section 3,
it is deemed to be with prejudice and shall have the effect of an adjudication on the merits. A ruling based on a motion to dismiss,
without any trial on the merits or formal presentation of evidence, can still be a judgment on the merits.[15]
We
now go to the fourth element – identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action.
Petitioners,
citing jurisprudence, argue that res
judicata is not defeated by a minor difference of parties, as it does not
require absolute but only substantial identity of parties[16]
in light of the fact that three prior cases before the instant case have been
decided in their favor against substantially the same parties over the same
subject matter and cause of action.
Public
respondent ruled there was no identity of parties for two reasons: (1) Private
respondent Mariano Bunag was not a party litigant in the Quieting of Title[17]
case because he denied in an affidavit that he authorized Carlos Bunag to sign
the Verified Complaint and to make him a party thereof; (2) Private respondent
Rolando Bunag was not made a party in the Quieting of Title case.
Private
respondent Mariano “Boy” Bunag’s claim that the Quieting of Title case was
filed without his knowledge does not inspire belief. In the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 4365 (for Unlawful Detainer), it is very clear that the defendants in
said case that included both private respondents, have knowledge of the
pendency of the Quieting of Title case.
A portion of the decision[18]
reads:
Defendants claim of ownership of the property involved in this case which is now pending with the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija (paragraph 3, Pre-Trial brief of defendants) where the issue of ownership is the subject of the proceedings x x x.
It was the defendants, through their trial
brief, that informed the court hearing the ejectment case that a case (Civil
Case No. 1600 for Quieting of Title) is pending where the issue of ownership is
the subject of the proceedings. Thus, as
early as the pendency of the Ejectment case, private respondents had known of
the case for Quieting of Title. If he
really did not authorize Carlos Bunag to include him as one of the plaintiffs
in the Quieting of Title case, he could have easily questioned his inclusion
therein at an earlier time. This, he did
not do. He executed his affidavit only
on
Private
respondents add that since Rolando Bunag was not a party in the Quieting of
Title case, the dismissal of said case will not bind him and thus not bar the
filing of the instant case.
We
do not agree. The principle of res
judicata may not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional
party to the first and second action. Only substantial identity is
necessary to warrant the application of res judicata. The addition or
elimination of some parties does not alter the situation. There is substantial
identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in
the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not
impleaded in the first case.[19]
In
the case at bar, it is apparent that from the face of the complaint for
Quieting of Title, private respondent Rolando Bunag was not a party therein as
his name does not appear in the title.
This, notwithstanding, his claim and that of the plaintiffs therein,
which included private respondent Mariano Bunag, are the same – to be declared
the true owners of the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 22262 and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67161 of the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. Private respondent Rolando Bunag and the
plaintiffs are all heirs of the alleged owners of the parcel of land covered by
OCT No. 22262. Private respondent
Rolando Bunag, though not a party therein, shared an identity of interest from
which flowed an identity of relief sought,
namely, to declare them the true owners of the parcel of land covered by OCT
No. 22262 and TCT No. 67161. Such
identity of interest is sufficient to make them privy-in-law, thereby satisfying
the requisite of substantial identity of parties.
As
regards the identity of subject matter, we find that there is. In both Civil Case No. 1600 (for Quieting of
Title) and Civil Case No. 2583 (for Annulment of Title), what is involved is
one and the same parcel of land covered by TCT No. 67161.
We likewise rule that there is
identity of causes of action. Hornbook
is the rule that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute
identity. Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res
judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain
both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would
sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the
first case is a bar to the subsequent action.[20] In Stilianopulos v.
The City of Legaspi,[21] this Court had this to say:
The underlying objectives or reliefs sought in both the quieting-of-title and the annulment-of-title cases are essentially the same -- adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lot and nullification of one of the two certificates of title. Thus, it becomes readily apparent that the same evidence or set of facts as those considered in the quieting-of-title case would also be used in this Petition.
The difference in form and
nature of the two actions is immaterial and is not a reason to exempt
petitioner from the effects of res judicata. The philosophy behind this
rule prohibits the parties from litigating the same issue more than once. When a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for
such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them. Verily, there should be an end to
litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject, once it is
fully and fairly adjudicated.
Civil Case No. 1600 was for Quieting
of Title, while Civil Case No. 2583 is for Annulment of Title with
Damages. The two cases are different
only in the form of action but an examination of the allegations in the second
case would reveal that the issue raised – ownership of the land -- and the
relief sought – be declared as owner and TCTs be issued in their names -- are
substantially the same. The evidence
required to substantiate their claims are likewise the same. The proceedings in the instant case, if
permitted to continue, would entail the presentation of evidence which should
have been adduced in the case for Quieting of Title. The case for Annulment of Title is simply a
second cycle of review involving a subject matter that has already been decided
with finality in the Quieting of Title case.
Finally, private respondents ask that
the instant case be not decided based on technicalities, for substantial
justice demands that technicalities should not be allowed to prevail over the
substantive right of a party litigant.
We find no reason not to adhere to
the doctrine of res judicata. A case for Quieting of Title had been filed
for the purpose of determining the ownership of the subject land, but same was
dismissed because the plaintiffs therein failed to attend the scheduled
hearings for the presentation of their evidence. As above discussed, the dismissal was an
adjudication on the merits. They had all
the opportunity to present all the evidence for their cause but they failed to
do so. It is undeniable that there was
no denial of due process in this case.
The doctrine of res judicata
is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely:
(1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State
that there should be an end to litigation - republicae ut sit litium,
and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause - nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary
doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the
part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.[22]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] CA rollo,
pp. 71-78; Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with Associate
Justices
[2] Rollo, p. 22.
[3]
[4]
[5] CA
rollo, pp. 79-82.
[6] Rollo,
p. 22.
[7]
[8]
[9] Substituting her husband private
respondent Mariano “Boy” Bunag per Resolution dated
[10] Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 401, 404 (1999).
[11] Rollo, p. 93.
[12] Prior to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Sec. 3 of Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Section 3. Failure to Prosecute - If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.
[13] De Knecht v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 833, 850 (1998).
[14] Rollo, p. 38.
[15] Luzon Development Bank v. Conquilla, G.R. No. 163338,
[16] Manila Electric Company v. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., 425 Phil. 65, 80 (2002).
[17] Not in the Injunction Case as erroneously stated by the public respondent in page 6 of its decision. Rollo, p. 18.
[18] MTC decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 27.
[19] Heirs of the Late Faustina Adalid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122202, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 27, 39.
[20]
[21] 374 Phil. 879, 897 (1999).
[22] Heirs of the Late Faustina Adalid v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19.