FIRST
DIVISION
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TRIAD SECURITY & ALLIED SERVICES,
INC. and ANTHONY U. QUE, Petitioners, - versus
- SILVESTRE ORTEGA, JR., ARIEL ALVARO,
RICHARD SEVILLANO, MARTIN CALLUENG, and ISAGANI CAPILA, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 160871 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: February 6, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
petition seeks to set aside the Decision[1]
dated
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order earlier
issued on
The
following are the pertinent facts:
Petitioner
Triad Security and Allied Services, Inc., (Triad Security) is a duly licensed
security agency owned by co-petitioner Anthony U. Que. It holds office at
On the other hand, respondents
Silvestre Ortega, Jr., Ariel Alvaro, Richard Sevillano,
Martin Callueng, and Isagani
Capila were formerly employed by petitioner Triad Security
as security guards.
On
According to respondents, during the
time that they were in the employ of petitioners, they were receiving compensation
which was below the minimum wage fixed by law.
They were also made to render services everyday for 12 hours but were
not paid the requisite overtime pay, nightshift differential, and holiday pay. Respondents likewise lamented the fact that
petitioners failed to provide them with weekly rest period, service incentive
leave pay, and 13th month pay.
As a result of these perceived unfairness, respondents filed a complaint
before the Labor Standards Enforcement Division of the Department of Labor on
For their part, petitioners denied
respondents’ claim of illegal dismissal.
Petitioners explained that management policies dictate that the security
guards be rotated to different assignments to avoid
fraternization and that they be required to take refresher courses at their
headquarters. Respondents allegedly
refused to comply with these policies and instead went on leave or simply
refused to report at their headquarters.
As for respondents’ money claims, petitioners insisted that respondents
worked for only eight hours a day, six days a week and that they received their
premium pays for services rendered during holidays and rest day. The service incentive leave of respondents
was allegedly made payable as soon as respondents applied for said benefit.[6]
In his decision dated
WHEREFORE,
all the foregoing premises considered judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondents to reinstate the complainants (respondents herein) to their former
jobs as security guards, and to pay jointly and solidarily
complainants’ backwages which as of February 24, 2000
already amount to P473,233.15, and to such
further backwages as they accrue until reinstatement
order is complied with by the respondents (petitioners herein).
Further,
respondents are ordered to pay jointly and solidarily
separation pay computed at the aggregate sum of P232,976.25
in the event reinstatement is no longer feasible.
Furthermore,
respondents are ordered to pay jointly and solidarily
complainants’ money claims in the aggregate sum of P956, 115.30.
And
finally, respondents are ordered to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the judgment award.[7]
As
petitioners failed to seasonably file an appeal with the National Labor
Relations Commission, the decision of the labor arbiter became final and executory prompting respondents to file a motion for the
issuance of writ of execution on
On
Pursuant
to the writ of execution, petitioner Triad Security’s funds with its clients Remal Enterprises and Don Pedro Azucarera
amounting to one million two hundred twenty-four thousand seven hundred
sixty-two pesos and forty centavos (P1,224,762.40)
were garnished.[11]
On
In
the order dated
On
On
Similarly
ill-fated were petitioners’ petition for injunction which was dismissed by the
NLRC in its resolution of
Following
petitioners’ set-backs before the NLRC, the labor arbiter issued the order
dated
On
P603,794.77) representing
the unsatisfied balance of the judgment award contained in the
Acting
on respondents’ motion dated P603,794.77.[21] The funds were eventually ordered released to
respondents pursuant to the labor arbiter’s order of
On
P2,097,152.26
representing the latter’s backwages and separation
pay.[23]
On
(a)
the balance of the unsatisfied award is only Php
603,794.77 and not Php 2,097,152.26 appearing on the
computation;
(b) the basis for computing the wage
differential is erroneous.[24]
On
the basis of the new computation, respondents filed a motion for the issuance
of 2nd alias writ of execution.[25] This motion was predictably opposed by
petitioners.[26]
Despite
petitioners’ protest, the labor arbiter issued the
The records of the case
reveal that the decision ordered the respondents to reinstate the complainants
to their former job as security guards and decreed that respondents shall pay
to the complainants further backwages
as they accrue until the order of reinstatement is complied with.
The order of reinstatement
is self-executing and should be complied with by the
respondents upon receipt of the decision either by payroll or physical
reinstatement. (Pioneer Texturizing Corporation vs.
NLRC, 280 SCRA 806, in relation to Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended).
The respondents failed to
comply with the order of reinstatement, hence, complainants’ backwages accrued.
As a matter of procedure,
this Office ordered the Computation and Examination Unit to compute
complainants’ accrued backwages.
On
The respondents filed their
comment on the computation and their opposition to complainants’ motion for
execution.
We considered and studied
respondents’ arguments in their comment and opposition and We
found them inadequate to overcome the presumption of correctness and regularity
of the computation; hence, the same is hereby approved.
Further, the argument
regarding the supposed prescribed period covering the month 2 February –
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, complainants’ motion for the execution of their accrued backwages amounting to TWO MILLION NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO and 26/100 (P2, 097,152.26) PESOS as computed by
the Computation and Examination Unit of the NLRC is hereby granted less the
amount of more or less P72,805.00 covering the
wage differential for the period 2
February – 20 April 1996.
Let an Alias Writ of
Execution for the enforcement of the P2,097,152.26
less the above-mentioned amount, as complainants’ accrued backwages,
be accordingly issued.[27]
Forthwith,
a 2nd alias writ of execution dated 14 May 2003 was issued by the
labor arbiter for the satisfaction of the amount of P2,024,347.26
“representing (respondents’) unpaid accrued backwages
as computed by the Computation and Examination Unit xxx, including attorney’s
fees, plus execution fee.”[28]
On
In
a resolution promulgated on
Petitioners’
victory with the Court of Appeals was, however, short-lived. In the decision now assailed before us, the
Court of Appeals ruled that backwages payable to
respondents should be computed from the date of their termination from their
jobs until actual reinstatement as provided in Article 223 of the Labor
Code. As petitioners failed to observe
said pertinent provision of the law, the labor arbiter could not be charged
with having committed a grave abuse of discretion when he issued the assailed
Moreover,
the Court of Appeals took note of the “procedural but fatal flaw”[31]
committed by petitioners when they immediately elevated their case via petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals without first seeking
recourse from the NLRC in violation not only of the Rules of Procedure of said
body but also of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution
dated
Hence
this petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE REMEDY ADOPTED BY THE PETITIONERS IS ERRONEOUS
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE TO THE
ADDITIONAL AMOUNT AS CONTAINED IN THE
WHETHER OR NOT THE 30 SEPTEMBER 2002 COMPUTATION ISSUE BY THE COMPUTATION AND EXAMINATION UNIT OF THE NLRC IS CORRECT AND PROPER
The petition is partially meritorious.
First,
we shall resolve the procedural issue posed in this petition.
Petitioners
contend that based on the rules of procedure of the NLRC, the order granting
the issuance of the 2nd alias writ of execution could not have been
the proper subject of an appeal before the NLRC neither could petitioners have
sought the remedy of certiorari from the NLRC. Petitioners argue that the rules of procedure
of the NLRC do not provide for any remedy or procedure for challenging the
order granting a writ of execution; hence, the pertinent provision of the Revised
Rules of Court should apply which in this case is Section 1 of Rule 41. It states:
Section 1. Subject of appeal – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
x x x
x
(f) An order
of execution;
x x x
x
In all the above instances where the judgment or final
order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
SECTION 4. PROHIBITED PLEADINGS & MOTIONS. The following pleadings, motions or petitions
shall not be allowed in the cases covered by these Rules:
x x x x
c) Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus or
Prohibition.
In addition, petitioners maintain
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as
it accepts of certain exceptions such as when an appeal would not be an
adequate remedy there being an order or execution already issued and the
implementation of said writ loomed as a great probability.[32]
We do not agree.
In this case, petitioners insist
that the NLRC is bereft of authority to rule on a matter involving grave abuse
of discretion that may be committed by a labor arbiter. Such conclusion, however, proceeds from a
limited understanding of the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article
223 of the Labor Code which states:
ART. 223. APPEAL
Decisions, awards, or orders of the
Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed
to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.
Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie
evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter.
In the case
of Air Services Cooperative v. Court of Appeals,[34]
we had the occasion to explain the scope of said article of the Labor Code
to mean –
x x x Also, while the title of
Article 223 seems to provide only for the remedy of appeal as that term is
understood in procedural law and as distinguished from the office of certiorari, nonetheless, a closer
reading thereof reveals that it is not as limited as understood by the
petitioners x x x.
x x x
x
Abuse of discretion is admittedly within the ambit of certiorari and its grant thereof to the
NLRC indicates the lawmakers’ intention to broaden the meaning of appeal as
that term is used in the Code x x x.[35]
Likewise, in the same case, this Court quoted with approval the following observation of the Court of Appeals:
We do not see how appeal
would have been inadequate or ineffectual under the premises. On the other hand, being the administrative
agency especially tasked with the review of labor cases, [the NLRC] is in a far
better position to determine whether petitioners’ grounds for certiorari are meritorious. Neither is there any cause for worry that
appeal to the Commission would not be speedy as the Labor Code provides that
the Commission shall decide cases before it, within twenty (20) calendar days
from receipt of the Answer of Appellee x x x.[36]
Given the foregoing, we hold that the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari brought
before it. Notwithstanding this
procedural defect committed by petitioners, in the interest of substantial
justice, we shall proceed to resolve the other issues presented by petitioners.
Petitioners insist that their monetary
obligation, as contained in the
Again, petitioners’ argument is
untenable.
Article 279 of the Labor Code, as
amended, states:
ART. 279. SECURITY OF TENURE
In cases of regular employment the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title.
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
As the law
now stands, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs, namely: backwages and
reinstatement. These are separate and
distinct from each other.[37] However, separation pay is granted where
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the
employee and the employer.[38] In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement
is no longer viable and backwages.[39]
Backwages
and separation pay are, therefore, distinct reliefs
granted to one who was illegally dismissed from employment. The award of one does not preclude that of
the other as this court had, in proper cases, ordered the payment of both.[40]
In this case, the labor arbiter
ordered the reinstatement of respondents and the payment of their backwages until their actual reinstatement and in
case reinstatement is no longer viable, the payment of
separation pay. Under Article 223
of the Labor Code, “the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed
or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall
be immediately executory, even pending appeal.” The same provision of the law gives the
employer the option of either admitting the employee back to work under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before his dismissal or separation from
employment or the employer may choose to merely reinstate the employee to the
payroll. It bears emphasizing that the
law mandates the prompt reinstatement of the dismissed or separated
employee. This, the petitioners failed
to heed. They are now before this Court
insisting that they have fully disposed of their legal obligation to
respondents when they paid the latter’s separation pay. We do not agree.
It should
be pointed out that an order of reinstatement by the labor arbiter is not the
same as actual reinstatement of a dismissed or separated employee. Thus, until the employer continuously fails
to actually implement the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the labor
arbiter, their obligation to respondents, insofar as accrued backwages and other benefits are concerned, continues to
accumulate. It is only when the illegally
dismissed employee receives the separation pay that it could be claimed with
certainty that the employer-employee relationship has formally ceased thereby
precluding the possibility of reinstatement.
In the meantime, the illegally dismissed employee’s entitlement to backwages, 13th month pay, and other benefits
subsists. Until the payment of separation pay is carried out, the employer
should not be allowed to remain unpunished for the delay, if not outright
refusal, to immediately execute the reinstatement aspect of the labor arbiter’s
decision.
The records of this case are bereft of
any indication that respondents were actually reinstated to their previous jobs
or to the company payroll. Instead, they
were given, albeit with much resistance from petitioners, the full amount of
the money judgment stated in the P603,794.77 representing the full satisfaction of 28 February
2000 judgment, including separation pay.
Nor can we
give credence to petitioners claim that they could not reinstate respondents as
the latter had already found jobs elsewhere.
It is worthy to note here that respondents were minimum wage earners who
were left with no choice after they were illegally dismissed from their
employment but to seek new employment in order to earn a decent living. Surely,
we could not fault them for their perseverance in looking for and eventually
securing new employment opportunities instead of remaining idle and awaiting
the outcome of this case.
We agree,
however, with petitioners that the amount of basic salary used by the
Computation and Examination Unit of the NLRC was erroneous. In said computation, the amount of
respondents’ basic salary from P250.00. However, the prevailing daily minimum wage on
P223.50[41]
and it was only on P250.00.[42] Clearly, the Computation and Examination Unit
of the NLRC was mistaken in its calculation. We, therefore, hold that from 25 February up
to P223.50 per
day and from P250.00 per day.
In addition, they should pay respondents any additional cost of living
allowance which may have been prescribed within the period
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, this Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Roberto A. Barrios with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga
and Arturo D. Brion, concurring.
[2] Rollo, p. 51.
[3] Records, Vol. I, pp. 2-3; Only the Triad Security & Allied Services, Inc. and Anthony U. Que filed the present petition for review.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo, pp. 67-68.
[8] Records, Vol. I, pp. 174-176.
[9] Rollo, pp. 69-71.
[10] Records, Vol. I, pp. 199-200.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Rollo, pp. 72-75.
[21] Records, Vol. I, pp. 508-509.
[22]
[23] Rollo, p. 84.
[24]
[25] Dated
[26] Dated
[27]
[28]
[29] CA rollo, pp. 2-23.
[30]
[31] Rollo, p. 49.
[32]
[33] Cuison
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128540,
[34] 354 Phil. 905 (1998).
[35] Air
Services Cooperative v. Court of Appeals, supra at 915.
[36]
[37] Torillo v. Leogardo, Jr., et al., 274 Phil. 758, 765 (1991).
[38] Lim
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 79907 and 79975,
[39] Air Services Cooperative v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34.
[40] Air Services Cooperative v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[41] Wage Order No. 7.
[42] Wage Order No. 8.