HON.
TOMAS N. JOSON III,
G.R. No. 160652
in his capacity as Governor of the
The SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN
OF NUEVA ECIJA,
QUISUMBING, J.,
Petitioners, Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES, and
TINGA,
JJ.
- versus -
COURT
OF APPEALS and Promulgated:
ELIZABETH
R. VARGAS,
Respondent. February 13, 2006
x
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CARPIO, J.:
This
is a petition for certiorari[1] with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction. The petition seeks to set aside the Resolution dated 13 October
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78247 granting the writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining and restraining Governor Tomas N. Joson III (“Governor Joson”) and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Nueva Ecija (“Sangguniang Panlalawigan”)
from conducting proceedings in the administrative case against Mayor Elizabeth
R. Vargas and from imposing the order of preventive suspension.
The Facts
On
On
On
Mayor Vargas appealed to the Office
of the President praying for the reversal of Resolution No. 105-S-2003 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The case was docketed as O.P. Case No. 03-D-164.
In April 2003, Governor Joson issued an order of preventive suspension against
Mayor Vargas. Mayor Vargas filed before the Office of the President a very
urgent petition to set aside the suspension order.
On
ACCORDINGLY,
the instant motion is GRANTED and the undated Preventive Suspension Order
against Mayor Elizabeth R. Vargas of the
Vice Mayor Victorino E. Reyes who may have assumed the position of Acting Municipal Mayor of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, is hereby directed to cease and desist from performing the duties of and functions of municipal mayor and vacate the same pending final resolution of Administrative Case No. 02-s-2003. Mayor Vargas may now reassume his (sic) position as such.
The Department of the Interior and Local Government is hereby directed to implement this Order immediately.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
On
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby GRANTED, and the April 22, 2003 Order subject thereof is hereby recalled and set aside. Accordingly, the Order of Governor Tomas N. Joson III placing Mayor Elizabeth R. Vargas under preventive suspension for a period of sixty (60) days is hereby reinstated.
The Department of Interior and Local Government is directed to implement this resolution immediately.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On
On
On
WHEREFORE,
in the interest of justice, to the end that undue prejudice and/or injury may
be avoided to any and all parties affected by these proceedings, as well as not
to render nugatory and ineffectual the resolution of this Court of the issues
herein presented, let a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued, to be effective
upon service and for a period of SIXTY (60) days, unless sooner lifted. ACCORDINGLY, respondents Provincial Governor
and the SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN of the Province of Nueva
Ecija are hereby commanded to cease and desist from
conducting proceedings in ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 02-S-2003, and from enforcing
the assailed July 8, 2003 Resolution of the Office of the President, through
the Executive Secretary, which directed the reinstatement of the order for
petitioner’s preventive suspension.
Furthermore, in view of the serious issues involved, let the hearing and
consideration of the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction be
scheduled on September 2, 2003 at 10:30 AM, Paras
Hall, Second Floor, Main Building, Court of Appeals, Ma.
In the meantime, without necessarily giving due course to the instant petition for certiorari, respondents are directed to file a comment, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. Petitioner, upon the other hand, has five (5) days from receipt of respondents’ comment, to file her reply.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners contend that:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH MANIFEST PARTIALITY, ARBITRARILY, AND IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDER BECAUSE –
a. RESPONDENT VARGAS AVAILED OF THE WRONG REMEDY WHEN SHE FILED CA-G.R. SP NO. 78247;
b. RESPONDENT VARGAS CLEARLY FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL RELIEF;
c. THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER WAS LEGALLY AND VALIDLY ISSUED.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED ARBITRARILY AND IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DIRECTING PETITIONERS “TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM CONDUCTING PROCEEDINGS IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 02-S-2003.”
3. THE INSTANT CASE PRESENTS A SITUATION WHEREIN A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED WITH BEFORE THE INSTANT CERTIORARI CASE CAN BE FILED.[8]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Petitioners
allege that Mayor Vargas should have filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Furthermore, Mayor
Vargas filed the action for certiorari even while her motion for
reconsideration was still pending resolution before the Office of the
President. According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals acted with manifest
bias and partiality when it issued the writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners despite the filing of a wrong remedy and the non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Under
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the writ of certiorari is proper when the following requisites are present:
1. It is directed against any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
2. Such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction; and
3. There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Mayor
Vargas filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Secretary Gaite. Thus, in a Resolution dated
To question the foregoing Resolution of respondent Executive Secretary, petitioner interposed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, essentially posing the following issues: (1) was it proper for respondent Executive Secretary to have ruled that petitioner is considered in default pursuant to Article 126, Rule XIX of the Rules Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991; (2) can the civil case filed by petitioner before the Cabanatuan RTC for annulment of falsified minutes of session and appropriation ordinance with damages be considered a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension of the proceedings in the administrative case; (3) has the respondent Sanggunian[g] Panlalawigan jurisdiction to hear the administrative case filed against herein petitioner, when the relief sought therein is her removal from office.
At first blush, the assailed resolution having
being issued by the Office of the President, through the Executive Secretary,
it would seem that the proper remedy is an appeal via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. A perusal of the instant
petition for certiorari would,
however, reveal that petitioner is alleging that the challenged resolution was
issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond respondents’ jurisdiction,
hence, the appropriate remedy is certiorari
under Rule 65. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the proper remedy is a petition
for review under Rule 43, the Supreme Court has oftentimes ruled that, in
accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice, a petition for certiorari may be treated as having been
filed under Rule 43, in which case this Court chooses to do so, in view of the
gravity and seriousness of the issues involved herein.[9]
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the appellate court in assuming jurisdiction over the
case. The special civil action of
certiorari is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction including the commission
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[10]
All the issues submitted for resolution in the Court of Appeals involve
questions of law which are reviewable on certiorari.[11]
Exception to the Application of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
Under
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a litigant cannot go to court
without first pursuing his administrative remedies, otherwise his action is
premature and his case is not ripe for judicial determination.[12] A
litigant should first exhaust the administrative remedies provided by law
before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency
an opportunity to decide correctly the matter and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the court.[13]
However,
the Court recognizes some exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. As held in Paat v. Court of Appeals:[14]
x x x However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
The requirement of prior exhaustion
of administrative remedies may likewise be dispensed with in the following
instances: (1) when the claim involved is small; (2) when strong public
interest is involved; and (3) in quo warranto proceedings.[15]
In this case, Mayor Vargas filed the
petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals alleging that Secretary Gaite
issued the Resolution dated
The issues raised are questions of
law which involve the interpretation and application of laws. Resolution of such questions constitutes
essentially an exercise of judicial power which is exclusively allocated to the
Supreme Court and such courts as the Legislature may establish.[17]
Since the issues involve purely legal questions which the court may review,
exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with.[18]
Propriety of the Preventive Suspension Order
Under
Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension may be imposed
(a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c)
given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Issues
are considered joined when the complaint has been answered and there are no
longer any substantial preliminary issues that remain to be threshed out.[19]
In its Order dated
In
the administrative case, it appears that petitioner did not file, so far, an
answer to the complaint thus the issues could not have been considered joined.
What she did was to file a Motion To Suspend Proceedings And/Or Motion To
Dismiss which was treated by the sanggunian as her
answer. However, nothing in the records
can be inferred that the petitioner intended the said motion to be her
answer. In fact, when the motion was
denied on
In fine, no inference can be had that the motion filed was considered her answer otherwise, petitioner could have stated so therein.
Finally, even assuming that petitioner’s motion was already her answer and therefore, the issues have been joined, it is observed that the grounds cited by the sanggunian in recommending the assailed preventive suspension are general statements – mere verbatim reproduction of the provision of law, unsupported by any factual and substantial evidence. There is no showing that the evidence of guilt is strong, with both parties charging each other with falsification of documents. In fact, that is the subject of Civil Case No. 4442. Moreover, it cannot be said that the continuance in office of respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The recitals in SP Resolution No. 105 s. 2003 are unconvincing.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant motion is
GRANTED and the undated Preventive Suspension Order against Mayor Elizabeth R.
Vargas of the
It
would thus appear that the grounds cited by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for recommending the preventive
suspension of Mayor Vargas were just general statements unsupported by any
evidence. This is contrary to the requisites for a preventive suspension which
require that evidence of guilt must be strong and that given the gravity of the
offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence. The haste in issuing the
resolution recommending the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas is
unreasonable considering the gravity of the effects of such suspension.
Suspension from office of an elective official would deprive the electorate of
the services of the person they have voted into office. As held in Ganzon v. Court of
Appeals:[21]
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions x x x because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, is simply “to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause (sic) of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses” or to keep him off “the records and other evidence.” It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it cannot exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
However, upon motion of Governor Joson, the Office of the President reversed its previous
order. Citing the case of Joson v.
Torres,[22] the Office of the President held that Mayor
Vargas’ failure to file her answer in ADM. CASE No. 02-S-2003 was deemed a
waiver of her right to file answer and present evidence. As a consequence, the
issues were deemed to have been joined.
In the Joson case,
this Court found inexcusable the failure of petitioner there to file an answer
despite the grant of three extensions of the period to file an answer. It was
only seven months later and after the lapse of all the extensions of time for
filing an answer that petitioner there filed a motion to dismiss.
In
this case, Mayor Vargas moved for a 15-day extension to file an answer. Before
the lapse of the period of extension, Mayor Vargas filed before the Cabanatuan RTC a civil case for annulment of Appropriation
Ordinance No. 1 and the Minutes of the Session of
Validity
of appellate court’s order for petitioners to cease and desist from conducting
proceedings in Administrative Case No. 02-S-2003
In
a Resolution dated
In a Resolution dated August 14, 2003, in order not to render nugatory the resolution of the present petition by this Court, We issued a temporary restraining order temporarily enjoining the Provincial Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Nueva Ecija from conducting further proceedings in Administrative Case No. 02-S-2003, and from enforcing the assailed resolution of the Office of the President, which directed the reinstatement of the order for petitioner’s preventive suspension.
After taking into account the parties’ arguments for and against the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in a hearing conducted on September 2, 2003, as well as respondents’ comment and opposition dated August 25, 2003, and considering that the present petition is still pending resolution before this Court, We deem it wise to issue a preliminary injunction to further enjoin and restrain public respondents Provincial Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from conducting proceedings in the administrative case against herein petitioner, particularly in imposing the order of preventive suspension, so as to prevent any injustice and irreparable injury that might inure to herein petitioner if it is adjudged by this Court that a reversal of the assailed resolution is warranted.
WHEREFORE,
for the foregoing premises, petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner is hereby required to post a bond
in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for the issuance of
said writ, as required by Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Petitioners allege that the
only issue presented in CA-G.R. SP No. 78247 is the validity of the
reinstatement of the preventive suspension order issued against Mayor Vargas as
embodied in the Resolution dated
Petitioners’ contention is without
merit. Two of the issues raised by Mayor Vargas in her petition to the Court of
Appeals pertain to the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 02-S-2003, to
wit: (1) whether the civil case filed by
Mayor Vargas before the Cabanatuan RTC for annulment
of falsified minutes of session and appropriation ordinance with damages
is a prejudicial question which warrants
the suspension of the proceedings in the administrative case, and (2) whether the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan has jurisdiction to hear the
administrative case filed against Mayor Vargas, when the relief sought is her removal from office.[24]
It
is, therefore, apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in the administrative case is an
issue in the certiorari case filed in the Court of Appeals. Mayor Vargas is
questioning the propriety of the proceedings of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan despite the alleged prejudicial
question in the civil case. Likewise, Mayor Vargas alleges that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
is bereft of jurisdiction over the administrative case which seeks her removal
from office since under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, only the
proper court may order the dismissal from public office of an elective local
official.[25]
We
find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in
issuing the Resolution dated
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the
petition for lack of merit, and DENY the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES DANTE O.
TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Rollo, pp. 41-42, 61.
[3]
[4]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Argel v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 867 (1999).
[11] BF Corporation v. CA, 351 Phil. 507 (1998).
[12] Bordallo v.
Professional Regulations Commission, 421 Phil. 281 (2001); Abe-abe v. Manta, No.
L-4827,
[13] Ambil, Jr. v. Comelec, 398 Phil. 257 (2000); Jariol v. Comelec, 336 Phil. 990 (1997).
[15] Celestial v. Cachopero,
G.R. No. 142595,
[16] Rollo, pp. 63-64.
[17] Philex Mining Corporation v. Zaldivia, et al., 150 Phil. 547 (1972).
[18] See note 14.
[19] A.
Pimentel, The Local Government Code of 1991 The Key to National Development 177
(1993).
[20] Rollo, p. 34.
[21] G.R. Nos. 93252, 93746 & 95245,
[23] Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[24]