EN
BANC
|
JOSE
TEOFILO T. MERCADO and MA. AGNES R. MERCADO,
Petitioners, - versus - SECURITY
BANK CORPORATION, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 160445 Present: panganbiban, CJ., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, * CARPIO MORALES, *CALLEJO,
SR., azcuna,
TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and GARCIA,
JJ. Promulgated: February 16, 2006 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SANDOVAL
GUTIERREZ, J.:
We find no compelling reason to grant petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that
before a petition for annulment of judgment can prosper, petitioners must first
file an appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief as required by
the Revised Rules of Court. Having failed to do so, they cannot avail of an
action for annulment of judgment, otherwise, they would benefit from their
inaction or negligence.
It bears emphasis at this point that an action for
annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal.
Petitioners’ contention that their failure to appeal
from the trial court’s Decision was due to the negligence of their former
counsel lacks merit. Records show that they participated actively, through
their counsel, in the proceedings before the trial court. As party litigants,
they were expected to be vigilant of their interests and, therefore, should
monitor the progress of the case. Thus, they should have constantly
communicated with their counsel to be advised of the status of their case. This
way, they would not have lost their opportunity to appeal.
Granting that petitioners’ petition for annulment of
judgment is in order, still the same is dismissible. For the remedy of
annulment of judgment to prosper, either one of the following grounds must be
present: (1) extrinsic fraud or (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of
due process. Petitioner argues that their counsel’s negligence constitutes
extrinsic fraud. We are not convinced. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a
counsel against his client when the latter is prevented from presenting his
case to the court. This situation is not present in this case.
We reiterate that in G.R. No. 151816, we ruled that
the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in dismissing petitioners’
petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the trial court’s order of execution
of its Decision in favor of respondent bank.
In fine, this Resolution should now write finis to the instant case.[5]
On
But when I received the Resolution dated P120,000,000.00 is known to my nephew
and us. While the buyer is drinking with my nephew and others, not knowing that
one of them is my nephew, he bragged to them that he just bought the property
of the Mercados in
Have you no
conscience at all? Are you not bothered
of the final judgment after life? Is this the legacy you want to impart to your
children and all the Filipino people?
What you did to my family and I is unforgivable not only to God and to
humanity. You have deprived us of our precious possession without due process.
This is also the abode of my wife, my children, their respective spouses, and
my 10 grandchildren, not to mention the several household members and their
families.
I would like to believe that the Supreme Court is the
last bulwark of true justice. If you,
the Chief Justice, himself, are the first person to make a mockery of our laws,
no wonder why foreign investors do not want to invest in our country because
they said, there is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular.
This is in the highest degree of injustice. You have deprived us of our basic
fundamental rights in the protection of our property without due process. There
is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular. Do you think I will bring my case to the Supreme
Court by mere question of facts? From
our petition for Annulment of Judgment filed before the Court of Appeals and
now the Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, my wife and I
as petitioners-movants have clearly invoked ‘LACK OF JURISDICTION’ on the part
of the trial court to adjudicate respondent SBC’s ‘counterclaim’ for the
payment of the loan. As I understand,
when the ground invoked as basis for Annulment of Judgment is ‘LACK OF
JURISDICTION’, the Petition may be filed at any time before it is barred by
estoppel or laches, neither of which is obtaining in our case. Even in layman’s legal point of view, this
Petition of ours clearly and undoubtedly raises a question of law.
Please I beg of you, have a last hard look on our
Petition and the two (2) Motions for Reconsideration and let us focus and not evade on the real issue on ‘LACK OF JURISDICTION’
on the part of the trial court and not concentrate on negligence of counsel and
other trivial reasons, etc. Or better yet, please refrain from influencing
the members of the Third Division. Let
them deliberate regularly on our case or inhibit themselves on the case. Please let the Institution serve justice, and
not individual pecuniary interests.
SBC’s counsels are experts in fabrication of facts and in misleading the
courts. I have a feeling that they might
as well have led you to believe something, which is not true. Please
don’t be an instrument of their wicked schemes, lest the Supreme Court itself
becomes their means to perpetrate injustice. This is the only Bank which is not interested
in amicable settlement in spite of my several sincere offers of amicable
settlement since the case was filed in 1995 up to 2003, and these are all in
writing and duly received by SBC.
Unfortunately, all my offers were rejected by them.
I wrote you this letter as a last resort because my
family and I looked up at you before as the most honest and upright Chief Justice. As we would like to know if you really had
intervened and put pressure, as the Ponente said to Atty. Villanueva, (my
counsel) to favor SBC because if you did, then we rest our case. Please enlighten us before we seek another
forum to seek redress the injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation and
embarrassment we suffered. If we
are wrong about you, and I hope we really are wrong, please accept our appeal
for forgiveness and apologies. GOD is my
witness, that what I have told you is the truth.
Mr. Chief Justice, the Filipino people know how
religious you are. Please do what a
religious man ought to do in serving justice.
Please live up to our, as well as HIS expectations. (Emphasis supplied)
On
On
On the
scheduled date, Mercado, together with Atty. Pablo G. Macapagal, his new counsel,
appeared before the Third Division and swore to the truth of the letter he
wrote.[8] He manifested that he only stated therein
what Atty. Villanueva told him – that his petition was denied for the second
time “because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice.” He further manifested that during the wake of
Atty. Villanueva’s mother, he (Atty. Villanueva) pointed to Justice Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez, bragging that she is “a
very very good, close and long time friend of his.”[9] However, while stating this, Mercado
referred to Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales as Justice Gutierrez.[10]
Forthwith,
the Third Division issued in open court a Resolution[11]
directing Atty. Macapagal to submit a written explanation why Mercado should
not be held in contempt of Court.
For his
part, Atty. Villanueva submitted a comment,[12]
strongly denying Mercado’s allegations in his letter. He denied having told petitioners that
their petition had to be denied again “because
there was a tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice in favor of Security
Bank Corporation.” He also stressed
that there was no correlation between the ponente’s
trip to the
On
On
Mercado
testified that it was Atty. Villanueva who informed him that the ponente is Justice Gutierrez. Atty. Villanueva
even bragged that she is his “very, very
close friend.”
For his part,
Atty. Villanueva testified that it was Mercado who informed him that Justice
Gutierrez is the ponente. He also
confirmed that she attended the wake of his mother. But he denied Mercado’s claim that he
pointed to Justice Gutierrez and said that she is his close friend.[14]
Thereafter,
the Third Division designated Court of Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao as
Commissioner to receive evidence on the factual issues involved in the contempt
incident. [15]
On P5,000.00).
We cannot
sustain Justice Dacudao’s finding that Mercado did not act with malice or bad
faith in imputing those derogatory and disrespectful remarks against Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.
Bad
faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong.[16] It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or
ill-will for ulterior purposes.[17] Malice is of the same genre. It
connotes a sinister motive.
Mercado’s
addressing such letter to Chief Justice Davide is a perfect illustration of bad
faith and malice tending directly to degrade the administration of justice. It transgresses the permissible bounds of
fair comment and criticisms bringing into disrepute, not only the authority and
integrity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente,
but also of the entire Judiciary. While
feigning to be searching for truth on whether Chief Justice Davide indeed
exerted “tremendous pressure” to the ponente, he repeatedly humiliated him
and the Judiciary in the most loutish and insolent manner. He accused him of
doing an “unthinkable, ungodly, and
malicious” act and of depriving his (Mercado’s) family of their “basic fundamental rights in the protection
of (their) property without due process.”
He concluded that what Chief Justice Davide did to his family “is unforgivable not only to God and to
humanity.” In an insulting and
insolent tenor, he stated that “if the
Chief Justice, himself, is the first person to make a mockery of our laws,”
then there is “no wonder why foreign
investors do not want to invest in our country.”
Furthermore,
he alleged that an irregularity or bribery attended the denial of his petition
for review. He insinuated that the
travels of Atty. Villanueva and the ponente abroad were financed by
respondent bank, stating that “when there is smoke, there is fire.” He also recklessly accused the ponente of giving respondent bank a “go-signal” to sell his property. In this backdrop, he asked Chief Justice Davide
to “refrain from influencing the members
of the Third Division;” “let them deliberate regularly on the case or
inhibit themselves on the case;”
and “let the Institution serve justice,
and not individual pecuniary interests.”
Finally, he condemned the entire
Judiciary by saying “there is no justice
in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular.” And with impudence, he threatened Chief
Justice Davide to enlighten him before he “seeks
another forum to seek redress for the injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation
and embarrassment” his family suffered.
Without
doubt, Mercado’s letter is marked with malice, bad faith, and gross
disrespect. He committed a remarkable
feat of character assassination and honor vilification. Contrary to his claim that he is just
verifying the truth of Atty. Villanueva’s statements, the words in his letter
are more accusatory than inquisitorial. What is disconcerting is that his accusations
have no basis in fact and in law. Obviously,
they caused intense pain and humiliation on the part of Chief Justice Davide
and the ponente.
The
Resolution of the Third Division of this Court dated
Mercado bewails the denial by the Third Division of his petition
through a mere Minute Resolution and after reinstating the petition.
Apparently, he finds the Court’s manner of denial and change of heart
unusual and casts sinister undertone to them.
In In Re Laureta,[19] we ruled that the Court is not “duty-bound”
to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate
decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given depending
on its evaluation of a case. In the same case, we held that “the recall of a due course Order after a
review of the records of the case is a common occurrence in the Court.” Like
the respondents in the said case, Mercado should not think that it is only his
petition which has been subjected to such recall.
The Third
Division initially denied Mercado’s
petition because it is apparent on its face that the Court of Appeals committed
no reversible error in dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment. Considering his motion for reconsideration alleging
that the Appellate Court merely relied on technical rules of procedure and that
his former counsel committed gross negligence, the Third Division took the most prudent course by
reinstating the petition. Now, after
considering the petition and the comment thereon, the Third Division was
convinced that, indeed, the Appellate
Court did not commit any reversible error.
Is this irregular? The answer is
a resounding “no.” The reinstatement of a petition does not guarantee that it will be
subsequently granted. Otherwise, the
filing of comment and subsequent pleadings would be an exercise in futility.
Now, in
a bid to escape liability for contempt, Mercado invokes freedom of speech and
privacy of communication.
A person
charged with contempt of court for his utterances which clearly constitute
contempt may not ordinarily escape liability by merely invoking the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.
The fact
that Mercado’s letter was addressed only to the Chief Justice does not rinse it
of its contemptuous character. In In Re Laureta,[20] we ruled that letters addressed to individual
Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become
part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.
Accordingly, we hold Mercado guilty of indirect contempt of
court.
Section
3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
Section 3.
Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge
in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:
x x x
x x x
d. Any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;
x x x x x x
As for Atty. Villanueva, while
Justice Dacudao did not categorically state that he (Atty. Villanueva) told
Mercado that Chief Justice Davide exerted “tremendous pressure” on the ponente,
the reason why the petition was dismissed for the second time, however, we are
inclined to believe that Atty. Villanueva gave such information to
Mercado. Not only that, Atty. Villanueva also revealed the name
of the ponente; that he and the ponente have known each other since
1964; and that the ponente would be at
the wake of his mother, thus:
After a careful and conscientious examination of the evidence adduced
in the instant case, the undersigned investigator is fully convinced that it
was only through Atty. Villanueva that petitioner could have learned or known
the name of the ponente in the case.
As between petitioner and Atty. Villanueva, the undersigned
investigator in inclined to give more credence to the testimony of petitioner.
Not only was petitioner consistent, firm, and candid and detailed in his
testimony, but he was also able to corroborate his claims, by submitting his
diary which contained vital entries and by presenting the testimony of his
nephew. x x x
Moreover, it was admitted by Atty.
Villanueva that he and Justice Gutierrez have known each other since 1964 and
that Justice Gutierrez was in the wake of his mother. These admissions tend to
strengthen the allegations of petitioner that Atty. Villanueva was the one who
told him the name of the ponente; that Atty. Villanueva told him that he and
the ponente are very close; and that when petitioner attended the wake of Atty.
Villanueva’s mother, he was told by Atty. Villanueva that Justice Gutierrez,
the ponente, was coming.
Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that “a
lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body.” Further, Rule 15.07 provides
that “a lawyer must impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness.” Atty.
Villanueva took the forbidden course.
In informing Mercado that he was “a
very very good, close and long time friend” of the ponente, Atty. Villanueva impressed upon the former that he can
obtain a favorable disposition of his case.
However, when his petition was dismissed twice, Mercado’s expectation
crumbled. This prompted him to hurl
unfounded, malicious, and disrespectful accusations against Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente.
We have repeatedly admonished lawyers
from making bold assurances to their clients.
A lawyer who guarantees the successful outcome of a litigation will
exert heavy pressure and employ any means to win the case at all costs. But when the case is lost, he will blame the
courts, placing them under a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in this case, Atty.
Villanueva’s statements led Mercado, not only to suspect but also to believe,
that the entire Court, together with Chief Justice Davide and the ponente,
could be pressured or influenced,
Responsibility enjoins lawyers to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts and the judicial officers.[21] Atty. Villanueva’s conduct, no doubt,
degraded the integrity and dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and
this Court as well.
Thus, we find Atty. Villanueva also
guilty of indirect contempt of court.
On the appropriate penalty, the
general rule is that courts have inherent power to impose a penalty for
contempt reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense. And that the degree of punishment for
contempt is said to lie within the sound discretion of the court.[22] Considering the circumstances obtaining
herein, we believe that Mercado and Atty. Villanueva should be fined P50,000.00
each and warned that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe
penalty.
One
last word. The reason for the inherent
power of courts to punish for contempt is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would
be resting on a very shaky foundation.[23] Thus, we must act to preserve its honor and
integrity from assaults of disrespect.
One reason why respect of the public for the Judiciary has diminished is
because of unscrupulous lawyers who imply that judges and justices can be
influenced or bribed. Such conduct has
no place in the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, Jose
Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P. Villanueva are declared GUILTY of
indirect contempt of court. They are FINED
P50,000.00 each and WARNED that a repetition of similar acts
will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let
a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Villanueva’s personal record in
the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
|
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN Chief
Justice
|
|
|
REYNATO
S. PUNO Associate
Justice CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate
Justice (On
leave) RENATO
C. CORONA Associate
Justice ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate
Justice DANTE
O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING Associate
Justice MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA Associate
Justice MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice CANCIO
C. GARCIA Associate
Justice |
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] See Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935).
[2] Rollo,
pp. 48-60. Penned by Justice Sergio L.
Pestaño (deceased) and concurred in by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and
Justice Noel G. Tijam.
[3]
[4] See Resolution, id. p. 151.
[5] Rollo, pp. 320-327.
[6] Letter dated
[7] Resolution dated
[8] TSN,
[9] TSN,
[10]
[11] Rollo, p. 65.
[12] Letter dated
[13] Compliance and Explanation dated
[14] TSN,
[15] See Resolution, rollo, p. 679.
[16] Spiegel
v. Beacon Participation, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007.
[17] Air
France v. Carrascoso, L-21438,
[18] Salonga
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111478,
[19] G.R. No. 68635,
[20] Supra.
[21] Fernandez v. Verzola, A. M.
No. CA-04-40,
[22] 17 Am Jur 2d § 105, citing United Marine Div. of I.L.A. v. Commonwealth, 193 Va 773, 71 SE2d 159, cert den 344 US 893, 97 L Ed 690, 73 S Ct 212.
[23] See Salcedo v. Hernandez, supra.