FIRST
DIVISION
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FELINO EBREO, SPOUSES ANTONIO and
EVELYN P. BERAÑA, IGNACIO EBREO and ELEUTERIA CUETO,
Petitioners, - versus
- GIL EBREO, represented by His
Attorney-in-Fact, FELIXBERTO EBREO, FLAVIANO EBREO and HOMOBONO CUETO, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 160065 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: February 28, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Isang palagay na
lupang palayanin o linangin ipinamumuwis sa ilalim ng
Tax Declaration No. 39949 S-1953, na ang mga karatig
sa Ilaya ay Prudencia Coz, sa Silangan ay Pablo Cantro at
Santiago Banaag, sa ibaba ay Ilat (Creek) at sa Kanluran ay Marcos at Fortunato Banaag may luwang na 31,781 metros kuwadrados humigit kumulang at may balor amiliorada na halagang
P950.00, lalong kilala
sa Lote 9046 ng sukat katastro
dito sa Batangas.[2]
On 11 September 1967, the five
heirs of Felipe Ebreo, through themselves and their
representatives, executed and signed a document entitled, “Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa”[4]
where they extrajudicially partitioned the
above-described property except the portion known as Lot No. 9046-F. As agreed upon by these heirs, Lot No.
9046-F, with an area of 13,799 square meters, shall remain under the
co-ownership of Gil, Flaviano, Felino,
Ignacio and the heirs of Felipa Ebreo. However, plaintiffs were surprised to
discover that
Answering
the complaint, the defendants countered that after the execution of the Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa, by and among the heirs of the late Felipe Ebreo,
As narrated by the defendants, Tax Declaration
No. 39241,[5]
beginning in the year 1969 covering
Defendants
further alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot No. 9046-F by the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo
was executed and ratified sometime in 1968 before Attorney Doroteo
M. Chavez of
After due proceedings, a decision[11]
dated
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered as follows:
(1) Ordering the parties-in-interest (heirs
of Felipe Ebreo and/or their representatives) to
partition Lot No. 9046-F among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance
under Sec. 2, Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and in default
thereof, the partition shall be conducted in accordance with Sec. 3, et. seq., of the same Rule.
(2) Ordering the dismissal of the
Counterclaim of the defendants.
(3) Ordering the defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay the plaintiffs the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00),
Philippine Currency, for and as attorney’s fee.
(4) Ordering the defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay the costs of suit.[12]
Defendants- appellants appealed the
decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.
In a decision[13] dated
The
main issue in this case is whether or not a valid transfer of Lot No. 9046-F
was effected which conveyed ownership of the property to Santiago Puyo. The
defendant-appellants rely on the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by the heirs
of Felipe Ebreo in favor of Santiago Puyo. However,
defendant-appellants failed to produce the alleged Deed of Sale in violation of
the Best Evidence Rule.
x x x x
The
best evidence rule, applied to documentary evidence, operates as a rule of
exclusion, that is, secondary (or substitutionary)
evidence cannot inceptively be introduced as the original writing itself must
be produced in court, except in the four instances mentioned in Section 3. (Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Volume II, Seventh Revised Edition, p. 555). Defendant-appellants miserably failed to
prove that their case is included among the exceptions to the Rule.
The
testimony of Felino Ebreo
regarding the execution of the Deed of Sale cannot be given credence. In fact, it was contradicted by his supposed
co-sellers and co-owners. His claim that
it was borrowed by Eleuteria Cueto
and never returned to him was also refuted by Eleuteria
Cueto. Not
only are the testimonies of Felino Ebreo and his son Antonio Ebreo
self-serving, they are also uncorroborated by independent witnesses. Defendant-appellants did not even look for a
copy of the deed of sale on the notarial registry of
Atty. Chavez, the notary public who allegedly notarized the deed of sale. Neither did they look for a copy in the
archives of the Court where it should have been submitted as required by the notarial law. In the
words of the trial court, “the decisive documentary evidence remains an elusive
phantom and conspicuously unproven.” The
controversial deed of sale not having been produced as required by the rules of
evidence, the trial court was correct in ruling that Santiago Puyo acquired no rights whatsoever to Lot No. 9046-F.
Since
there was no valid transfer of the ownership of the subject lot from the heirs
of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo,
the subsequent transfer thereof to Antonio Ebreo is
ineffectual. It is essential that the
seller is the owner of the property he is selling (Noel vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 78). Moreover, the fact that the tax
declarations for said lot were issued in the name of Antonio Ebreo is of no moment for they are not conclusive proof of
ownership. It must be remembered that a
tax declaration may be issued to any claimant even if it is not supported by
any deed.
Neither
can defendant-appellants’ open, adverse, notorious and continuous possession of
the land for several years amount to ownership for they are co-owners of the
land as evidenced by the “Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi Ng Lupa.” A co-owner
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners. (
The
motion for reconsideration of the defendants-appellants was denied in the
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
The following issues are submitted for
resolution in this petition:
1) Whether
or not the annotation of the Deed of Sale appearing in Tax Declaration No.
48221 is a sufficient proof of transfer in line with the doctrine of presumption
of regularity of performance of official duty.
2)
Whether or not
entries in official records are admissible in evidence to establish the fact of
valid transfer of Lot No. 9046-F that effectively conveyed ownership of the
property from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo.[16]
After a painstaking review of the records, we find the
petition bereft of merit. First, it is
important to re-state the general rule that the findings of the trial court
which are factual in nature, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals
deserve to be respected and affirmed by this court provided they are supported
by substantial evidence on record, as in the case at bench.[17]
As recounted by defendants, now
petitioners, Antonio and Evelyn Ebreo,
Petitioners went on further to
state that the Deed of Sale from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo
to Santiago Puyo could not be presented because the
copy on file with the Office of the City Assessor was lost in the fire which
occurred in
On the basis of the above narrations,
petitioners insist that there was a valid transfer of the lot from the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo,
and thereafter from Santiago Puyo to them. To buttress this claim of sale by the heirs
to Santiago Puyo, petitioners presented the testimony
of Antonio Pajilan of the City Assessors Office of Batangas City who testified on the annotation in Tax
Declaration No. 48221. The annotation
reads:
Deed of sale
D.V. P2,500.00
Doc. on file
Doc. No. 312
Page No. 17
Book No. VI
Series of 1967[18]
The testimony of Pajilan
went on as follows:
Q I
am showing to you a tax declaration No. 32941 in the name of Gil Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio, Genoveva, Eleuteria Cueto which is already marked as Exhibit “10” for the
defendants in this case and Exhibit “F” for the plaintiff, will you please
examine the same and identify it?
A Witness
is examining the document. I think this
tax declaration is an owner’s copy, Sir.
Q But
this tax declaration was issued by your office, the City Assessor of Batangas?
A Yes,
Sir.
Q Can
you inform before this Honorable Court, if this tax declaration was still
existing in your office or a copy thereof?
A This
tax declaration could not be found because our office was burned on
Q You
are also required by this Honorable Court to bring a copy of the tax
declaration No. 48221, do you have copy of the same?
A I
have copy of that tax declaration, Sir.
Q Will
you please produce the same?
Witness
is producing a copy of tax declaration No. 32941 in the name of Santiago Puyo.
A Can
you explain how this tax declaration was placed in the name of Santiago Puyo?
Q Previously
this tax declaration was owned by Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio Ebreo and Genoveva, Eleuteria and Homobono Cueto under PD 32941
this tax declaration is under 48221 in the name of Santiago Puyo
and this was transferred by a virtue of Deed of Sale annotated in the tax
declaration and in the Deed of Sale and purchase value was there: 2,500.00
document docketed No. 312, Page 17, Book No. 6, Series of 1967, Doroteo de Chavez, the Notary Public, Sir.
Q Can
you explain why this annotation was placed or written in this tax declaration
No. 48221?
A This
was placed under Tax Declaration No. 48221 because the office of the City
Assessor transferred the tax declaration and annotated the instrument used in
the transfer of the tax declaration, Sir.
Q Do
you have copy of that document which is the basis of the transfer?
A We
could not be located (sic) because as I have said earlier our office was burned
on
Q So
what does this phrase Deed of Sale, what do you mean by that?
A I
placed that, that is the title of the instrument used in the transfer of this
tax declaration, Sir.[19]
It
is worth noting that Antonio Pajilan, an employee of
the City Assessor’s Office of Batangas City[20]
who testified regarding Tax Declaration No. 48221 dated
Petitioners
next argue that Tax Declaration No. 48221 in the name of Santiago Puyo enjoys the presumption of regularity in its issuance.
It is a good time as any to re-state that this rule is a mere presumption, not
absolute nor inflexible and applies only in the absence of proof to the
contrary.[21] Besides, the mere fact that the disputed
property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of the
petitioners does not necessarily prove ownership. In the same manner, neither does the payment
of taxes conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for.[22] It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership.[23]
Petitioners
also presented the testimony of Felino Ebreo, father of petitioner Antonio Ebreo,
who testified that the heirs of Felipe Ebreo sold
Finally, petitioners presented Asuncion Aguado, step-daughter of Santiago Puyo,
who testified that her stepfather Santiago Puyo
bought the subject lot from the Ebreo heirs.[28] Similar to Pajilan’s
testimony, Aguado’s testimony cannot be given much
weight in view of the fact that save for her bare allegations that
To summarize, the testimonies of Pajilan, Felino Ebreo and Asuncion Aguado are at
most secondary evidence; hence, they are inadmissible considering that the
petitioners, as offerors of the Deed of Sale, thereof
failed to prove any of the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court and to establish conditions for their admissibility.[30]
Even if they are admitted, they have no
probative value.[31] This rule provides:
SEC.
3. Original
document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Under this rule, it is axiomatic that
before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of
the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite
quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the
copies of the original of the said deed or document. As former Supreme Court Chief Justice Manuel
V. Moran declared:
“Where there are two or more
originals, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed or cannot
be produced before secondary evidence can be given of any one. For example, a lease was executed in
duplicate, one being retained by the lessor and the
other by the lessee. Either copy was,
therefore, an original, and could have been introduced as evidence of the
contract without the production of the other.
One of these originals could not be found. The non-production of the other was not
accounted for it was held that “under these circumstances, the rule is that no
secondary evidence of the contents of either is admissible until it is shown
that originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of
any one.”
Indeed,
before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of
the original of the deed, the offeror is mandated to
prove the following:
“(a) the execution and existence of the original
(b) the loss and destruction of the
original or its non-production in court; and (c) unavailability of the original is not due to
bad faith on the part of the offeror.”[32]
On this score, the factual findings of
the trial court are worth repeating. It
held:
The
pivotal document of sale allegedly executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in favor of Santiago Puyo
and chiefly relied upon by defendant Antonio Ebreo as
the derivative basis of his ownership is sadly missing and remains a phantom in
the dark. The testimonies of Felino Ebreo, Asuncion Aguado and Antonio Ebreo to prove
by way of recollection of witnesses
that Lot 9046-F was sold to Santiago Puyo sometime in
1967 for P2,500.00 by virtue of a deed notarized before deceased Atty. Doroteo Chavez merits scant consideration. They were the
verbal say-so of interested parties and attributed acts to a party whose lips
had been sealed by death. Quite
evidently, their testimony should be taken cum grano salis – with a grain of salt.
Both
the testimonies of Asuncion Aguado and Antonio Ebreo lacked the legal underpinning needed to prove the
deed of sale. Their testimonies were not
recollection of witnesses who saw the execution and delivery of the
document. According to Sec. 4, Rule 130, the contents of the lost writing may
be proved, inter alia, by the recollection of
witnesses. As matters stand, however, Aguado’s
testimony relates not to the execution of the document but to what her father
(Santiago Puyo) did with the property after it was
already acquired. (t.s.n. pp. 4-7, Direct,
Neither
does the testimony of Felino Ebreo
evoke faith and confidence. His salutary
recollection of the missing document failed to instill credulity. For one, it was uncorroborated by any of the
parties to the alleged deed of sale. In fact, such sale was directly controverted by his supposed co-sellers and co-owners Gil
and Flaviano. (t.s.n. pp. 7-8, Direct,
While
many things have been said about the crucial deed of sale, the decisive
documentary evidence remains an elusive phantom and conspicuously
unproven. The ownership of Santiago Puyo becomes moreover doubtful because while the alleged
sale was executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in
1967 yet the earliest Tax Declaration in the name of Santiago Puyo was issued only in 1973 (Exh.
“9”) or 1974 (Exh. “4”) as far as the record of this
case can reveal. The issuance of a new
tax declaration in the name of the sunrise owner (Puyo)
which was late by six (6) or seven (7) years naturally cast a slur on the
veracity of the sale.
The
typewritten entry on Tax Decl. No. 48221 (Exhs. “9” and “9-A”) detailing the particulars of the
alleged deed of sale in favor of Santiago Puyo is patently
suspicious and a very very poor ersatz for the primary
document. While the sale allegedly took place in 1967, said deed was annotated
on Exh. “9” which however only “begins with the year
1973.” Moreover, while the alleged sale
took place in 1967, yet Tax. Decl. No. 32941 (Exh. “10”) that was issued on
Riveting
further its attention to the typewritten entry on Exh.
“9”, the Court finds it rather strange that such an entry appears on the Tax
Declaration. Firstly, it is not a widely accepted practice to make such
annotation. Secondly, there is more than meets the eye in the conspicuous
presence of this annotation only on this particular Tax Declaration (Exh. “9”). All other tax declarations in this case do not
have similar entry to identify the documentary basis for the issuance of the
latest tax declaration. Thirdly, not even Tax Decl.
Nos. 50669 and 075-534 (Exhs. “2” and “3”) of Antonio
Ebreo carry such annotation to indicate that he
acquired the property by virtue of Doc. No. 70, Page No. 15, Book No. I, Series
of 1976 of the Notarial Register of Atty. Meynardo L. Atienza. The pregnant
suspicion lurks that the alleged particulars of the document of sale from
Santiago Puyo to Antonio Ebreo
were belatedly annotated.
As
icing on the cake, Gil Ebreo categorically stated it
was Felino Ebreo who
authored the transfer. He testified on cross-examination that it was his eldest
brother Felino Ebreo who
was the caretaker of the lot and in-charge of the payment of taxes. It was his brother Felino
who sold the subject lot known as
The
alleged document of sale executed between Santiago Puyo
and Antonio Ebreo denominated as “Ganap
na Bilihan ng Lupa” (Exh.
“1”), was ineffectual for the purpose of transferring ownership of disputed Lot
No. 9046-F to said Antonio Ebreo because the alleged
vendor Santiago Puyo has not, as heretofore
explained, acquired it from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo
as the transaction has no supporting document of sale. It is self-evident that the seller cannot transfer more than what he
has or as oftenly stated hyperbolically, the river
cannot rise above its source. Moreover, Clerk of Court Jose C. Corales certified that the Ganap na Bilihan ng
Lupa (Doc. No. 70, Page No. 15, Book No. I, Series of
1976) despite diligent efforts could not be found in the old CFI vault located
at the
The
fact that tax declarations for
In sum, considering that the
annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient
proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the
Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the petitioners to adduce in evidence the
original or a copy of the deed consistent with Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. In the absence of the said
document, the exhortations of petitioners regarding the existence of said deed
of sale must fail.
Wherefore, premises
considered, the instant petition is Denied for lack of merit and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, Annex D, pp. 53-58.
[2]
[3] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit A-1, p. 2.
[4] Rollo, Annex H, pp. 75-76.
[5] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit 10, p. 25.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo, Annex E, pp. 59-63.
[10] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit 1, p. 13.
[11] Penned by Judge Teodoro Tapia Riel.
[12] Rollo, p. 50.
[13] Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58602;
Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine with
Associate Justices Eugenio s. Labitoria
and Renato C. Dacudao,
concurring;
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 368, 378 (1999); Vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 72, 77 (1986); Republic of the Phils. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 229 Phil. 20, 25 (1986); Cabatbat Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-69679,
[18] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit 9, p. 24.
[19] TSN,
[20]
[21] REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(m).
[22] Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 76792, 12 March 1990,
183 SCRA 102, 112; Del Rosario v.
Republic of the Phils., 432 Phil. 824, 838 (2002); Seriña v. Caballero, G.R. No. 127382, 17 August 2004, 436 SCRA 593, 604.
[23] Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246, 2 March 1993, 219 SCRA 339, 348; Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 57, 63 (1995); San Miguel Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57667, 28 May 1990, 185 SCRA 722, 725; Heirs of Brusas v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 47, 55 (1999).
[24] TSN,
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] TSN,
[29]
[30]
[31] Republic v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 852, 875 (1996).
[32]
[33] Rollo, pp. 46-49.