FIRST
DIVISION
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SPOUSES
ANTONIO and SOLIDAD DIVINAGRACIA, JUDITH TULOD, CRESENCIO TAUTOAN, VICENTE
TAUTOAN, MARIA BEATRIZ PAREJA, FABIAN MASONG, MACARIO MASONG, APOLINARIA
MASONG, EPIFANIA MASONG-CUAMBOT, WENCESLAO BERCERO, JUAN ANDRINO and PERFECTO
DY, JR., Petitioners, - versus - LEONIDISA
N. COMETA, LEOPOLDO MUÑEZ also known as LEOPOLDO NUÑEZ, MARLYN MUÑEZ also
known as MARLYN NUÑEZ, DEMETRIO MUÑEZ, JR., also known as DEMETRIO NUÑEZ,
JR., SEGUNDO MUÑEZ also known as SEGUNDO NUÑEZ, MIGUEL BONSUCAN, SABINA N.
NUÑEZ also known as SABINA N. MUÑEZ, JOSISIMO ARACADIO, CONCHITA NUÑEZ also
known as CONCHITA MUÑEZ, and LUIS NUÑEZ also known as LUIS MUÑEZ, ALBERTO
TUDTUD and HILARIO TUDTUD,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 159660 Present: PANGANIBAN, CJ Chairperson YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR.,* and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: February 20, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us
is a petition for review on certiorari
questioning the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated
The controversy affects parcels of land situated at
Bogo,
Respondents, as defendants before
the RTC, are the sole living heirs of seven of the parties to the 1928
partition. On
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals shed
light into the events that transpired after the 1992-1993 partition, thus:
One of these two lands,
Marlyn Nuñez and Demetrio Nuñez, Jr., with 9,682 sq. m.
As a result of this instrument, OCT
RO-13176 (0-13175) was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-84670 to T-84676 were issued in May 1994.
The other land,
Marlyn Nuñez and Demetrio
Nuñez Jr. with 10,330 sq. m.
Accordingly, OCT RO-3177 (0-13173)
was cancelled and replaced on the same date by Transfer Certificates of Title
No. T-84677 to T-84683.
The plaintiffs in this case claim
that they acquired these lots from Agustin’s heirs and from third persons who
acquired from those heirs. Relying on the superiority of the 1928 partition, prius in tempore potior in jure, they
filed an action against these adjudicatees for the declaration of nullity of
the subsequent extrajudicial declaration of heirs made in 1992 and all the
titles issued by virtue thereof. The complaint was docketed as CEB-16645 and
raffled to branch 22 of the RTC of Cebu.
In time, the defendants filed their
answer. They disclaimed knowledge of the 1928 instrument which was not
registered, and argued that their partition was legal because they were the
heirs of the parties to the 1928 instrument and their right to the properties
commenced from the time of the death of their grandparents. They accordingly
had the right to partition the property or confirm a previous oral partition,
and the efficacy of their acts had been firmed up by the issuance in their
names of subsequent transfer certificates of title. It is alleged that the
plaintiffs are not heirs of the parties to the partition and have not shown the
legal mode by which they acquired the properties. They are allegedly guilty of laches for not
enforcing their rights over an uncommonly long period of time.
Before pre-trial went underway, the
brothers Alberto and Hilario Tudtud intervened as the purchasers of several of
the lots into which the two properties were divided. Through separate deeds of sale, Alberto had
acquired
In a decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants and
Intervenors, declaring the extra-judicial declaration of heirs and confirmation
of the oral sale as well as TCT Nos. 84670 to 84683 in the name of defendants
as null and void and ordering defendants and intervenors to jointly and severally
pay the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fee and P10,000.00
as litigation expenses.[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court decision and dismissed the case.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied, they are now
before us with the following arguments:
I.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
EXTRAJUDICIAL DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL
PARTITION, EXHIBIT “A” AND EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION OF THE ESTATE OF DECEASED
PERSON AMONG HEIRS, EXHIBIT “B”, WERE NULL AND VOID.
II.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS HAVE NOT PRESENTED ANY PROOF THAT THEY HAVE LEGAL AND EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE PROPERTIES IN LITIGATION.[7]
We do not find
any justification to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals. We agree that petitioners have not proved by
preponderance of evidence their legal or equitable title or interest in the
properties in litigation.
The action to quiet title to property or to remove a
cloud thereon is a remedy or form of proceeding originating in equity
jurisprudence.[8] The plaintiff in such an action seeks for adjudication
that any adverse claim of title or interest in the property in question is
invalid, so that the plaintiff and those claiming under him or her may forever
be free from any danger of the hostile claim.[9] However, in order to maintain an action to
quiet title or remove a cloud thereon, the plaintiff must have a legal or
equitable title to the property in question or some interest therein. Thus, Article 477 of the Civil Code prescribes
that:
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
In the case
under consideration, petitioners maintain that although they do not have legal,
i.e., registered,[10]
title over the subject parcels of land, they have equitable or beneficial
ownership having obtained these properties from the parties to the 1928
partition and/or from third persons who acquired from these parties.
Of the 12[11]
petitioners, however, only one testified
as to her alleged acquisition of rights over the subject properties. The 11 other petitioners chose to remain
silent. Not only did they not bother to
take the witness stand, neither did they present any document other than the
1928 partition that could prove their beneficial ownership over the subject
properties. What is clear only is that
they are possessors/occupants of these properties. However, since it is equally clear that petitioners
are not heirs of the parties to the 1928 partition, it was incumbent upon them
to show, by documentary and testimonial evidence, the link that connects their
possession to the 1928 partition without which their mission must necessarily flounder
and fail. The Court of Appeals thus
correctly ruled that –
With less reason may We uphold the case of the other plaintiffs. It was only Cuambot who has come forward with her evidence, and although scrappy, it was only intended to prove her claim and not the claims of the others who never bothered to appear. Under these circumstances, the burden has not shifted to the defendants to prove their own rights to the disputed properties, and to the intervenors to justify their acquisitions from the defendants. In fine, We agree with the appellants that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their cause of action.[12]
Petitioners
insist, however, that they need not take the witness stand as their co-petitioner,
Epifania Masong-Cuambot, testified in their behalf. Unfortunately for petitioners, we are far
from swayed by this argument.
Cuambot
testified on
Besides, consistent with the purpose of her testimony,
Cuambot endeavored to prove only her title to subject properties. The sole reference she made to her 11 co-petitioners
was when she stated that they likewise owned properties in Binabag, Bogo, and that all of them executed affidavits of adverse
claim when they learned that other people were claiming their land.[15] By no stretch of the imagination can we
consider such testimony as proof of petitioners’ ownership over subject
properties.
That the 11 petitioners’ efforts were futile begs the
question of whether or not the 12th petitioner, Cuambot, has succeeded
where they have failed.
To this question, the Court of Appeals has the answer,
thus:
In their appeal brief, the plaintiffs cited the testimony of
Epifania Masong Cuambot for evidence of her acquisition of rights. Epifania is the only one among the 12
plaintiffs who testified, and in her testimony, she identified the lands she
was claiming to be those that she inherited from her parents Dalmacio and Maria
Masong, and those she bought from her sister Justina Masong. The properties that she bought from Justina
in 1974 were covered by a notarized deed of sale, in which one parcel located
at Bogo was described as
There remains the June 1950 deed of sale in which the (sic)
Epifania’s parents bought three parcels of land located at Binabag, Bogo and
San Remigio from Miguel Bogsukan. This
document now traces the properties to its very source. It says that the lands were acquired by
Bogsukan from Roman Nuñez who acquired them in turn from his father Agustin
Nuñez by virtue of the 1928 partition.
If we go by this instrument, the existence of which as we
have noted was affirmed by the trial court, there were three parcels allotted
to Roman from Agustin’s estate. The
location and description of these properties tally with those of the lots
covered by the sale to Cuambot’s parents.
The properties that eventually went to them as recorded in the 1950 deed
of sale were, therefore, those that came from Roman and ultimately from Agustin.
We are satisfied that this particular plaintiff has proven her right to
lands covered by the 1928 partition.
When the defendants, who were all descendants of Agustin,
effected the 1992-1993 partition of the same lands, they were doing nothing
more than disregarding the 1928 partition.
They could do this if they were the only surviving heirs and the rights
of third parties had not intervened. But
it may now be argued that Cuambot’s rights would be unavoidably affected by
such act.
The pivotal question is whether the lands claimed by Cuambot are
among those adjudicated by the defendants and covered by the titles sought to
be nullified. This is where the
difficulty in her case already becomes intractable. We have gone to extreme length in searching
the records for even the slightest clues of a connection. But there are none. The acquisitions of the Tudtuds could not be
traced to the original patrimony of Cuambot’s ancestor Roman Nuñez. All the lots acquired by the intervenors came
form his co-heirs. The lands allotted to
Roman under the 1928 partition are identified in a manner that also tells us
they could not be the properties that went to the defendants under the 1992-93
partition. We looked into how the
properties under these two partitions, separated by 64 years, were described,
and they simply do not coincide. This
observation may be inconclusive, but it must be borne in mind that under the
civil law, as we have earlier mentioned, it is the plaintiff who must prove the
identity of the land he is claiming.
Cuambot has miserably failed in this duty, and as a result, her case
falls. This Court cannot be, as Justice
Cardozo once put it in striking metaphor, a knight errant that roams the
countryside at will for its own ideals of truth and beauty. Under our adversarial system of justice, the
parties must put their case before the court assisted by legal advocates of
their choice, and the court adjudicates only on such evidence as are presented
to it. As it is, the paper trail we have
pursued in this case already goes beyond the ken of the inquiry courts are wont
to do.[16]
Summarizing
the foregoing, the Court of Appeals held that although Cuambot succeeded in
showing that she owns properties that can be traced to Roman Nuñez, a party to
the 1928 partition, still, she has failed to show that these properties are the
very same ones partitioned by respondents in 1992 and 1993.
We agree. We find it baffling that Cuambot and the rest
of the petitioners have not bothered to identify the exact locations of their
properties. Thus, we ask, is Cuambot
occupying and claiming title over all the parcels of land which are now covered
by TCT Nos. T-84670 to T-84683, or is she claiming only certain portions thereof? Which of the properties, now covered by TCT
Nos. T-84670 to T-84683, originally belonged to Roman Nuñez?
Although Cuambot can trace her rights ultimately to
Roman Nuñez, one of Agustin’s heirs, it does not appear that the properties of
Roman Nuñez were included in the 1992-1993 partition. The 1992-1993 partition pertains only to the properties
of the other parties to the 1928 partition, in particular, Tomas, Mariano,
Isidra, Catalina,
The failure of Cuambot to identify with certainty the
parcels of land she is claiming is a fatal omission on her part. In Sese
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[17]
we emphasized that “in order to maintain
an action to recover ownership of real property, the person who claims that he
has a better right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the
same, but first, he must satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.”
Considering that there is paucity of proof that petitioners
have real or equitable title or interest over the subject properties, there is
no longer any need to resolve the two other issues in this case, i.e., whether or not the 1992-1993
partition was void and whether or not the intervenors were buyers in bad faith.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
* On leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Martin S. Villarama, Jr., concurring (Rollo, pp. 76-82).
[2] Rollo, p. 96.
[3] The parties have consistently
referred to subject parcels of land as Lots 3116 and 3108 of the Bogo Cadastre.
[4] Records, pp. 1-7.
[5] Rollo, pp. 77-77(a).
[6]
[7]
[8] A.M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 137 (1983 ed.); Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 15, 25 (2000).
[9]
[10] Gapacan v. Omipet, 436 Phil. 177, 187
(2002).
[11] We have adopted the Court of Appeals’ treatment of the spouses Antonio and Solidad Divinagracia as one entity.
[12] Rollo, p. 81.
[13] TSN,
[14] Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court. Offer
of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified.
[15] TSN,
[16] Rollo, pp.
79-81.
[17] G.R. No. L-66186,