SPS.
THELMA and GREGORIO G.R. No. 158895
ABRAJANO, SPS.
and RODEL LAVA and OSCAR Present:
DACILLO,
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairman,
-
versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO-MORALES, and
TINGA,
JJ.
HEIRS
OF AUGUSTO F. SALAS,
JR., namely: TERESITA D.
SALAS, FABRICE CYBILL D. Promulgated:
LESACA and KARINA D. February 16, 2006
SALAS, and COURT OF APPEALS
Respondents.
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Tinga,
J.:
Before
us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
dated August 2, 2003, assailing the Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75882 dated April 30, 2003, which
ruled that the trial court judge should have inhibited himself from hearing the
case and directed that it be raffled off to another branch, and its Resolution[3]
dated July 15, 2003 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The facts as condensed from the
records are as follows:
Augusto L. Salas, Jr. (Salas) was the
registered owner of a large parcel of land located in
On
Meanwhile, Laperal subdivided the
properties and sold portions thereof to Rockway Real Estate Corporation
(Rockway), South Ridge Village, Inc. (South Ridge), spouses Gregorio and Thelma
Abrajano (Abrajanos), spouses Rodel and Virginia Lava (Lavas), Oscar Dacillo
(Dacillo), Eduardo A. Vacuna (Vacuna), Marahani Development Corporation
(Marahani), Florante dela Cruz (dela Cruz) and Jesus Vicente B. Capellan
(Capellan).
On
Laperal filed a Motion to Dismiss[5] on
the ground of failure to comply with the arbitration clause in the Owner-Contractor
Agreement.
Vacuna and Capellan filed an Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,[6]
alleging that the Complaint states no cause of action; that plaintiffs have no
capacity to sue; that the condition precedent of resorting to arbitration was
not complied with; that they were buyers in good faith and for value; and that
plaintiffs’ claim over the subject properties is a virtual opening of Salas’s
succession prior to the required 10-year period of disappearance under Art. 390
of the Civil Code.[7]
Marahani and dela Cruz filed an
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,[8]
raising as affirmative defenses the prescription of the cause of action for
rescission; the lack of capacity to sue of one of the plaintiffs; that they
were buyers in good faith; that the sale to them of a portion of Salas’s
property was for a consideration; and that the arbitration clause in the
Owner-Contractor Agreement should have first been complied with.
The Abrajanos, the Lavas, and Dacillo
filed a Joint Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,[9] raising
essentially the same affirmative defenses as the rest of the defendants.
For their part, Southridge and
Rockway filed separate Answers,[10] claiming
that plaintiffs’ Complaint is tantamount to opening Salas’s succession before
the mandatory 10-year period of absence under the Civil Code. Southridge
further averred that it is a purchaser in good faith and that the arbitration
clause should have first been resorted to.
The Heirs of Salas opposed Laperal’s
Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the arbitration clause is inapplicable since
there are defendants who are not privy to the Owner-Contractor Agreement.
Besides, the agreement purportedly allows any of the parties to seek its
cancellation.
In an Order[11]
dated
When the case was remanded to the
trial court, Vacuna and Capellan filed a Motion for Leave to Conduct
Preliminary Hearing on the Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses,[13] praying
that the affirmative defenses in their answer be heard in a preliminary hearing
pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of
Court).
The Heirs of Salas filed a Comment,[14]
contending that the affirmative defense of lack of capacity to sue has no basis
in view of the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Teresita D.
Salas by the RTC of Makati in Sp. Proc. No. M-4394.
Judge Demetria granted the motion to
conduct preliminary hearing in his Order[15]
dated
Subsequently, they also filed a
motion to inhibit Judge Demetria from further hearing the case pursuant to Sec.
1, Par. 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, averring that the previous dismissal
of the complaint by the judge, as well as the preliminary hearing ordered by
him on motion of the defendants, “have rendered the plaintiffs uneasy and
doubtful as to whether they will ever obtain an impartial judgment.”[18] Defendants
opposed the Motion for Inhibition.
On
Their Motion for Reconsideration[20]
having been denied,[21]
the Heirs of Salas filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
assailing Judge’s Demetria’s Order on the ground that his denial of the Motion
for Inhibition is a violation of their right to due process as it deprived them
of the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge.” Judge Demetria allegedly
allowed the delay in the resolution of the main case by dismissing the same
without considering all of the issues raised by the buyers only to allow the
latter to relitigate the same issues in a preliminary hearing.
Interpreting Sec. 6, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, the appellate court held that the provision applies only if no
motion to dismiss had been filed. If a motion to dismiss had been filed and
denied, the defendant may also reiterate the grounds thereof as affirmative
defenses but no preliminary hearing may be had thereon because a motion to
dismiss had already been filed and decided.
According to the Court of Appeals, the reversal by the Supreme Court of
the trial court’s order of dismissal operated as a denial of the motion to dismiss.
Hence, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses should no longer have been
conducted.
Accordingly, even as the Court of
Appeals found no indication of bias and partiality on the part of Judge
Demetria, it ordered his inhibition because the Heirs of Salas had already allegedly
lost faith in his actions.
With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioners are now before this Court asserting that the Court of Appeals
erroneously applied Sec. 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. They contend that respondents participated
fully in the preliminary hearings on the affirmative defenses and that it was
only after the admission of the evidence presented by petitioners that they
filed a motion to inhibit Judge Demetria.
In their Comment[22]
dated
Petitioners filed a Reply[24]
dated
First, the issue of mootness.
As a general rule, courts of justice
constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where
no actual interests are involved.[25] Courts generally decline jurisdiction when
the issues are already moot.
It does not escape our attention,
however, that the preliminary hearings on petitioners’ affirmative defenses are
nearing conclusion with the filing of petitioners’ Formal Offer of Evidence and
respondents’ Comments/Objections. To put
to naught the proceedings already taken only to repeat them during trial serves
no practical purpose. Clearly, the
Court’s declaration on the issues raised would still be of practical use and
value.
Besides, this case presents an
important procedural issue which is capable of repetition if left
unresolved. Hence, we shall not refrain
from expressing an opinion and rendering a decision on the merits.
At the heart of the present
controversy is the question of the propriety of Judge Demetria’s Order granting
petitioners’ motion to conduct preliminary hearings on their affirmative
defenses.
Sec. 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses.—If
no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided
for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in
the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed.
The dismissal of the complaint under this section
shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate action of
a counterclaim pleaded in the answer.
This section is explicit in stating
that the defendant may reiterate any of the grounds for dismissal provided
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court as affirmative defenses but that a
preliminary hearing may no longer be had thereon if a motion to dismiss had
already been filed. The section,
however, does not contemplate a situation, such as the one obtaining in this
case, where there are several defendants but only one filed a motion to
dismiss.
In such a case, should the denial of
the motion to dismiss prejudice the other defendants such that they may no
longer move for a preliminary hearing on their own affirmative defenses?
The answer is no. Translated in terms of this case, the Motion
to Dismiss filed by Laperal does not affect the right of the other defendants,
including petitioners herein, to plead their own affirmative defenses and be
preliminarily heard thereon. The trial
court is likewise not proscribed from granting, in its discretion, such a
motion for preliminary hearing. The only
caveat is that the ground of non-compliance with the condition precedent of
resorting to arbitration, which was raised in Laperal’s Motion to Dismiss, may
no longer be included in the preliminary hearing because it has already been
heard and finally resolved.
That said, we now examine whether the
Court of Appeals erred in ordering Judge Demetria’s inhibition. The rule on inhibition and disqualification
of judges is laid down in Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges.—No judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
Thus stated, the rule contemplates
two kinds of inhibition: compulsory disqualification assumes that a
judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for the reasons stated in
the first paragraph, while voluntary inhibition under the second
paragraph leaves to the judge’s discretion whether he should desist from
sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons with only his conscience to
guide him.[26]
The issue of voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.[27] This
discretion is an acknowledgement of the fact that judges are in a better
position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who
directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.[28] The decision on whether he should inhibit
himself, however, must be based on his rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him.[29]
The rule does not give the judge the
unfettered discretion to decide whether he should desist from hearing a case.
The inhibition must be for just and valid causes.[30]
The mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the
judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and
evidence and without fear or favor.[31] The disqualification of a judge cannot be
based on mere speculations and surmises or be predicated on the adverse nature
of the judge’s rulings towards the movant for inhibition.[32]
The basis of the motion for
inhibition filed by respondents in this case is Judge Demetria’s Order
dismissing the Complaint and subsequent grant of petitioners’ motion for
preliminary hearing on their affirmative defenses. This situation has allegedly made respondents
uneasy and doubtful as to whether they will obtain impartial judgment.
We believe that these circumstances give
Judge Demetria a just and valid reason for inhibiting himself. When the situation is such that would induce
doubt as to a judge’s actuations and probity, or incite such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination.[33]
In this case, Judge Demetria’s Order
dismissing the Complaint already caused considerable delay in the
proceedings. His subsequent order
granting the motion for preliminary hearing, while correct, caused further
prejudice to respondents of a character that would make them doubt his probity
and neutrality. Rightly so, Judge
Demetria ultimately thought it more prudent to inhibit himself than to have any
order, resolution or decision he would make in the case put under a cloud of
distrust and skepticism.
In view of the foregoing, we deem it
best that Civil Case No. 98-0047 be forthwith tried by the presiding judge of
Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Hon. Vicente F. Landicho,
to whom the case was re-raffled upon Judge Demetria’s inhibition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[2]
[7]Art.
390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.
The
absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession
till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that
his succession may be opened.
[23]
The Honorable Court of Appeals in its DECISION dated
As directed by the Honorable Court of Appeals, the undersigned judge
hereby inhibits himself from further proceeding with this instant case.
Consequently, the Branch Clerk of this Court is ordered to transmit the complete
records of this case to the Office of the Clerk of Court,
SO ORDERED.
[25]Royal
Cargo Corporation v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. Nos. 103055-56,
[31]Id., citing
People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129120, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 705,
710; People v. Kho, supra; and Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106087, April
7, 1993, 221 SCRA 397, 409-410.