EN BANC
|
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Petitioner, - versus - DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT,
Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 158791
Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,* CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: February 10, 2006 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before this
Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) praying that this Court reconsider its Decision dated July 22,
2005 (the Decision) granting the subject petition.
The DBM assails
this Court’s interpretation of Article IX (A) Section 5 of the Constitution,
Sections 62, 63, and 64 of the FY 2002 General
Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 9162), and the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC (Constitutional Mandate
on the Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy) dated June 3, 1993.
The DBM
posits that this Court’s ruling that fiscal autonomy means preference in terms
of cash allocation is not supported by the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, particularly the discussions on the draft article on
the Judiciary where the concept of fiscal autonomy was, by its claim, introduced.
The DBM
cites the comments of then Commissioner Blas Ople expressing concern over “the
propensity throughout this Article in its various provisions to accord the
Supreme Court, the lower courts and the judicial system as a whole, a whole
plethora of privileges and immunities that are denied the rest of the
government of the Republic of the
A close
reading of Commissioner Ople’s comments shows, however, that he was not
questioning nor seeking to qualify the concepts of “fiscal autonomy” and
“automatic release” as provided for in what is now Article VIII Section 3 of
the Constitution.[2] What was then under consideration was the
original draft article on the Judiciary which, with regard to appropriations,
provided as follows:
Section 15. An amount equivalent to not less than two
percent of the national budget shall be automatically appropriated and
regularly released for the judiciary. (Underscoring supplied)
What the
original draft thus provided for was automatic appropriation, which is
not the same as automatic release of appropriations. The power to appropriate belongs to Congress,
while the responsibility of releasing appropriations belongs to the DBM.
Commissioner Ople objected to automatic appropriation, it bears emphasis, not to
automatic release of appropriations.
It was
Commissioner Christian Monsod who proposed the substitute provision that is now
Article VIII Section 3 providing for “fiscal autonomy” and for automatic and
regular release of appropriations.
In support
of its position, the DBM also cites Commissioner Monsod’s explanation that
“[t]he whole purpose of that provision is to protect the independence of the
judiciary while at the same time not giving the judiciary what we call a
position of privilege by an automatic percentage.” Again, what Commissioner Monsod objected to
was automatic appropriation for the judiciary, not automatic release of
appropriations once approved. The following
statement of Commissioner Monsod, read in its context, does not in any way
support the position taken by the DBM.
The Commissioner will recall that
when the provision giving fiscal autonomy to the judiciary was presented to the
body, we were the ones who denied to it the percentage of the budget
because, precisely, we wanted the judiciary to go through the process of
budget-making to justify its budget and to go through the legislature for that
justification. But we
also said that after having gone through this process, it should have
fiscal autonomy so that there will be an automatic and regular release of
such funds. The whole purpose of
that provision is to protect the independence of the judiciary
while at the same time not giving the judiciary what we call a position of
privilege by an automatic percentage.[3] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The DBM
further claims that the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly
release funds does not preclude the implementation of a cash payment schedule
for all agencies, including those belonging to the constitutional fiscal
autonomous group (CFAG). It explains the meaning of “cash payment
schedule” in the context of the budgetary process, from the enactment of the
general appropriations law to the release of appropriations, thus.
After the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) is signed into law, this Department, in coordination with the agency
concerned, prepares the financial plan for the year in accordance with its
appropriations under the GAA. The result
of this exercise is embodied in the Agency Budget Matrix or ABM which
reflects the individual obligation authority ceilings of the agency, called the
allotment. An allotment allows
the agency to enter into a contract or otherwise obligate funds although cash
has not yet been received by said agency.
Simply put, allotments serve as a guarantee that the national government
will look for cash to support the agency’s obligations. Therefore, the closer the allotment is to the
amount of its appropriation, the better.
The approved allotment of an
ordinary agency does not cover its full appropriations, while those for
entities vested with fiscal autonomy always cover the full amount of its
appropriations. For instance,
allotments for Personal Service of an ordinary agency only cover those for
filled positions. In contrast, the
Personal Service allotments of agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy are
comprehensively released, including those for positions that are admittedly
vacant. At the end of the year, whatever
is unspent for Personal Services, particularly for unfilled positions,
translates to savings, which may be used to augment other items of
appropriations.
As emphasized, the ABM of an
ordinary agency is disaggregated into those Needing Clearance and Not Needing
Clearance. Pursuant to Budget Execution
Guidelines no. 2000-12 dated
Finally, items under the Not Needing
Column of an ordinary agency is further disaggregated to “this release” which
represents the initial allotment authorized under the ABM, and “for later
release” which represents the amount to be released after the conduct of the
agency performance review. In contrast, the
total appropriation and allotment of entities belonging to the CFAG are all
placed under “this release” since no agency performance review is conducted by
the DBM on these entities.
x x x x
Thus, in order to ensure that the budgets of agencies vested with fiscal autonomy are released in full, the DBM in a ministerial capacity, ensures that the allotments of agencies belonging to the CFAG (i) cover the full amount of their annual appropriations, and (ii) are not subject to any condition. In other words, budgets of fiscal autonomous agencies occupy the highest category in terms of allotment.
x x x x
After the ABMs are issued, the Notices
of Cash Allocations (NCAs) are issued every month to support approved
allotments with cash.
Ideally, the NCA should cover
in full the monthly allotment of the agency.
The reality, however, is that every national budget is based on revenue
projections, and that there is an ever present risk that these revenue targets
are not met in full during the course of the budget year. Last FYs 2001 and 2002, for instance, revenue
shortfall was at 7.16% and 9.16%, respectively, as shown below under Table 2.
x x x x
Further, not all revenue collections
are received at the start of the budget year.
The cash flow of the national government, like most other public
institutions, has its highs and lows depending on the tax calendar. Thus, not all of the projected revenues are
available for spending at the start of the budget year.
It thus becomes imperative for
the Executive Department, through the DBM, to manage the release of funds
through implementation of cash payment schedules. For instance, if collections for a given
month meet the monthly revenue target, then the NCA for that month shall cover
100% of the allotment. If, however,
collections do not meet the monthly revenue target, then the NCA to be released
may not cover 100% of the allotment. Add
a few more variables, such as amount of deficit and total disbursement of
agencies, then one gets a cash payment schedule that varies on a monthly basis.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The DBM
goes on to emphasize that it has no discretion on how much cash enters
petitioner’s coffers, as cash payment schedules are “dictated by the
amount of revenue collection, borrowings, deficit ceilings and total
disbursement program of the national government”[5];
and if the cash payment schedule prescribes that the total cash to be released
for a given month is 85% of allotment, then a Notice of Cash Allocation
amounting to 85% of each agency’s allotment is released for all
agencies. It thus contends that this
equality in treatment does not violate the fiscal autonomy of the agencies
belonging to the CFAG, for “since approved allotments of agencies belonging to
the CFAG are higher than ordinary agencies, they automatically get
higher cash allocations.”[6]
The DBM’s protestation
that it has no discretion on the amount of funds released to agencies with
fiscal autonomy fails. The Court finds
that the DBM, in fact, exercised discretion denied it by the constitutional
mandate to automatically release such funds. Understandably, a shortfall in revenue in a
given year would constrain the DBM not to release the total amount appropriated
by the GAA for the government as a whole during that year. However, the DBM is certainly not
compelled by such circumstance to proportionately reduce the funds appropriated
for each and every agency. Given
a revenue shortfall, it is still very possible for the DBM to release the full
amount appropriated for the agencies with fiscal autonomy, especially since, as
noted in the Decision, the total appropriation for such agencies in recent
years does not even reach 3% of the national budget.[7] That the full amount is, in fact, not
fully released during a given fiscal year is plainly due to a policy decision
of the DBM. Such a decision, whether
it goes by the label of “cash payment schedule” or any other term, cannot be
reconciled with the constitutional mandate that the release to these agencies
should be automatic.
Respecting
this Court’s observation that Sections 62, 63 and 64 of the General Provisions
of the FY2002 GAA reflect the legislative intent to except entities with fiscal
autonomy from the possibility of retention or reduction of funds in the event
of an unmanageable budget deficit, the DBM comments as follows:
Unfortunately, the sponsorship
speech of Cong. Rolando G. Andaya, Jr. Chairman of the House Committee on
Appropriations in justifying the introduction of Sections 63 and 64 (sic)
in the FY 2002 GAA, belies such contention. x x x In his speech, he
states that the incorporation of Section 62 is due to concerns raised by
Congressmen on the general impoundment powers of the President, without
distinguishing as to the two types of public institutions. More revealing is his explanation in
introducing Section 63, which defines unmanageable national government
deficit. He states that in order to discourage the Executive Department from
reducing the Internal Revenue Allotment of local government units, there is
need to define the legal parameters of “unmanageable deficit”. Reference to local government units, which
likewise enjoy fiscal autonomy according to the pronouncements of this
Honorable Court [Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 at 218 (2000)],
reveal the true intent of Congress to cover both agencies vested with fiscal
autonomy and those without. x x x”[8] (Underscoring supplied)
The Court,
however, has examined the speech of Congressman Andaya and finds nothing
therein that detracts from its ruling.
It bears emphasis that this Court explicitly observed that Sections 62
and 63 refer to government agencies in general, while Section 64
applies specifically to agencies with fiscal autonomy. It is in these three provisions read
together, and not in reading each one in isolation, that the distinction
intended by the legislature becomes evident.
When
Congressman Andaya introduced Sections 62 and 63, he was thus speaking of
government agencies in general. If he
did not then expressly distinguish between agencies with fiscal autonomy and
those without, it was because there was no pressing need for him to do so. Particularly with regard to Section 62, his
speech would reveal that his attention was on a matter that did not call for
such distinction, namely, the “deep concern, frustration and despair” expressed
by numerous members of Congress “over the impoundment of appropriations by the
Department of Budget and Management and the Office of the President”
which, he explained, provided the reason behind Section 62 of the GAA.
As for the
mention of local governments in Congressman Andaya’s introduction of Section
63, the same does not imply that said provision was meant to include the
agencies belonging to the CFAG. In fact,
his speech even suggests that Section 63, rather than itself being an
authorization to the DBM to withhold or reduce appropriations, was merely
intended to set a guiding principle for the DBM in those cases where it
already has authority to withhold or reduce such appropriations.
In the case
of LGUs, the Congressman explicitly referred to “the provisions of the Local
Government Code, R.A. 7160 which authorizes the reduction of the
IRA in the event that there is an ‘unmanageable deficit’ of the National
Government.”[9] He then stated that Section 63 was prompted
by the need to set parameters in determining the existence of an
“unmanageable deficit.”
On the
other hand, there is no similar authorization for such reduction in the case of
agencies belonging to the CFAG – not even during an “unmanageable deficit” –
either in the Constitution or in statute.
Thus, notwithstanding the inclusion of LGUs, there is no basis for
supposing that the agencies belonging to the CFAG are also covered by Section
63 of the GAA.
The DBM furthermore
argues that this Court’s Resolution of
After approval by Congress, the
appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and regularly released subject
to availability of funds. (Underscoring supplied)
means that fund releases may still
be subject to a cash release program.
In support
of this argument, the DBM cites a letter dated May 18, 1993 of then Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio (now a
member of this Court) to the Secretary of Budget and Management, regarding A.M.
No. 92-9-029-SC then pending with this Court.
The letter
quotes then Chief Justice Narvasa’s summary of this Court’s position on the
controversy, which summary states, inter alia:
“4) the Court will look to releases
by the DBM of funds against the approved budget of the Judiciary, in the
full amount sought and promptly upon notice; it is willing to
consider and pass upon suggestions by the DBM for scheduling of releases;
x x x”(Underscoring supplied)
In the same
letter, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, after considering the Court’s
position, opined that one of the principles by which the constitutional mandate
on judicial fiscal autonomy can be achieved is that “[a]fter approval by
Congress, the appropriations for the judiciary shall be automatically and regularly released
subject to availability of funds” –
which opinion, the DBM alleges, is the position adopted by this Court.
Instead of
supporting the DBM’s position, however, this letter only shows the consistency
of this Court in interpreting “automatic release” as requiring the full
release of appropriations. The Court’s
willingness to pass upon suggestions for scheduling of releases in no way
implies that it was assenting to an incomplete or delayed release of funds. Rather, it was a recognition by this Court
that scheduling of releases, as such, does not violate the Constitution
and is, in fact, presupposed in the phrase “automatically and regularly released.”
The phrase
“subject to availability of funds” must thus be understood in harmony with the
constitutional mandate to automatically release funds as the same has been
consistently interpreted by this Court.
It is not an authority for the DBM to implement a policy which, although
labeled “cash payment schedule,” actually goes beyond mere scheduling of
releases and
effects a withholding and reduction
of the approved appropriations, as it did in the present case against
petitioner Civil Service Commission.
Finally,
while acknowledging the unconstitutionality of imposing a “no report, no
release” policy on agencies clothed with fiscal autonomy, the DBM prays for a
clarification that such agencies are still responsible for the timely
submission to it of financial reports.
The Court considers it sufficient to echo the following statements in
the Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.:
This is not to say
that agencies vested with fiscal autonomy have no reporting responsibility at
all to the DBM. This is precisely the
reason why guideline No. 5 under the Resolution of 3 June [1993] states that
the Supreme Court, or constitutional commissions clothed with fiscal autonomy
for that matter, may submit reports relative to its appropriation “for
records purposes only.” The word “may”
is permissive [Dizon v. Encarnacion, 119 Phil. 20, 22 (1963)], as it is
an auxiliary verb manifesting “opportunity or possibility” and, under ordinary
circumstances, “implies the possible existence of something.” [Supangan, Jr.
v. Santos, G.R. No. 84663,
WHEREFORE, the Motion
for Reconsideration of respondent Department of Budget and Management is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES- Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice (ON SICK LEAVE) ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
(ON LEAVE) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO
C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justices
* On Sick Leave.
** On Leave.
[1] I Record, Constitutional Commission 467 (1986).
[2] “The
Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous
year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.”
[3] II
Record, Constitutional Commission 170 (1986).
[4] Rollo, pp. 180-183.
[5]
[6] Ibid (underscoring supplied).
[7] The only exception would be the remote
possibility noted in the Decision where total revenue collections are not even
sufficient to cover the total appropriations for the agencies with fiscal
autonomy.
[8] Rollo, p. 192.
[9]
[10] Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy.