EN BANC
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EDUARDO TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ and
IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, - versus - |
G.R. No. 157977 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: February
27, 2006 |
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THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA – BRANCH 17, GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, and DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents. |
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DECISION
QUISUMBING,
J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition directed against the Orders dated May
7, 2003[1] and May 9,
2003[2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17 in Case No. 01-190375, which cancelled the
bail of petitioners and denied their motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The case
stemmed from the petition for extradition filed on
After their
arrest, petitioners applied for bail which the trial court granted on
Thereafter,
we directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail which, according to
its November 28, 2001 Order,[3] shall be
subject to whatever ruling that this Court may have in the similar case of Mark
Jimenez entitled Government of the United States of America v. Purganan,[4] docketed
as G.R No. 148571. In compliance with
our directive, the trial court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the
cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest,[5] to wit:
Accordingly, following the En Banc Decision
of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 148571 dated September 24, 2002 to the effect
that extraditees are not entitled to bail…
while the extradition proceedings are pending…’ (page 1, En Banc Decision in
G.R. No. 148571), let a warrant
of arrest issue against the herein
respondents sans any bail, for implementation by the Sheriff or any
member of any law enforcement agency in line with Section 19 of Presidential
Decree No. 1069.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a very urgent
motion for the reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail. The motion was heard and denied on
Having no
alternative remedy, petitioners filed the present petition on the following
grounds:
I
…THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED SUCH SERIOUS
AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
CANCELLING THE BAIL OF HEREIN PETITIONERS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING
OF ITS CANCELLATION.
II
…THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED SUCH SERIOUS
AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
NOT CONSIDERING CERTAIN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDANT TO THE PRESENT CASE, AS
AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE OF “NO-BAIL” IN EXTRADITION CASES WHEN
PETITIONERS’ CASH BAIL WAS UNILATERALLY CANCELLED.
III
…THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED SUCH SERIOUS
AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING THE WARRANT OF ARREST WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE HEREIN PETITIONERS’ SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY EXTRADITION PRIOR TO CANCELLING THEIR CASH BAIL.[7]
Once again we face the controversial matter
of bail in extradition cases. We are
asked to resolve twin issues: First, in an extradition case, is prior notice
and hearing required before bail is cancelled?
Second, what constitutes a “special circumstance” to be exempt from the
no-bail rule in extradition cases?
Petitioners assert that their bail
cannot be cancelled without due process of law.
By way of analogy, they point to Rule 114, Section 21[8] of the
Rules of Court where the surety or bonding company is required to be notified
and allowed to show cause why the bail bond should not be cancelled. They say that if the rules grant this opportunity
to surety and bonding companies, the more reason then that in an extradition
case the same should be afforded.
Petitioners
also contend that this Court’s directive in G.R. No. 151456 did not in any way authorize the respondent
court to cancel their bail. Petitioners
aver that respondent court should have first determined the facts to evaluate if
petitioners were entitled to continuance of their bail, e.g. their
willingness to go on voluntary extradition, which respondent court should have considered
a special circumstance.
Respondents,
for their part, argue that prior notice and hearing are not required to cancel petitioners’
bail, and the issuance of a warrant of arrest ex parte against an
extraditee is not a violation of the due process clause. Further, respondents maintain that prior
notice and hearing would defeat the purpose of the arrest warrant since it could
give warning that respondents would be arrested and even encourage them to flee.
Besides, even
granting that prior notice and hearing are indeed required, respondents contend
that petitioners had been effectively given prior notice and opportunity to be
heard, because the trial court’s order clearly stated that the matter of bail
shall be subject to whatever ruling the Supreme Court may render in the similar
extradition case of Government of the
More
significantly, petitioners claim that their bail should not have been cancelled
since their situation falls within the exception to the general rule of no-bail.
They allege that their continuous offer
for voluntary extradition is a special circumstance that should be considered
in determining that their temporary liberty while on bail be allowed to
continue. They cite that petitioner
Eduardo is in fact already in the
Respondents
counter that petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez did
not show her good faith by her continued refusal to appear before the
respondent court. Further, the reasons of
petitioners do not qualify as compelling or special circumstances. Moreover, the special circumstance of voluntary
surrender of petitioner Eduardo is separate and distinct from petitioner
Imelda’s.
Additionally,
respondents maintain that the ruling in the case of Atong Ang[10] has no
applicability in the instant case. Ang’s bail was allowed because the English translation of a
testimony needed to determine probable cause in Ang’s
case would take time. This special circumstance is not attendant in this case.
The issue
of prior notice and hearing in extradition cases is not new. In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[11] by a vote
of nine to six, we initially ruled that notice and hearing should be afforded
the extraditee even when a possible extradition is still being evaluated.[12] The Court, deliberating on a motion for
reconsideration also by a vote of nine to six, qualified and declared that
prospective extraditees are entitled to notice and
hearing only when the case is filed in court and not during the process of
evaluation.[13]
In the later
case of Purganan, eight justices concurred
that a possible extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest while six others dissented.
Now, we are
confronted with the question of whether a prospective extraditee is entitled to
notice and hearing before the cancellation of his or her bail.
The issue
has become moot and academic insofar as petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez is
concerned. He is now in the
In Purganan, we said that a prospective extraditee is not
entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest,[14] because
notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest. But this
is for cases pending the issuance of a warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been issued after determination
that the extraditee is a no-flight risk.
The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to
avoid his flight from justice.[15] On the
extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is
granted.[16] If after his arrest and if the trial court
finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner
has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no
flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and
had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner
is entitled to provisional release.
Under these premises, and with the trial court’s knowledge that in this
case, co-petitioner has offered to go on voluntary extradition; that she and
her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband
had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA
undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the
possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is
an existing hold-departure order against her; and that she is now in her
sixties, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of
continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of
bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and
without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued.
We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon
a clear and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community, and (2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.[17]
The trial court’s immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners is
contrary to our ruling in Purganan, and it had
misread and misapplied our directive therein.
Now, was the order to issue warrant of arrest against petitioners and to
cancel the bail of extraditees a grave abuse of
discretion of the trial court?
Grave abuse of discretion is capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.[18]
In our view, the cancellation of co-petitioner’s
bail, without prior notice and hearing, could be considered a violation of
co-petitioner’s right to due process tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Finally, considering
that remanding the case to the court a quo will only delay the final
resolution of the case as in all probability it would only end up with us again,[19] we will decide
if Imelda’s bail was validly cancelled.
In Purganan, we held also that
the grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity.[20]
Considering
that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the community,
she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled. Based on the record, we find that, absent
prior notice and hearing, the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her right
to due process.
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Orders dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
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CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice |
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ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate
Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
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MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 24-25.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Rollo,
pp. 24-25.
[6]
[7]
[8] SEC. 21. Forfeiture of bail.
– When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his
bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and
time. If the accused fails to appear in
person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given
thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why
a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their bail….
[9] G.R. No. 148571,
[10] District Magistrate Lawrence Leavitt of the
U.S. District Court of Nevada granted a $300,000 bail to Charlie “Atong” Ang, who is sought to be
extradited by the Philippine government. <http://www.newsflash.org/2002/11/hl/hl016987.htm>
(visited
[11] G.R. No. 139465,
[12]
[13] Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465,
[14] Government of the
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Zarate v.
Maybank Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 160976, 8
June 2005,459 SCRA 785, 794.
[19] Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
154448, 15 August 2003 409 SCRA 267, 278 citing Fernandez v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 105892, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 149, 170.
[20] Government
of the
Cf. Salerno
v.