THIRD DIVISION
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AGUSTIN RIVERA, substituted by
GREGORIO B. RIVERA, DOMINGA B. RIVERA, ORLANDO B. RIVERA, ROSARIO R. LOPEZ,
CRISANTO B. RIVERA, EMILIANO B. RIVERA and CONCHITA B. RIVERA, Petitioners, - versus - |
G.R.
No. 157307 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, and TINGA, JJ. |
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NEMESIO DAVID, Respondent. |
Promulgated: February
27, 2006 |
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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition
for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision[1]
dated
The pertinent facts of the case are
as follows:
Respondent Nemesio
David, with the other heirs of Consolacion Suarez David, owned in common five
hectares of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47588-R in Dau,
Mabalacat, Pampanga.
Petitioner Agustin Rivera occupied 1.8 hectares of the land. Through counsel, the Davids demanded that petitioner
vacate the property. Rivera refused and
instituted a complaint with an application for injunction to maintain peaceful
possession before the PARAB.[3]
In his Complaint, Rivera averred that
he was a duly instituted tenant. To
support his averment, he submitted a certification from the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office together with the affidavits of two neighbors.
Respondent David denied that Rivera
was his family’s tenant. According to respondent, Rivera had been squatting on
the property since 1965 and had put up, without the Davids’
consent, a hollow blocks business and also a piggery in the property. David sought the dismissal of the case before
the PARAB alleging that the PARAB lacked jurisdiction, considering that the
property was not an agricultural land and the case involved the issue of
ownership.[4]
The PARAB required the parties to file
their position papers. In his position
paper,[5]
Rivera averred that he occupied the land, at first, as a tenant; then, as
an owner in 1957. He alleged that the
land became his own as disturbance compensation. He prayed that he be declared as a qualified
beneficiary of the agrarian reform program and he be awarded three hectares as mandated
by law.
For his part, respondent David reiterated
his defenses and added that Rivera’s claim that the property was transferred to
the latter in 1957 was inconsistent with Rivera’s claim of disturbance compensation
since the idea of disturbance compensation was introduced only by Republic Act No.
3844[6] on
August 8, 1963 and the disturbance compensation awarded to an agricultural
lessee is equivalent only to five years’ rental. Even so, the 1.8 hectares claimed by the
petitioner was in excess of what is allowed under said law.[7]
Initially, the PARAB held that David
was guilty of laches or estoppel since he and his predecessors-in-interest had
allowed petitioner to retain the property.
Further, the PARAB said it had more reasons to believe that respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest had given the land to the petitioner as the latter had
long occupied the property and developed it.
It rendered judgment maintaining petitioner Rivera in peaceful
possession of the property without prejudice to his claim as qualified
beneficiary of the agrarian reform program.[8]
On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the
PARAB’s finding of estoppel and added that the action to recover the property
was barred by the Statute of Limitations under Section 38[9]
of Rep. Act No. 3844.[10]
Respondent David elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals, raising the following issues:
(A) DID RESPONDENT [petitioner
herein] FAIL TO DISCHARGE THE BURDEN OF PROVING BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE HIS
AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS OF (I) FARMING AND TILLING; (II) PALAY PRODUCTION;
(III) PERSONAL PERFORMANCE OF ALL PHASES OF PRODUCTION; (IV) PAYMENT OF
LEASEHOLD RENTALS; (V) SETTLEMENT BY PETITIONER’S FATHER OF A CONTROVERSY WITH
HIM; (VI) CONVEYANCE BY PETITIONER’S FATHER OF THE 1.8 HECTARES TO RESPONDENT?
(B) DID
RESPONDENT’S EVIDENCE FAIL TO ESTABLISH THE TRADITIONAL SIX ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
TEST FOR TENANCY RELATIONSHIPS IN
(C) IS MERE ALLEGATION OF CONVEYANCE WITHOUT PROOF ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN THE DARAB’S CONCLUSION THAT RESPONDENT IS A TENANT-FARMER ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE?
(D) IS A
DARAB DECISION BASED ON SOME HEARSAY AFFIDAVITS AND CERTIFICATION – NOT SUBJECTED
TO
(E) IS A DARAB DECISION BASED ON HEARSAY AFFIDAVITS AND CERTIFICATION – NOT SUBJECTED TO PRIOR IDENTIFICATION BY THE AFFIANT OR PERSON CERTIFYING – A DECISION BASED ON EVIDENCE THAT [LA]CKS RATIONAL PROBATIVE FORCE?
[(F) IS A DARAB DECISION BASED ON SOME HEARSAY AFFAIDAVITS AND CERTIFICATION – NOT SUBJECTED TO CROSS-EXAMINATION – A DECISION BASED ON EVIDENCE THAT LACKS RATIONAL PROBATIVE FORCE?] [sic]
(G) IS THE
DARAB’S
(H) DOES THE
PARAB/DARAB (sic) HAVE JURISDICTION TO MAKE A FINDING OF OWNERSHIP UNDER THE
GUISE OF A CHARACTERIZATION TO THE EFFECT THAT PETITIONER’S FATHER HAD MADE A
CONVEYANCE TO RESPONDENT?[11]
The appellate court reversed the
decisions of both the PARAB and the DARAB.
It reasoned that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) no longer had
jurisdiction over the case because by petitioner Rivera’s own admission, the tenancy
ended in 1957. The appellate court set
aside the decisions of both the PARAB and DARAB for lack of jurisdiction and
dismissed petitioner’s complaint, to wit:
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged decisions of both the
SO
ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner
before us raises now mainly the issue concerning jurisdiction, alleging that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
Simply
put, the main issue now is as follows: Does the DAR have jurisdiction? Secondly, was petitioner the owner of the land
and are his substitute-petitioners entitled to its peaceful possession?
We note that because of petitioner
Rivera’s death, his heirs are now substituted as petitioners. At any rate, petitioner had insisted that the
DAR had jurisdiction over the case for he had sufficiently established before
the PARAB and the DARAB that he was a tenant of respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest. He asserted
that as tenant of respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, his tenancy was
intimately related to the issue of ownership and thus his case fell under the
jurisdiction of the DAR.
Petitioner further contended that even though the tenancy relation no
longer existed at the time the complaint was filed, the DAR had not been
deprived of its jurisdiction since under Section 1(e), Rule II of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure,[14]
it has jurisdiction over cases involving the alienation of agricultural lands covered
by the agrarian reform program. He added
that the definition of “agrarian dispute” under Rep. Act No. 6657[15]
included any controversy relating to compensation of land acquired under the
Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farm workers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries.
For his part, respondent David reiterates
before us the arguments in his earlier pleadings before the administrative
agencies and the appellate court.
First, on the
matter of jurisdiction. We agree with petitioner that the
DAR has jurisdiction over his case. In
the 2004 case of David v. Rivera,[16]
a case involving the same parcel of land here, filed before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat by the respondent against petitioner, the
issue raised was whether the MCTC or the DAR had jurisdiction. Therein, we held that the existence of prior
agricultural tenancy relationship characterizes the controversy as an “agrarian
dispute”, adding that–
Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the
action still involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant
relationship. Where the case involves
the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed
to have been given as compensation in consideration of the renunciation of the
tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled:
Indeed,
section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all cases involving the
dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the
settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of
landlord and tenant . . . shall be under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction does not require the
continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenant — at the time of the
dispute. The same may have
arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of such
relationship. If the same existed
immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof
is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the
dispute otherwise springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and
tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable only by the Court of Agrarian
Relations . . .[17]
Although the cause of action now may
differ from that in the 2004 case of David v. Rivera, under the facts of
the cases, and by our prior judgment on the issue of jurisdiction, the parties
herein are bound by the conclusiveness of judgment in the 2004 case of David
v. Rivera, in accordance with Rule 39, Sec. 4(c), of the Rules of
Court.[18] Conformably then, the DAR has jurisdiction.
Now, on the issue of ownership, we
find that petitioner Rivera failed to prove that he indeed owned the
property. All he submitted was an
affidavit from a Feliciano Manansala stating that there was a verbal agreement
between him and the respondent’s predecessor-in-interest giving him the 1.8
hectares. However, petitioner did not
present the affiant in court. Where the affiant did not appear, nor was he presented
during the administrative investigation to identify his sworn statement, his
affidavit is hearsay, hence inadmissible in evidence.[19]
On the other hand, respondent David presented
TCT No. 47588-R, dated
In sum, we find that the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing Agustin Rivera’s complaint, not because the
DAR had no jurisdiction over the case but because his complaint lacks merit.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. We affirm the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-23. Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, and Sergio L. Pestaño concurring.
[2]
· PARAD in some parts of the records.
[3] Rollo, p. 54.
[4]
[5]
[6] AN ACT TO ORDAIN THE AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM CODE AND TO INSTITUTE LAND REFORMS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INCLUDING THE ABOLITION OF TENANCY AND THE CHANNELING OF CAPITAL INTO INDUSTRY, PROVIDE FOR THE NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES, APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[7] Rollo, pp. 86-91.
[8]
[9] SEC. 38. Statute of Limitations.—An action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued.
[10] Rollo, pp. 120-125.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE (1994).
RULE II–JURISDICTION OF THE ADJUDICATION BOARD.
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following:
x x x
e) Those involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws;
x x x
[15] AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[16] G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159,
[17]
[18] Rules of Court, Rule 39, Sec. 47, par. (c).
SEC.
47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the
. . .
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein
or necessary thereto.
[19] Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, 16 February 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 483 citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129124, 15 March 2002, 379 SCRA 322, 330.