THIRD DIVISION
STEVEN PAUL REID and
PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ,
Petitioners, Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent. February 10, 2006
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CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for
review[1]
of the Decision[2]
dated
The Facts
Petitioners
John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and
Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining
Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (“Marcopper”), a
corporation engaged in mining in the
Marcopper had
been storing tailings[3]
from its operations in a pit in
In August
1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal
Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (“MTC”) with violation of Article 91(B),[4]
sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the
Philippines (“PD 1067”),[5]
Section 8[6]
of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976
(“PD 984”),[7]
Section 108[8] of
Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (“RA 7942”),[9]
and Article 365[10]
of the Revised Penal Code (“RPC”) for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property.[11]
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were “duplicitous” as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
The
Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint
Order of
[T]he 12 Informations have common
allegations of pollutants pointing to “mine tailings” which were precipitately
discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the
Tapian drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate
measures to prevent pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River
systems, the very term and condition required to be undertaken under the
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations
point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the single fact of
pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law which
are the same set of evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of
pollution, in proving the elements constituting violation of the conditions of
ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions
of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is
required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing
the contending arguments of the parties and after taking into consideration the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the
three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of
Philippine Mining Act should be maintained.
In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law
(PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the
elements constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements
which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal
Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for
[v]iolation of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49
for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED
and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the
Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be maintained and heard in a
full blown trial because the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence
resulting to [sic] damage to
property. It is the damage to property
which the law punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water
system. The prosecution for the
[v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for
reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.[13]
The
MTC re-scheduled petitioners’ arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners’ petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondent’s appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondent’s motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent’s appeal consolidated with petitioners’ petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its
Resolution[14]
of
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court
is of the opinion that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three
other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct
from each other. The elements of proving
each violation are not the same with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine
tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was
the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct
offense. But it is also a
well-established rule in this jurisdiction that –
“A single act may offend against two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not
bar prosecution under the other. x x x.”
x
x x x
[T]he different laws involve cannot
absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different from one
another. Each of these laws require
[sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not although
they stemmed from a single act.[15]
Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch
94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC “proceed
from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings” and (2) the duplicitous nature
of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.[16] Petitioners further contended that since the
acts complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942
are “the very same acts complained of” in the charge for violation of Article
365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only
be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.[17]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its
Decision of
The records of the case
disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned
Informations for being duplicitous in nature.
Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically
provides the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
x
x x x
[D]uplicity of
Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
x
x x x
We
now go to petitioners’ claim that the resolution of the public respondent
contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative of
their right against multiple prosecutions.
In the said case, the
Supreme Court found the People’s argument with respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being
charged to be correct. The Court,
however, decided the case in the context of the second sentence of Article IV
(22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x
x x x x
[T]he doctrine laid down
in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench since the
Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four separate
and distinct laws which are national in character.
x
x x x
This
Court firmly agrees in the public respondent’s understanding that the laws by
which the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another
as the elements of each crime are different.
Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
x x x x
[T]his Court finds that
there is not even the slightest indicia
of evidence that would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
reversing the Municipal Trial Court’s quashal of the Informations against the
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the
trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.[18]
Petitioners
sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its Resolution
of
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING THE CHARGES
FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT
(R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE
(P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
A.
THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR
INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND
B.
THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES
THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS.
RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986] THAT “AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE
NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL
ELEMENTS.”
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF
LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND
IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL
WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE
WATER CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST
PETITIONERS[.][19]
The petition
raises these issues:
(1)
Whether all the charges
filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges
and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
should stand; and
(2)
Whether Branch 94’s
ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110[20] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only
in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.[21]
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.[23] Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
The
Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only — Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property — because (1) all the charges filed against them “proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings” and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC “absorbs” the other charges since the element of “lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence” is common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.[24] The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for “the same offense.”[25] In People v. Doriquez,[26] we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not “the same” —
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different
laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.[27] (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.[28] However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners’ claim that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94’s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067
(Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the
dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River
System without prior permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the
absence of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the
prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine
Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating
the Water Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has
complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or
further, even [if] it did take the necessary precautions to prevent damage to
property.
In P.D. 984
(Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence
of actual pollution. The gravamen is the
pollution itself. In the absence of any
pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this law although there was
unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of precaution on its part to
prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional
fact that must be established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the
part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the
containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac
Rivers. If there was no violation or
neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily
proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of
the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot
be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal
Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an
essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.[29]
On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC “absorbs” the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
Petitioners
reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution
contravenes this Court’s ruling in People v. Relova. In particular,
petitioners cite the Court’s statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent
harassment of the accused by “multiple prosecutions for offenses which though
different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or
overlapping sets of technical elements.”
This contention is also without merit.
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one Manuel Opulencia (“Opulencia”) with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated Opulencia’s right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
The
petitioner concludes that:
“The unauthorized installation punished by
the ordinance [of
The above argument[ ] made by the
petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both
from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved – which reads
as follows:
“No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.” x
x x
and
from our case law on this point. The
basic difficulty with the petitioner’s position is that it must be examined,
not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
Constitution, but rather under the second
sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22)
sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is not available where the
second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged
in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses
may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the
general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense
charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently
under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
x x x[30]
(Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova
is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple prosecutions
based on a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not
at issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are
being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and
not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever,
fall under the first sentence of Section
21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova,
for offenses arising from the same incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM
the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis with
Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring.
[3]
Mine tailings or
mine waste refer
to “soil and/or
rock materials from
surface or underground mining operations with no present
economic value to the generator of the same” (Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Administrative Order No. 96-40 (1996) (“DENR DAO No. 96-40”),
Section 5[be]). Waste from milling operations or mill tailings is defined as
“materials whether solid, liquid or both[,] segregated from the ores during
concentration/milling operations which have no present economic value to the
generator of the same” (DENR DAO No. 96-40, Section 5 [au]).
[4] This provision states: “A fine exceeding
Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) but not more than Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00)
or imprisonment exceeding three (3) years but not more than six (6) years, or
both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court, shall be
imposed on any person who commits any of the following acts:
x x x x
5. Constructing, without prior permission of the government agency concerned, works that produce dangerous or noxious substances, or performing acts that result in the introduction of sewage, industrial waste, or any substance that pollutes a source of water supply.
6. Dumping mine tailings and sediments into rivers or
waterways without permission.”
[5]
The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 96-44, 96-45, and 96-46. Except for
the names of the accused and their respective designations at Marcopper, the
Informations uniformly alleged (rollo, pp. 54-62):
That
on or about
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously dispose, discharge or introduce industrial waste, particularly mine
tailings, without permission into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac
River system which is a source of water supply and/or dump or cause, permit,
suffer to be dumped, without permission, mine tailings or other waste matters
discharged due to breach caused on its Tapian drainage pit/tunnel, thus causing
pollution and siltation in the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River
system which became a dead river, resulting to damage and/or destruction of
living organisms, like fish or other aquatic life in the vicinity, and to
health and property in the same vicinity.
[6] This provision states: “Prohibitions. — No person shall throw,
run, drain, or otherwise dispose into any of the water, air and/or land
resources of the
No person shall perform any of the following activities without first securing a permit from the [National Pollution Control] Commission for the discharge of all industrial wastes and other wastes which could cause pollution:
(1) the construction, installation, modification or operation of any sewage works or any extension or addition thereto;
(2) the increase in volume or strength of any wastes in excess of the permissive discharge specified under any existing permit;
(3) the
construction, installation or operation of any industrial or commercial
establishments or any extension or modification thereof or addition thereto, the
operation of which would cause an increase in the discharge of waste directly
into the water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines or would otherwise
alter their physical, chemical or biological properties in any manner not
already lawfully authorized.”
[7]
The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 96-47, 96-48, and 96-49. Except for the names of the accused and their
respective designations at Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo,
pp. 63-71):
That
on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in
the municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise
dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River system
and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such
river/waterway, mine tailings or other waste matters discharged due to breach
caused on its Tapian drainage pit/tunnel for his failure to institute adequate
measures as a managing head thereof, thus causing pollution of such
rivers/waterways due to exceedances [sic] in the criterion level for cadmium,
copper, and lead, as found by the Pollution Adjudication Board, which rendered
such water resources harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health, safety
or welfare or which adversely affected their utilization for domestic,
agricultural, and/or recreational purposes.
[8] This provision states: “Violation of the Terms and Conditions of the [E]nvironmental Compliance
Certificate. — Any person who willfully violates or grossly neglects to
abide by the terms and conditions of the environmental compliance certificate
issued to said person and which causes environmental damage through pollution
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months to six (6) years or
a fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court.”
[9]
The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 96-50, 96-51, and 96-52. Except for the names of the accused and their
respective designations at Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo,
pp. 72-80):
That
on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in
the municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise
dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River system
and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such river
system, mine tailings or other waste matters discharged due to breach caused on
its Tapian drainage tunnel for his failure to institute adequate measures, thus
causing pollution and siltation in the entire Boac River System thus, willfully
violating or grossly neglecting to abide by the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued to [Marcopper Mining
C]orporation x x x, particularly that the Marcopper Mining Corporation should
ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Magpog
and Boac Rivers, resulting to damage and/or destruction of living organisms,
like fish and other aquatic life in the vicinity, and to health and property in
the same vicinity.
[10] This
provision states, in part: “Imprudence
and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.
x x x x
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall
have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to
three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five
pesos.
x x x x
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.”
[11]
The Informations under this charge were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
96-53, 96-54, and 96-55. Except for the names of the accused and their
respective designations at Marcopper, the Informations uniformly alleged (rollo,
pp. 81-91):
That
on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in
the municipality of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, x x x, did then
and there negligently, imprudently, unlawfully and feloniously drain or
otherwise dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit River or Boac River system
and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such river
system/waterway, its mine tailings due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage
pit/tunnel of the [Marcopper Mining C]orporation so managed and operated by
said accused, in a negligent, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regard
and in gross violation of the conditions
set forth in the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the
Environmental Management Bureau to the said corporation on April 6, 1996, and
the accused, x x x, did not take the necessary or adequate precaution to
prevent damage to property thus causing by such carelessness and imprudence
said corporation operated by him to discharge mine tailings into the Makulapnit
River at the rate of 5 to 10 cubic meters per second then resulting to damage
and/or destruction of living organisms, like fish or other aquatic life in the
said river system and which also affected agricultural products, the
rehabilitation and restoration of which will cost the government the
approximate sum of not less than P50,000,000.00.
[12]
Presided by Judge Celso De Jesus Zoleta.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 120-122.
[14] Penned by Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano.
[15] Rollo, pp. 202-203.
[16]
No. L-45129,
[17]
CA rollo, pp. 1-18.
[18] Rollo, pp. 43, 45-46, 48, 50 (internal citations omitted).
[19]
[20]
Substantially reiterated in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, effective
[21] See Reodica v. CA, 354 Phil. 90 (1998).
[22]
This provisions states: “Grounds.
— The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
x x x x
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses[.]” This is substantially reiterated in Section 3(f), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules.
[23] People v. Ferrer, 101 Phil. 234 (1957).
[24] See Nierras v. Dacuycuy,
G.R. Nos. 59568-76,
[25] Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 21.
[26] 133 Phil. 295 (1968).
[27]
[28] Under Section 7, Rule 117, of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (substantially reiterated in Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules), the following requisites must obtain for the accused to claim protection against double jeopardy: (1) a valid complaint or Information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, (2) a competent court; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; (4) the defendant had been convicted, or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent; (5) the second offense charged is the same as the first, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof, or that the second offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense or information. Only the first three elements are present in this case.
[29] Rollo, pp. 203-205.