FIRST DIVISION
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FILOMENO G. GONZALES, P e t i t i o n e r, - versus - QUIRINO G. GONZALES,
represented by EUFEMIA GONZALES, R e s p o n d e n t. |
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G.R. No. 151376 Present: PANGANIBAN,
CJ,
Chairman, YNARES-SANTIAGO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: February 22, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside, in part,
the Decision[1]
dated 26 August 1999, and the Resolution[2] dated 08 January 2002,
both promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 47348, in so
far as the aforesaid decision 1) reversed and set aside the portion of the
Order[3] dated 11 November 1997 of
Honorable Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., presiding judge of Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 93,
dismissing the appeal filed by herein respondent Quirino G. Gonzales for
failure to file the Memorandum of Appeal within the reglementary period
provided for under Sec. 7 (b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and
2) directed the RTC to give due course to respondent’s appeal and decide the
case based on the records.
The Facts
The present petition
stemmed from a complaint[4] for ejectment dated 11
December 1995 filed by herein petitioner Filomeno G. Gonzales against herein
respondent Quirino G. Gonzales before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 35, docketed as Civil Case No. 35-14327.
During
the pendency of the case, on
In a Motion[5] dated
In an Order[6] dated
In a Decision[7] dated
WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
Filomeno Gonzales against the defendant Eufemia Gonzales ordering the latter
the following:
1) Ordering the defendant Eufemia Gonzales,
and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate and surrender peacefully
the subject premises to the plaintiff;
2) Ordering the defendant to pay rentals
from November 22, 1995 up to the present in the amount of P5,000.00 a
month until defendants have vacated the leased premises, as reasonable
compensation of the use of the premises;
3) To pay the amount of P10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, and
4)
To pay the cost of suit.[8]
Respondent seasonably appealed[9] the foregoing decision to
the RTC, which docketed the appeal as Civil Case No. Q-97-32061.
In an Order dated
Instead of filing the necessary
memorandum of appeal, however, respondent filed a motion to consolidate[12] the
present case with the one she instituted against petitioner for annulment of
title filed before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 84, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-97-30360.
On
On
On
On
Before this court is an Appeal
from a decision rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 35,
A perusal of the record reveals
that defendant-appellant had failed to comply with the court order dated
In view thereof, the court hereby
orders the dismissal of the appeal.
On
On
On
On
On
On the same date,
The preceding motion
was likewise denied[25] by the court a quo for lack of merit and for being in
the nature of a second motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited
pleading.
Undaunted, respondent
subsequently filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari[26] before the CA essentially
seeking to annul and set aside: 1) the 10 March 1998 Order of the court a
quo denying her Omnibus Urgent Motion for Reconsideration; and 2) the 27
March 1998 Order denying her second motion for reconsideration.
In her petition, respondent
assigned two errors allegedly committed by the court a quo: 1) that “the court a quo erred and exercised grave
abuse of its discretion in granting execution pending appeal there being a
pending motion to fix Supersedeas (sic) bond which is still unresolved by the
Court;” and 2) that “the court a quo erred and gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the appeal there being a prayer on the part of the
defendants-appellants that instead of filing an appeal brief
defendants-appellants will instead adopt the position paper filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court as their brief on appeal.”
Six days later, or on
On
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partially GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Order dated
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was subsequently
denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution dated
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now comes to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court predicated on the following errors.
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
GRANTING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION AS IT WAS FILED OUT OF TIME, AND THERE WAS
NO COMPLIANCE WITH MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS; and
II.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
THE APPEAL WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL FILED BEFORE IT BY
RESPONDENT, DUE TO RESPONDENT’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO FILE A MEMORANDUM.
Simply put, the present
petition raises as a primary issue the question of whether or not the CA
committed reversible error in reversing and setting aside the order of the court
a quo dismissing respondent’s appeal for failure to file the memorandum
of appeal. And, in the event that said order of dismissal is proper, whether or
not the CA committed reversible error in granting due course to respondent’s petition despite its numerous
procedural defects.
We grant the petition.
Petitioner faults the
appellate court for overlooking “x x x the significant fact that respondent
manifested her intention to adopt the Position Paper filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court as her memorandum in the Regional Trial Court, only
after the Regional Trial Court had already issued an order dismissing
respondent’s appeal and long after the period to file a Memorandum on (sic)
Appeal had expired.”[29]
For such reason, in issuing said order, the court a quo only acted in accord with and in compliance to, the clear and
mandatory provisions of the Rules of Court.
Further, petitioner
reduces respondent’s manifestation as a mere afterthought; an attempt at
circumventing the effects of the Rules.
Respondent, on the other hand, counters that there is nothing in the
Rules of Court that prohibits a party to adopt pleadings and arguments which were
already embodied in the record, fully discussed and supported by evidence, the
appeal in the RTC being a review of evidence presented before the MTC. She went
on further to rationalize that “(r)ules must not be strictly
construed to defeat substantial right of the litigants. The rules must be
interpreted liberally.”
In passing judgment on the petition, the CA agreed in respondent’s assertion
that the court a quo erred in
dismissing her appeal considering that she has opted to adopt her position
paper filed before the MTC as her memorandum of appeal.
Moreover, the CA ratiocinated that “[n]othing in the
Rules of Court prohibits adoption of some pleading and arguments which are
already embodied in the record, fully discussed and supported by evidence, the
instant appeal being a review of evidences (sic) presented before the
Metropolitan Trial Court.” Adding further, that “[a]ppeal from the Metropolitan
Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court is merely a review of the records,
facts and evidence submitted (sic) before the Metropolitan Trial Court, hence,
if the parties desire to adopt (the) same argument and evidence submitted
before the Metropolitan Trial Court the appellate court may consider the same
facts and evidence adopted by the party, the Regional Trial Court being an
appellate court and no new evidence will be presented in the appeal.”
The issue of whether or not the CA committed reversible error in
reversing and setting aside the order of the court a quo dismissing respondent’s
appeal for failing to file the memorandum of appeal is best answered by the Rules of Court,
specifically, Section 7 (b) of Rule 40 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. –
x
x x x.
(b) Within
fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to
submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower
court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant’s Memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to
file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
x
x x x. [Emphasis supplied.]
The present fundamental issue vexing
the parties has already been squarely addressed by this Court in the case of Enriquez
v. Court of Appeals.[30]
In said case, we had the occasion to elucidate on the meaning and consequence
of the aforequoted provision. For this reason, we deem it apt to quote in toto pertinent portions of the ponencia, viz:
The use of the word
“shall” in a statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory
(citation omitted). Further, the Rule imposes upon an appellant the “duty” to
submit his memorandum. A duty is a “legal or moral obligation, mandatory act,
responsibility, charge, requirement, trust, chore, function commission, debt,
liability, assignment, role, pledge, dictate, office, (and) engagement
(citation omitted).” Thus, under the express mandate of said Rule, the
appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such submission is
not a matter of discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate
or to perform said duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.
In rules of procedure, an act which is
jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the
protection or benefit of the party affected is mandatory (citation omitted).
The raison d'être for such
necessity was likewise made clear in the same case. The ponencia put it in plain words:
[I]n appeals from
inferior courts to the RTC, the appellant’s brief is mandatory for the
assignment of errors is vital to the decision of the appeal on the merits. This
is because on appeal only errors specifically assigned and properly argued in
the brief or memorandum will be considered except those affecting jurisdiction
over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors (citation
omitted). Otherwise stated, an appellate court has no power to resolve an
unassigned error, which does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter, save for a plain or clerical error (citation omitted).
It is true that the Rules should be interpreted
so as to give litigants ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and
that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities
should be avoided (citation omitted). But it is equally true that an appeal
being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with
the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court (citation omitted). In other words, he who seeks to avail of the
right to appeal must play by the rules (citation omitted). This the petitioner failed to do when she did
not submit her memorandum of appeal x x x. That she lost her case is not the
trial court’s fault but her own.
Bearing in mind the prior discussion, it was obligatory on the part of
respondent, being the appellant in the court a quo, to submit or file a memorandum of appeal within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the order enjoining the filing of said pleading. And failing such duty, consequently, it was
incumbent upon the court a quo to
dismiss the appeal as the Rules unmistakably commanded.
Though, as pointed out by the CA in its decision, nothing in the
aforecited provision prohibits the adoption of a party’s position paper earlier
filed, such option must be manifested to the court a quo during the period within which to file the required
memorandum of appeal. In the case at bar, the records of the case bear out the
fact that when respondent manifested her desire to adopt her position paper in
the MTC, the dismissal of the appeal had already been ordered. In fact, said
manifestation was contained in the same pleading praying for the reconsideration
of the court a quo’s order of
dismissal.
That
the fundamental cause of the dismissal of respondent’s appeal was due to her
failure to file the obligatory memorandum of appeal within the period allotted
was extremely palpable. Respondent’s counsel, Atty. Arturo Z. Temanil, made no
secret of the fact that he neglected to heed the order of the court a quo
regarding the submission of the memorandum of appeal. In the Omnibus Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration,[31] filed on 03 December
1997, in praying for the reconsideration of the Order of Dismissal, among other
things, respondent’s counsel tried to excuse his inaction by saying that his
failure to file the memorandum of appeal was inadvertent and, also, equally due
to his “voluminous” workload. He then prayed that he be allowed to submit the
required appeal memorandum; or, since he had already fully discussed respondent’s
position in the memorandum[32] filed before the MTC,
that he be allowed to just adopt aforesaid memorandum[33] as her appeal memorandum.
In the case at bar,
respondent did not even come near to substantially complying with the
requirement of the Rules of Court, as such, the court a quo had no basis upon which it could actually and completely
dispose of the appeal in view of the absence of issues or errors raised for its
consideration, specifically assigned and argued before it. All told, therefore,
the court a quo, in dismissing the
respondent’s appeal, was only being subservient to the mandate of the Rules of
Court, particularly Section 7 (b) of Rule 40.
Verily, We feel the need to articulate a very
disturbing observation. Just why an exceedingly significant fact – the failure
of respondent to submit the mandatory memorandum of appeal within the period
provided for as the fundamental cause of the dismissal of her appeal – was
disregarded disturbs us no end.
Respondent insists on
a liberal construction and application of the Rules of Court so as not to
defeat the ends of justice and deprive her of her substantial right.
We think not.
In extraordinary
circumstances and for compelling grounds, we have disregarded procedural or
technical defects in order to set right an arrant injustice. To our mind,
though, respondent was the least prejudiced by the progression of events in the
case at bar. She has shown no compelling reason or exceptional cause for us to
relax the requirements of Section 7 (b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, even
if we could.
As early as 1997, the
dismissal of the respondent’s appeal had already become a fact. By the undue
delay of putting to rest the final judgment in his favor, petitioner has
suffered an injustice. We must state here for the respondent and her counsel
and all others similarly inclined to resort to the same or related scheme or
stratagem that this Court cannot condone or tolerate any abuse of the judicial
process. [34]
“The Court views with
disfavor the unjustified delay in the termination of cases. Litigation must end
and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.”[35]
Let it be stressed
once again that “[t]here should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants
that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to
be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the
operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in
the present case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for
vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable. x x x. The aim of a lawsuit is to render
justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely
designed to accomplish such worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any
attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation.”[36]
Lawyers, as officers
of the court, have an obligation to aid in the proper administration of
justice. They fail to carry out this sworn duty by filing pointless petitions
that only add to the workload of the judiciary. A prudent examination or
analysis of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this,
should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested
judicial dockets. Petitions such as the one filed before the CA in the case at
bar, assailing the order of dismissal by the court a quo, do nothing to
advance the cause of law or their clients for the sheer lack of merit hardly
deserve the attention of the courts as they are not even worth the paper they
are printed on.
Prescinding from all of the
above, we see no reason to further discuss the procedural issue raised in the
petition. In fine, it was extremely grave error for the CA to reverse and set
aside the court a quo’s 11 November
1997 Order of Dismissal which was in full accord with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
Chief
Justice
Chairman
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice |
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice |
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria and concurred in by Associate
Justices Jesus M. Elbinias and Ramon A. Barcelona; Annex “D” of the Petition; rollo, pp. 23-29.
[2] Annex
“E” of the Petition; rollo,
pp. 30-31.
[3] Records,
p. 246.
[4]
[5] Records,
pp. 138-139.
[6]
[7] Penned
by Hon. Gregorio D. Dayrit, Presiding Judge, MTC, Br. 35 – Q.C.;
[8]
[9] Notice
of Appeal dated
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Section
19. Immediate execution of judgment.
xxx
x x x x
x x x Should the defendant fail to
make the payment above prescribed from
time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate
court, upon motion of the plaintiff,
and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the
restoration of possession, x x x.
[15] Records,
p. 237.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Position
paper.
[20] Records,
pp. 253(a) -253(b).
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] In
an Order dated
[26] CA rollo, pp. 08-52.
[27]
[28]
[29] Petition,
p. 13; rollo, p. 48.
[30] 444
Phil. 419, 428 (2003).
[31] Records,
pp. 248-252.
[32] Position
paper.
[33]
[34] Chua Huat, et al., v. Courtof Appeals, et
al., GR No. 53851 & 63863, July 09, 1991,
199 SCRA 1, 15.
[35] Lim v. Jabalde, G.R.
No. 36786, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 211, 224, citing Banogan v. Serna, G.R. No. L-35469,
[36] Rubenito v. Lagata,
G.R. No. 140959,