Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, - versus - THE HONORABLE AUGUSTO
V. BREVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 10, ERNESTO
SALVADOR and GUILLERMO SALDAÑA, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 145938
Present: PUNO, Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: February 10, 2006 |
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Office of the Ombudsman seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Orders dated September 8 and 29, 2000
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City in Criminal Case No. 45, 505-2000
entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Ernesto Salvador and Guillermo Saldaña, Accused,
a prosecution for violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The
facts:
At times material hereto, the
above-named accused, Ernesto Salvador
and Guillermo Saldaña, now private respondents, were both employees of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Investigating news reports regarding the
allegations of Davao City Councilor
Diosdado Mahipus concerning anomalous disbursements of the city’s PhP1M
legislative research fund, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, in a
proceeding thereat docketed as OMB-MIN-98-0200, thru its Graft Investigation
Officer Rachelle M. Ladrera-Tagud, issued a resolution (hereinafter referred to
as the Ladrera resolution) finding
the existence of sufficient evidence to warrant the criminal prosecution of
both private respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Accompanying
the Ladrera resolution is a draft Information[1] bearing date
That sometime in or about 1997, or shortly prior or
subsequent thereto, in Davao City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, ERNESTO SALVADOR and GUILLERMO SALDAÑA, both
low-ranking public employees, committing the offense while in performance of
their official duties and taking advantage of their public position,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did there and then,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury to the City Government
of Davao thru evident bad faith in the performance of their official duties
when accused Salvador made a cash advance in the amount of P1 million under the
Legislative Research Program of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and in the
liquidation of the same, they made it appear that they have paid said amount to
the caterers who provided food and snacks during the seminars and trainings
they have allegedly conducted for the youth in the different barangays in Davao
City when in truth and in fact, no seminars and trainings of said
nature were conducted, thereby causing damage and injury to the government in
the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On
On
Meanwhile, in OMB-MIN-98-0200,
private respondent Ernesto Salvador filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ladrera resolution, followed a few days
later by a similar motion of private respondent Guillermo Saldaña.
To complement
their motions for reconsideration, both private respondents jointly filed in Criminal Case No. 45, 505-2000 an Omnibus
Manifestations and Motions, praying thereunder as follows:
a. For reconsideration and/or
completion of Preliminary Investigation by the Ombudsman;
b. Holding in abeyance the implementation of and/or recall
the warrant of arrest; and
c. To defer further proceedings.
In its Order[2] of
Subsequently, private
respondent
On
On the same
date -
Submitted for resolution without opposition is the MOTION
TO QUASH filed by accused Ernesto Salvador, dated
“In this connection,
it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the
corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial
court. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.”
xxx xxx xxx
“The clear import of
such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular
provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control
over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. The investigation and
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 (“An
Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of
the Ombudsman, and for other purposes”) which vests upon the Ombudsman “primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan …” And this is further buttressed by Section
11(4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor
shall have the power “to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.” Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudman's and Special Prosecutor's
authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.”
Apparently not
yet aware of the trial court's aforementioned order of dismissal, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an Opposition [6] dated September 8, 2000, therein
opposing and basically praying for the denial of Salvador’s Motion to Quash on the argument that –
1. While it
is true that the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of George Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 105965-70, that “it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has authority to file the
corresponding information/s against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court”
and “the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan”, it is equally true that said decision rendered on 09 August
1999 and followed by a Resolution dated 22 February 2000 has never been final
and, therefore, premature as of this moment to consider the same as judicial
precedent;
Also, seemingly
unaware, too, of the dismissal of the case, private respondent Saldaña filed his own Motion
to Quash,[7] dated September 11, 2000,
therein likewise citing George Uy.
Apprised later of
the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 45, 505-2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[8] which the trial
court denied via its other assailed Order [9]
dated
On
I. HE TOOK COGNIZANCE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
II. HE ADOPTED THE GEORGE UY RULING AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 45,
505-2000 ON THE GROUND THAT THE OFFICER WHO FILED THE INFORMATION HAD NO
AUTHORITY TO DO SO, THEREBY DISREGARDING THE FOLLOWING VITAL CONSIDERATIONS:
A. THE JURISDICTION OF THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN IS NOT PARALLEL TO, OR TO BE EQUATED WITH, THE BROADER
JURISDICTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN;
B. THE PHRASE “PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER CASES COGNIZABLE BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN” IS NOT A
DELIMITATION OF ITS JURISDICTION SOLELY TO SANDIGANBAYAN CASES; AND
C. THE AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR TO PROSECUTE CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN CANNOT BE
CONFUSED WITH THE BROADER INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORIAL POWERS OF THE OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND
III. HE DISREGARDED THE PENDENCY OF
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION IN THE GEORGE UY CASE BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT.
We find merit in the petition.
At the core of
the controversy is the perceived overlapping of jurisdiction between the Office
of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice in the
investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees. The confusion came about as
an aftermath of a series of enactments restructuring the offices of the
Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, specifically, the following: Rep. Act No. 6770,
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, reorganizing
the Office of the Ombudsman; Rep.
Act No. 7975, reorganizing the Sandiganbayan; and Rep. Act No. 8249, defining the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
As may be
recalled, it was amidst the foregoing backdrop of legislative enactments when
this Court promulgated on
(T)he clear import of
such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular
provincial and city prosecutors under the [DOJ] to have control over prosecution
of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases
rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section
15 (1) of R.A. 6770 … which vests upon the Ombudsman “primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan …”
And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes
that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to “conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.” Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudman's and Special Prosecutor's
authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan” (Word in bracket added; italization in the original).
Subsequently,
the Ombudsman interposed in George Uy
a motion for further clarification.[13] Resolving the motion, the Court, this time
speaking thru Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, in a Resolution
dated March 20, 2001,[14] nullified and set aside its pronouncement in its decision of
August 9, 1999 and its resolution of February 20, 2000 in George Uy that the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, thus:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
Court’s ruling in its decision dated
SO ORDERED.
This time, the
Court categorically stated that: “the
Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only
those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.”
Elaborating on its nullificatory ruling, the Court, in its
aforementioned Resolution of
The authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees
is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the power
to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient, thus:
“Sec 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.–The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases;
xxx xxx xxx”
Section 11 grants the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office of the
Ombudsman . . ., the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It states:
“Sec 11. Structural Organization. – xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(4) The
Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and
upon authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
xxx xxx xxx
The power to investigate and to
prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any
illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15 (1) giving
the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
and Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as
authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public
officers and employees cognizable by other courts. xxx.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the
Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770 [whose] power to conduct
preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to
confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types
of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by
law to act on all complaints against officers and
employees of the government ….
Given the Court’s George Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial
court’s assailed Orders of September 8 and 29, 2000, are, in hindsight, without
legal support and must, therefore, be set aside. This is not necessarily to
say, however, that grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, as petitioner presently argues, attended the issuance of both
orders. As it were, the orders were issued under the aegis of the then
prevailing
At any rate, the
determinative issue in this case pivots on the question of whether or not the
Office of the Ombudsman was possessed of the authority to file with the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders of the
respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 45,
505-2000 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO
ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of
the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice