Republic of the
Supreme Court
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LARRY ESTACION, |
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G.R. No. 144723 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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PANGANIBAN,
CJ., Chairperson, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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NOE BERNARDO, thru and his |
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CALLEJO,
SR. and |
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guardian ad litem ARLIE |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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BERNARDO, CECILIA |
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BANDOQUILLO and |
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Promulgated: |
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GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA, |
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Respondents. |
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February
27, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before us is a petition for review on
certiorari filed by Larry Estacion (petitioner)
seeking to annul the Decision dated April 17, 2000[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR CV No. 41447 which affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete
City, Branch 41, Negros Oriental, holding petitioner
and his driver Bienvenido Gerosano
(Gerosano) liable for damages for the injury
sustained by Noe Bernardo (respondent Noe). Also assailed
is the appellate court’s Resolution dated
In the afternoon of
Police investigation reports showed
that respondent Noe was one of the 11 passengers of
the Fiera who suffered injuries; that when the Fiera stopped to pick up a passenger, the cargo truck
bumped the rear left portion of the Fiera; that only
one tire mark from the front right wheel of the cargo truck was seen on the
road. A sketch of the accident was drawn
by investigator Mateo Rubia showing the relative
positions of the two vehicles, their distances from the shoulder of the road
and the skid marks of the right front wheel of the truck measuring about 48
feet.
On
Petitioner
and his driver Gerosano filed their Answer[4]
denying the material allegations in the complaint. They, in turn, filed a third party complaint[5]
against respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, as owner and driver respectively of the Fiera. They alleged
that it was the reckless imprudence of respondent driver Quinquillera
and his clear violation of the traffic rules and regulations which was the
proximate cause of the accident and asked for indemnification for whatever
damages they would be sentenced to pay. Respondents Bandoquillo
and Quinquillera filed their Answer to the third
party complaint asking for the dismissal of the third party complaint and for
payment of attorney’s fees.
Driver
Gerosano was charged criminally for reckless
imprudence resulting to multiple physical injuries with damage to property
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Pamplona-Amlan
and
On
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion, to pay
plaintiff, jointly or solidarily, the following:
1. P129,584.20 for actual damages in
the form of medical and hospitalization expenses;
2. P50,000.00 for moral damages,
consisting of mental anguish, moral shock, serious anxiety and wounded
feelings;
3. P10,000.00 for attorney’s
fees; and
4.
P5,000.00 for litigation expenses.
SO
ORDERED.[8]
The trial court ruled that the
negligence of Gerosano, petitioner’s driver, is the
direct and proximate cause of the incident and of the injuries suffered by respondent
Noe; that Gerosano’s gross
negligence and reckless imprudence had been confirmed by the Judgment in Criminal
Case No. 463; that based on the findings of the police investigator, the faulty
brakes caused the cargo truck to bump the Fiera; that
the Traffic Accident Report showed that the tire mark of the cargo truck measuring 48 feet is visibly
imprinted on the road where the incident took place indicating that the said
vehicle was speeding fast; that the existence of one tire mark of the cargo
truck proved that the said vehicle had a faulty brake, otherwise, it would have
produced two tire marks on the road; and that the photographs taken right after
the incident also showed who the guilty party was.
The trial court did not give credence
to the argument of petitioner and his driver that the truck was properly
checked by a mechanic before it was dispatched for a trip. It found that petitioner is negligent in maintaining
his vehicle in good condition to prevent any accident to happen; that petitioner
is liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as employer of driver Gerosano for being negligent in the selection and
supervision of his driver as well as for maintaining and operating a vehicle
that was not roadworthy; and that petitioner and his driver are solidarily liable for all the natural and probable
consequences of their negligent acts or omissions. The trial court dismissed the third party
complaint filed by petitioner and his driver against respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera.
Dissatisfied, only petitioner appealed
to the CA. On
Hence, the herein petition for
review.
Petitioner submits the following
issues for resolution:[9]
WHETHER
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT PETITIONER LARRY ESTACION EXERCISED THE DUE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
FATHER OF A FAMILY TO PREVENT DAMAGE DESPITE ABUNDANCE OF EVIDENCE TO THAT EFFECT;
WHETHER
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER LARRY ESTACION
EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF HIS EMPLOYEE AND IN
MAINTAINING HIS CARGO TRUCK ROADWORTHY AND IN GOOD OPERATING CONDITION;
WHETHER
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXONERATING RESPONDENTS CECILIA BANDOQUILLO AND
GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA.
In his Memorandum, petitioner
contends that he was able to establish that he observed the diligence of a good
father of a family not only in the selection of his employees but also in
maintaining his truck roadworthy and in good operating condition; that the CA
erred in exonerating respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, owner and driver, respectively of the Fiera from liability when their negligence was the
proximate cause of respondent Noe’s injuries; that
respondent Noe’s act of standing in the rear
carrier of the Fiera
is in itself negligence on his part which was aggravated by the fact that
respondent Quinquillera overtook the cargo truck
driven by Gerosano on the curve and suddenly cut into
the latter’s lane; that due to the overloading of passengers, Gerosano was not able to see the brake lights of the Fiera when it suddenly stopped to pick up passengers; that overloading
is in violation of the applicable traffic rules and regulations and Article
2185 is explicit when it provides that “unless there is proof to the contrary,
it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation”; that since
the Fiera driver was negligent, there arises a
presumption that respondent Bandoquillo, as owner of
the Fiera, is negligent in the selection and supervision of her
employee; that assuming petitioner Estacion and his
driver are not entirely blameless, the negligence of Quinquillera
is sufficient basis why the respective liabilities should be delineated vis-à-vis
their degree of negligence consistent with Article 2179[10]
of the Civil Code.
Respondent Noe
filed his Memorandum alleging that the first and second issues raised are
factual in nature which are beyond the ambit of a petition for review; that
petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of negligence thus he is liable
for the negligence of his driver Gerosano; and that
the third issue is best addressed to respondents Bandoquillo
and Quinquillera.
Respondents Bandoquillo
and Quinquillera failed to file their memorandum despite
receipt of our Resolution requiring them to submit the same.
We find it apropos to resolve first
the third issue considering that the extent of the liability of petitioner and
his driver is dependent on whether respondents Bandoquillo
and Quinquillera are the ones negligent in the
vehicular mishap that happened in the afternoon of
At the outset, the issue raised is
factual in nature. Whether a person is
negligent or not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon in a petition
for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
errors of law.[11]
As a rule, factual findings of the trial
court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the
CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence
on record.[12]
On the basis of the records of this
case, we find that there is cogent reason for us to review the factual findings
of the lower courts to conform to the evidence on record and consider this case
as an exception to the general rule.
The trial court and the appellate
court had made a finding of fact that the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by respondent Noe was the negligent and
careless driving of petitioner’s driver, Gerosano,
who was driving at a fast speed with a faulty brake when the accident happened.
We see no cogent reason to disturb the
trial court’s finding in giving more credence to the testimony of respondent Noe than the testimony of Gerosano,
petitioner’s truck driver.
The correctness of such finding is
borne by the records. In his testimony, Gerosano said that he was driving the truck at a speed of about
40 kilometers per hour;[13]
that the Fiera was behind him but upon reaching the
curve, i.e., after passing San Jose going to Dumaguete,
the Fiera overtook him and blocked his way;[14]
that he was 10 meters from the Fiera prior to the
impact[15]
when he applied the brakes[16]
and tried to evade the Fiera but he still hit it.[17]
We agree with the trial court and the
appellate court when they found that the truck was running at a fast speed
because if Gerosano was really driving at a speed of
40 kilometers per hour and considering that the distance between the truck and
the Fiera in front was about 10 meters, he had more
than enough time to slacken his speed and apply his break to avoid hitting the Fiera. However, from
the way the truck reacted to the application of the brakes, it showed that Gerosano was driving at a fast speed because the brakes
skidded a lengthy 48 feet as shown in the sketch of police investigator Rubia of the tire marks visibly printed on the road.
Moreover, the photographs taken after
the incident and the testimony of Gerosano as to the
extent of damage to the truck, i.e. the truck’s windshield was broken
and its hood was damaged after the impact,[18]
further support the finding of both courts that Gerosano
was driving at a fast pace.
The accident was further caused by
the faulty brakes of the truck. Based on
the sketch report, there was only one tire mark of the right tire of the cargo
truck during the incident which, as testified to by police investigator Rubia, meant that the brakes of the truck were not aligned
otherwise there would be two tire marks impressions on the road.[19]
Although petitioner contends that there
are other factors to explain why only one skid mark was found at the place of
the incident, such as the angle and edges of the road as well as the balance of
the weight of the cargo laden in the truck, he failed to show that indeed those
factors were present to prove his defense. Such claim cannot be given credence
considering that investigator Rubia testified that
the body of the truck was very much on the road, i.e., not over the
shoulder of the road,[20]
and the road was straight.[21]
Indeed, it is the negligent act of petitioner’s
driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast speed coupled with faulty brakes
which was the proximate cause of respondent Noe’s
injury.
Petitioner’s claim that right after
overtaking the cargo truck, the Fiera driver suddenly
stopped to pick up three passengers from the side of the road; that the
overloading of passengers prevented his truck driver from determining that the Fiera had pulled over to pick up passengers as the latter’s
brakelights were obstructed by the passengers
standing on the rear portion of the Fiera were not
substantiated at all. Respondent Quinquillera, the driver of the Fiera,
testified that the distance from the curve of the road when he stopped and
picked up passengers was estimated to be about 80 to 90 feet.[22] In fact, from the sketch drawn by
investigator Rubia, it showed a distance of 145 feet
from the curve of the road to the speed tire mark (which measured about 48 feet)
visibly printed on the road to the Fiera. This means that the Fiera
driver did not stop immediately after the curve as what petitioner claims. Moreover, Gerosano
admitted that his truck was at a distance of 10 meters prior to the impact. The distance between the two vehicles was such
that it would be impossible for Gerosano not to have
seen that the Fiera had pulled over to pick up
passengers.
However, we agree with petitioner
that respondent Noe’s act of standing on the rear
carrier of the Fiera exposing himself to bodily
injury is in itself negligence on his part. We find that the trial court and the CA erred when
they failed to consider that respondent Noe was also
guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory
negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he
is required to conform for his own protection. [23]
It has been established by the
testimony of respondent Noe that he was with four or five
other persons standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera
since it was already full. Respondent Noe’s act of standing on the left rear carrier portion of
the Fiera showed his lack of ordinary care and
foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It has been held that “to hold a person as
having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act
that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an
impending danger to health and body.[24] Respondent Noe’s
act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely dangerous
to his life and limb.
We likewise find merit in petitioner’s
contention that respondent Quinquillera, the Fiera driver, was also negligent. There is merit to petitioner’s claim that
there was overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and regulations. Respondent Noe himself
had testified that he was standing at the rear portion of the Fiera because the Fiera was
already full. Respondent Quinquillera should not have taken more passengers than
what the Fiera can accommodate. If the Fiera was not
overloaded, respondent Noe would not have been standing
on the rear carrier and sustained such extent of injury.
Furthermore, we find that respondent Quinquillera was negligent in allowing respondent Noe to stand on the Fiera’s rear
portion. Section 32(c) of Article III of
Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as “The Land Transportation and Traffic
Code” provides:
(c)
Riding on running boards – No driver shall allow any person to ride on running
board, step board or mudguard of his motor vehicle for any purpose while the
vehicle is in motion.
Respondent Quinquillera’s act
of permitting respondent Noe to hang on the rear
portion of the Fiera in such a dangerous position creates
undue risk of harm to respondent Noe. Quinquillera failed
to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances
justly demand. Thus, respondent Noe suffered injury.[25] Since
respondent Quinquillera is negligent, there arises a
presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, respondent Bandoquillo, in supervising her employees properly. Such presumption was not rebutted at all by Bandoquillo. Thus,
the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the third party complaint filed by
petitioner against respondents Quinquillera and Bandoquillo.
Petitioner contends that he was able
to establish that he exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection of his employees as well as in the maintenance of his cargo
truck in good operating condition. He claims
that in addition to looking at Gerosano’s driver’s
license, he accompanied the latter in his first two trips, during which he
ascertained Gerosano’s competence as a driver,
petitioner being a driver himself; that the truck driven by Gerosano
has never figured in any accident prior to the incident involved; that upon his
acquisition of the cargo truck on March 16, 1982, only 7 months prior to the
incident, the same was thoroughly checked up and reconditioned; and that he had
in his employ a mechanic who conducted periodic check-ups of the engine and
brake system of the cargo truck.
We are not persuaded.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art.
2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
x x x
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solidarily
liable for the quasi-delict committed by the
former. Petitioner is presumed to be
negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law
and may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of his driver, who
at the time was acting within the scope of his assigned task, only if he can
show that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.[26]
In Yambao
v. Zuniga,[27]
we have clarified the meaning of the diligence of a good father of a family,
thus:
The “diligence of a good father” referred to in the last paragraph of the aforecited statute means diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Thus, when an employee, while performing his duties, causes damage to persons or property due to his own negligence, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after the selection. For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family. x x x
Petitioner’s claim that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her driver, Venturina, deserves but scant consideration. Her allegation that before she hired Venturina she required him to submit his driver’s license and clearances is worthless, in view of her failure to offer in evidence certified true copies of said license and clearances. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the rules of evidence. x x x
In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina did submit his license and clearances when he applied with petitioner in January 1992, the latter still fails the test of due diligence in the selection of her bus driver. Case law teaches that for an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the applicant’s mere possession of a professional driver’s license; he must also carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service. Petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she went to this extent of verifying Venturina’s qualifications, safety record, and driving history. The presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection of her bus driver, thus, remains unrebutted.
Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over Venturina after his selection. For as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did not present any proof that she drafted and implemented training programs and guidelines on road safety for her employees. In fact, the record is bare of any showing that petitioner required Venturina to attend periodic seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency. Hence, petitioner cannot claim exemption from any liability arising from the recklessness or negligence of Venturina.
In
sum, petitioner’s liability to private respondents for the negligent and
imprudent acts of her driver, Venturina, under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code is both manifest and clear. Petitioner, having failed to rebut the legal
presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of her driver, is
responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or
on the employer’s own negligence. x x x[28]
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner failed to show that he
examined driver Gerosano as to his qualifications,
experience and service records. In fact,
the testimony of driver Gerosano in his cross-examination
showed the non-observance of these requirements. Gerosano testified
that petitioner was his first employer in Dumaguete
and that he was accepted by petitioner on the very day he applied for the job;[29]
that his driver’s license was issued in Mindanao where he came from[30]
and that while petitioner asked him about his driving record in Mindanao, he
did not present any document of his driving record.[31] Such admission clearly established that
petitioner did not exercise due diligence in the selection of his driver Gerosano.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner’s
driver Gerosano was driving in an efficient manner
when petitioner was with him in his first two trips would not conclusively
establish that Gerosano was not at all reckless. It could not be considered as due diligence
in the supervision of his driver to exempt petitioner from liability. In the supervision of his driver, petitioner
must show that he had formulated training programs and guidelines on road
safety for his driver which the records failed to show. We find that petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of his employees.
Moreover, there was also no proof
that he exercised diligence in maintaining his cargo truck roadworthy and in
good operating condition. While
petitioner’s mechanic driver testified that he made a routine check up on
Turning now to the award of damages,
since there was contributory negligence on the part of respondent Noe, petitioner’s liability should be mitigated in
accordance with Article 2179 of the Civil Code which provides:
When
the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
The underlying precept of the above
article on contributory negligence is that a
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled
to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own
negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages
actually caused by his negligence.[32]
In Phoenix Construction, Inc., v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[33] where we held that the legal and proximate cause of the accident
and of Dionisio’s injuries was the wrongful and
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked but found Dionisio guilty of contributory negligence on the night of
the accident, we allocated most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. In said case, we required Dionisio
to bear 20% of the damages awarded by the appellate court, except as to the
award of exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
In the present case, taking into
account the contributing negligence of respondent Noe,
we likewise rule that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by distributing
the damages also on a 20-80 ratio excluding attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.[34]
Consequently, 20% should be deducted
from the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court in favor of respondent
Noe, that is: 20% of P129,584.20 for actual
damages is P25,916.84 and 20% of P50,000.00 for moral damages is P10,000.00. Thus, after deducting the same, the award for
actual damages should be P103,667.36 and P40,000.00 for moral damages
or 80% of the damages so awarded.
Petitioner
and respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera
are jointly and severally liable for the 80% of the damages as well as attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses conformably with our pronouncement in Tiu v. Arriesgado[35] where we held:
The petitioners, as well as the respondents Benjamin Condor and Sergio Pedrano are jointly and severally liable for said amount, conformably with the following pronouncement of the Court in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:
The same rule of
liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the
bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third
party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buño, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro
Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus company, its
driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were
jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latter’s
heirs. The basis of this allocation of
liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of
Appeals, thus:
“Nor should it make
difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract
while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi
delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez
v. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to
the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the
driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two
vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some members of the Court, though, are of the
view that under the circumstances they are liable on quasi delict.”[36]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated
“WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion, as well as
third party defendants Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, to pay plaintiff, jointly and solidarily, the following:
1. P103,667.36 for actual damages in
the form of medical and hospitalization expenses;
2. P40,000.00 for moral damages,
consisting of mental anguish, moral shock, serious anxiety and wounded
feelings;
3. P10,000.00 for attorney’s
fees; and
4.
P5,000.00 for litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.”
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(No Part)
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
(On
Leave)
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred
in by Justices Quirino D. Abad
Santos, Jr. (now retired) and B.A. Adefuin–dela Cruz (now retired); rollo, pp. 38-53.
[2]
Rollo,
pp. 55-56.
[3]
Docketed as Civil Case No.
8122; records, pp. 1-5.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
Penned by Judge Arsenio J. Magpale (now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals); rollo,
pp. 57-79.
[8]
Rollo,
p.79
[9]
[10]
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if
his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
[11]
Yambao
v. Zuñiga, G.R. No. 146173,
[12]
Child Learning Center Inc.
v. Tagario, G.R. No. 150920,
[13]
TSN,
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
TSN,
[20]
TSN,
[21]
[22]
TSN,
[23]
Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals, 323 Phil. 374, 388 (1996).
[24]
Ma-ao
Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83491, August 27,
1990, 189 SCRA 88, 93.
[25]
See Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency
Corporation v. Borja, 432 Phil. 913, 922 (2002).
[26]
Tugade,
Sr. v. Court of Appeals 455 Phil.
258, 280-281 (2003), citing Viron
Transportation Co., Inc., v. Delos Santos, 399 Phil. 243, 253 (2000); Victory
Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Malecdan, 442 Phil. 784,
793 (2002).
[27]
Supra note 11 at pp 273-274.
[28]
[29]
TSN,
[30]
[31]
[32]
Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA
285, 293, citing Syki v. Begasa, G.R. No. 149149, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA
237, 244.
[33]
G.R. No. L-65295,
[34]
[35]
G.R. No. 138060,
[36]