ELIZABETH MENDIZABEL,
IGNACIO MENDIZABEL, and Present:
ADELINA VILLAMOR,
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
TINGA, JJ.
- versus -
FERNANDO APAO and Promulgated:
TEOPISTA PARIDELA-APAO,
Respondents. February 20, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
CARPIO, J.:
This is a
petition for review[1] to
set aside the Decision[2]
dated
On P400. The vendors executed a deed of sale which
stated inter alia that they could
purchase back the property within six months for P400, failing which,
the sale would become absolute. The
vendors failed to repurchase the property.
Fernando thus took possession of the same.[6]
On
After the survey
of Fernando’s land, the Survey Party of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the same
area. This latter survey resulted in a
subdivision of the land into two separate and distinct lots identified as Lot
Nos. 407 and 1080.[10] Fernando learned that Ignacio Mendizabel
(“Ignacio”) had filed prior to the Bureau of Lands’ survey a homestead
application over
On
On appeal,[13]
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources modified the decision of the
Bureau of Lands. The dispositive portion
of the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reads:
Wherefore,
the decision of the Director of Lands dated
Dissatisfied
with the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
Fernando appealed to the Office of the President.[15] Fernando did not receive any notice of the
decision on his appeal. Barely 10 days
after he filed his appeal, Fernando found out from the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Pagadian City that Lot No. 1080 had been partitioned between
Ignacio and his son Nestor Mendizabel (“Nestor”). Fernando learned that Lot No. 1080 was
already titled separately as Lot No. 1080-A covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. P-29,822 in the name of Nestor, and Lot No. 1080-B covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-29,823 in the name of Ignacio. The Register of Deeds issued the certificates
of title on
Fernando talked to Nestor and Ignacio, pleading with them to reconvey the property to him. Nestor and Ignacio rejected Fernando’s request.
On
Certain
parcel of land actually devoted to corn and rice cultivation, root crops,
bananas and about one hundred (100) punos of coconut fruit bearing trees and
with four (4) residential houses occupied by produce-sharing tenants and with
all other existing improvements thereon, located at Kilometer 4, Barangay
Mabini, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur.
Bounded on the NORTH by the lot of Ricardo Conwi; on the SOUTH by the
lot of the herein plaintiffs; on the EAST by the
Respondents also alleged that petitioners secured the titles to the property “fraudulently.” Respondents asserted that –
x x x Assuming, arguendo, that the issuance thereof, could have been based and
predicated upon the resolution of the aforesaid land conflict by and between
herein plaintiffs and defendant, Nestor Mendizabel, which has been raised on
appeal to the Office of [the] President, nonetheless, such administrative
decision/order and/or resolution, if any there be, did not since then ripen
into or attain its finality and enforceability, for the basic and fundamental
reason that plaintiffs who, are directly affected thereby, has [sic] not been
furnished with a copy thereof.[20]
In their
answer,[21]
petitioners claimed that Ignacio, whose wife Adelina Villamor (“Adelina”) had
since died, purchased the property, identified as Lot No. 1080, from Alejandro
Magbanua on
As
affirmative defenses, petitioners claimed that respondents had no cause of
action against them as respondents had no personality to institute the present
case “seeking the nullity of a patent issued by order of the President of the
As
counterclaim, petitioners alleged that the present case was filed merely to
harass them because respondents knew that the Bureau of Lands, Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the Office of the President had already
adjudged petitioners the owners of the property. Petitioners sought the dismissal of the
complaint and asked for damages.
On
Respondents asked the trial court to issue “an injunctive, prohibitory, mandatory restraining writ” ordering petitioners to desist and refrain from disturbing the peaceful enjoyment and possession of respondents of the property during the pendency of the proceedings, lest respondents suffer more damages.
On
On
On
The trial
court denied respondents’ Motion to Declare Ignacio and Wife in Default in its
Order dated
In their
Amended Answer,[28]
petitioners included the defenses of prescription, estoppel and laches, and the
indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their titles.
On
On
On
Respondents presented three witnesses: Brañanula, Justiniano Lizardo (“Lizardo”), both of whom were residents of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur, and Fernando himself. Respondents also offered documentary evidence consisting of a Sketch Plan and the blue print of the approved subdivision plan of respondents’ land identified as Psu-173083.
On the other
hand, petitioners repeatedly failed to present evidence at the scheduled
hearings.[34]
On
When the above-entitled case was called for continuation of trial today, counsel for the plaintiffs appeared and manifested that he is ready for today’s continuation of hearing. On the other hand, counsel for the defendants had requested that this case be reset to another date. Counsel for the plaintiffs manifested that he is not interposing to the postponement of this case today but requested that this will be the last postponement with the warning that should the defendants fail to present any evidence in the next hearing of this case, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.
Finding
the manifestation of counsel for the plaintiffs to be proper and in order, the
same is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE,
let the continuation of trial of the above-entitled case be set again on
October 18, 1994, at 8:30 in the morning, with the warning that should
defendants fail to present their evidence in the next hearing, the case is
deemed submitted for decision.
SO
ORDERED.[35]
Petitioners’ counsel
failed to present evidence at the scheduled hearing of
On
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by counsel for the defendants, the court resolves to DENY the same.
As
borne out by the record of the instant case, as of
Despite
the indulgence of the Court, defendants choose to delay the proceedings of this
case thus, in an Order dated September 13, 1994, the defendants were warned
that should they fail to present their evidences in the next hearing, the case
will be deemed submitted for decision.
However,
on
WHEREFORE,
considering that this case has logged for a long time already, the instant
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED and this case is deemed submitted
for resolution. Stenographers who took the proceedings of this case are hereby
ordered to submit their transcripts of their stenographic notes within 15 days
from the date of this order.
SO
ORDERED.[38]
On
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
a. Declaring Original Certificate of Title
No. P-29,822 for
b. Ordering the Register of Deeds of
Pagadian City to require defendants Nestor Mendizabel and Ignacio Mendizabel to
surrender the above named titles immediately;
c. Ordering the Provincial Sheriff through
the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Pagadian City, to execute the necessary Deed of Reconveyance of the
above-specified titles in favor of plaintiffs; and
d. Pronouncing exemplary and incidental
damages against defendants, in favor of plaintiffs to include cost of suit and
attorney’s fees in the amount of seventy five
(P75,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency.
SO ORDERED.[41]
The trial court explained its decision in this wise:
From the documents presented and from the oral testimonies given by the witnesses, it is very clear that defendants never acquired actual possession of the land in question. In fact, after they were issued the titles, they had to employ the services of an INP Station Commander in the person of Oscar Guevarra to be able to enjoy the harvest and fruits of the plants in the litigated area.
There
is also no showing that defendants acted to eject plaintiff if the latter
forcibly entered and took possession of the land.
Although
it is true that the Deed of Sale in Cebuano (Exhibit “A” for plaintiff) remains
a private document being devoid of notarial registration, it stands as plain
proof of plaintiffs prior acquisition and right of possession which defendants
have not demolished, except by their having secured titles thereon.
The
tenants who testified affirmed plaintiffs[’] claim of ownership. Under the land reform law, they have all the
right to have the land they are tenanting acquired by opting to avail of the
benefits provided by law, but not one of them ventured, perhaps, out of respect
or goodwill with the landholders.
How
plaintiff failed to secure title over the land in question is explained by the
fact that some other persons were applying for it. It is clear, however, that the battle or contest to secure the title was
not waged in the venue itself, meaning, while one party applying for title over
the land was in actual possession, the other parties applying for title over
the same area was in a better position to facilitate the documents, as shown by
the fact that defendant Nestor Mendizabel was working with the Bureau of Lands
as a skilled employee.
This
Court would like to believe defendants as the true and lawful owners of Lot No.
1080, which was subdivided and apportioned among father and son as Lot Nos.
1080-A and 1080-B, because of the titles they have thereon. But ownership of real property is better
recognized by actual possession thereof and not by mere possession of documents
relative thereto.
Nowhere
in the records of this case was there any evidence to show from whom defendants
acquired and how they acquired the land they succeeded to have titles to,
except the allegation that they bought the property from Alejandro Magbanua, on
It is obvious that the authorities, namely,
the DENR, the Secretary of Agriculture and the [O]ffice of the President were
made to believe that defendants, at the time they applied for homestead title,
were in actual possession of and occupying the land in question, when the
contrary was true.
Ironically,
the Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture which was accordingly affirmed in
toto by the [O]ffice of the President placed defendants in an awkward
situation, because the “free patent” application of Fernando Apao was given due
course for Lot No. 407 and the “homestead” application of Ignacio Mendizabel
was similarly given due course for Lot No. 1080. If it was the other way around, that would
have saved defendants from an awkward situation. “
The
documentary evidences and the oral testimonies have conjured a very clear
picture sufficient to convince this Court that the original certificate of
titles issued in the name of defendants Ignacio Mendizabel and Nestor
Mendizabel, namely Original Certificate of Title No. P-29,822 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-29,823, could have been obtained through fraud,
manipulation, and stratagem to the disadvantage of plaintiffs. Accordingly, under these circumstances an
implied trust is created by operation of law for the benefit of the plaintiffs.[42] (Emphasis supplied)
On
The
Court in the exercise of its inherent power hereby corrects its Decision dated
d. Pronouncing exemplary and incidental
damages against defendants, in favor of plaintiffs to include cost of suit and
attorney’s fees in the amount of seventy five thousand (P75,000.00)
pesos, Philippine Currency.
SO ORDERED.[43]
Petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
On
WHEREFORE,
prescinding from the foregoing disquisitions, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against defendants-appellants.
SO
ORDERED.[44]
The Court of Appeals held that there is no cogent reason for it to deviate from the rule that factual findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has overlooked or ignored some fact or circumstance of sufficient weight or significance, which, if considered, would alter the situation. The Court of Appeals held that while factual findings of administrative agencies must be respected, the same holds true only if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence presented by respondents “tend to disprove the factual findings of the administrative bodies.”
The Court of
Appeals further held that respondents have adequately proven by the testimonies
of their witnesses that Fernando actually possessed and cultivated the property
at the time of the homestead application and was then enjoying its fruits.
The Court of Appeals noted that the only instance when petitioners “voiced out” their title to the property was in 1988 when Oscar Guevarra vehemently told respondents’ tenants to vacate Lot No. 1080. Since prior to that time, respondents were undisturbed in their possession of the property, the Court of Appeals ruled that the possessor has a better right.
The Court of Appeals, moreover, held that reliance by petitioners on the fact that respondents never appealed the 1971 decision of the Office of the President could not be given credence because the decision was not properly identified. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners’ failure to prove that respondents received the decision or that petitioners enforced the decision against respondents was fatal to petitioners’ defense.
The Court of
Appeals also ruled that the doctrine of implied trust as enunciated in Article
1456 of the Civil Code operates in favor of respondents. The Court of Appeals stated that under
Article 1456, when a person through fraud succeeds in registering a property in
his name, the law creates what is called a “constructive or implied trust” in
favor of the defrauded party and grants the latter the right to recover the
property fraudulently registered.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the action for reconveyance that respondents availed of in the present case is proper. The Court of Appeals held that while it is doctrinal that a decree of registration is no longer open to review or attack after the lapse of one year, although its issuance is attended with fraud, it does not necessarily mean that the aggrieved party is without remedy at law. An action for reconveyance is still available to the aggrieved party if the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
The Court of
Appeals held that in the present case prescription has not set in. The Court of Appeals held that considering
that respondents are in possession of the property in the concept of an owner, the
action for reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property,
does not prescribe. The Court of Appeals
held that an action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in 10
years only if the claimant is not in actual possession.[45]
The Court of
Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its Resolution[46]
dated
Hence, this
petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether the petition lacks cause of action
considering that the alleged
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake were not stated with particularity
in the complaint.
2. Whether the action for
reconveyance has already prescribed.
3. Whether respondents have
acquired ownership of the lands covered by the homestead titles granted to
petitioners.
4. Whether the Court of
Appeals erred in not giving weight to the factual findings of the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
5. Whether
implied trust exists in this case.[47]
The Ruling
of the Court
The petition must fail.
Action
for Reconveyance Based on Implied Trust
Petitioners claim that while
respondents’ complaint alleged “fraud or mistake,” it did not state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners claim that on this score alone, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals should have decided the case in their favor.
Petitioners’ argument is untenable.
In an action for reconveyance, all
that must be alleged in the complaint are two facts which, admitting them to be
true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land,
namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land or possessed the land
in the concept of owner,[48]
and (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the land.[49]
In their complaint, respondents
clearly asserted that: (1) they were the “true and actual possessors” of the
property; (2) they purchased the property
from spouses Alejandro and Teofila Magbanua on 21 March 1955 as
evidenced by a deed of sale pacto de
retro which spouses Magbanua executed in their favor; (3) their ownership
of the property became absolute when the vendors failed to repurchase it within
the period stipulated in their contract; and (4) they were fraudulently
deprived of ownership of the property when petitioners obtained homestead
patents and certificates of title in their names.[50] These allegations certainly measure up to the
requisite statement of facts to constitute an action for reconveyance based on
an implied trust.
Indubitably, the act of petitioners in
misrepresenting that they were in actual possession and occupation of the
property, obtaining patents and original certificates of title in their names,[51]
created an implied trust in favor of the actual possessors of the
property. The Civil Code provides:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
In other words, if the registration of
the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds
it as a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action for
reconveyance of the property.[52]
Petitioners would nonetheless insist
that respondents failed to present any proof of fiduciary relation between them
and respondents and “breach of such trust by petitioners.”
Whether there is fiduciary relation
between petitioners and respondents is of no moment. Construing the provision of Article 1456, the
Court in Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying[53]
stated:
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.
x x x x
… implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. x x x
x x x constructive
trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the
demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one
who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right
to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.[54]
(Emphasis supplied)
The records show that respondents
bought the property from spouses Alejandro and Teofila Magbanua on
Petitioners’ assertion has no
merit. All documents attached to a
complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not denied under oath
by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without need of
introducing evidence.[58] In petitioners’ answer, there was no denial
under oath of the due execution and genuineness of the deed of sale. Thus, the deed of sale is not only
incorporated into respondents’ complaint, it is also deemed admitted by petitioners.[59] This has the effect of relieving respondents
from the duty of expressly presenting such document as evidence. The court, for the proper resolution of the
case, may and should consider without the introduction of evidence the facts
admitted by the parties.[60]
Moreover, despite the opportunities
given them by the trial court,
petitioners still failed to prove that they were the owners of the
property or that they had been in possession of the same.[61] In fact, it was only on
In a number of cases, the Court has ordered
reconveyance of property to the true owner or to one with a better right, where
the property had been erroneously or fraudulently titled in another person’s
name.[63] In Bustarga v. Navo II,[64] the Court held that “reconveyance is just and proper in order to terminate the intolerable
anomaly that the patentees should have a Torrens title for the land which they
and their predecessors never possessed and which has been possessed by [another
person] in the concept of owner.” After all, the
Considering the circumstances in the
present case, therefore, we hold that respondents have a better right to the
property since they had long been in possession of the property in the concept
of owners. In contrast, petitioners were
never in possession of the property.
Despite the irrevocability of the
Prescriptive
Period of an Action for Reconveyance
The essence of an action for
reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought is the
transfer of the property, in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to
one with a better right.[66]
It is of no moment that respondents
filed this action for reconveyance more than four years after the property was
registered in favor of petitioners. An
action for reconveyance of registered land based on implied trust prescribes in
10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.[67] Besides, respondents were in possession of
the property at the time they filed their complaint in the present case.[68] The Court has ruled that the 10-year
prescriptive period applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in
possession of the property. If a person
claiming to be its owner is in actual possession of the property, the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does
not prescribe. The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the
land claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a
third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by
one who is in possession.[69]
Factual Findings of Administrative
Agencies
The decision[70]
of the Office of the President affirming the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR Case No. 2481, which petitioners
offered in evidence, could hardly carry the day for them. Factual findings of administrative agencies
such as the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (“DANR”) are
accorded not only respect but also even finality if they are supported by substantial
evidence. However, deviation from this
rule must be made when the administrative agency itself clearly misappreciated
the facts.[71]
In the present case, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are at
variance with those of the DANR. We have
carefully reviewed the records and found that petitioners have not sufficiently
proved that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are totally devoid of
support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion.
Wherefore, we hold that the findings of fact made by the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on this Court even if contrary to those of
the DANR, so long as such findings are supported by the records or based on
substantial evidence.[72]
Besides, there is no showing that respondents received a copy
of the decision of the Office of the President.[73] No judgment or order, whether final or
interlocutory, has juridical existence unless it is set down in writing,
signed, promulgated, and released to the parties. Even after its promulgation,
a decision does not bind the parties until notice of the decision is duly
served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law.[74]
WHEREFORE,
we DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 52803.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES DANTE O.
TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes
and Eloy R.
[3] Penned
by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes
and Romeo A. Brawner, concurring.
[4] Penned
by Judge Fausto H. Imbing.
[5] Alejandro’s name also appears in
the Records as “Alijandro.”
[6] Records,
pp. 634-635.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Docketed
at the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 2481.
[14] Records,
p. 640.
[15]
[16]
[17] Teopista’s
name also appears in the Records as “Teofista” and “Teafista.”
[18] Records,
pp. 1-4.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[24] Records,
p. 26-A.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[42]
[43] Id., p. 708.
[44] CA rollo, p. 72.
[45] CA rollo, pp. 69-71.
[46] Id., pp. 80-81.
[47] Rollo, pp. 5-7.
[48] Bustarga, et al. v. Navo II, et
al., 214 Phil. 86 (1984).
[49] Heirs
of Maximo Sanjorjo v. Heirs of Manuel Y. Quijano, G.R. No. 140457, 19 January
2005, 449 SCRA 15; Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, 428 Phil. 249 (2002).
[50] Records,
pp. 1-3.
[51]
[52] Pagkatipunan
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70722,
[53] G.R.
No. 144773,
[54] See Vda. de Esconde v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 103635, 1 February 1996, 253 SCRA 66; Philippine National Bank v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97995, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA 347.
[55] Records,
pp. 5-6.
[56] TSN,
28 July 1988, pp. 3-7, 9-14, and 19; TSN, 15 September 1988, pp. 4-5, 9-11, and
13; TSN, 10 January 1989, pp. 3, 7-8, 10-12; TSN, 5 July 1990, p. 8; TSN, 22
January 1991, p. 5; TSN, 26 March 1991, p. 2.
[57] Rollo,
p. 6.
[58] City
of
[59]
[60] Asia
Banking Corporation v. Walter E. Olsen & Co., 48 Phil. 529 (1925).
[61] Supra notes 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, and 40.
[62] Records,
p. 24; TSN,
[63] Vda.
de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108547,
[64]
Supra note 48, at 89. See Linaza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 63.
[65] Pagkatipunan v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra note 52; Amerol v. Bagumbaran, supra note 63.
[66] Caro
v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. 157536, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 595; Leyson v. Bontuyan,
G.R. No. 156357, 18 February 2005, 452 SCRA 94; Heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo v.
Heirs of Manuel Y. Quijano, supra
note 49.
[67] Tale
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101028,
[68] Supra note 62.
[69] Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, supra note 63.
[70] Records,
pp. 639-643.
[71] Electruck
Asia, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 147031,
[72] Gonzales
v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 232 (2001).
[73] Supra note 70.
[74] 2.0
Herrera, Review Law 142
(2000); Lindo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 95016,