Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
SPS. LUIS K.S. LIM and CHUA Petitioners, -
versus - THE COURT OF
APPEALS, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 134617
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,* AZCUNA,
and GARCIA,
JJ. Promulgated: February 13, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
By this petition[1]
for review on certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction, petitioners seek the reversal and setting aside of
the decision[2]
dated July 10, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 47085, sustaining an earlier order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, denying petitioners’ application for a
writ of preliminary injunction in its Civil Case No. 97-86459.
In its Resolution[3] of
The facts:
Herein petitioners, the spouses Luis K.S.
Lim and Chua
In the pursuit of their business,
petitioners secured and obtained several loans from respondent Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) amounting to P11,000,000.00, to secure which
the spouses Luis K.S. Lim and Chua P18,865,509.00, inclusive of interest and surcharges.
Hence, in a letter dated
On
In an Order[6]
dated
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for should be DENIED. The plaintiffs’ [petitioners’] evidence simply consisted of proposals to settle the loans, or request for the re-structuring of the same. Plaintiffs did not deny that the loans were already due and that they have defaulted in the payment therefor. The foreclosure of the mortgage thus becomes a matter of right on the part of the defendant [respondent] bank, for such is the security of the loans and its foreclosure is a condition of the document. Of course, requests for extension to pay, or proposals for re-structuring of the loans, do not novate a contract and suspend its execution. This is academic and fundamental. The principles of offer and acceptance must be recalled. The fundamental requisites for the existence of an enforceable contract must be remembered.
Plaintiffs have not thus established, so far, a clear legal right to the relief prayed for. Their right to the suspension of the foreclosure is not in esse, free from doubt and dispute. Necessarily, this Court cannot grant them the relief. (Word in bracket ours; Emphasis in the original).
With their motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the trial court in its subsequent Order[7] of
March 6, 1998, petitioners went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, thereat
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47085,
insisting that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
its orders of December 16, 1997 and March 6, 1998, supra, and claiming that they were deprived of due process because
they received a copy of BPI’s petition for extrajudicial foreclosure only on
November 24, 1997 and that on the following day - November 25, 1997 – they
received the respondent sheriff’s Notice
to Parties of Sheriff’s Auction Sale[8]
setting the auction sale on December 9, 1997. Petitioners thus argued that they
had no opportunity to comment on BPI’s foreclosure petition, adding that they
were misled by BPI when the latter assured them that it would study their
proposals when in fact a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure was already
filed with the respondent sheriff.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the
CA, in its decision[9]
dated
…This Court
finds the respondent court's reasoning on this point to be unassailable. Thus:
The
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for should be DENIED. The plaintiffs' evidence simply consisted of
proposals to settle the loans, or a request for the re-structuring of the
same. Plaintiffs did not deny that the loans were already due
and that they have defaulted in the payment therefor. The foreclosure of the mortgage thus becomes
a matter of right on the part of the defendant bank, for such is the security
of the loans and its foreclosure is a condition of the document. Of course, requests for extension to pay, or
proposals for re-structuring of the loans do not novate a contract and suspend
its execution. This is academic and fundamental. The principles of offer and acceptance must
be recalled. The fundamental requisites
for the existence of an enforceable contract must be remembered.
Plaintiffs have not thus
established, so far, a clear legal right to the relief prayed for. Their right to the suspension of the
foreclosure is not in esse, free from
doubt and dispute. Necessarily, this
Court cannot grant them the relief.
But
even assuming that said Orders were wrong, the petition would be dismissed just
the same because the writ of certiorari is unavailing in a situation like the
one at bench. The sole office of the
prerogative writ of certiorari is to correct errors of jurisdiction including
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. (Flores v. NLRC, 253 SCRA 494)
Thus, certiorari is not issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct
erroneous conclusions of law or fact. As
long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in
the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of
judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil
action of certiorari. (Commissioner of BIR v. Court of Appeals, 257
SCRA 200)
One last point. Again, even if hypothetically, said orders
are erroneous, this Court cannot see in them nor in the annexes of the petition
any streak of arbitrariness, capriciousness or any shred of oppressiveness,
partiality, or prejudice on the part of the respondent court. Therefore, there was no grave abuse of
discretion and this petition must fall.
Hence, this recourse by the petitioners.
The petition lacks merit.
As in the CA, petitioners made much of
their claim that respondent BPI misled and deprived them of any opportunity to
question the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings instituted by it with the
respondent sheriff.
The Court is not persuaded.
The requisites for
preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of right sought to be
protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[10]
As such, a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing
right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. The twin requirements of a valid injunction
are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations.[11] Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ,
the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown.[12]
Here, petitioners failed
to show their right to injunctive relief against BPI. There is no clear showing of a right claimed
which necessitates their entitlement to an injunctive writ. As aptly pointed
out by both the CA and the trial court, petitioners’ evidence simply consisted
of proposals to settle the loans or a request for a restructuring of the same.
Petitioners not once denied that their loans were already due and that they
have defaulted in the payment thereof. Thus, the foreclosure of the mortgage
becomes a matter of right on the part of BPI, for such is the purpose of
security of the loans. To be sure, petitioners’ requests for extensions to pay
and proposals for restructuring of the loans, without BPI’s acceptance, remain as that. Without more, those
proposals neither novated the parties’ mortgage
contract nor suspended its execution. In
fine, petitioners failed to establish a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected by the injunctive writ they seek.
Accordingly, the
Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA when it upheld the
challenged RTC orders.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
( On Sick Leave
) (On Leave )
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On Leave.
[1] In the petition, the Court of Appeals was impleaded as respondent. This was not necessary since this is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice
Hilarion L. Aquino (ret.), with Associate Justice Arturo B. Buena (later member
of this Court, ret.), and Associate Justice Ramon U. Mabutas (ret.),
concurring; Rollo, pp. 16-19.
[3] Rollo, p. 125.
[4] Rollo, p. 177.
[5] Rollo, pp. 39-45.
[6] Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[7] Rollo, p. 37.
[8] Rollo, p. 61.
[9] See Note #2, supra.
[10] Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers’ Association vs. Court of Appeals, 412 SCRA 69, 86 (2003).
[11] Sabalones vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 79 (1994).
[12] Knecht vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 1 (1993).