Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
SPOUSES
PEDRO M. REGALADO and ZANITA F. REGALADO, Petitioners,
- versus - ABRAHAM
M. REGALADO, CIRILO M. REGALADO, ISIDRO M. REGALADO, CIRIACO M. REGALADO,
JORGE M. REGALADO, JULIANA R. ABELLO, LUCIO M. REGALADO, and APOLONIO M.
REGALADO, JR., Respondents. |
G.R. No. 134154 Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Herein petitioners, the spouses Pedro
Regalado and Zanita Regalado, have come to this Court via this appeal[1] by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the
following issuances of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch
8, in its Spl. Civil Action No. 4518,
to wit:
1.
Order dated
2. Decision dated November 28, 1997,[3] declaring the parcel of fishpond land subject of the case as the common property of all the parties; ordering the partition of the same into nine (9) equal parts; requiring petitioners to render an accounting of the produce of said fishpond starting 1980 until actual partition is effected; ordering petitioners to pay jointly and severally attorney’s fees and litigation expenses and other costs; and ordering the appointment of a receiver agreeable to all parties upon the filing of the bond for receivership;
3. Order dated January 14, 1998,[4] dismissing the appeal filed by petitioners for failure to file their record on appeal and to pay the appellate court docket and other lawful fees; and
4.
Order dated
The facts:
Petitioner Pedro
M. Regalado, married
to co-petitioner Zanita F. Regalado, and respondents Abraham, Cirilo, Isidro,
Ciriaco, Jorge, Lucio, and Apolonio, all surnamed Regalado, and Juliana R.
Abello (hereinafter collectively referred to as respondents), are the children
of the deceased spouses Apolonio Regalado and Sofia Regalado.
It appears that as
early as 1929, the parties’ parents had been in possession of a 40-hectare
fishpond which the parents developed and even leased to third persons for a
time. At one time, their father leased
part of the fishpond property to one Benjamin Roxas for a period of nine (9)
years commencing
Upon the death of
their father, respondents demanded from petitioner-spouses who are in the
possession of the entire fishpond, the partition thereof. Respondents alleged
that petitioners refused and merely requested for another three (3) years to be
in possession of the subject property.
Again, in 1989,
respondents reiterated their demand for partition but petitioners again refused
and once more requested that they be allowed to remain in possession and
usufruct of the property for five (5) more years after all the litigations
concerning the same shall have been terminated, reasoning out that they have
not yet recovered all their expenses in developing and recovering possession of
the fishpond from third persons.
In 1992,
respondents again demanded for partition but as before, petitioners again
refused. Hence, on
In their Answer,
petitioner-spouses, as defendants a quo,
claimed that the fishpond in question was not part of the hereditary estate of
their parents as it is a public land covered by a Fishpond Lease
Agreement. They argued that even if it
were to be considered as part of the hereditary estate of the parents,
respondents as plaintiffs below are not entitled to share equally in the
fishpond property as it was allegedly only petitioner Pedro Regalado who
recovered the actual physical possession of the same from third persons. Petitioners also claimed that respondents did
not keep their part in the agreement to let the spouses recover all the
expenses they incurred in the development and re-possession of the subject
fishpond and to enjoy sole usufruct thereof for five (5) years.
On May 31, 1993, respondents filed in Spl. Civil Case No. 4518, a verified
Petition for
Receivership,[7] thereunder alleging that there was
a compelling need
for the appointment
of a receiver to safeguard the
property and its
produce from being
wasted or materially injured
on account of
petitioners’ failure to pay
the real estate taxes and
fishpond rentals due thereon.
Respondents further averred that
the property and the income
derived therefrom are
in danger of
being lost or misappropriated by petitioners who
were allegedly constructing
their own house thereat out
of the income of
the fishpond, throwing lavish
parties frequently and getting heavily indebted to several persons.
Petitioners
opposed the petition for receivership, claiming that mere co-ownership does not
justify the appointment of a receiver, since it was actually petitioner Pedro
Regalado who risked his own life, spent his own money and time in recovering
the fishpond without the other parties contributing a single centavo. Petitioners also argued in their opposition
that the subject fishpond was public property which belongs to the Government, hence it would be folly and a waste of money to
pay the real property taxes thereon in addition to the fishpond rentals to the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR).
In the
herein first assailed Order
dated July 26, 1995,[8]
the trial court granted respondents’ petition for receivership, explaining that
respondents had rights and interests on the subject property,
which property is in danger of being foreclosed by petitioners’ creditors or forfeited
by the Government for non-payment of taxes.
Aggrieved by the
aforementioned Order, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that said Order was premature as they (petitioners) were not yet
finished with their presentation of evidence in opposition to respondents’
petition for the appointment of a receiver.
Acting thereon,
the trial court issued an Order[9] on
Eventually, in the
herein assailed Decision[10]
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Declaring the parcel of fishpond land located at Barangay Camanci, Batan, Aklan described under paragraph 4 of the complaint and herein referred to as the land in question, the common property of all the parties herein;
b) Ordering the partition of the fishpond in question into nine (9) equal parts, each part shall represent the share of Abraham M. Regalado, Cirilo M. Regalado, Isidro M. Regalado, Ciriaco M. Regalado, Jorge M. Regalado, Juliana R. Abello, Lucio M. Regalado, Apolonio M. Regalado, Jr. and Pedro M. Regalado in the following manner: Within thirty (30) days from receipt by the parties of this decision, they may make partition among themselves, if they are able to agree, by proper instruments of conveyance to be conformed by the court, otherwise, partition would be effected in accordance with Sections 3 or 5, Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended;
c) Ordering the defendants [now petitioners] to render an accounting of the produce of the fishpond in question starting 1980 when they first actually took possession of the same until actual partition of the property is effected among the parties;
d) Ordering the defendants [now petitioners], to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiffs [now respondents] the sum of P10,000.00 attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses and to pay the costs;
e) Ordering, upon filing of the petitioners’ [plaintiffs’] bond for receivership in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), the appointment of a receiver agreeable to all the parties, who is likewise directed to put-up a bond before assuming his duties as such in the amount which will be fixed later by this Court. [Words in brackets supplied]
SO ORDERED.
Against said decision, petitioners filed
a Notice of Appeal[11] on
In the herein other assailed Order[12]
dated January 14, 1998, the lower court denied due course to petitioners’
notice of appeal, saying that while the notice was timely filed, yet
petitioners did not pay the appellate court docket and other lawful fees nor a
record on appeal filed by them.
With the
Then, on
March 10, 1998, petitioners, this time thru one Atty.
Pedro Icamina who was without any proof of entry of
appearance in the case either as new or collaborating counsel for the
petitioners, filed a Petition for Relief from Order,[14] thereto attaching an affidavit of Atty. Tirol,
petitioners’ counsel on record about whom there is no indication of any
withdrawal of appearance. In that
affidavit, Atty. Tirol alleged that while his office
received on January 19, 1998 a copy
of the January 14, 1998 Order (denying due course to
petitioners’ appeal), his law
clerk did not personally inform him about it and just placed said order on his
table among the piles of legal and court papers, adding that he (Atty. Tirol) had several court hearings, not to mention the fact
that he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan which required
his attendance, all of which caused him to overlook the filing of the Record on
Appeal. In the same pleading, Atty.
Icamina attached petitioners’ Record on Appeal and a check for P400.00
as appellate court docket fee.
In the herein last assailed Order[15]
dated
Hence, this recourse
by the petitioners.
We DENY.
At the outset, it must be stressed that
in seeking the reversal and setting aside of the assailed Orders and Decision
of the trial court in its Spl. Civil
Action No. 4518, petitioners came to us on a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the
Rules, the denial of a petition for relief from judgment or an order
disallowing or dismissing an appeal may only be challenged through the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
xxx xxx xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, in seeking
the reversal of the trial court’s Order
dated May 19, 1998 which denied their petition for relief from judgment,
petitioners, in coming to us via the vehicle
of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, have thus clearly availed of the wrong
remedy.
In any event, even
if petitioners came to us by certiorari under Rule 65, still the recourse must
fail. For, from a perusal of the
petition itself, it is quite apparent that no allegation of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court was ever presented by them, and even
assuming there was, the same would still have to be dismissed.
A petition for
relief from denial of an appeal is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
“Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. – When a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due course.”
In Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[16]
we ruled:
“A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.” (Citations omitted)
Here, there was no
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented petitioners
from filing their Record on Appeal on time and paying the necessary appellate
court docket and filing fees therefor.
In the precise words of the trial court:
“The petition for relief stresses the reasons that the clerk of Atty. Tirol, a certain Ms. Nina Temporaza, in charged (sic) of receiving and filing of office papers failed to bring to the attention of Atty. Tirol the order of denial dated January 14, 1998 and secondly, Atty. Tirol due to pressure of work and court appearances and being an incumbent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan, thinking all the time that his notice of appeal filed by him was in order (sic).
On the first excuse, the Supreme Court in an analogous case had the occasion to rule, viz;
“The excuse offered by respondent Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in due time his appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that counsel’s clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. x x x in the face of the Supreme Court repeated rulings (that) they are neither credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence” (Phil. Airlines Inc. vs. Arca, et al., Vol. 19 SCRA 350).
As to the second excuse, the Supreme Court has this to say,
“Volume and pressure of work is not an excusable negligence. Moreover, the said petition was not based on a valid ground as We have consistently ruled that volume and pressure of work does not constitute mistake or excusable negligence as to warrant relief from judgment which is available only in exceptional cases” (Biscarra vs. Republic, 95 SCRA 248).
Furthermore, the appellate court docket fee and other lawful fees are now required to be paid within the period for taking an appeal to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or order appealed from. Failure to pay said fees on time is also a ground for dismissal of the appeal (Sec. 1 (c) of Rule 50).”
To stress, even in
the matter of questioning the trial court’s Order dated
It must be
remembered that a party aggrieved by an order disallowing or dismissing an
appeal may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Sadly, however, petitioners erroneously filed
an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
Assuming, arguendo,
that petitioners are
allowed to take an appeal from
said Order, we find no excusable negligence
to merit the grant of the petition for relief.
In this case, it
is undisputed that petitioners merely filed a Notice of Appeal. The Record on Appeal was belatedly filed, as
in fact it was merely attached to their
Unfortunately for
petitioners, negligence, to be “excusable,” must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.[17] Again, petitioners’ failure to file a Record
on Appeal and pay the appellate docket fees cannot be considered as excusable
negligence due to counsel’s pressure of work and inadvertence of his office
clerk.
On a
final note, we
emphasize that petitioners
are bound by the
acts of their
counsel in the conduct of the
instant case. They have to bear the
consequences thereof. Petitioners
cannot thereafter be
heard to complain
that the result might have been
different had their
counsel proceeded differently.
So it is that in Rivera v. Court
of Appeals,[18]
we ruled:
“xxx It has been held time and again that blunders and mistakes made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction.”
There must,
therefore, be an end to this litigation.
We take this
occasion to require Atty. Pedro Icamina to explain within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof why he should not be proceeded administratively for filing the very
petition in this case and the Petition
for Relief from Order in the lower court without first entering his
appearance as petitioners’ counsel.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and
the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 8-17.
[2] Rollo,
p. 20.
[3] Rollo,
pp. 23-35.
[4] Rollo, pp. 38 and 39
[5] Rollo, pp.74-75.
[6] Records, pp. 1-6.
[7] Records, pp. 79-82.
[8] Records, p. 183.
[9] Records, p. 193.
[10] Rollo, pp. 23-35; Records, pp. 281-293.
[11] Records, p. 305.
[12] See Footnote #4, supra; Records, p. 317.
[13] Records, pp. 513-514.
[14] Rollo, pp. 40-44.
[15] See Note #5, supra; Records, pp. 575-576.
[16] 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
[17] Insular Life Savings and Trust Company v. Runes, Jr., 436 SCRA 317 (2004), citing Gold Line Transit, Inc. v. Ramos, 363 SCRA 262 (2001).
[18] 405 SCRA 61 (2003).