Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
|
TELENGTAN
BROTHERS & SONS, INC., Petitioner, -
versus - UNITED STATES LINES,
INC. and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. |
G.R. No.
132284
Present: PUNO,
J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, * CORONA, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: February 28, 2006 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA,
J.:
Thru this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Telengtan
Brothers & Sons, Inc. (Telengtan) seeks the
reversal and setting aside of the decision[1] dated
January 8, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 18349 which affirmed in toto the
decision dated January 10, 1985[2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, finding petitioner liable to
respondent United States Lines, Inc. (U.S. Lines) for demurrage and damages.
Petitioner Telengtan is a domestic corporation doing business under the
name and style La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette
Factory, while respondent U.S. Lines is
a foreign corporation engaged in the business of overseas shipping. During the
period material, the provisions of the Far East Conference Tariff No. 12
were specifically
made applicable to Philippine
containerized cargo from the U.S.
and Gulf Ports, effective
with vessels arriving at Philippine ports on and after December 15, 1978. After
that date, consignees who fail to take delivery of their containerized cargo
within the 10-day free period are liable to pay demurrage charges.
As recited in the decision under
review, the factual antecedents may be summarized as follows:
On June 22, 1981, respondent U.S.
Lines filed a suit against petitioner Telengtan seeking
payment of demurrage charges plus interest and damages. Docketed
as Civil Case No. R-81-1196 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and
raffled to Branch 38 thereof, the complaint alleged that between the years 1979
and 1980, goods belonging to petitioner loaded on containers aboard its
(respondent’s) vessels arrived in Manila from U.S. ports. After the 10-day free period, petitioner
still failed to withdraw its goods from the containers wherein the goods had
been shipped. Continuing, respondent
U.S. Lines alleged that petitioner incurred on all those shipments a demurrage
in the total amount of P94,000.00 which the
latter refused to pay despite repeated demands.
In its amended answer with compulsory
counterclaim, petitioner Telengtan, as defendant a
quo, disclaims liability for the demanded demurrage, alleging that it has
never entered into a contract nor signed an agreement to be bound by any rule
on demurrage. It likewise maintains that,
absent an obligation to pay respondent who made no proper or legal demands in
the first place, there is justifiable reason to refuse payment of the latter’s
unwarranted claims. By way of
counterclaim, petitioner states that, upon arrival of the conveying vessels, it
presented the Bills of Lading (B/Ls) and all other pertinent documents covering
seven (7) shipments and demanded from respondent delivery of all the goods
covered by the aforesaid B/Ls, only to be informed that respondent had already unloaded the
goods from the container vans, stripped them of their contents which contents
were then stored in warehouses. Petitioner further states that respondent had refused
to deliver the goods covered by the B/Ls and required petitioner to pay the
amount of P123,738.04 before the goods can be
released. It thus prays that respondent
be ordered to pay the aforestated amount with
interest.
After due proceedings, the trial court
found for respondent U.S. Lines, as plaintiff therein, and accordingly rendered judgment, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
the Court finds [petitioner] liable to [respondent] for demurrage incurred in
the amount of P99,408.00 which sum will bear interest
at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint till full
payment thereof plus attorney’s fees in the amount of 20% of the total sum due,
all of which shall be recomputed as of the date of payment in accordance with
the provisions of Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Exemplary damages in the amount of P80,000.00 are also granted.
The counterclaim is dismissed. Costs against [petitioner]. (Words in bracket ours)[3]
Party explains the trial court in its
decision:[4]
In other words, contrary to [petitioner’s]
contentions, both the provisions of the contract between the parties, in this
case the bill of lading, and the interpretation given by the higher courts to
these provisions are to the effect that demurrage may be lawfully
collected. As a matter of fact, [respondent
U.S. Lines] has submitted official receipts showing that on many other and
previous occasions, [petitioner] paid demurrage to [respondent] (Exhibits “F”,
“F-1” to “F-4”, “G”, “G-1” to “G-4”, “H”, “H-1” to “H-4”, and “I”, “I-1” to
“I-3”). [Petitioner] is, therefore, in estoppel to claim that it did not know of demurrage being
charged by [respondent] and that it had not agreed to it since these exhibits
show that [petitioner] knew of this demurrage and by paying for the same, it in
effect, agreed to the collection of demurrage.
x x x x
x x x x x
On the other hand, [petitioner] claims
that [respondent] company owes them the far larger sum of P123,738.04 by way of damages allegedly suffered by their goods
when [respondent] company removed these goods from its cargo vans and deposited
them in bonded warehouses without its consent.
It is not disputed that [respondent] company did not [sic] in fact
remove these goods belonging to [petitioner] from its vans and deposited them
in warehouses. However, this was done by
authority of the Bureau of Customs and for that purpose,
[respondent] addressed a letter-request to the Collector of Customs, for
permission to remove the goods of defendant from its vans (Exhibit “L”). xxx.
x
x x x x x x x x
The Court finds that the charges for
warehousing were necessary expenses covered by the terms of the bill of lading
which the consignee was responsible for.
There is therefore now no necessity of discussing whether or not the
counterclaim of [petitioner] had prescribed or not. Neither is there any question of bad faith on
the part of [respondent]. When it
requested for authority to remove [petitioner’s] consigned goods from its vans
and deposited them in warehouses, [respondent] had already given consignee
sufficient time to take delivery of the shipment. This, [petitioner] chose not to do. Instead, it sat pat by the telephone calling
without making any positive effort to check up on the shipment or arrange for its
delivery to its factory. Once arrived at
the port, the shipment was available to consignee for its proper delivery and
receipt and the carrier discharged of its responsibility therefor. Rather, by its inaction, [petitioner] was
guilty of bad faith. Once it had
received the notice of arrival of the carrier in port, it was incumbent on
consignee to put wheels in motion in order that the shipment could be delivered
to it. The inaction of [petitioner]
would only indicate that it had no intention of taking delivery except at its
own convenience thus preventing carrier from taking on other shipments and from
leaving port. Such unexplained and unbusiness-like delay smacks highly of bad faith on the
part of [petitioner] rather than of the [respondent]. (Words in bracket,
added).
Appealing to the CA, whereat its
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 18349, petitioner contended that
the trial court erred in (1) holding it liable for demurrage, (2) dismissing
its counterclaim, and (3) awarding exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to
respondent.
As stated at
the outset, however, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated January 8, 1998,[5]
affirmed in toto the judgment of the
trial court.
Undaunted, petitioner is now with this
Court via the present recourse, imputing to the CA the following errors:
A. xxx in concluding that it [petitioner] was
the one at fault in not withdrawing its cargo from the container vans in which
the goods were originally shipped despite documentary evidence and written
admissions of private respondent to the contrary.
B. xxx in affirming the trial court’s order for the
recomputation of the judgment award in accordance
with Article 1250 of the Civil Code contrary to existing jurisprudence and
without any evidence at all to support it.[6]
The petition is partly meritorious.
It is undisputed that the goods
subject of petitioner’s counterclaim and covered by seven (7) B/Ls with
Shipper’s Reference Nos. S-16844, S-16846, S-16848, S-17748, S-17750, S-17749
and S-17751[7]
were loaded for shipment to Manila on respondent’s vessels in container vans on
a “House/House Containers-Shippers Load, Stowage and Count” basis. This
shipping arrangement means that the shipping company’s container vans are to be
brought to the shipper for loading of its goods; that from the shipper’s
warehouse, the goods in container vans are brought to the shipping company for
shipment; that the shipping company, upon arrival of its ship at the port of
destination, is to deliver the container vans to the consignee’s compound or
warehouse; and that the shipper (consignee) is supposed to load, stow and count
the goods from the container van.[8] Likewise
undisputed is the fact that the container vans containing the goods covered by
three (3) of the aforesaid B/Ls, particularly those with Shipper’s Reference
Nos. S-17748, S-17750 and S-17751,[9] were
delivered to a warehouse, stripped of their contents and the contents deposited
thereat.[10]
On the argument that the respondent,
upon the foregoing undisputed facts, violated its contractual obligation to
deliver when, instead of delivering the goods to the petitioner as consignee
thereof, it
deposited the same in bonded warehouse/s, petitioner would now score the CA for
finding it at fault for non-withdrawal of its cargo from the container vans
within the 10-day free demurrage period. Pressing the point, petitioner argues
that, since the CA drew an erroneous conclusion from an undisputed set of facts,
petitioner now asserts that the matter of who is at fault - its first assigned
error - could be treated as a legal issue and not a question of fact.
After
careful consideration, the Court sustain the CA’s stance faulting the petitioner for not taking delivery of its
cargo from the container vans within the 10-day free period, an inaction which
led respondent to deposit the same
in warehouse/s.
It may be that, when the relevant facts
are undisputed, the question of whether or not the conclusion deduced therefrom by the CA is correct is a question of law properly
cognizable by this Court.[11] However, it has also been held that all doubts
as to the correctness of such conclusions will be resolved in favor of the
disposing court.[12]
So it must be in this case.
At any rate, the Court finds that
petitioner’s first contention raises a question of fact rather than of law. And settled is the rule that factual findings
of the CA, particularly those confirmatory of that of the trial court, as here,
are binding on this Court,[13]
save for the most compelling of reasons, like when they are reached
arbitrarily.[14]
As it were, however, the conclusion
of the CA on who contextually is the erring party was not exactly drawn from a
vacuum, supported as such conclusion is by the records of the case. What
the CA wrote with some measure of logic commends itself for concurrence:
However, ... We find that [petitioner] was the one at fault in not withdrawing its
cargo from the containers wherein the goods were shipped within the ten
(10)-day free period. Had it done so,
then there would not have been any need of depositing the cargo in a warehouse.
It is incumbent upon the carrier to
immediately advise the consignee of the arrival of the goods for if it does
not, it continues to be liable for the same until the consignee has had
reasonable opportunity to remove them.
Sound business practice dictates that the
consignee, upon notification of the arrival of the goods, should immediately
get the cargo from the carrier especially since it has need of it. xxx.
Appellant tries to shift the blame on the
[respondent] by stating that it was not informed beforehand of the latter’s
intention to deliver the goods to a warehouse.
It likewise alleges that it does not know where to contact [respondent]
for it argues that the person manning the latter’s office would only hold
office for a few hours, if not always out.
But had it taken the necessary steps of inquiring for the address of [respondent]
from the proper government offices, then it would have succeeded in finding the
latter’s address.
Judging from the [petitioner’s] way of
conducting business in the past, We come to the
conclusion that it is used to paying demurrage charges. Exhibits “H” and “I” are certainly proofs of
appellant’s practice of not getting its cargo from the carrier immediately upon
notification of the goods’ arrival. [15]
(Words in bracket added.)
It cannot be over-emphasized that the
container vans were stripped of their cargo with the prior authorization of the
Bureau of Customs. The trial court said
as much, thus:
It is not disputed that [respondent]
company did not [sic] in fact remove these goods belonging to [petitioner] from
its vans and deposited them in warehouses.
However, this was done by authority of the Bureau of Customs and for
that purpose, [respondent] addressed a letter-request
to the Collector of Customs, for permission to remove the goods of [petitioner]
from its vans (Exhibit “L”). The
corresponding authority was granted by the Bureau of Customs to do so as
evidenced by a van permit … (Exhibit “M”).
In other words, while [respondent] admits that it removed the goods of [petitioner]
from its vans and deposited them in various warehouses, there is no question
that this was done by authority of the Bureau of Customs which is the proper
agency of the government charged with the supervision and regulation of
maritime commerce.
Verily, the authority secured from the
Bureau of Customs is indicative of the bona fides of respondent’s
intention. And as held below, the authority thus acquired relieved respondent of its obligations
under the B/Ls when it caused the containers to be stripped and the goods
stored in bonded warehouses.
Not lost on this Court is the fact that
the B/Ls under which petitioner anchors its counterclaim
allow the goods
carried to be delivered
to bonded warehouses
for the shipper’s
and/or consignee’s account if it does not take possession or delivery thereof
as soon as
they are at its disposal for removal. Section 17 of the Regular
Long Form Inward B/L of the respondent[16]
which is incorporated by reference to the Short Form of B/L[17] provides:
17. The
carrier shall not be required to give any notification whatsoever of arrival,
discharge or any disposition of or action taken with respect to the goods, …
even though the goods are consigned to order with provision for notice to a
named person.
The carrier or master may appoint a
stevedore or any other persons to unload and take delivery of the goods and
such delivery from ship's tackle shall be considered complete and all
responsibility of the carrier shall then terminate.
It is agreed that when possession of the
goods is received or taken by the customs or other authorities or by any
operator of any lighter, craft, … or other facilities whether selected by the
carrier or master, shipper of consignee, whether public or private, such
authority or person shall be considered as having received possession and
delivery of the goods solely as agent of and on behalf of the shipper and consignee,
…. Also if the consignee does not take possession or delivery of the goods
as soon as the goods are at the disposal of the consignee for removal, the
goods shall be at their own risk and expense, delivery shall be considered
complete and the carrier may, subject to carrier's liens, send the goods to
store, warehouse, put them on lighters or other craft, put them in possession
of authorities, dump, permit to lie where landed or otherwise dispose of them,
always at the risk and expense of the goods, and the shipper and consignee
shall pay and indemnify the carrier for any loss, damage, fine, charge or
expense whatsoever suffered or incurred in so dealing with or disposing of the
goods, or by reason of the consignee's failure or delay in taking possession
and delivery as provided herein. (Emphasis Ours)
On
the second issue raised, the Court finds as erroneous the trial
court’s decision, as affirmed by the CA, for the recomputation
of the judgment award as of the date of payment in accordance with Article 1250
of the Civil Code.
In calling for the application of the
aforementioned provision, respondent urged that judicial notice be taken of the
succeeding devaluations of the peso vis-à-vis the US dollar since the
time the proceedings began in 1981. According to respondent, the computation of
the amount thus due from the petitioner should factor in such peso
devaluations.[18]
Article 1250 of the Civil Code
states:
In case an extraordinary inflation or
deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the
currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis
of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
Extraordinary inflation or deflation, as the
case may be, exists
when there is an unusual increase or decrease in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso which is beyond the
common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such increase or decrease
could not have been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the
obligation.[19]
Extraordinary inflation can never be assumed;
he who alleges the existence of such phenomenon must prove the same.[20]
The Court holds that there has been no extraordinary inflation
within the meaning of Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, there is no
plausible reason for ordering the payment of an obligation in an amount
different from what has been agreed upon because of the purported supervention of extraordinary inflation.
As it were, respondent was unable to
prove the occurrence of extraordinary inflation since it filed its complaint in
1981. Indeed, the record is bereft of
any evidence, documentary or testimonial, that inflation, nay, an extraordinary
one, existed. Even if the price index of
goods and services may have risen during the intervening period,[21]
this increase, without more, cannot be considered as resulting to “extraordinary
inflation” as to justify the
application of Article 1250. The erosion
of the value of the Philippine peso in the past three or four decades, starting in
the mid-sixties, is, as the Court observed in Singson
vs. Caltex (Phil), Inc., [22] characteristics of most currencies. And while
the Court may take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing power of
the Philippine currency in that span of time, such downward trend of the peso cannot
be considered as the extraordinary phenomenon contemplated by Article 1250 of
the Civil Code. Furthermore, absent an official pronouncement or declaration by
competent authorities of the existence of extraordinary inflation during a
given period, as here, the effects of extraordinary inflation, if that be the
case, are not to be applied.
Lest it be overlooked, Article 1250
of the Code, as couched, clearly
provides that the value of the peso at the time of the establishment of the
obligation shall control and be the basis of payment of the contractual
obligation, unless there is “agreement
to the contrary.” It is only when
there is a contrary agreement
that extraordinary inflation will make the value of the currency
at the time of payment, not at the time of the
establishment of obligation, the basis for payment.[23] The Court, in Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals and Fernando A. Pedrosa,[24]
formulated the same rule in the following wise:
In other words, an agreement is needed
for the effects of an extraordinary inflation to be taken into
account to alter the value of the currency at the time
of the establishment of the obligation which, as a rule, is always the
determinative element, to be varied by agreement that would find reason only in
the supervention of extraordinary inflation or
deflation.
To be sure,
neither the trial
court, the CA nor respondent has pointed to any provision of the covering B/Ls whence
respondent sourced its contractual right under the premises where the defining
“agreement to the contrary” is set forth. Needless to stress, the Court sees no
need to speculate as to the existence of such agreement, the burden of proof on
this regard being on respondent.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the order for recomputation as of the date of payment in accordance with
the provisions of Article 1250 of the Civil Code is deleted.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
(On leave) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T
A T I O N
I attest
that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo B. Buena, later appointed member of this Court (ret.), and concurred in by Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero (ret.) and Portia Alino-Hormachuelos; Rollo, pp. 30-36.
[2] Rollo, pp. 59-68.
[3] CA Decision; Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[4] RTC Decision; Rollo, pp. 64-68.
[5] See Note #1, supra.
[6] Petition; Rollo, pp. 7-8.
[7] Folder of Exhibits, Defendant Exhs.
“1” - “7.”
[8] Petition; Rollo, p. 22.
[9] Ibid., Exhs. “4,” “5” & “7.”
[10] See paragraphs f, g & i of Respondent’s Reply to Paragraph 17 of the Amended Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the RTC; Records, pp. 148-149.
[11] Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. 1, 1999 ed, p. 541, citing Com. of Immigration vs. Garcia, L-28082, June 28, 1974.
[12] Ibid., citing Pilar Dev.
Corp. vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No.
72283, Dec. 12, 1986.
[13] Salvador vs. Montecillo, 426
SCRA 433, 443 (2004).
[14] Sunshine Finance & Investment Corp. vs. IAC, 203 SCRA 210 (1991).
[15] Supra, pp. 34-35.
[16] Plaintiff-Exh. “K.”
[17] Folder of Exhibits, Exh.
“J”-Plaintiff.
[18] Petitioner’s Manifestation before the trial court; Records, pp. 327-329.
[19] Singson vs. Caltex (Phils.), Inc., 342 SCRA 91, 97 (2000); Huibonhoa vs. CA, 320 SCRA 625, 653 (1999); Hahn vs. CA, 173 SCRA 675, 680 (1989); Filipino Pipe & Foundry Corp. vs. NAWASA, 161 SCRA 32, 35 (1988).
[20] Ibid., p. 98; Sangrador vs. Valderrama, 168
SCRA 215, 229 (1988).
[21] Sangrador vs. Valderrama, 168 SCRA 215, 228 (1998).
[22] 342 SCRA 91, 99 (2000); Lantion vs. NLRC, 181 SCRA 513, (1990); C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. vs. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 381 SCRA 314, 320 (2002), Mobil Oil Phils., Inc. vs. CA, 180 SCRA 651, 667 (1989).
[23] Commissioner of Public Highways vs. Burgos, 96 SCRA 831, 837 (1980).
[24] 180 SCRA 651, 667 (1989).