FIRST
DIVISION
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MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus
- HON. ARTURO D. BRION in his official
capacity as Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment and the NATIONAL MINES
AND ALLIED WORKERS
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 157696-97 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: February 9, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the Decision[1]
dated
Petitioner
Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC) is a domestic
corporation engaged in mining business and operation, while private respondent
National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local 103 (NAMAWU) is the exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of petitioner.
On
Eventually,
petitioner presented its counter-proposals and started the CBA negotiations. While the negotiations were going on,
petitioner dismissed some workers effective
On
On
After
the NCMB failed to conciliate the labor dispute between NAMAWU and petitioner, then
Department of Labor and Employment (
Meanwhile,
Pedro M. Abuana, Jr., an adversely affected employee
of petitioner during the retrenchment effected on
In
an order dated 30 July 1997 (Quisumbing order), Secretary
Quisumbing resolved
the labor dispute in favor of NAMAWU: (1)
directing the reinstatement with backwages of the
workers laid-off in May and October 1996;
(2) finding petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice; (3) directing the parties to
enter into a collective bargaining agreement incorporating all the terms and
conditions of the previous bargaining agreement; and (4) providing for
across-the-board increase of all rank-and-file workers. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Declaring
that lay-offs implemented on
2.
Ordering
that all workers, whether union members or not, who were laid-off on May 7,
1996 and October 7, 1996 be immediately reinstated without gap in service, loss
of seniority, and that their full backwages and
benefits from the time of termination until actual reinstatement be paid;
3.
Declaring
the Company to have violated the Labor Code provisions on Unfair Labor Practice
for negotiating in bad faith and later refusing to negotiate; and
4.
Ordering
the parties to enter into a new collective bargaining agreement incorporating
all the terms and conditions of the previous collective bargaining agreement
between the Company and the NFL, except the name of the exclusive bargaining
agent, and providing for an annual across-the-board increase in the daily wage
of all rank and file workers in the amount of P60.00 per day from February,
1995 until January, 1998 and another P50.00 increase annually effective February
1, 1998 until January 31, 2000.
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by succeeding DOLE Secretary
Cresenciano Trajano in an
order dated
This Office finds that there are no new matters/evidence in the Motion for Reconsideration which would warrant a reversal of Our decision on wage issue.
We however find it necessary, in the
interest of justice and fairness, to reconsider Our finding of Unfair Labor
Practice which could ultimately subject the Company and its officers to
criminal prosecution.
x x x x
This being the case, it is a matter of necessity that a full-blown hearing be conducted on the issue of unfair labor practice. Indeed, Art. 247 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that a hearing should be conducted in the resolution of an unfair labor practice.
Pending resolution of the issue of
unfair labor practice and illegal termination, the Company is directed to
physically reinstate all workers, whether union members or not who were
laid-off on
WHEREFORE, except as above modified,
Our Order dated
The Executive Labor Arbiter, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, National Labor Relations Commission, is hereby deputized as Hearing Officer and is directed to conduct hearing/s and receive evidence as expeditiously as possible on the issues of unfair labor practice and terminations effected by the Company on May 7, 1996 and October 7, 1996, and to submit his Report and Recommendation to this Office within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing.
Meanwhile,
as earlier mentioned, on
Dissatisfied
by the Quisumbing and Trajano
orders, petitioner MMC filed a petition for certiorari before this Court
docketed as G.R. No. 133519 entitled, “Maricalum Mining
Corporation v. Hon. Cresenciano B. Trajano, et al.” In a resolution dated
Petitioner
moved for a reconsideration of the Resolution.
On
During
the pendency of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, the decision in St.
Martin’s Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission[6] was
promulgated. Following the ruling in said case, petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of our resolution dated
On
Still
undaunted, petitioner brought the case anew to this Court via petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 138996
entitled, “Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon Cresenciano B. Trajano, in his
capacity as the Secretary of the DOLE and NAMAWU Local 103,” which was,
however, denied with finality in a resolution dated 26 January 2000.
On
On
25 July 2000, the BWC submitted to the DOLE its findings and observation,
coming up with a computation in the aggregate amount of One Hundred Fifty-Nine
Million, Fifty-Four Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-One and 30/100 (P159,054,971.30)
Pesos for loss of time, benefits, rice subsidy, health insurance bonus and backwages of union members who were illegally dismissed.
Petitioner
filed a comment to the BWC findings on 08 September 2000, stating that the BWC
computation was erroneous for the following reasons: (1) there is no legal
basis for the computation of backwages because the Trajano order deleted the award of backwages
made in the Quisumbing order; (2) the entitlement to backwages of the employees retrenched in May and October
1996 would be dependent on the resolution of the cases for illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice; and (3) the wage increase awarded by the Secretary
cannot be availed of by the other employees who were not retrenched in May and
October 1996.
On
18 November 2000, 149 employees of petitioner who claimed were part of the 215
members of NAMAWU filed a Motion for Intervention With Prior Leave before the
Office of the Secretary of DOLE.[7]
In
an order[8]
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering
respondent MMC to immediately reinstate all workers whether union member or
not, who were laid-off on May 7, 1997 and October 7, 1996 without gap in
service, loss of seniority, and that their full backwages
and benefits from the time of termination until actual reinstatement be paid;
2. Approving
the computation of BWC consisting of 23 pages based on the Order of
3. Denying
intervenor’s motion for intervention; and
4.
Ordering the Bureau of Working Condition to
compute the remaining amount of the award due to complainants as per order of
the Secretary of Labor dated
Let
a partial writ of execution be issued directing the Sheriff, Regional Office
No. VI, Department of Labor and Employment, Bacolod
City to proceed to the premises of Mariculum Mining
Corporation to execute the Order dated July 30, 1997 affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court in the resolutions dated June 14, 1999 and July
6, 1998, respectively, and collect the aggregate amount of P159,054,971.30
whose breakdown is specified in the partial writ of execution.
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration. On
With
the denial of petitioner’s motion, Carlos G. Nerja,
Jr. and Eugenio D. Caras,
who claimed to represent the 342 employees of petitioner at that time and who
allegedly stand to be adversely affected by the enforcement of the Partial Writ
of Execution, filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65351.
Petitioner
also filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65458.
NAMAWU
filed a motion for consolidation of the two petitions which was granted by the
appellate court in its order dated
The
Court of Appeals dispose of the two petitions by dismissing them in a Decision
dated
Motions
for reconsiderations were filed, which the Court of Appeals denied in an order
dated
Carlos
G. Nerja, Jr. and Eugenio
D. Caras filed a petition for review before this Court
which was dismissed on
On
In
its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TRAJANO ORDER MODIFIED THE QUISUMBING
ORDER AND THUS, PUBLIC
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WHIMSICALLY AND
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT NAMAWU HAD NO LEGAL STANDING TO SEEK THE IMPLE
The
petition has no merit.
On
the first issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the assailed orders issued by DOLE Acting Secretary Brion finding that it was the Quisumbing
order that this Court upheld in G.R. No. 133519 and that the said order should
be the basis for the enforcement of the writ of execution.
Petitioner
stresses that the Trajano order superseded and
modified the Quisumbing order, hence, the basis for
the issuance and enforcement of the writ of execution must be the former order. To support its stance, petitioner
argues that when it filed the petition in G.R. No. 133519, it merely questioned
the Trajano order inasmuch as the said order affirmed
the Quisumbing order directing the reinstatement of
the laid-off workers and the award of wage increase. Petitioner points out that since the only
issues raised by it in G.R. No. 133519 were the reinstatement and award of wage
increase, it follows that the other issues such as unfair labor practice and
the award of backwages are excluded. Thus, the effect of the dismissal of the petition
in G.R. No. 133519 was the reinstatement of the Trajano
order.
Petitioner
also asserts that even assuming that the Resolution affirmed the Quisumbing order in its entirety without a similar
pronouncement that the Trajano order was a nullity,
would only mean that there were two valid and subsisting orders. Since the Trajano
order is the later issuance, ergo, it
supersedes and modifies the Quisumbing order.
Petitioner
further claims that NAMAWU admitted the validity, finality and enforceability
of the Trajano order in its Motion for Partial
Execution dated
In
the petition filed by petitioner in G.R. No. 133519, the following averments
appear:[10]
Now, not only was the assumption improperly made, but worse, its implementation was also gravely abused by the then Secretary of Labor. It may be well to note that in the first assailed Order dated 30 July 1997, the Petitioner was found guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, a finding that was arrived at by then Secretary Quisumbing without observing the measure of due process demanded by the gravity of the charges made against MMC x x x.
For all its efforts, the Petitioner should have, at the very least, been spared of these whimsical and arbitrary impositions of the Public Respondent and his predecessor in office (referring to Secretary Quisumbing) x x x.
The
foregoing portion of the petition amply suggests that petitioner was assailing
the Quisumbing order, not only on the issues of
reinstatement and the award of wage increase, but also on the matter of unfair
labor practice, illegal dismissal and the award of backwages
as well. Assuming arguendo that indeed the issues
on unfair labor practice and award of backwages were
not raised by petitioner, there is nothing to prevent this Court from reviewing
matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the controversy,
as in the instant case. Thus we held:
x x x It is axiomatic that an
appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and
that this Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or
assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just resolution of the case.[11]
In
upholding the Quisumbing order over the Trajano order, we resolved:[12]
Indeed,
the timing of the retrenchment of workers tends to confirm the finding of
the Secretary of Labor that the cessation of operations on
Considering
that he found Petitioner to be guilty of unfair labor practice in bargaining in
bad faith, the reinstatement of the dismissed workers and the grant of wage
increase were proper.
It
must be noted that the Trajano order omitted the
findings of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal and the award of backwages which were embodied in the Quisumbing
order. Since we upheld entirely the
findings in the Quisumbing order, i.e., illegal dismissal, unfair labor
practice, award of backwages, reinstatement and wage
increase in our Resolution, as a result the Trajano order
is necessarily vacated.
Furthermore,
the dispositive portion could not have been clearer
as it categorically declares that the Secretary of Labor, i.e.,
WHEREFORE, the petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of showing that the Secretary of Labor and
Employment committed grave abuse of discretion in his order of
The
order that we sustained in the foregoing fallo is the Quisumbing
order which is dated
As
to petitioner’s contention that NAMAWU allegedly admitted in its Motion for
Partial Execution dated
Besides,
even if there was such an admission, the same does not bind this Court. It is not the interpretation of NAMAWU that
makes the Trajano order or the Quisumbing
order controlling, rather, it is the Court’s declaration that settles such
issue.
Anent
the second issue, petitioner questions the BWC computation. It accentuates that the same is flawed as it
included the award of backwages which was already
deleted in the Trajano order.
Petitioner
also insists that the Abuana case – where the
dismissal of Abuana was declared valid, and therefore
the award of backwages was deleted by the labor
arbiter and later affirmed by the NLRC - should have a bearing in the instant
case considering that the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of Abuana are the same circumstances that resulted in the retrenchments
of NAMAWU’s members in May and October 1996. As Abuana was not
awarded backwages, NAMAWU’s
members should not have been awarded backwages as
well.
Petitioner
likewise avers that the employees who were not retrenched in May and October
1996 should not be awarded the wage increase because of subsequent and
supervening events such as the fact that these employees had entered into
separate agreements with petitioner for the adoption of a new progressive wage
system and that they executed quitclaims releasing petitioner from any
liabilities.
According
to petitioner, another reason why the wage increase cannot be availed of by the
employees not retrenched in May and October 1996, is because the NAMAWU and
petitioner have yet to enter into a collective bargaining as required by the Quisumbing order. It
is petitioner’s interpretation of the said order that prior to the implementation
of the wage increase, a CBA must first be constituted.
On
the other hand, the Court of Appeals opined that the Quisumbing
order, and not the Trajano order, is controlling and
should be the basis of the issuance of the writ of execution.
As
to the Abuana case, the appellate court ruled that
the same cannot prevail over the Quisumbing order,
the latter having been affirmed both by the Court of Appeals and this Court. The Court of Appeals added that the decision
in Abuana cannot bind the parties in the instant case
since they are not involved in the said Abuana case.
Addressing
the matter on the execution of quitclaims, the Court of Appeals discredited the
same on the grounds that the copies of the same were not presented, and that granting
that they were indeed executed, the same cannot bar the execution of the Quisumbing order in the absence of any showing that the
entire amount due the employees was fully satisfied with the execution of the
quitclaims.
It
ruled that the wage increase embodied in the BWC computation does not refer to
the agreed wage increase that can only be implemented after a CBA is reached by
the parties, rather, it refers to the across-the-board increase granted in the Quisumbing order as a result of a finding of unfair labor
practice on the part of petitioner due to its failure to observe its duty to
bargain. Thus, the wage increase as
computed by the BWC, is legally in order even in the absence of a new CBA.
We
agree with the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner’s
assertion that there is no basis for the computation of backwages,
because the backwages awarded in the Quisumbing order was deleted in the Trajano
order flounders in view of our declaration that the Quisumbing
order sets aside the Trajano order.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying
that the pronouncement in the Abuana case is not
binding on the parties in this case. We
further state that the Abuana case does not affect
NAMAWU no matter the similarity in situation is on the ground that NAMAWU was not
impleaded as a party in the Abuana
case. It is a basic postulate in this
jurisdiction that “no man shall be affected [in] any proceeding to which he is
a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by
the court.”[15] Due process requires that a court decision
can only bind a party therein and not against one who did not have his day in
court.
As to petitioner’s argument on the new
progressive wage, suffice it to state that the same issue had already been
passed upon in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Trajano[16]
where we affirmed the finding of the Court of Appeals, viz:[17]
The alleged acceptance of the workers of the new wage structure is likewise unreliable. If the alternative is dismissal, who would not sign an “acceptance” of such new wage structure? Besides, as pointed out by the private respondent, even granting that the workers freely agreed to such wage structures, the company could not have validly negotiated with them without violating the Labor Code, considering that the private respondent was still then the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.
Petitioner’s contention that the
workers whose services were terminated subsequent in May and October 1996
executed quitclaims does not merit our attention because petitioner failed to
prove such execution.
Quitclaims are commonly frowned upon
as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure
of the workers’ legal rights especially if the following are present: (a) there is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (b) the terms of the
settlement are unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such quitclaims must
be struck down as invalid or illegal.[18] In the instant case, the execution of the
alleged quitclaims appears to be suspect because of the illegal dismissal of
the workers and the unfair labor practice committed by petitioner. For fear of getting nothing from petitioner,
it may be readily concluded that employees were compelled to sign the
quitclaims. Also, petitioner failed to
present evidence to show that payments to the workers were made.
Equally unavailing is petitioner’s
assertion that the wage increase or adjustment adopted under the BWC
computation is premature since no CBA had been entered into.
As accurately explained by the appellate
court:[19]
Neither can We subscribe to petitioner’s contention that the wage adjustment or increase adopted in the BWC computation cannot be implemented in the absence of a new CBA. It is undisputed that the increase adverted to in the BWC computation does not refer to the agreed wage increase that could only be implemented based on a new CBA. Rather, it refers to the across-the-board increase granted in the Quisumbing order as a consequence of a finding of unfair labor practice on the part of MMC due to its failure to observe its duty to bargain.
Anent the third issue, petitioner
argues that NAMAWU had no legal standing to seek the implementation of the
assailed orders of DOLE Acting Secretary Brion
because of the disaffiliation of the majority of its members which deprived NAMAWU’s authority to represent its members.
Article 256 of the Labor Code partly provides:
REPRESENTATION ISSUE IN ORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENTS. – In organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five (25%) percent of all the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
x x x x
At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed.
According to the foregoing provision,
for a union to become an exclusive bargaining representative of a particular
establishment, it must emerge as winner in a certification election. In the
case at bar, there was no certification election held challenging the majority
status of NAMAWU as the exclusive bargaining representative of petitioner’s
employees. NAMAWU, therefore, remains
the exclusive bargaining representative of petitioner’s employees and possesses
legal standing to represent them.
One final point. NAMAWU accuses petitioner of forum shopping. NAMAWU alleges that the instant petition is
filed for the purpose of preventing the execution of the Quisumbing
order as affirmed by this Court on
Petitioner counters that it did not
commit forum shopping because the relief prayed for in the previous case was
the reversal of the Trajano order while the relief
prayed for in this petition is the reversal of the orders enforcing and
executing the terms of the Quisumbing order.
Forum shopping exists when a party
repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely,
by some other court.[20]
It has been characterized as an act of
malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as trifling with the courts and
abusing their processes. The test in
determining whether a party violates the rule against forum shopping is where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration or where the elements of litis pendentia are present.
In turn, the elements of res judicata as enumerated in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals[21] are as
follows: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity
in the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be
rendered on the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res
judicata in
the action under consideration.
In this case, the parties are the
same, petitioner and NAMAWU. The reliefs prayed for are substantially identical which is ultimately
the nullification of the Quisumbing order. Likewise, res judicata[22]
exists because a ruling of this Court on the issues raised by petitioner would
amount to revisiting and re-ventilating the essentially same issue, i.e., whether or not the Quisumbing order is controlling, which were already passed
upon and definitely resolved by this Court in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Trajano.[23] Even
on this ground alone, for being violative of the rule
against forum shopping, the instant petition for review should be denied.[24]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 45-61. Penned by
Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-
[2] Now Associate Justice of this Court.
[3] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 65351), pp. 100-116.
[4]
[5]
[6] G.R. No. 130866,
[7] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 65351), pp. 187-198.
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, G.R. No. 138996, pp. 225-226.
[11] Sociedad Europea De Financiacion, S.A v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75787, 21 January 1991, 193 SCRA 105, 114 , citing Saura Import & Export Co., Inc. v. Philippine International Co., Inc., 118 Phil. 150, 156 (1963); Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 140 Phil. 304, 312 (1969).
[12] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 65458), p. 441.
[13] G.R. No. L-44696,
[14]
[15] Orquiola v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 323, 332 (2002), citing Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98310, 24 October 1996, 263 SCRA 490, 505.
[16] G.R. No. 138996,
[17] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 65458), p. 446.
[18] Phil.
Employ Services and Resources, Inc. v. Paramio,
G.R. No. 144786,
[19] Rollo, p. 59.
[20] Tantoy, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141427, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 329, 330, citing Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 155, 167 (1997).
[21] 217 Phil. 289, 293 (1984) .
[22] It refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit (Taganas v. Emuslan, G.R. No. 146980, 02 September 2003, 410 SCRA 237, 242).
[23] Supra note 16.
[24] Paradero v. Abragan, G.R. No. 158917,