FIRST DIVISION
ALFREDO CHING, G.
R. No. 164317
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR
CECILYN BURGOS-VILLAVERT,
JUDGE EDGARDO SUDIAM of Promulgated:
the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52; RIZAL COMMERCIAL February 6, 2006
BANKING CORP. and THE PEOPLE
OF THE
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57169 dismissing the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
filed by petitioner Alfredo Ching, and its Resolution[2]
dated
Petitioner was the Senior Vice-President
of Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (PBMI). Sometime in September to October
1980, PBMI, through petitioner, applied with the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (respondent bank) for the issuance of commercial letters of credit to
finance its importation of assorted goods.[3]
Respondent
bank approved the application, and irrevocable letters of credit were issued in
favor of petitioner. The goods were purchased and delivered in trust to PBMI. Petitioner
signed 13 trust receipts[4]
as surety, acknowledging delivery of
the following goods:
|
T/R Nos. |
Date Granted |
Maturity Date |
Principal |
Description of Goods |
|
1845 |
|
|
|
79.9425 M/T “SDK” Brand Synthetic
Graphite Electrode |
|
1853 |
|
|
|
3,000
pcs. (15 bundles) Calorized Lance Pipes |
|
1824 |
|
|
|
One
|
|
1798 |
|
|
|
5
cases spare parts for CCM |
|
1808 |
|
|
|
200
pcs. ingot moulds |
|
2042 |
|
|
|
High
Fired Refractory Nozzle Bricks |
|
1801 |
|
|
|
Synthetic
Graphite Electrode [with] tapered pitch filed nipples |
|
1857 |
|
|
|
3,000
pcs. (15 bundles calorized lance pipes [)] |
|
1895 |
|
|
|
Spare
parts for Spectrophotometer |
|
1911 |
|
|
|
50
pcs. Ingot moulds |
|
2041 |
|
|
|
50
pcs. Ingot moulds |
|
2099 |
|
|
|
8
pcs. Kubota Rolls for rolling mills |
|
2100 |
|
|
|
Spare
parts for Lacolaboratory Equipment[5] |
Under the receipts, petitioner agreed to hold the goods in trust for the
said bank, with authority to sell but not by way of conditional sale, pledge or
otherwise; and in case such goods were sold, to turn over the proceeds thereof
as soon as received, to apply against the relative acceptances and payment of other
indebtedness to respondent bank. In case the goods remained unsold within the specified
period, the goods were to be returned to respondent bank without any need of
demand. Thus, said “goods, manufactured products or proceeds thereof, whether
in the form of money or bills, receivables, or accounts separate and capable of
identification” were respondent bank’s property.
When the trust
receipts matured, petitioner failed to return the goods to respondent bank, or to
return their value amounting to P6,940,280.66 despite demands. Thus, the
bank filed a criminal complaint for estafa[6]
against petitioner in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
After the
requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor found probable cause estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)
of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 115,
otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law. Thirteen (13) Informations were
filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Petitioner appealed the resolution of
the City Prosecutor to the then Minister of Justice. The appeal was dismissed
in a Resolution[7]
dated
previous resolution finding probable cause against petitioner.[8]
The City Prosecutor was ordered to move for the withdrawal of the Informations.
This time, respondent
bank filed a motion for reconsideration, which, however, was denied on
In the
meantime, the Court rendered judgment in Allied
Banking Corporation v. Ordoñez,[11]
holding that the penal provision of P.D. No. 115 encompasses any act violative
of an obligation covered by the trust receipt; it is not limited to transactions
involving goods which are to be sold (retailed), reshipped, stored or processed
as a component of a product ultimately sold. The Court also ruled that “the non-payment of
the amount covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the obligation of
the entrustee to pay.”[12]
On
Preliminary investigation ensued. On
1. That there is no evidence to show that respondent
participated in the
misappropriation
of the goods subject of the trust receipts;
2. That the respondent is a mere surety of the trust
receipts; and
3. That the liability of the respondent is only civil
in nature.[14]
On
The Justice Secretary further stated
that the respondent bound himself under the terms of the trust receipts not
only as a corporate official of PBMI but also as its surety; hence, he could be
proceeded against in two (2) ways: first,
as surety as determined by the Supreme Court in its decision in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v.
Court of Appeals;[17]
and second, as the corporate official
responsible for the offense under P.D. No. 115, via criminal prosecution. Moreover, P.D. No. 115 explicitly allows the
prosecution of corporate officers “without prejudice to the civil liabilities
arising from the criminal offense.” Thus, according to the Justice Secretary,
following Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation,
the civil liability imposed is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal
liability of the accused under P.D. No. 115.
Conformably with the Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice, the City Prosecutor filed 13 Informations against
petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 115 before the RTC of Manila. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No.
99-178596 to 99-178608 and consolidated for trial before Branch 52 of said court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Secretary of Justice
denied in a Resolution[18]
dated
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
the CA, assailing the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on the following
grounds:
1. THE RESPONDENTS ARE ACTING WITH AN UNEVEN HAND AND
IN FACT, ARE ACTING OPPRESSIVELY AGAINST ALFREDO CHING WHEN THEY ALLOWED HIS
PROSECUTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO EVIDENCE HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO PROVE HIS
PARTICIPATION IN THE ALLEGED TRANSACTIONS.
2. THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED AN
ACT IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN THEY CONTINUED
PROSECUTION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE LENGTH OF TIME INCURRED IN THE
TERMINATION OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION THAT SHOULD JUSTIFY THE DISMISSAL
OF THE INSTANT CASE.
3. THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND ASSISTANT
CITY PROSECUTOR ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO AN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN THEY CONTINUED THE PROSECUTION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE LACK
OF SUFFICIENT BASIS.[19]
In
his petition, petitioner incorporated a certification stating that “as far as
this Petition is concerned, no action or proceeding in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any tribunal or agency. It
is finally certified that if the affiant should learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, of any other tribunal or agency, it
hereby undertakes to notify this Honorable Court within five (5) days from such
notice.”[20]
In its Comment on the petition, the
Office of the Solicitor General alleged that -
A.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE CORRECTLY RULED
THAT PETITIONER ALFREDO CHING IS THE OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OFFENSE
CHARGED AND THAT THE ACTS OF PETITIONER FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF VIOLATION OF P.D.
[No.] 115 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 315, PAR. 1(B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
B.
THERE IS NO MERIT IN PETITIONER’S CONTENTION THAT
EXCESSIVE DELAY HAS MARRED THE CONDUCT OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE
CASE, JUSTIFYING ITS DISMISSAL.
C.
THE PRESENT SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS IS NOT THE PROPER MODE OF REVIEW FROM THE RESOLUTION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. THE PRESENT PETITION MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED.[21]
On
On
the merits of the petition, the CA ruled that the assailed resolutions of the Secretary
of Justice were correctly issued for the following reasons: (a) petitioner,
being the Senior Vice-President of PBMI and the signatory to the trust receipts,
is criminally liable for violation of P.D. No. 115; (b) the issue raised by the
petitioner, on whether he violated P.D. No. 115 by his actuations, had already
been resolved and laid to rest in Allied
Bank Corporation v. Ordoñez;[22] and
(c) petitioner was estopped from raising the
City Prosecutor’s delay in the final
disposition of the preliminary investigation because he failed to do so in the
DOJ.
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition,
alleging that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
INCORPORATED THEREIN WAS DEFECTIVE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT NO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WAS COMMITTED
BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IN COMING OUT WITH THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS.[23]
The Court will delve into and resolve
the issues seriatim.
The petitioner avers that the CA erred
in dismissing his petition on a mere technicality. He claims that the rules of procedure should
be used to promote, not frustrate, substantial justice. He insists that the
Rules of Court should be construed liberally especially when, as in this case,
his substantial rights are adversely affected; hence, the deficiency in his certification
of non-forum shopping should not result in the dismissal of his petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
takes the opposite view, and asserts that indubitably, the certificate of
non-forum shopping incorporated in the petition before the CA is defective because
it failed to disclose essential facts about pending actions concerning similar
issues and parties. It asserts that petitioner’s
failure to comply with the Rules of Court is fatal to his petition. The OSG
cited Section 2, Rule 42, as well as the ruling of this Court in Melo v. Court of Appeals.[24]
We
agree with the ruling of the CA that the certification of non-forum shopping petitioner
incorporated in his petition before the appellate court is defective. The certification reads:
It is further
certified that as far as this Petition is concerned, no action or proceeding in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any
tribunal or agency.
It is finally certified that if the affiant should
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, of any
other tribunal or agency, it hereby undertakes to notify this Honorable Court
within five (5) days from such notice.[25]
Under
Section 1, second paragraph of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
petition should be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping,
as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of said Rules. The
latter provision reads in part:
SEC.
3. Contents and filing of petition;
effect of non-compliance with requirements. — The petition shall contain
the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a
concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case
and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
xxx
The
petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification
that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts
and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. xxx
Compliance with the certification
against forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of
forum shopping itself. The requirement is mandatory. The failure of the petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirement
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided.[26]
Indubitably,
the first paragraph of petitioner’s certification is incomplete and
unintelligible. Petitioner failed to
certify that he “had not heretofore commenced any other action involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or the different divisions
thereof or any other tribunal or agency” as required by paragraph 4, Section 3,
Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We
agree with petitioner’s contention that the certification is designed to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, and therefore,
should not be interpreted with absolute literalness. In his works on the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, former Supreme Court Justice Florenz Regalado
states that, with respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader
may prepare, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of.[27] However, there must be a special circumstance
or compelling reason which makes the strict application of the requirement clearly
unjustified. The instant petition has not alleged any such extraneous
circumstance. Moreover, as worded, the certification cannot even be regarded as
substantial compliance with the procedural requirement. Thus, the CA was not
informed whether, aside from the petition before it, petitioner had commenced
any other action involving the same issues in other tribunals.
On
the merits of the petition, the CA ruled that the petitioner failed to
establish that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding probable cause against the petitioner for violation of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)
of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to P.D. No. 115. Thus, the appellate court ratiocinated:
Be that as it may, even on the merits, the arguments
advanced in support of the petition are not persuasive enough to justify the
desired conclusion that respondent Secretary of Justice gravely abused its
discretion in coming out with his assailed Resolutions. Petitioner posits that,
except for his being the Senior Vice-President of the PBMI, there is no iota of
evidence that he was a participes
crimines in violating the trust receipts sued upon; and that his liability,
if at all, is purely civil because he signed the said trust receipts merely as
a xxx surety and not as the entrustee.
These assertions are, however, too dull that they cannot even just dent
the findings of the respondent Secretary, viz:
“x x x it is apropos to quote section 13 of PD 115
which states in part, viz:
‘xxx If the violation or offense is committed by a
corporation, partnership, association or other judicial entities, the penalty
provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers,
employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense,
without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense.’
“There is no dispute that it was the respondent, who
as senior vice-president of PBM, executed the thirteen (13) trust receipts. As
such, the law points to him as the official responsible for the offense. Since
a corporation cannot be proceeded against criminally because it cannot commit
crime in which personal violence or malicious intent is required, criminal
action is limited to the corporate agents guilty of an act amounting to a crime
and never against the corporation itself (West Coast Life Ins. Co. vs. Hurd, 27
Phil. 401; Times, [I]nc. v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303). Thus, the execution by
respondent of said receipts is enough to indict him as the official responsible
for violation of PD 115.
“Parenthetically, respondent is estopped to still
contend that PD 115 covers only goods which are ultimately destined for sale
and not goods, like those imported by PBM, for use in manufacture. This issue
has already been settled in the Allied Banking Corporation case, supra, where
he was also a party, when the Supreme Court ruled that PD 115 is ‘not limited
to transactions in goods which are to be sold (retailed), reshipped, stored or
processed as a component or a product ultimately sold’ but ‘covers failure to
turn over the proceeds of the sale of entrusted goods, or to return said goods
if unsold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts.’
“In regard to the other assigned errors, we note that
the respondent bound himself under the terms of the trust receipts not only as
a corporate official of PBM but also as its surety. It is evident that these are two (2)
capacities which do not exclude the other. Logically, he can be proceeded
against in two (2) ways: first, as surety as determined by the Supreme Court in
its decision in RCBC vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 739; and, secondly, as the
corporate official responsible for the offense under PD 115, the present case
is an appropriate remedy under our penal law.
“Moreover, PD 115 explicitly allows the prosecution of
corporate officers ‘without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the
criminal offense’ thus, the civil liability imposed on respondent in RCBC vs.
Court of Appeals case is clearly separate and distinct from his criminal
liability under PD 115.’”[28]
Petitioner
asserts that the appellate court’s ruling is erroneous because (a) the
transaction between PBMI and respondent bank is not a trust receipt transaction;
(b) he entered into the transaction and was sued in his capacity as PBMI Senior
Vice-President; (c) he never received the goods as an entrustee for PBMI,
hence, could not have committed any dishonesty or abused the confidence of respondent
bank; and (d) PBMI acquired the goods and used the same in operating its machineries
and equipment and not for resale.
The OSG, for its part, submits a contrary
view, to wit:
34. Petitioner further claims that he is not a person
responsible for the offense allegedly because “[b]eing charged as the Senior
Vice-President of Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM), petitioner cannot be held
criminally liable as the transactions sued upon were clearly entered into in
his capacity as an officer of the corporation” and that [h]e never received the
goods as an entrustee for PBM as he never had or took possession of the goods
nor did he commit dishonesty nor “abuse of confidence in transacting with
RCBC.” Such argument is bereft of merit.
35. Petitioner’s being a Senior Vice-President of the
Philippine Blooming Mills does not exculpate him from any liability. Petitioner’s
responsibility as the corporate official of PBM who received the goods in trust
is premised on Section 13 of P.D. No. 115, which provides:
Section 13. Penalty Clause. The failure of an
entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, documents or
instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the
entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods, documents
or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms
of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article Three hundred
and fifteen, paragraph one (b) of Act Numbered Three thousand eight hundred and
fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If the
violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or
other juridical entities, the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be
imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons
therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities
arising from the criminal offense. (Emphasis supplied)
36. Petitioner having participated in the negotiations
for the trust receipts and having received the goods for PBM, it was inevitable
that the
petitioner is the proper corporate officer to be proceeded against by virtue of
the PBM’s violation of P.D. No. 115.[29]
The ruling of the CA is correct.
In
Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),[30]
this Court held that the acts of a quasi-judicial officer may be assailed
by the aggrieved party via a petition
for certiorari and enjoined (a) when
necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice; (c) when
the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (d) where the charges
are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (e) when
there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused.[31] The
Court also declared that, if the officer conducting a preliminary investigation
(in that case, the Office of the Ombudsman) acts without or in excess of his
authority and resolves to file an Information despite the absence of probable
cause, such act may be nullified by a writ of certiorari.[32]
Indeed, under Section 4, Rule 112 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,[33]
the Information shall be prepared by the Investigating Prosecutor against the
respondent only if he or she finds probable cause to hold such respondent for
trial. The Investigating Prosecutor acts
without or in excess of his authority under the Rule if the Information is
filed against the respondent despite absence of evidence showing probable cause
therefor.[34] If the
Secretary of Justice reverses the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor who
found no probable cause to hold the respondent for trial, and orders such
prosecutor to file the Information despite the absence of probable cause, the
Secretary of Justice acts contrary to law, without authority and/or in excess
of authority. Such resolution may
likewise be nullified in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.[35]
A
preliminary investigation, designed to secure the respondent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a
crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof. It
is a means of discovering the person or persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon probable cause of reasonable
belief. Probable cause implies
probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed by the suspect.[36]
However,
while probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need
to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential
accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and
fair play[37] and to
protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting
alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or
groundless charges.[38]
In
this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. Indeed, he acted
in accord with law and the evidence.
Section 4 of P.D. No. 115 defines a trust receipt transaction, thus:
Section 4. What
constitutes a trust receipt transaction. A trust receipt transaction, within the
meaning of this Decree, is any transaction by and between a person referred to
in this Decree as the entruster, and another person referred to in this Decree
as entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or
security interests over certain specified goods, documents or instruments,
releases the same to the possession of the entrustee upon the latter’s
execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed document called a “trust
receipt” wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods,
documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise
dispose of the goods, documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over
to the entruster the proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to the
entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or
instruments themselves if they are
unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and
conditions specified in the trust receipt, or for other purposes substantially
equivalent to any of the following:
1. In case of goods or documents, (a) to sell the
goods or procure their sale; or (b) to manufacture or process the goods with
the purpose of ultimate sale; Provided,
That, in the case of goods delivered under trust receipt for the purpose of
manufacturing or processing before its ultimate sale, the entruster shall
retain its title over the goods whether in its original or processed form until
the entrustee has complied fully with his obligation under the trust receipt;
or (c) to load, unload, ship or otherwise deal with them in a manner
preliminary or necessary to their sale; or
2. In the case of instruments a) to sell or procure
their sale or exchange; or b) to deliver them to a principal; or c) to effect
the consummation of some transactions involving delivery to a depository or
register; or d) to effect their
presentation, collection or renewal.
The sale of goods, documents or instruments by a
person in the business of selling goods, documents or instruments for profit
who, at the outset of the transaction, has, as against the buyer, general
property rights in such goods, documents or instruments, or who sells the same
to the buyer on credit, retaining title or other interest as security for the
payment of the purchase price, does not constitute a trust receipt transaction
and is outside the purview and coverage of this Decree.
An entrustee is one having or taking
possession of goods, documents or instruments under a trust receipt
transaction, and any successor in interest of such person for the purpose of
payment specified in the trust receipt agreement.[39] The entrustee is obliged to: (1) hold the
goods, documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and shall dispose of
them strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions of the trust receipt;
(2) receive the proceeds in trust for the entruster and turn over the same to
the entruster to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears
on the trust receipt; (3) insure the goods for their total value against loss
from fire, theft, pilferage or other casualties; (4) keep said goods or
proceeds thereof whether in money or whatever form, separate and capable of
identification as property of the entruster; (5) return the goods, documents or
instruments in the event of non-sale or upon demand of the entruster; and (6)
observe all other terms and conditions of the trust receipt not contrary to the
provisions of the decree.[40]
The
entruster shall be entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the goods,
documents or instruments released under a trust receipt to the entrustee to the
extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt,
or to the return of the goods, documents or instruments in case of non-sale,
and to the enforcement of all other rights conferred on him in the trust
receipt; provided, such are not contrary to the provisions of the document.[41]
In
the case at bar, the transaction between petitioner and respondent bank falls
under the trust receipt transactions envisaged in P.D. No. 115. Respondent bank imported the goods and entrusted
the same to PBMI under the trust receipts signed by petitioner, as entrustee, with
the bank as entruster. The agreement was
as follows:
And in consideration thereof, I/we hereby agree to
hold said goods in trust for the said BANK as its property with liberty to sell
the same within ____days from the date of the execution of this Trust Receipt
and for the Bank’s account, but without authority to make any other disposition
whatsoever of the said goods or any part thereof (or the proceeds) either by
way of conditional sale, pledge or otherwise.
I/we agree to keep the said goods insured to their
full value against loss from fire, theft, pilferage or other casualties as
directed by the BANK, the sum insured to be payable in case of loss to the
BANK, with the understanding that the BANK is, not to be chargeable with the
storage premium or insurance or any other expenses incurred on said goods.
In case of sale, I/we further agree to turn over the
proceeds thereof as soon as received to the BANK, to apply against the relative
acceptances (as described above) and for the payment of any other indebtedness
of mine/ours to the BANK. In case of non-sale within the period specified
herein, I/we agree to return the goods under this Trust Receipt to the BANK
without any need of demand.
I/we agree to keep the said goods, manufactured
products or proceeds thereof, whether in the form of money or bills,
receivables, or accounts separate and capable of identification as property of
the BANK.[42]
It must be stressed that P.D. No. 115
is a declaration by legislative authority that, as a matter of public policy,
the failure of person to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods
covered by a trust receipt or to return said goods, if not sold, is a public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.[43]
The Court likewise rules that the issue
of whether P.D. No. 115 encompasses transactions involving goods procured as a
component of a product ultimately sold has been resolved in the affirmative in Allied Banking Corporation v. Ordoñez.[44] The law applies to goods used by the
entrustee in the operation of its machineries and equipment. The non-payment of
the amount covered by the trust receipts or the non-return of the goods covered
by the receipts, if not sold or otherwise not disposed of, violate the
entrustee’s obligation to pay the amount or to return the goods to the entruster.
In Colinares v. Court of Appeals,[45] the Court declared that there are two
possible situations in a trust receipt transaction. The first is covered by the
provision which refers to money received under the obligation involving
the duty to deliver it (entregarla) to the owner of the
merchandise sold. The second is covered by the provision which refers to merchandise received under the
obligation to return it (devolvera) to the owner.[46]
Thus, failure of the entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
the goods covered by the trust receipts to the entruster or to return said
goods if they were not disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust
receipt is a crime under P.D. No. 115, without need of proving intent to
defraud. The law punishes dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of
money or goods to the prejudice of the entruster, regardless of whether the
latter is the owner or not. A mere
failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale of the goods, if not sold,
constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice, not only to another, but
more to the public interest.[47]
The Court rules that although
petitioner signed the trust receipts merely as Senior Vice-President of PBMI
and had no physical possession of the goods, he cannot avoid prosecution for
violation of P.D. No. 115.
The penalty clause of the law, Section 13 of P.D. No. 115
reads:
Section 13. Penalty
Clause. The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale
of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent
of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to
return said goods, documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed
of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime
of estafa, punishable under the
provisions of Article Three hundred and fifteen, paragraph one (b) of Act
Numbered Three thousand eight hundred and fifteen, as amended, otherwise known
as the Revised Penal Code. If the
violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or
other juridical entities, the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be
imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons
therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities
arising from the criminal offense.
The crime defined in P.D. No. 115 is malum prohibitum but is classified as estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, or estafa with
abuse of confidence. It may be committed
by a corporation or other juridical entity or by natural persons. However, the
penalty for the crime is imprisonment for the periods provided in said Article
315, which reads:
ARTICLE 315. Swindling
(estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over
200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed 200
pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any
of the following means; xxx
Though the entrustee is a
corporation, nevertheless, the law specifically makes the officers, employees or other officers or persons responsible for the
offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities of such corporation and/or
board of directors, officers, or other officials or employees responsible for
the offense. The rationale is that
such officers or employees are vested with the authority and responsibility to
devise means necessary to ensure compliance with the law and, if they fail to
do so, are held criminally accountable; thus, they have a responsible share in
the violations of the law.[48]
If the crime is committed by a
corporation or other juridical entity, the directors, officers, employees or
other officers thereof responsible for the offense shall be charged and
penalized for the crime, precisely because of the nature of the crime and the
penalty therefor. A corporation cannot
be arrested and imprisoned; hence, cannot be penalized for a crime punishable
by imprisonment.[49]
However, a corporation may be charged and prosecuted for a crime if the
imposable penalty is fine. Even if the statute prescribes both fine and
imprisonment as penalty, a corporation may be prosecuted and, if found guilty,
may be fined.[50]
A crime is the doing of that which
the penal code forbids to be done, or omitting to do what it commands. A necessary part of the definition of every crime
is the designation of the author of the crime upon whom the penalty is to be
inflicted. When a criminal statute
designates an act of a corporation or a crime and prescribes punishment
therefor, it creates a criminal offense which, otherwise, would not exist and
such can be
committed only by the corporation. But when a penal statute does not
expressly apply to corporations, it does not create an offense for which a
corporation may be punished. On the
other hand, if the State, by statute, defines a crime that may be committed by
a corporation but prescribes the penalty therefor to be suffered by the
officers, directors, or employees of such corporation or other persons
responsible for the offense, only such individuals will suffer such penalty.[51] Corporate officers or employees, through
whose act, default or omission the corporation commits a crime, are themselves
individually guilty of the crime.[52]
The principle applies whether or not
the crime requires the consciousness of wrongdoing. It applies to those
corporate agents who themselves commit the crime and to those, who, by virtue
of their managerial positions or other similar relation to the corporation,
could be deemed responsible for its commission, if by virtue of their
relationship to the corporation, they had the power to prevent the act.[53] Moreover, all parties active in promoting a
crime, whether agents or not, are principals.[54] Whether such officers or employees are
benefited by their delictual acts is not a touchstone of their criminal
liability. Benefit is not an operative
fact.
In this case, petitioner signed the trust
receipts in question. He cannot, thus,
hide behind the cloak of the separate corporate personality of PBMI. In the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren, a
corporate officer cannot protect himself behind a corporation where he is the
actual, present and efficient actor.[55]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., with Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring; rollo, pp. 10-26.
[2] Rollo, pp. 7-8.
[3] Records, pp. 15-23.
[4]
[5]
[6] Docketed as I.S. No. 84-01648.
[7] Annex “A,” Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 57169.
[8] Annex “C,” id.
[9] Annex “D,” id.
[10] Rollo, pp. 70-73.
[11] G.R. No
82495,
[12]
[13] Rollo, pp. 82-85.
[14]
Records, p. 6.
[15] Rollo, pp. 86-91.
[16] Supra, at note 11.
[17] G.R.
No. 85396,
[18] Records, p. 140.
[19] Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[20]
[21] Comment
dated
[22] Supra, at note 11.
[23] Rollo, p. 34.
[24] 376 Phil. 204 (1999).
[25] Rollo,
p. 58. (Emphasis supplied)
[26] Melo v. Court of Appeals, supra, at note 24.
[27] Cited
in Melo v. Court of Appeals, supra at
214-215.
[28] Rollo, pp. 20-22.
[29] Rollo, pp. 117-118.
[30] 430 Phil. 101 (2002).
[31]
[32]
[33] The
Court approved the revised rules on
[34] Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
No. 146731,
[35] Nava v. Commission on Audit, 419 Phil.
544 (2001).
[36]
[37] Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil.
916, 923 (1996).
[38] People v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil.
401, 412-413 (1999), citing Ledesma v.
Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 657, 673-674 (1997).
[39] Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 115.
[40] Section 9 of P.D. No. 115.
[41] Section 7 of P.D. No. 115.
[42] Annex “K,” records, p. 27.
[43] Tiomico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
122539, March 4, 1999, 304 SCRA 216, citing Lee
v. Rodil, 175 SCRA 100 (1989).
[44] Supra, at note 11.
[45] 394 Phil. 106 (2000).
[46]
[47] People v. Nitafan, G.R. Nos. 81559-60,
[48] See
[49] See Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 499
Phil. 691 (2003).
[50] W.H. Small & Co. v. Commonwealth, 120
S.W. 361 (1909).
[51] Paragon Paper Co. v. State, 49 N.E. 600
(1898).
[52] U.S. v. Park, supra, at note 48.
[53]
[54]
[55]