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FIL-ESTATE
MANAGEMENT INC., MEGATOP REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., PEAKSUN ENTERPRISES AND
EXPORT CORP., ARTURO DY, AND ELENA DY JAO, Petitioners, - versus - GEORGE
H. TRONO, MA. TERESA TRONO, MA. VIRGINIA TRONO, JESSE TRONO, MA. CRISTINA
TRONO, PATRICIA TRONO, MA. DIVINA TRONO, INOCENCIO TRONO, JR., CARMEN TRONO,
AND ZENAIDA TRONO, Respondents. |
G. R. No. 130871 Present: PUNO,
J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, * AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: February 17, 2006 |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before
us is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
assailing the Decision[2]
dated May 20, 1997 and Resolution[3]
dated September 5, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40263, “Ayala
Land, Inc., Fil-estate Management Inc., Megatop Realty Development, Inc.,
Peaksun Enterprises and Export Corp., Arturo E. Dy, and Elena Dy Jao,
petitioners, versus Hon.
Florentino Alumbres, George H. Trono, Ma. Teresa Trono, Edgardo Trono, Ma.
Virginia Trono, Jesse Trono, Ma. Cristina Trono, Inocencio Trono, Jr., Carmen
Trono, and Zenaida Trono, respondents.”
The
petition alleges that on
Mr. Salvador L. Oriel, Chief of the Docket
Division, Land Registration Authority (LRA), issued a Notice of Initial Hearing,[5]
stating, among others, that:
NOTE: This lot is covered portion of Lot 2271
that which is overlapped by Lot 10, Psu-80886 Lot 2276, that which is
overlapped by Lot 2, Psu-56007 which is also Lot 6, Psu-80886; Lot 2270,
portion of that which is overlapped by Lot 7, Psu-56007 and the whole Lot 8,
Psu-56007.
On
Earlier,
or on
During the hearing, respondents
presented the July 24, 1995 Report of the LRA and the Survey Report of the Land
Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, showing
that the land they sought to register under Plan Psu-31086 overlaps the
property already registered in the names of petitioners.
Thereafter,
petitioners and
On
Petitioners
then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
On
The incontrovertibility of a title prevents a
land registration court from acquiring jurisdiction over a land that is applied
for registration if that land is already decreed and registered under the
Torrens System.
The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
assailed Order dated
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners
then filed their motion for partial reconsideration praying that LRC Case No.
M-228 be dismissed with prejudice and to declare that the right of
respondents to file any action for reconveyance of the property has prescribed.
Meanwhile,
on
On
In a
Resolution dated
Petitioners then filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals the
following errors:
IN REFUSING TO DECLARE THE DISMISSAL OF LRC
M-228 TO BE WITH PREJUDICE AND THAT ANY ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE TO HAVE LONG
AGO PRESCRIBED, THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE ISSUE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE, IN THAT –
I.
HAVING ALREADY FOUND THAT THE LAND WAS
TITLED, THE COURT OF APPEALS’ REFUSAL TO DISMISS THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE
WITH PREJUDICE CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINES THAT A) DECREES OF REGISTRATION ARE IN
REM, B) TITLED LANDS CANNOT BE DECREED AGAIN AND C) THERE CAN BE NO
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON TITLES.
II.
HAVING FOUND THAT THE DECREES FROM WHICH
PETITIONERS’ TITLE IS DERIVED, WERE ISSUED IN 1966, THE COURT OF APPEALS’
REFUSAL TO DECLARE AS ALREADY PRESCRIBED, ANY DIRECT ATTACK OR ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE CONTRAVENES SECTION 32 OF PD 1529 AND THE DOCTRINES IN CARO VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SALVATIERRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
Petitioners
contend that the dismissal of a subsequent application for original
registration of title already covered by a
In their
comment, respondents claim that they were misled by their lawyers and that what
they should have filed was a complaint for nullification of titles instead of an
application for registration of land.
The
petition is impressed with merit.
The fundamental issue for our
resolution is whether the trial court has jurisdiction over respondents’ application
for registration of a parcel of land.
Section 2 of Presidential Decree (PD)
1529[7] partly
provides:
Sec. 2. Nature of registration
proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. – Judicial proceedings for the
registration of lands throughout the
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands,
including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed
after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions. x x x
Pursuant
to the above provisions, the Regional Trial Court (formerly Court of First
Instance) has the authority to act, not only on applications for original
registration of title to land, but also on all petitions filed after the
original registration of title. Thus, it
has the authority and power to hear and determine all questions arising from
such applications or petitions.[8]
The
Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 255, Las Piñas City has no jurisdiction over LRC Case No. M-228 on the ground that the land subject
of respondents’ application for registration was already registered in the Registry
of Deeds of Las Piñas City.
Significantly,
even respondents themselves admit in their comment on the instant petition that
what they should have filed was a complaint for nullity of petitioners’ titles.
Likewise, Section 48 of PD 1529 provides:
Sec. 48.
Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. (Underscoring ours)
Respondents’
application for registration of a parcel of land already covered by a
In Ramos v. Rodriguez,[11] we held:
It must be noted that petitioners failed to
rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was
spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued
under the Torrens System, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an earlier case (Reyes
and Nadres vs. Borbon and Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791), “(t)he very
purpose of the
Corollarily, Section 32 of the same
law states:
Sec. 32.
Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. –
The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of
any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud,
to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and
review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the
date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such
petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for
value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one
year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of
registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against
the applicant or any other person responsible for the fraud. (underscoring ours)
A decree
of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on
the questions actually contested and determined, but also upon all matters that
might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings.[12]
As per
records of the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City, TCT No. T-9182[13]
was registered in petitioners’ name as early as
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40263 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents’ application for
registration of land in LRC Case No. M-228 pending before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 255, Las Piñas City is ordered DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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(On leave) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Filed pursuant to Rule 45, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J.
Valdez, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Hilarion L. Aquino
(all retired), Rollo, pp. 9-29.
[3] Rollo, pp. 31-32.
[4] Annex “B,” Petition, p. 129.
[5] Annex “B,” Original Records, p. 145.
[6] CA Rollo, pp. 358-366.
[7] Otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree.
[8] Talusan
v. Tayag, G.R. No. 133698,
[9] Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
93687, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 706, citing Natalia
Realty Corporation v. Vallez, G.R. Nos. 78290-94, May 23, 1989, 173 SCRA
534; Gonzales v. IAC, G.R. No. 69622, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 587; Cimafranca
v. IAC, L-68687, January 31, 1987, 147 SCRA 611; Barrios v. Court of
Appeals, L-32531, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 427; Magay v. Estandian,
L-28975, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 456; Director of Lands v. Gan Tan,
L-2664, May 30, 1951, 89 Phil. 184.
[10] Domingo, et al. v.
[11] G.R. No. 94033,
[12] Cacho v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123361,
[13] Rollo, p. 196.