ANGELES
MANGUBAT, A.M. No. P-06-2115
Complainant, (Formerly OCA-IPI No. 04-1897-P)
Present:
-
versus -
QUISUMBING,
J.
Chairman,
CARPIO,
JOEL FRANCIS C. CAMINO, CARPIO-MORALES, and
Sheriff III, TINGA, JJ.
MTCC,
Samal,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 23, 2006
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Tinga,
J.:
For resolution is an administrative case filed
by Angeles Mangubat (Mangubat) against Joel Francis C. Camino (Camino), Sheriff
III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Island Garden City of Samal, Davao
for gross misconduct, dishonesty, and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, also
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Complainant
Mangubat was convicted of slander in Criminal Case No. 854[1]
entitled “People of the P10,000.00 by way of moral damages.[2] Subsequently, she was granted probation. On
Mangubat
alleges that on P12,500.00.
Camino then took the P10,000.00 and issued her a temporary
receipt.[4]
On
In
his Comment[6] dated
When
they arrived at Mangubat’s residence, Camino tendered to her a copy of the
Sheriff’s Letter of Demand[7]
pursuant to the writ of execution after the latter refused to receive it. He claims that he did so in a courteous
manner, explaining and interpreting to her the contents of the writ. After conferring with her husband, Mangubat
conveyed to Camino her willingness to comply with the court order and requested
him to come back the following day as they would still look for means to pay
the P10,000.00 moral damages stated in the writ.
In
the morning of P10,000.00 and he, in turn, issued
the corresponding receipt. Thereafter,
he proceeded to Barangay San Isidro to locate Plaza, to whom he turned over the
amount of P10,000.00 for which the latter issued and signed the
corresponding temporary receipt.[8] Camino attached to his comment the affidavits[9]
of Florian Rebong and Miguel Cuberos, the livestock buyer who bought the
Mangubats’ carabao. They essentially
corroborate Camino’s statement that Mangubat sold her carabao to satisfy the
writ of execution voluntarily and without any intervention from Camino.
In
her Reply[10]
dated
Mangubat
assails Camino’s act of delivering the amount of P10,000.00 to Plaza as
illegal because it violates par. 2, Sec. 9(a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure on execution of judgments for money enforced through immediate
payment on demand.[11]
She opines that it is another indication of his giving undue favor and
advantage to Plaza.
In
his Rejoinder[12]
dated
On
The Court Administrator, through Retired Justice Narciso Atienza,[15]
found Camino’s version of the facts to be more credible compared to Mangubat’s. He concluded that Mangubat voluntarily sold
her carabao in order to satisfy the writ of execution against her. However, he found Camino’s act of delivering
the P10,000.00 personally to Plaza as illegal. Under the second
paragraph of Sec. 9 (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[16]
if the judgment obligee
or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the
judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff
who shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same
day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is
not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest
government depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality. Justice Atienza further made the following
findings:
Respondent’s
deviation from the afore-quoted provision merits no justification. In fact it was risky for respondent to go out
of his way to seek the judgment obligee whose residence he did not even
know. His recourse is not sanctioned by
law, for which appropriate sanction is warranted. However, as no bad faith or malice was
established, and that respondent was apparently pressed by the circumstances,
it is deemed that the sanction be accordingly tempered.[17]
The
Court Administrator recommended that Camino be reprimanded for neglect of duty
by failing to strictly follow the procedure required by law for the execution
of judgments for money.
We
agree with the findings of the Court Administrator.
The
nature of a sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is
purely ministerial such that he exercises no discretion as to the manner of
executing the same.[18] He has the duty to perform faithfully and
accurately what is incumbent upon him and any method of execution falling short
of the requirement of the law deserves reproach and should not be countenanced.[19]
While
Camino did not strictly adhere to the required procedure, Mangubat failed to
establish malice on his part in so doing.
Neither did he cause delay in the execution of the final judgment in
Criminal Case No. 854. In fact, the
judgment obligor received the amount on the very same day Mangubat paid
Camino. In addition, Camino made a
return[20]
of the writ of execution and reported to the court which issued the writ the
manner and circumstances by which the said judgment was satisfied. Considering the foregoing, there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of the rules of procedure.
Although
Camino’s departure from Sec. 9(a), Rule 39 appears excusable under the
circumstances, we find that he committed other violations which, if taken
together with the rest, merit a stiffer penalty than reprimand.
First,
the writ of execution clearly commanded Camino to cause the execution of the
money judgment pursuant to the procedure outlined in Rule 39 by demanding from
Mangubat the immediate payment of the full amount stated therein, or by levying
her personal properties, and in case the same is insufficient, by levying so
much of her real property as sufficient to satisfy the judgment.
Camino
admitted that he went to Mangubat’s house on
In
Torres v. Cabling,[21]
we held that a sheriff is not required to give the judgment debtor some time to
raise cash. Otherwise, the property may
be placed in danger of being lost or absconded.
After Mangubat refused to receive Camino’s letter of demand and to pay
the amount stated in the writ, he should have levied on whatever personal
properties he found in her house and in default thereof, her real
properties. By coming back to her house
twice, he risked the possibility that the judgment may not be satisfied.
Second,
although he made a return of the writ, he did so belatedly and in clear
violation of Sec. 14, Rule 39 which provides,
viz:
The writ of
execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the
judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full
within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report
to the court and state the reason therefore.
Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the
judgment may be enforced by motion. The
officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the
proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its
effectivity expires. The returns or
periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall
be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties. (Underscoring
ours.)
The
raison d' etre behind this requirement is to update the court on the
status of the execution and to take necessary steps to ensure the speedy
execution of decisions. [22]
The
judgment in Criminal Case No. 854 was fully satisfied when Camino received
Mangubat’s payment on
We
have held before[23] that
sheriffs and deputy sheriffs play a significant role in the administration of
justice. They are primarily responsible
for the execution of a final judgment which is “the fruit and end of the suit
and is the life of the law.”[24] Thus, sheriffs must at all times show a high
degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. As officers of the court, they are expected
to uphold the norm of public accountability and to avoid any kind of behavior
that would diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in
the judiciary.
In sum, we find that Camino
disregarded the rules on execution of judgment which is tantamount
to neglect or dereliction of duty. Section
22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law considers
simple neglect of duty as a less grave offense punishable by suspension for one
(1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Meanwhile, this offense is punishable with suspension from six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year under Sec. 52 (B), Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding
respondent Joel Francis C. Camino GUILTY of neglect or dereliction of duty and
is hereby meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from office for two (2) months.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
Associate Justice Associate Justice
[1]Raffled
to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
[4]Annex “B” of the Affidavit-Complaint; id. at 7.
[5]Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39, Sec. 13, par. (c) provides:
“SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
x x x x
(c) Three horses, or three cows, or three carabaos, or other beasts of burden, such as the judgment obligor may select necessarily used by him in his ordinary occupation;
x x x x”
[11]Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39, Sec. 9(a), par. 2 provides:
SEC. 9 Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. –
(a) Immediate payment on demand. --
x x x x
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality.
x x x x
[14]
[16]Applicable to criminal procedure pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 1 thereof.
[18]Sps. Biglete v. Deputy Sheriff Maputi, Jr., 427 Phil. 227 citing Portes v. Tepace, 334 Phil. 839 (1997).
[19]Sps. Biglete v. Deputy Sheriff Maputi, Jr., supra, citing Remollo v. Garcia, 357 Phil. 86 (1998).
[23]Jumio v. Egay-Eviota, A.M. P-92-746, March 29, 1994, 231 SCRA
551, citing Maya v. Bassig, A.M. No. 2769-P, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA
49, 47 Am. Jur. Sheriffs, Police
and Constables 855; De Castro v.
[24]Eduarte
v. Ramos, A.M. P-94-1069,