SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
Quisumbing,
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
JUDGE ROSABELLA M.
TORMIS,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Promulgated:
Branch 4,
Respondent. February 28, 2006
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RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
This
resolves the Memorandum/Supplement to the Manifestation of respondent Judge Rosabella M. Tormis seeking for a
reinvestigation of the administrative case filed against her and to be allowed
to present additional evidence thereto.
In
the Court’s Decision dated
The
record shows that the case was initially referred to Executive Judge Simeon P.
Dumdum, Jr. of the
In
compliance with the foregoing directive, the Investigating Judge submitted the
Report dated November 18, 2004[2]
with the recommendation that respondent judge be fined P20,000.00 or suspended
for three months.[3]
The
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) concurred with the findings of the
Investigating Judge but recommended that respondent judge be suspended for
three months.[4]
Thereafter,
the Court issued a Resolution dated
Subsequently,
the Court issued a Resolution dated
On
It
appears from the record[8]
that even before her receipt of a copy of the above-mentioned judgment, the
same had been downloaded from the web site of the Court and disseminated to the
local media. Indeed, respondent judge was apprised by her staff that her
six-month suspension was bannered by the Freeman,
a local newspaper, in its
In the afternoon of
On
It
must be stressed that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings
is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.[17] Owing
to the foregoing confluence of events aggravated by the delay in our postal
system, the Court is inclined to grant the request of respondent judge.
In
an administrative case, if the respondent judge must be disciplined for grave
misconduct or any grave offense, the evidence against the miscreant magistrate
should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge.[18] The
Judiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its
members could be faulted, it should only be after due investigation and after
presentation of the required quantum of evidence especially because the charge
is punitive by nature.[19]
Any
administrative complaint leveled against a judge must be examined with a
discriminating eye for its consequential effects are by nature penal in
character, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal,
disbarment, or suspension. As champion –
at other times tormentor – of trial and appellate judges, this Court must be
unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of unscrupulous magistrates, but it must
also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which serve no other
purpose than to harass them.[20]
It has been said “[t]he wheels of
justice would run smoothly not only if the judiciary is purged of the
debilitating presence of recreant judges, but also importantly, if the members
who perform their functions conscientiously are not hampered by groundless and
vexatious charges. In its attempt to cleanse the Aegean stables, so to speak,
this Court must tread on with utmost circumspection and prudence to make sure
that only the guilty is denounced and the innocent absolved.”[21] It
must be stressed in this regard that in cases where the charges involved are
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or incompetency,
the general rules as to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply and
the culpability of the respondent should be established beyond reasonable
doubt.[22]
Thus, as in criminal cases where the
dictates of due process is observed with utmost stringence,
the respondent judge in this
administrative complaint should likewise be given full opportunity upon reasonable notice[23]
to defend herself and to adduce evidence in support thereof for the Court will
not allow itself to be an instrument that would destroy the reputation of any
member of the bench by pronouncing guilt on the basis of incomplete evidence or
mere speculation.[24]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the motion of respondent Judge Rosabella
M. Tormis, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 52.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Cojuangco, Jr. v.
[18] Suarez-De Leon v. Estrella, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1935,
[19] Araos v. Luna-Pison, 428 Phil. 290, 295-296 (2002).
[20] Diomampo v. Alpajora, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1880,
October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 534, 538-539.
[21] Cea v. Paguio, 445 Phil. 533, 537 (2003).
[22] Araos v. Luna-Pison, supra at 296.
[23] See Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, A.C.
No. 4256, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 527, 533.
[24] Ong v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1538,