THIRD DIVISION
|
ROSEMARIE L. HSIEH, Complainant, - versus - ATTY. Respondents. |
A.C. No. 6128 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: December
19, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present complaint of Rosemarie Loria
Hsieh[1] (complainant)
against respondents-spouses Attorneys Salvador and Nancy Quimpo,
for gross misconduct, was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The
following antecedents spawned the filing of the complaint.
Complainant,
together with one Pilar Cabuslay,
was arrested for drug trafficking and possession of marijuana during a buy-bust
operation conducted by police operatives within the vicinity of Isetann Department Store,
Complainant
secured the services of respondents who represented her and Pilar
during the inquest and preliminary investigation of the case.
As
complainant did not have sufficient funds to defray the expenses attendant to
her defense, she, while on detention at the Manila City Jail or on May 21,
1999, authorized respondents, who in the meantime were able to secure the
release of the car, to sell it by signing a Deed of Sale the complete
particulars of which were left in blank.
By
complainant’s claim, respondents informed her that the proceeds of the sale would
defray “expenses in dismissing her case and expediting and facilitating her
release from the Manila City Jail;”[2] respondents,
however, ceased to appear on her behalf, forcing her to secure the services of
another lawyer; and
when she demanded the return of her car, respondents refused, claiming that it would
serve as payment for their legal services.
Complainant
thus filed a complaint for replevin[3] against
respondents. She soon discovered,
however, that the car was already registered in the name of respondents by
virtue of the Deed of Sale.[4]
While
complainant was able to regain possession of the car, the Traffic Management
Group seized it from her and charged her with carnapping
and theft,[5]
and respondents were eventually able to get hold of it.
Respondents,
on the other hand, claim that they agreed to handle complainant’s case for P20,000 as acceptance fee, and P1,000,000 success fee,
but as complainant did not have money, she convinced them to accept the Deed of
Sale covering her car as a form of assurance that she would settle any outstanding
account.
Respondents
claim further that on September 1999, as there was a big possibility that
complainant would be released on bail, she secured the services of another
lawyer without her informing them, and to avoid a “humiliating” situation, they
withdrew as her counsel but demanded full settlement of her outstanding account; and since complainant failed to settle her
account, she and respondents mutually agreed on September 21, 1999 to “give
effect” to the Deed of Sale which they caused to be notarized.
The
IBP Investigator defined the issue in the present complaint to be whether
respondents, as counsels for complainant, violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility “when they acquired from the complainant the [car].”
The IBP investigator found that there was a breach of trust
on respondents’ part, in light of, among other things, the lack of
justification of the charge of P600,000 for
attorney’s fees, and the fact that the order allowing complainant to post bail
was issued two months after the deed of sale was concluded and, therefore, the
amount could not have represented the success fee even if there was such an
agreement for the payment thereof.
.
. . [T]here is here a case of a breach
of trust on the part of the respondents. It is submitted that respondents took
advantage of the fact that the Deed of P600,000.00 to be indicated therein and Atty. Nancy Quimpo’s signing the same in 21 September 1999 [see p. 3,
Respondents’ Reply to Complainant’s Position Paper] was unethical if not improper, and smacks of lack of delicadeza especially
since the amount of P600,000.00 allegedly representing legal fees or
expenses incurred have not been clearly substantiated or justified by the
respondents. It is further pointed
out that the complainant was allowed to post bail only on 09 November 1999
[see Order dated 09 November of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54; Annex F, Complainant’s Reply to Respondent’s
Position Paper]. This is roughly two
(2) months after the questioned instrument was allegedly notarized. At this time [P600,000.00 could not also be considered
a success fee payable to the respondents.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. Moreover, the respondents were duty-bound to observe faithfulness towards
their client and should have conducted themselves with utmost professionalism
in discharging their fiduciary duty.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By
Report[7]
dated
.
. . that both respondents, Atty. Salvador Quimpo and Atty. Nancy Quimpo, be
STRONGLY REPRIMANDED, and that a repetition by respondents of this offense
shall be dealt with more severely. However, it is further recommended that the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90
and the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, Branch
129, be required to submit their decisions in the replevin
case [Civil Case No. Q-00-41395] and the carnapping/theft
cases [Criminal Case Nos. C-67161 and C-67162], respectively, as soon as
they are promulgated, to enable the Honorable Supreme Court to determine
whether there is a need to revise or adjust the herein recommended penalty,
assuming the same is approved.[8] (Underscoring supplied)
It
appears from the computer-generated Deed of Sale that complainant’s first name,
the particulars of the car, and the month and year (May 1999) of the signing of
the document were the only data originally provided therein. It can thus be reasonably concluded that the
other important particulars, such as the vendee’s name – respondent Atty. Nancy
Quimpo, and the purchase price – P600,000, were subsequently filled up.
If
the Deed of Sale was originally intended to serve as security for the payment
of complainant’s outstanding account with respondents, as claimed by the
latter, why was not the name of the obligee for whom the security was allegedly executed – respondents – not
also printed out? And why did not
respondents bother to advise complainant of the eventual sale of the car and
account the proceeds thereof? It is on
this account that this Court finds the above-quoted ratiocination of the IBP
Investigator in holding respondents to have committed breach of contract well-taken.
Although
a lawyer’s lien over a client’s property in satisfaction of his lawful fees and
disbursements is recognized by this Court, the same cannot be exercised
haphazardly.
This
Court’s pronouncement that a fiduciary relationship requires a high degree of
fidelity and good faith and is designed to remove all such temptation and to
prevent everything of that kind from being done for the protection of the client[9]
bears reiterating.
It
is thus this Court’s duty to look into dealings between attorneys and their
clients and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a
situation in which they may stand unequal.[10]
As
the breach of the trust reposed upon respondents constitutes a violation of the
Canon 16 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility which reads:
Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON
16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION,
this Court finds that the recommended
penalty therefor is not commensurate. Instead, respondents’ suspension for three months
from the practice of law would be reasonable.
On
the IBP-CBD recommendation that the courts before the replevin
and carnapping/theft cases involving the same parties
were lodged submit their decisions to enable this Court to determine whether
there is a need to revise or adjust the penalty, the same does not lie.
Administrative
cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and may proceed independently of civil and/or criminal cases. Hence, the
disposition in the administrative case is not governed by that in the civil
and/or criminal cases and vice versa.[11]
WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Salvador Quimpo and Atty. Nancy Quimpo are
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months from
notice, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be
furnished all courts in the country, the Integrated Bar of the
SO ORDERED
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-7.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., 386 Phil.
221, 231 (2000).
[10]
[11] Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., v. Atty. Naldoza, 374 Phil. 1, 9-10 (1999).