OSCAR Z.
BENARES,[1] G.R. No. 173421
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J.
(Chairperson),*
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,**
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
JOSEPHINE LIM,
Respondent. Promulgated:
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This petition for review assails the May
25, 2005 Decision[2] of the Court
of Appeals setting aside the Resolution[3]
dated May 5, 2004 and Order[4]
dated July 9, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 132,
which set aside the Orders dated June 11, 2002[5]
and December 26, 2002[6] of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City granting respondent’s motion
for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the complaint for estafa for
failure to prosecute. Also assailed is
the
The following facts are undisputed:
Petitioner Oscar Beñares was accused of
estafa arising from two contracts of sale executed in 1976 where he sold two
parcels of land to respondent. Records
show that after respondent had fully paid the amortizations and after the deed
of absolute sale was issued, petitioner mortgaged the same parcels of land to
the Bank of Philippine Islands. Thus,
when respondent demanded delivery of the properties, petitioner failed to
comply, thus respondent was compelled to file a case for estafa against
petitioner.
Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution presented its last
witness, it was given 15 days to formally offer its evidence.[8] However, the prosecution did not make any
formal offer of evidence, hence petitioner filed a motion praying that the
prosecution’s submission of formal offer of evidence be deemed waived and the
case dismissed for lack of evidence.[9] Despite receipt of notice of petitioner’s
motion, respondent and her counsel failed to attend the hearing on the motion set
on
On
In
view of the oral manifestation of counsel for the accused, showing that the
private prosecutor received the Order of this Court dated January 28, 2002 on
February 7, 2002 giving them an extension of another fifteen days to file their
formal offer of evidence, yet failed to do so; the court finds reason to deny
the submission of formal offer of evidence.
Acting
on the Motion of the accused for the dismissal of this case, for failure of the
prosecution to prosecute this case, the motion is granted. This case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO
ORDERED.[12]
Respondent moved to reconsider the order
of dismissal and prayed for the admission of Formal Offer of Documentary
Exhibits,[13] claiming
that she had difficulty securing documents from the court which were marked
during trial. Petitioner opposed the
motion invoking his right against double jeopardy.[14]
On
[I]n line with the
long standing policy of the Courts to decide issues based on the substantial
merits of the case and not simply dismiss cases on technical defects, the Court
finds Merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Prosecution.
Effectively,
the Order of the Court dated
Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration[17] was
denied, hence a petition[18]
for certiorari was filed with the RTC. In
granting the petition, the RTC noted that the MeTC Order dismissing the case
for failure to prosecute “had the effect of an acquittal” which is “a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged.”[19] The RTC denied respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion,
respondent filed a petition[20]
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals arguing that there was no failure to
prosecute and that double jeopardy did not attach as a result of the dismissal
thereof. The Court of Appeals reversed
the RTC’s Resolution. It held that
contrary to the findings of the RTC, there was no double jeopardy because the
order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute had not become final and
executory due to the timely motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent. The appellate court also
held that petitioner’s right to speedy trial was not violated when respondent
failed to formally offer her evidence within the period required by the trial
court. The Court of Appeals thus ordered
the MeTC to set the case for further trial.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition
on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO
SPEEDY TRIAL WAS NOT VIOLATED.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BY
MTC-61 WAS A DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS WHICH RESULTED IN THE ACQUITTAL OF THE
PETITIONER.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT APPLYING THE RULE ON
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.[21]
The
issue for resolution is whether the MeTC’s Order dismissing the case for
failure to prosecute amounted to an acquittal which gave petitioner the right
to invoke double jeopardy.
Petitioner
argued that the six months’ delay by the prosecution to formally offer its
evidence is vexatious, capricious and oppressive; that the private prosecutor’s
claim that the documents could not be found is untrue considering that no
manifestation was filed in court stating that fact; that the documents were
available as early as January 2002 but the prosecution never asked for extension,
nor explained the delay in filing its formal offer despite two orders to do so.
Petitioner further argued that under
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, failure to comply with a court order
without justifiable reason may cause the dismissal of the case, which shall
have the effect of an adjudication on the merits unless otherwise stated by the
court.
Respondent,
on the other hand, asserted that it was petitioner who delayed the proceedings
in the instant case, when he questioned the finding of probable cause against
him before the Department of Justice, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court, which were all denied; and that the delay in the filing of a formal
offer of evidence is justified because as noted by the MeTC, the records were missing.
Respondent likewise insisted that even
without documentary evidence, testimonial evidence were presented against
petitioner; that petitioner admitted the documentary evidence formally
offered. Respondent refuted petitioner’s
invocation of double jeopardy because the case was dismissed with his express
consent.
The petition is without merit.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court states in part:
SEC.
7. Former
conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court,
(3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the
defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.[22]
In
the instant case, there is no question as to the presence of the first four
elements. As to the last element, there was
yet no conviction, nor an acquittal on the ground that petitioner’s guilt has
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt,[23] but
the dismissal of the case was based on failure to prosecute.
A dismissal with the express consent
or upon motion of the accused does not result in double
jeopardy, except in two instances, to wit:
(1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case
is dismissed for violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial. [24]
Petitioner’s claim that the
prosecution’s delay in filing its formal offer of evidence violated his right
to speedy trial is not well taken.
The prosecution’s delay in the filing
of its formal offer of evidence in this case cannot be considered vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive. It appears
that there was justifiable reason for the prosecution’s failure to formally
offer its evidence on time, i.e., the
documents which were previously marked in court were misplaced. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals:
Truly, the
prosecution had failed twice to file the formal offer of evidence within the
fifteen (15) day period set by the MeTC.
Once was due to the fault of the MeTC judge who expressly admitted in
his order that the documentary exhibits necessary for the formal offer of
evidence were lost in his office. Thus,
the prosecution was unable to submit its formal offer of evidence on time. In short, there was actually only one
unjustified delay in the filing of formal offer of evidence in the proceedings below,
which cannot be described as vexatious, capricious or oppressive. There is no showing that the criminal case
was unreasonably prolonged nor there was deliberate intent on the part of the
petitioner to cause delay in the proceedings resulting to serious and great
prejudice affecting the substantial rights of the accused.[25]
Indeed, delay is not a mere mathematical
computation of the time involved. Each case must be decided upon the facts
peculiar to it. The following factors must
be considered and balanced: the length of the delay, the reasons for such
delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay.[26] In the instant case, the totality of the
circumstances excuses the delay occasioned by the late filing of the
prosecution’s formal offer of evidence. Since
the delay was not vexatious or oppressive, it follows that petitioner’s right
to speedy trial was not violated, consequently he cannot properly invoke his
right against double jeopardy.[27]
Petitioner’s reliance in People v. Cloribel[28] is misplaced because in said case,
trial commenced almost four years from the date of filing of the complaint. Such delay, the Court held, can hardly be
ignored or disregarded by any fair
standard.
Neither can petitioner
rely on the doctrine that when a judge dismisses a case for failure to prosecute, the
termination amounts to an acquittal as the prosecution will fail to prove the
case when the time therefor comes. In
the instant case, testimonial evidence were presented against petitioner. Thus, even without
documentary evidence, his guilt or innocence may be proven. Second, petitioner appears to have admitted
the genuineness and due execution of respondent’s documentary evidence, thus
the prosecution need not even present such documents in view of his
admission. With or without these
documents, therefore, the prosecution has enough evidence left for the trial
court’s determination of his guilt. Thus
–
We agree with the OSG’s
contention that the trial court exceeded its authority when it dismissed
the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence there was a
violation of due process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to
offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary exhibits, the
prosecution could still prove its case through the testimonies of its
witnesses. Thus, we find that when the
trial court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely corrected itself.[29]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals setting
aside the Resolution dated May 5, 2004 and Order dated July 9, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132, as well as its July 7, 2006
Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Working
Chairman, First Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Sometimes referred to as Beñares or Bernares in the records.
*
Retired as of
**
Working Chairman.
[2] Rollo, pp. 9-20. Penned by Associate
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Eliezer R.
de los
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
Should be
[16] Rollo, p. 114.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Almario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
127772, March 22, 2001, 355 SCRA 1, 7.
[23] Malanyaon v. Lising, 193 Phil. 425, 428
(1981).
[24] Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, G.R.
No. 151912, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 94, 105-106.
[25] Rollo, p. 14.
[26] Ty-Dazo v.Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 945,
951 (2002).
[27]
Almario v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 10.
[28]
120 Phil. 775 (1964).
[29] People v. Alberto, 436 Phil. 434,
443-444 (2002); emphasis added.