FIRST DIVISION
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM, G.R. No. 168156
Represented by Rogelio Lasam
and Atty. Edward P. Llonillo,
Petitioners, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C. J.,
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO,
SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
VICENTA UMENGAN, Promulgated:
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for
review on certiorari filed by the
Heirs of Rosendo Lasam, represented by Rogelio M. Lasam and Atty. Edward P.
Llonillo, seeking the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated
The RTC
decision affirmed that of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of the
same city, Branch III, which had rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of
Rosendo Lasam and directed the ejectment of respondent Vicenta Umengan from the
lot subject of litigation.
The present
petition likewise seeks the reversal of the CA Resolution dated
As culled from the records, the
backdrop of the present case is as follows –
In an instrument denominated as Deed
of Confirmation and acknowledged before a notary public on
Isabel Cuntapay had four children by
her first husband, Domingo Turingan, namely: Abdon, Sado (deceased), Rufo and
Maria. When Domingo Turingan passed
away, Isabel Cuntapay remarried Mariano Lasam. She had two other children by
him, namely:
Sometime in January 2001, the heirs of
Rosendo Lasam (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her second husband) filed with the
MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer against Vicenta Umengan, who was then
occupying the subject lot. Vicenta Umengan
is the daughter of Abdon Turingan (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her first
husband).
In their
complaint, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam alleged that they are the owners of the
subject lot, having inherited it from their father. Rosendo Lasam was allegedly the sole heir of
the deceased Pedro Cuntapay through Isabel Cuntapay. During his lifetime, Rosendo Lasam allegedly
temporarily allowed Vicenta Umengan to occupy the subject lot sometime in
1955. The latter and her husband
allegedly promised that they would vacate the subject lot upon demand. However, despite written notice and demand by
the heirs of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta Umengan allegedly unlawfully refused to
vacate the subject lot and continued to possess the same. Accordingly, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam were
constrained to institute the action for ejectment.
In her
Answer with Counterclaim, Vicenta Umengan specifically denied the material
allegations in the complaint. She
countered that when Isabel Cuntapay passed away, the subject lot was inherited
by her six children by her first and second marriages through intestate
succession. Each of the six children
allegedly had a pro indiviso share of
1/6 of the subject lot.
It was
further alleged by Vicenta Umengan that her father, Abdon Turingan, purchased
the respective 1/6 shares in the subject lot of his siblings Maria and
Sado. These conveyances were allegedly
evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated
Prior
thereto, Rufo already sold his 1/6 share in the subject lot to Vicenta Umengan
and her husband as evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated June 14, 1961, appearing
as Doc. No. 539, Page No. 41, Book No. V, series of 1961 of the notarial book
of Atty. Pedro Lagui. Also on June 14,
1961, Abdon donated his 1/6 share in the subject lot to her daughter Vicenta
Umengan as evidenced by the Deed of Donation appearing as Doc. No. 538, Page
No. 41, Book No. V, series of 1961 of the notarial book of the same notary
public.
According
to Vicenta Umengan, the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her second husband (Rosendo
and Trinidad Lasam) own only 2/6 portion of the subject lot. She thus prayed that the complaint for
ejectment be dismissed and that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam be ordered to pay
her damages.
The MTCC
rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and directed the
ejectment of Vicenta Umengan. In so
ruling, the MTCC gave credence to the newly discovered last will and testament
(entitled Testamento Abierto) purportedly
executed by Isabel Cuntapay where she bequeathed the subject lot to her son,
Rosendo Lasam, thus:
x x x
my share 1/5th (one-fifth) of the Cuntapay heirs, bordered on
the North by Sr. Elia Canapi; to the South, by Calle Aguinaldo; to the East, by
Calle P. Burgos and the West, by the late Don Luis Alonso; on the property
which is my share stands a house of light materials where I presently reside;
this 1/5th (one-fifth) share of my inheritance from the Cuntapays I
leave to my son Rosendo Lasam and also the aforementioned house of light
material x x x[2]
The MTCC
reasoned that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam anchored their claim over the subject
lot on the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay while Vicenta Umengan
hinged hers on intestate succession and legal conveyances. Citing jurisprudence[3]
and Article 1080[4] of
the Civil Code, the MTCC opined that testacy was favored and that intestacy
should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should prevail. It observed that the last will and
testament of Isabel Cuntapay was not yet probated as required by law;
nonetheless, the institution of a probate proceeding was not barred by
prescription.
With the finding that the subject lot was
already bequeathed by Isabel Cuntapay to Rosendo Lasam, the MTCC held that the
siblings Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria Turingan no longer had any share
therein. Consequently, they could not
convey to Vicenta Umengan what they did not own. On the issue then of who was entitled to
possession of the subject lot, the MTCC ruled in favor of the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam as it found that Vicenta Umengan’s possession thereof was by mere
tolerance. The dispositive portion of
the MTCC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, this Court Resolve[d] to order the EJECTMENT of VICENTA T.
UMENGAN and in her place INSTITUTE THE HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM.
It is further ordered the defendant
shall pay the Heirs of Rosendo Lasam the sum of P500.00 pesos representing the
monthly rental of the land from August 2000 to the time this case shall have
been terminated.
Ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 attorney’s fees plus cost of this
litigation.
So Ordered.[5]
On appeal,
the RTC affirmed in toto the decision
of the MTCC. The RTC echoed the
reasoning of the MTCC that the testamentary disposition of the property of
Isabel Cuntapay should be respected, and that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam have a
better right to possess the subject lot.
Undaunted,
Vicenta Umengan filed an appeal with the CA.
She argued that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case as it
involved the recovery of ownership of
the subject lot, not merely recovery of possession
or unlawful detainer. She also assailed
the RTC’s and the MTCC’s holding that the purported Testamento Abierto of Isabel Cuntapay prevails over Vicenta Umengan’s muniments of title and,
consequently, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam have a better right to the subject lot
than Vicenta Umengan.
In the assailed Decision dated
However, the CA declared that the RTC,
as well as the MTCC, erred in ruling that, by virtue of the purported last will
and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam have a better
right to the subject lot over Vicenta Umengan.
The CA explained that the said last will and testament did not comply
with the formal requirements of the law on wills.[6]
Specifically,
the CA found that the pages of the purported last will and testament were not
numbered in accordance with the law.
Neither did it contain the requisite attestation clause. Isabel Cuntapay as testator and the witnesses
to the will did not affix their respective signatures on the second page
thereof. The said instrument was
likewise not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The CA even raised doubts as
to its authenticity, noting that while Isabel Cuntapay died in 1947 and the
heirs of Rosendo Lasam claimed that they discovered the same only in 1997, a
date –
It was observed by the CA that as
against these infirmities in the claim of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta
Umengan presented a Deed of Sale and a Deed of Donation to justify her
possession of the subject lot. The
CA noted that she has also possessed the
subject property since 1955. Such prior
possession, the CA held, gave Vicente Umengan the right to remain in the
subject lot until a person with a better right lawfully ejects her. The heirs of Rosendo Lasam do not have such a
better right. The CA stressed that the
ruling on the issue of physical possession does not affect the title to the
subject lot nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits
on the issue of ownership. The parties
are not precluded from filing the appropriate action to directly contest the
ownership of or the title to the subject lot.
The decretal portion of the assailed
decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The August 29, 2003 decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan in Civil Case No. 5924 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents’ complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The heirs of Rosendo Lasam sought the
reconsideration thereof but their motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated
The heirs of Rosendo Lasam
(petitioners) now come to the Court alleging that the CA committed reversible
error in setting aside the decision of the RTC, which had affirmed that of the
MTCC, and dismissing their complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent
Vicenta Umengan.
Petitioners argue that the CA erred
when it held, on one hand, that the MTCC had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint as the allegations therein make out a case for unlawful
detainer but, on the other hand, proceeded to discuss the validity of the last
will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay.
Petitioners insist that respondent is
holding the subject lot by mere tolerance and that they, as the heirs of
Rosendo Lasam who was the rightful owner of the subject lot, have a better
right thereto. It was allegedly error
for the CA to declare the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay as null
and void for its non-compliance with the formal requisites of the law on wills. The said matter cannot be resolved in an
unlawful detainer case, which only involves the issue of material or physical
possession of the disputed property. In
any case, they maintain that the said will complied with the formal
requirements of the law.
It was
allegedly also erroneous for the CA to consider in respondent’s favor the deed
of sale and deed of donation covering portions of the subject lot, when these
documents had already been passed upon by the RTC (Branch 3) of
Petitioners emphasize that in an
unlawful detainer case, the only issue to be resolved is who among the parties
is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in
dispute. On this point, the MTCC held (and
the same was affirmed by the RTC) that petitioners have a better right since
the “merely tolerated” possession of the respondent had already expired upon
the petitioners’ formal demand on her to vacate. In support of this claim, they point to the
affidavit of Heliodoro Turingan, full brother of the respondent, attesting that
the latter’s possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of Rosendo
Lasam who inherited the same from Isabel Cuntapay.
According to petitioners, respondent’s predecessors-in-interest from whom she derived her claim over the subject lot by donation and sale could not have conveyed portions thereof to her, as she had claimed, because until the present, it is still covered by OCT Nos. 196 and 1032 under the names of Pedro and Leona Cuntapay. Their respective estates have not been settled up to now.
It is also the contention of petitioners that the CA should have dismissed outright respondent’s petition filed therewith for failure to comply with the technical requirements of the Rules of Court. Specifically, the petition was not allegedly properly verified, lacked statement of material dates and written explanation on why personal service was not made.
This last contention of petitioners deserves scant consideration. The technical requirements for filing an appeal are not sacrosanct. It has been held that while the requirements for perfecting an appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business, the law does admit of exceptions when warranted by circumstances.[8] In the present case, the CA cannot be faulted in choosing to overlook the technical defects of respondent’s appeal. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.[9]
The Court shall now resolve the substantive issues raised by petitioners.
It is well settled that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.[10]
In the present case, petitioners base their claim of right to possession on the theory that their father, Rosendo Lasam, was the sole owner of the subject lot by virtue of the newly discovered last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay bequeathing the same to him. Respondent is allegedly holding the subject lot by mere tolerance of Rosendo Lasam and, upon the petitioners’ formal demand on her to vacate the same, respondent’s right to possess it has expired.
On the other hand, respondent hinges her claim of possession on the legal conveyances made to her by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first husband, namely, Maria, Rufo, Sado and Abdon. These conveyances were made through the sale and donation by the said siblings of their respective portions in the subject lot to respondent as evidenced by the pertinent deeds.
The CA correctly held that, as between the respective claims of petitioners and respondent, the latter has a better right to possess the subject lot.
As earlier stated, petitioners rely on the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay that they had allegedly newly discovered. On the basis of this instrument, the MTCC and RTC ruled that petitioners have a better right to the possession of the subject lot because, following the law on succession, it should be respected and should prevail over intestate succession.
However, contrary to the ruling of the MTCC and RTC, the purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be relied upon to establish petitioners’ right to possess the subject lot because, without having been probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838
of the Civil Code is instructive:
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator’s death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals,[11]
the Court ruled that: “[a] will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to
the testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right
can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: ‘No will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.’”[12]
Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on
civil law, also explained that “[b]efore
any will can have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some
officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the
instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased
person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been
executed, attested and published as required by law, and that the testator was
of sound and disposing mind. It is a
proceeding to establish the validity of the will.”[13]
Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter
of public policy.[14]
Following the above truisms, the MTCC
and RTC, therefore, erroneously ruled that petitioners have a better right to
possess the subject lot on the basis of the purported last will and testament
of Isabel Cuntapay, which, to date, has not been probated. Stated in another manner, Isabel Cuntapay’s
last will and testament, which has not been probated, has no effect whatever
and petitioners cannot claim any right thereunder.
Hence, the CA correctly held that, as
against petitioners’ claim, respondent
has shown a better right of possession over the subject lot as evidenced by the
deeds of conveyances executed in her favor by the children of Isabel Cuntapay
by her first marriage.
Contrary to the claim of petitioners, the dismissal of
respondent’s action for partition in Civil Case No. 4917 before the RTC (Branch
3) of Tuguegarao City does not constitute res
judicata on the matter of the validity of the said conveyances or even as
to the issue of the ownership of the subject lot. The order dismissing respondent’s action for
partition in Civil Case No. 4917 stated thus:
For resolution is a motion to dismiss based on defendants’ [referring to the petitioners herein] affirmative defenses consisting inter alia in the discovery of a last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, the original owner of the land in dispute.
x x x
It appears, however, that the last will and testament of the late Isabel Cuntapay has not yet been allowed in probate, hence, there is an imperative need to petition the court for the allowance of said will to determine once and for all the proper legitimes of legatees and devisees before any partition of the property may be judicially adjudicated.
It is an elementary rule in law that testate proceedings take precedence over any other action especially where the will evinces the intent of the testator to dispose of his whole estate.
With the discovery of the will of the late Isabel Cuntapay in favor of the defendants, the Court can order the filing of a petition for the probate of the same by the interested party.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing considerations, let the above-entitled case be as it is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[15]
For there to be res judicata, the following elements must be present: (1) finality
of the former judgment; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action.[16] The third requisite, i.e., that the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits, is
not present between the action for partition and the complaint a quo for unlawful detainer. As aptly observed by the CA:
Our reading
of the Orders (dated
Further, it is not quite correct for
petitioners to contend that the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first
marriage could not have conveyed portions of the subject lot to respondent, as
she had claimed, because until the present, it is still covered by OCT Nos. 196
and 1032 under the names of Pedro and Leona Cuntapay. To recall, it was already agreed by the heirs
of the said spouses in a Partition Agreement dated
and/co-ownership among the heirs. The
Court had expounded the principle in this wise:
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under administration. This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court.
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s property, even if the same is under administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs.
The Civil Code, under the provisions of co-ownership, further qualifies this right. Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common.
As early as 1942, this Court has recognized
said right of an heir to dispose of property under administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., it was said that the sale
made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the
pending administration, in no wise, stands in the way of such
administration. The Court then relied on
the provision of the old Civil Code, Article 440 and Article 399 which are
still in force as Article 533 and Article 493, respectively, in the new Civil
Code. The Court also cited the words of
a noted civilist, Manresa: “Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs
‘becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part
or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being
thus formed among the co-owners of the estate which remains undivided.’”[18]
Contrary to the assertion of petitioners, therefore, the
conveyances made by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage to
respondent are valid insofar as their pro
indiviso shares are concerned.
Moreover, the CA justifiably held that these conveyances, as evidenced
by the deed of donation and deed of sale presented by respondent, coupled with
the fact that she has been in possession of the subject lot since 1955,
establish that respondent has a better right to possess the same as against petitioners
whose claim is largely based on Isabel Cuntapay’s last will and testament
which, to date, has not been probated; hence, has no force and effect and under
which no right can be claimed by petitioners.
Significantly, the probative value of the other evidence relied upon by
petitioners to support their claim, which was the affidavit of Heliodoro
Turingan, was not passed upon by the MTCC and the RTC. Their respective decisions did not even
mention the same.
In conclusion, it is well to stress the CA’s admonition that
–
x x x our
ruling on the issue of physical possession does not affect title to the
property nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits on
the issue of ownership. The parties are
not precluded from filing the appropriate action directly contesting the
ownership of or the title to the property.[19]
Likewise, it is therefore in this context that the CA’s
finding on the validity of Isabel Cuntapay’s last will and testament must be
considered. Such is merely a provisional
ruling thereon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to
possession de facto.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria (retired) and Eliezer R. De Los Santos, concurring.
[2] As quoted in the MTCC Decision dated
[3] Citing
[4] The provision reads in part:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected , insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
x x x
[5] Rollo, p. 81.
[6] The pertinent provisions read:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
[7] Rollo, pp. 61-62.
[8] Orozco
v. Court of Appeals, Fifth Division, G.R. No. 155207,
[9]
[10] Keppel
Bank Philippines, Inc. v. Adao, G.R. No. 158227,
[11] 335 Phil. 1107 (1997).
[12]
[13] TOLENTINO, III CIVIL CODE OF THE
[14] See, for example, Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 (1943); Baluyut v. Paño, 163 Phil. 81 (1976) and; Roberts v. Leonidas, 214 Phil. 30 (1984).
[15] Rollo, pp. 123-124. Citations omitted.
[16] Perez
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157616,
[17] Rollo, p. 57. Emphasis supplied.
[18] Acebedo
v. Abesamis, G.R. No. 102380,
[19] Rollo, p. 61 citing Boy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125088, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 196.