Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
LOURDES
DELA CRUZ, G.R. No. 139442
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS Promulgated:
and MELBA TAN TE,
Respondents. December 6, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For unto every one that hath shall be given,
and he shall have abundance: but from
him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.
—Holy Bible, Matthew 25:29
The Case
This
petition for review seeks to nullify the April 30, 1999 Decision and the July
16, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097, which
reversed the Decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in
Civil Case No. 98-89174, and reinstated the Decision of the Manila Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 20, which ordered petitioner Dela Cruz to vacate the
subject lot in favor of respondent Tan Te.[1]
The Facts
The Reyes
family, represented by Mr. Lino Reyes, owned the lot located at No. 1332 Lacson
Street (formerly Gov. Forbes Street), Sampaloc, Manila. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz was one of their
lessees, and she religiously paid rent over a portion of the lot for well over
40 years. Sometime in 1989, a fire
struck the premises and destroyed, among others, petitioner’s dwelling. After the fire, petitioner and some tenants
returned to the said lot and rebuilt their respective houses; simultaneously,
the Reyes family made several verbal demands on the remaining lessees,
including petitioner, to vacate the lot but the latter did not comply. On
On
On
On
September 8, 1997, respondent Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with damages before
the Manila MeTC, entitled Melba Tan Te v.
Lourdes Dela Cruz and docketed as Civil Case No. 156730-CV. The complaint averred that: (1) the previous
owners, the Reyeses were in possession and control of the contested lot; (2) on
November 26, 1996, the lot was sold to Tan Te; (3) prior to the sale, Dela Cruz
forcibly entered the property with strategy and/or stealth; (4) the petitioner
unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical possession of the property and
continues to do so; and, (5) the respondent sent several written demands to
petitioner to vacate the premises but refused to do so.
On
October 24, 1997, petitioner filed her answer and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had
no jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC
as more than one year had elapsed from petitioner’s forcible entry; (2) she was
a rent-paying tenant protected by PD 20;[2]
(3) her lease constituted a legal encumbrance upon the property; and (4) the
lot was subject of expropriation.
The Ruling of the
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant and all persons
claiming right under her to vacate the premises situated at
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P360.00 a month from December 1996 to November 1997; P432.00 a month from December 1997 to November 1998, plus 20% for each subsequent year until the premises shall have been vacated and turned over to the plaintiff;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and, the costs of the
suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The Ruling of the Regional Trial
Court
Unconvinced,
petitioner Dela Cruz appealed the Decision of the MeTC in the Manila RTC and
the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-89174. On September 1, 1998, the RTC rendered its judgment
setting aside the April 3, 1998 Decision of the Manila MeTC and dismissed respondent
Tan Te’s Complaint on the ground that it was the RTC and not the MeTC which had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The RTC believed that since Tan Te’s
predecessor-in-interest learned of petitioner’s intrusion into the lot as early
as
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Disappointed
at the turn of events, respondent Tan Te appealed the adverse Decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA) which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49097. This time, the CA rendered a Decision in
favor of respondent Tan Te reversing the Manila RTC September 1, 1998 Decision
and reinstated the Manila MeTC April 3, 1998 Decision.
Petitioner
tried to have the CA reconsider its Decision but was rebutted in its
Unyielding
to the CA Decision and the denial of her request for reconsideration,
petitioner Dela Cruz now seeks legal remedy through the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari before the Court.
The Issues
Petitioner Dela Cruz claims two (2)
reversible errors on the part of the appellate court, to wit:
A
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE CASE AND CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT.
B
THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE RTC AND IN
EFFECT, REINSTATING THE DECISION OF THE [MeTC] WHICH IS CONTRADICTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[4]
The Court’s Ruling
Discussion on Rule 45
Before
we dwell on the principal issues, a few procedural matters must first be
resolved.
Petitioner
Dela Cruz asks the Court to review the findings of facts of the CA, a course of
action proscribed by Section 1, Rule 45.
Firm is the rule that findings of fact of the CA are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court provided they are
supported by evidence on record or substantial evidence. Fortunately for petitioner, we will be
liberal with her petition considering that the CA’s factual findings contradict
those of the RTC, and there was an asseveration that the court a quo went beyond the issues of the
case. Indeed, these grounds were
considered exceptions to the factual issue bar rule.
Secondly,
the petition unnecessarily impleaded the CA in violation of Section 4, Rule
45. We will let this breach pass only
because there is a need to entertain the petition due to the conflicting
rulings between the lower courts; however, a repetition may result to
sanctions.
The
actual threshold issue is which court, the Manila RTC or the Manila MeTC, has
jurisdiction over the Tan Te ejectment suit.
Once the jurisdictional issue is settled, the heart of the dispute is
whether or not respondent is entitled to the ejectment of petitioner Dela Cruz
from the premises.
However,
the petition is bereft of merit.
On the Issue of
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the power or capacity
given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine
certain controversies.[5] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law.
Section 33 of Chapter III -- on
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts of B. P. No. 129[6]
provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
x x x x
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction
over ejectment proceedings (accion
interdictal) is lodged with the first level courts. This is clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that embraces an action for forcible entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of
physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. In actions
for forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be met for the municipal trial
court to acquire jurisdiction. First,
the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the
property. Second, they must also assert
that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. Third, the action
must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors
learned of their deprivation of physical possession of the land or building.
The other kind of ejectment
proceeding is unlawful detainer (desahucio),
where one unlawfully withholds possession of the subject property after the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. Here, the issue of rightful possession is the
one decisive; for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual
possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the
defendant’s right to continue in possession.[7] The essential requisites of unlawful detainer
are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied; (2) the
expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to hold possession; (3)
withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land or building after
expiration or termination of the right to possession; (4) letter of demand upon
lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the
action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand received by
the defendant.
A person who wants to recover
physical possession of his real property will prefer an ejectment suit because
it is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure which allows immediate
execution of the judgment under Section 19, Rule 70 unless the defendant
perfects an appeal in the RTC and complies with the requirements to stay
execution; all of which are nevertheless beneficial to the interests of the lot
owner or the holder of the right of possession.
On the other hand, Section 19, of
Chapter II of B.P. No. 129 on Regional Trial Courts provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction
in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
x x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Two (2) kinds of action to recover
possession of real property which fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC are:
(1) the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession (accion publiciana) when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year or when the action was filed
more than one (1) year from date of the last demand received by the lessee or
defendant; and (2) an action for the recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria) which includes
the recovery of possession.
These actions are governed by the
regular rules of procedure and adjudication takes a longer period than the
summary ejectment suit.
To determine whether a complaint for
recovery of possession falls under the jurisdiction of the MeTC (first level
court) or the RTC (second level court), we are compelled to go over the
allegations of the complaint. The
general rule is that what determines the nature of the action and the court
that has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. These cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.[8]
This general rule however admits exceptions. In Ignacio
v. CFI of Bulacan, it was held “that while the allegations in the complaint
make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is averred by way of defense
and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
as the case should properly be filed with the then Court of Agrarian
Relations.”[9]
The cause of action in a complaint is
not what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in
the body of the complaint define and describe.
The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations
in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of
the complaint.[10]
Let us refer to the allegations of
the complaint filed in the Manila MeTC in Civil Case No. 98-89174, which we
quote verbatim:
3. That
plaintiff is the absolute and registered owner of a parcel of land located at
No. 1332, Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila now being occupied by defendant;
4. That
plaintiff purchased the above-said parcel of land together with its
improvements from the legal heirs of the late EMERLINDA DIMAYUGA REYES on
November 26, 1996, under and by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale x x x;
5. That
pursuant to the said deed of sale, the title to the land and all its improvements
was transferred in plaintiff’s name as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 233273 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila on April 22, 1997 x
x x;
6. That
prior to said sale, the previous owners, represented by Mr. Lino Reyes, husband
of the said deceased Emerlinda D. Reyes and the administrator of her estate,
was in possession and control of the property subject of this complaint;
7. That
also prior to said sale, defendant, without the knowledge and consent of Mr.
Lino Reyes, surreptitiously and by means of stealth and strategy entered, used
and occupied the said premises thus depriving the former of rightful possession
thereof;
8. That on February 21, 1994, Mr. Lino Reyes, through Atty. Alejo Sedico, his lawyer, furnished the defendants a letter formally demanding that defendant vacate the premises x x x;
9. That,
however, defendant failed and refused to vacate despite just and legal demand
by Mr. Lino Reyes;
10. That
after the sale to plaintiff of said premises, plaintiff has several times
demanded of defendants to vacate the premises, the last demand having been made
on them personally and in writing on January 14, 1997 x x x;
11. That
defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to vacate the premises
without legal cause or justifiable reason whatsoever;[11]
The answer of petitioner averred:
4. The
Court has no jurisdiction over the case, having been filed by plaintiff more
than the reglementary one year period to commence forcible entry case, which is
reckoned from the date of the alleged unlawful entry of defendant by the use of
stealth and strategy into the premises;
5. For
more than four decades now, defendant has been and still is a rent-paying
tenant of the subject land occupied by their residential house, dating back to
the original owner-lessor, the Dimayuga family.
Her lease with no definite duration, commenced with a rent at P60.00 per
month until it was gradually increased in the ensuing years. As of November 1996, it stood at P300.00 a
month;
6. In
this circumstances [sic], defendant enjoys the protective mantle of P.D. 20 and
the subsequent rental control status against dispossession. She cannot be ejected other than for causes
prescribed under B.P. Blg. 25. Further,
in case of sale of the land, she has the right of first refusal under the
express provision of P.D. 1571;
7. Throughout
the years of her tenancy, defendant has been updated in her rental payment
until the collector of the original owner-lessor no longer came around as she
has done theretofore;
7.1. As
a result, she was compelled to file a petition for consignation of rent before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila;
8. A
bona fide tenant within the ambit if [sic] P.D. 20 and the subsequent rental
control status, including B.P. Blg. 25, under its terms, cannot be ousted on a
plea of expiration of her monthly lease;
9. Her
lease constitutes a legal encumbrance upon the property of the lessor/owner and
binds the latter’s successor-in-interest who is under obligation to respect it;
10. The
land at bench is the subject of a pending expropriation proceedings;
11. Plaintiff
being a married woman cannot sue or be sued without being joined by her
husband;[12]
Undeniably, the aforequoted
allegations of the complaint are vague and iffy in revealing the nature of the
action for ejectment.
The allegations in the complaint show
that prior to the sale by Lino Reyes, representing the estate of his wife
Emerlinda Reyes, he was in possession and control of the subject lot but were deprived
of said possession when petitioner, by means of stealth and strategy, entered
and occupied the same lot. These
circumstances imply that he had prior physical possession of the subject lot
and can make up a forcible entry complaint.
On the other hand, the allegation
that petitioner Dela Cruz was served several demands to leave the premises but
refused to do so would seem to indicate an action for unlawful detainer since a
written demand is not necessary in an action for forcible entry. It is a fact that the MeTC complaint was
filed on
As previously discussed, the settled
rule is jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the initiatory pleading and
the defenses in the answer are deemed irrelevant and immaterial in its
determination. However, we relax the
rule and consider the complaint at bar as an exception in view of the special
and unique circumstances present. First,
as in Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan,[13]
the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised in the answer wherein there was
an admission that petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the former owners of the
lot, the Reyeses, prior to the sale to respondent Tan Te. The fact that petitioner was a tenant of the
predecessors-in-interest of respondent Tan Te is material to the determination
of jurisdiction. Since this is a
judicial admission against the interest of petitioner, such admission can be
considered in determining jurisdiction.
Second, the ejectment suit was filed with the Manila MeTC on
Based on the complaint and the
answer, it is apparent that the Tan Te ejectment complaint is after all a
complaint for unlawful detainer. It was
admitted that petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the Reyeses for around four
(4) decades. Thus, initially petitioner
as lessee is the legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a contract of
lease. When fire destroyed her house,
the Reyeses considered the lease terminated; but petitioner Dela Cruz persisted
in returning to the lot and occupied it by strategy and stealth without the
consent of the owners. The Reyeses
however tolerated the continued
occupancy of the lot by petitioner.
Thus, when the lot was sold to respondent Tan Te, the rights of the
Reyeses, with respect to the lot, were transferred to their subrogee,
respondent Tan Te, who for a time also tolerated
the stay of petitioner until she decided to eject the latter by sending several
demands, the last being the January 14, 1997 letter of demand. Since the action was filed with the MeTC on
Thus, an ejectment complaint based on
possession by tolerance of the owner,
like the Tan Te complaint, is a specie of unlawful detainer cases.
As early as 1913, case law introduced
the concept of possession by tolerance in ejectment cases as follows:
It is true that the landlord might, upon
the failure of the tenant to pay the stipulated rents, consider the contract
broken and demand immediate possession of the rented property, thus converting
a legal possession into illegal possession. Upon the other hand, however, the
landlord might conclude to give the tenant credit for the payment of the rents
and allow him to continue indefinitely in the possession of the property. In
other words, the landlord might choose to give the tenant credit from month to
month or from year to year for the payment of their rent, relying upon his
honesty of his financial ability to pay the same. During such period the tenant
would not be in illegal possession of the property and the landlord could not
maintain an action of desahucio until after he had taken steps to convert the
legal possession into illegal possession. A mere failure to pay the rent in
accordance with the contract would justify the landlord, after the legal
notice, in bringing an action of desahucio. The landlord might, however, elect
to recognize the contract as still in force and sue for the sums due under it.
It would seem to be clear that the landlord might sue for the rents due and [unpaid,
without electing to terminate the contract of tenancy;] [w]hether he can
declare the contract of tenancy broken and sue in an action desahucio for the
possession of the property and in a separate actions for the rents due and
damages, etc.[14]
The concept of possession by
tolerance in unlawful detainer cases was further refined and applied in
pertinent cases submitted for decision by 1966.
The rule was articulated as follows:
Where despite the lessee’s failure to pay
rent after the first demand, the lessor did not choose to bring an action in
court but suffered the lessee to continue occupying the land for nearly two
years, after which the lessor made a second demand, the one-year period for
bringing the detainer case in the justice of the peace court should be counted
not from the day the lessee refused the first demand for payment of rent but
from the time the second demand for rents and surrender of possession was not
complied with.[15]
In Calubayan v. Pascual, a case usually cited in subsequent decisions
on ejectment, the concept of possession by tolerance was further elucidated as
follows:
In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the premises nor filing an action to eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendant’s possession and use of the premises. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing jurisprudence, it
is unequivocal that petitioner’s possession after she intruded into the lot
after the fire—was by tolerance or leniency of the Reyeses and hence, the
action is properly an unlawful detainer case falling under the jurisdiction of
the Manila MeTC.
Even if we concede that it is the RTC
and not the MeTC that has jurisdiction over the Tan Te complaint, following the
reasoning that neither respondent nor her predecessor-in-interest filed an
ejectment suit within one (1) year from February 21, 1994 when the Reyeses knew
of the unlawful entry of petitioner, and hence, the complaint is transformed
into an accion publiciana, the Court
deems it fair and just to suspend its rules in order to render efficient,
effective, and expeditious justice considering the nine (9) year pendency of
the ejectment suit. More importantly, if
there was uncertainty on the issue of jurisdiction that arose from the
averments of the complaint, the same cannot be attributed to respondent Tan Te
but to her counsel who could have been confused as to the
actual nature of the ejectment suit. The
lawyer’s apparent imprecise language used in the preparation of the complaint
without any participation on the part of Tan Te is sufficient special or compelling
reason for the grant of relief.
The case of Barnes v. Padilla[17] elucidates
the rationale behind the exercise by this Court of the power to relax, or even
suspend, the application of the rules of procedure:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this
principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
this Court itself has already declared to be final x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.[18]
Moreover, Section 8, Rule 40
authorizes the RTC—in case of affirmance of an order of the municipal trial
court dismissing a case without trial on the merits and the ground of dismissal
is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter—to try the case on the merits
as if the case was originally filed with it if the RTC has jurisdiction over
the case. In the same vein, this Court,
in the exercise of its rule-making power, can suspend its rules with respect to
this particular case (pro hac vice),
even if initially, the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over the ejectment suit,
and decide to assume jurisdiction over it in order to promptly resolve the
dispute.
The issue of jurisdiction settled, we
now scrutinize the main issue.
At the heart of every ejectment suit
is the issue of who is entitled to physical possession of the lot or possession
de facto.
We rule in favor of respondent Tan Te
for the following reasons:
1. Petitioner
admitted in her Answer that she was a rent-paying tenant of the Reyeses,
predecessors-in-interest of respondent Tan Te.
As such, she recognized the ownership of the lot by respondent, which
includes the right of possession.
2. After
the fire raged over the structures on the subject lot in late 1989 the
contracts of lease expired, as a result of which Lino Reyes demanded that all
occupants, including petitioner, vacate the lot but the latter refused to
abandon the premises. During the
duration of the lease, petitioner’s possession was legal but it became unlawful
after the fire when the lease contracts were deemed terminated and demands were
made for the tenants to return possession of the lot.
3. Petitioner’s
possession is one by the Reyeses’ tolerance and generosity and later by
respondent Tan Te’s.
Petitioner fully knows that her stay
in the subject lot is at the leniency and magnanimity of Mr. Lino Reyes and
later of respondent Tan Te; and her acquiescence to such use of the lot carries
with it an implicit and assumed commitment that she would leave the premises
the moment it is needed by the owner.
When respondent Tan Te made a last, written demand on
Petitioner raises the ancillary issue
that on March 15, 1998, the Manila City Council passed and approved Ordinance
No. 7951:
[a]uthorizing the Manila City Mayor to acquire either by negotiation or expropriation certain parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 233273, 175106 and 140471, containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Five (1,425) square meters, located at Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets, Sta. Cruz, Manila, for low cost housing and award to actual bonafide residents thereat and further authorizing the City Mayor to avail for that purpose any available funds of the city and other existing funding facilities from other government agencies x x x.[19]
It readily appears that this issue
was not presented before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097 despite
the fact that the respondent’s petition was filed on September 25, 1998, six
months after the ordinance was passed.
Thus, this issue is proscribed as are all issues raised for the first
time before the Court are proscribed.
Even granting for the sake of
argument that we entertain the issue, we rule that the intended expropriation
of respondent’s lot (TCT No. 233273) by the city government of
WHEREFORE,
this petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The April 30, 1999 Decision of
the Court of Appeals reinstating the April 3, 1998 MeTC Decision in Civil Case
No. 156730-CV and the July 16, 1999 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097 are
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[2] Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6359, entitled “An Act to Regulate Rentals for the Years of Dwelling Units or of Land on which Another’s Dwelling is Located and Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes.”
[8] Santos v. Ayon, G. R. No. 137013, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA 83, 89; see also Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.
[9] G.R. No. L-27897-98, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 89, 95, cited in F.D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I (6th revised ed.) 9.
[10] Supra note 7, at 386, citing Feranil v. Arcilla, G.R. No. L-44353, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 770, 776.