SECOND
DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, *
AZCUNA,
and
GARCIA,
JJ.
HON. JUDGE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ,
in his capacity as Presiding
Br. 158,
LIGAYA P. SALAYON and ATTY.
ANTONIO M. LLORENTE,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Joint Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 68922 and 69703 which affirmed the Order[2] issued by respondent Judge Jose R. Hernandez, presiding judge of Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 118823-31, 118848-91, 118902-9063 and 119099-204 for violation of private respondents Llorente and Salayon's right to speedy trial.
First, the facts.
The instant case stemmed from a complaint filed by Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senatorial candidate in the May 1995 elections, against private respondents Salayon and Llorente, Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City, and a certain Reynaldo San Juan, Campaign Manager of senatorial candidate Juan Ponce Enrile, for allegedly decreasing Pimentel's votes in the Statement of Votes per precinct and in the City Certificate of Canvass for Pasig City. Pimentel filed a petition with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 133509, which sought the reversal of the resolutions of the COMELEC dismissing his complaint for lack of probable cause. On February 9, 2000, we promulgated our Decision in said case, granting Pimentel's petition and ordering the COMELEC "to file forthwith with the proper [RTC] the necessary criminal information for violation of Section 27(b) of [Republic Act] No. 6646,[3] otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, against private respondents Ligaya Salayon and Antonio Llorente."[4]
Pursuant thereto, the COMELEC filed a total of 321 informations for violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against private respondents Llorente and Salayon on the following dates: a) nine (9) informations were filed on August 28, 2000, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 118823-118831; b) forty-four (44) informations on August 29, 2000, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 118848-118891; c) one hundred sixty-two (162) informations on August 31, 2000, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 118902-119063; and d) 106 informations on September 7, 2000, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 119099-119204. The four sets of informations were raffled to Branches 164, 158, 153 and 69, respectively, of the RTC of Pasig City.
Private respondent Llorente filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Consolidation[5] of Criminal Case Nos. 118823-118831 (pending before Branch 164) with Criminal Case Nos. 118848-118891 (pending before Branch 158). This motion was granted by Branch 164,[6] thereby consolidating the nine (9) informations pending before it with the 44 other informations pending with Branch 158.
Subsequently, private respondent Llorente filed three (3) Omnibus Motions before Branches 158, 153 and 69 of the RTC of Pasig City, asking them: 1) to consolidate all the cases filed against him for violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646; 2) to declare the multiple informations filed against him as constituting only one offense; 3) to treat the 321 informations filed against him as only one information for violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646; and 4) to allow him to post bail to only one information.
After finding private respondent Llorente's prayer to consolidate to be "meritorious and there being no objection" from the prosecution, Judge Ericcio C. Ygaña of Branch 153 granted the same and remanded Criminal Case Nos. 118902-119063 to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City for proper disposition.[7] Similarly, Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna of Branch 69 granted private respondent Llorente's motion to consolidate, finding that "it is for the convenience of the parties that these cases (Criminal Case Nos. 119099-119204) be consolidated with those cases pending before Branch 158 considering that all cases involved common questions of fact and law and the parties may have to introduce common evidence in support of their respective positions in these cases." Judge Pahimna forwarded the cases pending before Branch 69 to Branch 158 "unless the presiding judge of said branch interposes objection to such consolidation." Moreover, the other issues raised by private respondent Llorente were referred to Branch 158 for appropriate action.[8]
On
Private respondent Llorente filed an
Opposition (to the Prosecution's Urgent Omnibus Motion dated
On
WHEREFORE,
accused Llorente's Omnibus Motion dated September 5, 2000, Omnibus Motion dated
September 6, 2000 and Omnibus Motion dated September 8, 2000 are granted
allowing the consolidation of cases against accused Llorente pending before
Branches 69, 153 and 164 of this Court with those pending before this branch. The multiple acts alleged in the 321
Informations filed against him are declared to constitute only one violation of
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.
There should then be only one information against accused Llorente. This benefit applies also to accused
Salayon. Public Prosecutor's (sic) Bagabuyo's Omnibus Motion dated
The
arraignment and pre-trial of both accused is (sic) set on
SO
ORDERED.[13]
The trial court noted that
during the hearing on private respondent Llorente's motion on
[I]n this
case[,] the unity of criminal intent is manifested by the fact that the several
acts of tampering[,] while allegedly done separately over a three-day period,
were perpetuated on one single occasion which is the canvassing of the votes
cast in the May 8, 1995 elections in Pasig City, and, significantly,
perpetuated only on one single document, the SoV, a document of fifty-eight
(58) pages. While there maybe several
acts of tampering, this Court could attribute only one crime against accused
Llorente. This is what the Comelec did
in People vs. Maria Arsenia Garcia, et al. docketed as Criminal Case No. 3485-A
before the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan. The multiple acts of tampering by the accused
were treated by the COMELEC as one offense or a single count of (sic) the violation of Section 27(b) of
R.A. 6646. There is no reason then why
accused Llorente should be treated differently.[14]
On
In his Order[18] dated May 11, 2001, respondent Judge denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the March 2, 2001 Order and set the arraignment and pre-trial of private respondents "on June 15, 2001 at 8:30 in the morning."
On
Both
accused, assisted by their respective counsels, after having been informed of
the charge filed against them and its attending consequences, entered a plea of
NOT GUILTY.
Pursuant
to the Order of
Having
entered their plea, set the pre-trial of this case on
On
Since
Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo is again not
available for today's hearing because he is indisposed as relayed to this Court
by his representative, Atty. Jay I. Dejaresco, and through a telephone call
from his secretary Orlando Nicolas, as prayed for, and over the vehement
objection of counsels for both accused, the pre-trial/trial scheduled today is
cancelled and reset on August 2, 2001 at 8:30 in the morning.
x x x
In
the event that there will again be no appearance from Prosecutor Bagabuyo at
the next scheduled hearing, the Legal Department of the COMELEC shall then make
its appearance and take over the prosecution of this case.
SO
ORDERED.[22]
After considering the
respective positions of the prosecution and the private respondents, the trial
court issued its Order dated
Accordingly, petitioner, through Senior
State Prosecutor Bagabuyo, filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus, Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No. 65966. On
Meantime, in the trial court, the
hearing set on
On
Private respondent Llorente filed his
Motion to Dismiss dated
On
WHEREFORE, the Motion
to Dismiss dated
SO ORDERED.[35]
Petitioner, through Senior State
Prosecutor Bagabuyo, then filed with
this Court a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus[36]
dated
1.
Upon the filing hereof, this case be consolidated with [the] Petition
for Review, filed last
2.
The Order dismissing the instant cases be recalled, set aside and the
321 criminal cases filed against both accused Salayon and Llorente be
reinstated; after which they be arraigned for the 321 counts for the violation
of Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646;
3.
The Order, dated
4.
All the cases that used to be pending before the respondent, Honorable
RTC-158 be ordered remanded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle
to the other branches, except those where these cases were originally assigned
to; or in the alternative,
5.
An Order be issued changing venue from the City of
6.
Plaintiff-petitioner prays for such other relief consistent with law and
equity on the matter.[37]
Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, we referred said
petition to the CA for appropriate action.[38]
In the CA, the case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69703.
Meantime, on
Subsequently, CA-G.R. SP Nos. 69703 and 68922 were
consolidated.[42]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68922 and CA-G.R. SP No. 69703 are hereby both DENIED DUE COURSE
and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
The assailed Order dated November 23, 2001 issued by Branch 158 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Criminal Case Nos. 118823-31; 118848-91;
118902-9063; and 119099-204, all entitled “People of the Philippines v. Ligaya
P. Salayon and Antonio M. Llorente,” is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[43]
The CA noted that as to CA-G.R. SP No. 69703, Senior State
Prosecutor Bagabuyo filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Petition dated
Hence,
the instant petition on certiorari under Rule 45 in which petitioner raises the
following issues:
I. [WHETHER]
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE WRIT OF
CERTIORARI IS NOT WARRANTED INASMUCH AS WHAT IS BEING IMPUGNED IS "AN
ERROR OF JUDGMENT."
II. [WHETHER] THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE
321 CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.[46]
The issues to be resolved are: a) whether a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy from the dismissal of the cases before the trial court on the ground of the denial of private respondents' right to speedy trial; and b) whether the CA erred in finding that respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the instant criminal cases against private respondents upon a finding that the right of private respondents to speedy trial has been violated.
We shall first resolve the procedural issue.
Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA was the proper remedy since respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he consolidated the 321 criminal cases into one information and dismissed the "criminal case" on the ground of the denial of private respondents' right to speedy trial, without giving the prosecution the chance to present evidence. Citing People v. Velasco,[47] petitioner contends that the dismissal of the "criminal case" against private respondents is tantamount to their acquittal which, as a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal from in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. In any case, the alleged existence of the remedy of appeal does not always foreclose the remedy of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner's remedy with the CA was correct.
Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[a]ny party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.”
As a general rule, the prosecution
cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the
defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring
that right.[48]
Thus, errors of judgment are not appealable by the prosecution. Appeal by the prosecution from the order of
dismissal of the criminal case by the trial court may be allowed only on errors
of jurisdiction when there was denial of due process resulting in loss or lack
of jurisdiction.[49]
This is so as while it is true that double jeopardy will attach in case the
prosecution appeals a decision acquitting the accused, an acquittal rendered in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not
really "acquit" and therefore does not terminate the case as there
can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment.[50]
In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against private respondents for the denial of their right to speedy trial. In a long line of cases, we have held that a dismissal on the ground of the denial of the accused's right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal that would
bar further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense.[51] Thus, we have held that where after such
dismissal the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order of
dismissal and the court re-set the case for trial, the accused can successfully
claim double jeopardy as the said order was actually an acquittal, was final
and cannot be reconsidered.[52] Hence, petitioner was correct in filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging that "respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the order of dismissal dated November 23, 2001 allegedly
on account of the speedy trial rule" as an appeal was not available to
it. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly
capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve
double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the correctness but the
validity of the order of dismissal and such grave abuse of discretion amounts
to lack of jurisdiction which prevents double jeopardy from attaching.[53]
Having settled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA was the proper remedy from the dismissal of the instant cases by the trial court, the crucial issue is: was the CA correct in ruling that a writ of certiorari was not warranted inasmuch as the respondent Judge did not act in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the instant cases against private respondents for the denial of their right to speedy trial?
A writ of certiorari is warranted when 1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[54] An act of a court or tribunal may be considered as in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.[55]
We affirm the CA's ruling that no such grave abuse of discretion was shown to exist in respondent Judge's dismissal of the instant cases.
The right of the accused to a speedy
trial is guaranteed under Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.[56]
In 1998, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8493, otherwise known as the "Speedy
Trial Act of 1998." The law provided for time limits in order "to
ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, [RTC],
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court." On
Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.--
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the preceding
section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity
on
R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate certain reasonable delays as exclusions
in the computation of the prescribed time limits. They also provide that "no provision of
law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a
bar to any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section
14(2), of the 1987 Constitution."[57]
Thus, in spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence
continues to adopt the view that the concept of "speedy trial" is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[58] In Corpuz
v. Sandiganbayan,[59] we held:
The right of the accused to a speedy trial
and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him
for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice
by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
cases. Such right to a speedy
trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding
is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. x x x
While justice is administered with
dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere
speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a
system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights
to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.
Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are
to give meaning to that intent.
A
balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has
been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy
trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for
the
delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the
defendant. (citations omitted)
In the cases at
bar, in finding that private respondents were denied of their right to speedy
trial, respondent Judge recounted the following incidents in the trial court:
The Court considers the accused['s] arraignment of
The
August 2, 2001 hearing was held, but the Prosecution, through Prosecutor
Bagabuyo, manifested that it would question the Order of this Court dated June
15, 2001 and the Court’s Order on said date denying the Prosecution’s Motion
for Reconsideration to the Order of June 15, 2001. As requested, the Court granted the
Prosecution 30 days to file the proper petition before the higher court, and
the pre-trial and trial was reset anew to
Clearly, the one hundred eleven (111) days that have elapsed from the time private respondents were arraigned on June 15, 2001 up to the filing of the Motion to Dismiss by private respondents on the ground of the denial of their right to speedy trial on October 4, 2001 is beyond the 80-day limit provided under the law and the rules. The incidents that transpired before the trial court likewise show that the postponements at the instance of the prosecution were not justified. As found by the CA:
The
Court a quo has sufficiently
justified its order of dismissal for failure to prosecute in violation of the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial as mandated by Section
14(2) and Section 16 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The right to speedy trial means one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to
assure that an innocent person may be freed from the anxiety and expense of a
court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatever legitimate defense he may interpose.[61]
x x x
The
cancellation of the hearings by the prosecution without any valid ground is
certainly vexatious, capricious and oppressive and it has been held that the
dismissal of the case following a number of postponements at the instance of
the prosecution is not an abuse of discretion,[62]
and especially taking into account the periods in Rule 119 which are explicitly
provided.[63]
Petitioner invokes the exclusions provided in Section 3(a)(3) and (f), Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which state:
Sec. 3.
Exclusions.-- The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence:
a) Any period of delay resulting from other
proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:
x x x
3) Delay resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders;
x x x
f) Any period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted by any court motu proprio, or on motion of either
the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set
forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
Petitioner contends that there was no inordinate delay
on the part of the prosecution to justify a dismissal of the cases based on a
violation of the private respondents' right to speedy trial. The date of arraignment was
We are not persuaded. As correctly held by the CA, "delay
resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" must
be read in harmony with Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides
that the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against
the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." This was clearly spelled out by respondent
Judge when, in addition to granting a 30-day continuance in view of the
manifestation of the prosecution that it would file an appeal from the
interlocutory order of the trial court with a higher court, the trial court, in
its August 2, 2001 Order, gave a warning that "[i]n the event that the
prosecution shall not be able to get any restraining order to stop the
proceedings in this case, the hearing on [September 4, 2001] shall proceed as
scheduled." Despite this warning,
however, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo did not appear for the prosecution on
the September 4, 2001 hearing set by the trial court and the court only received a call from the
secretary of said Senior State Prosecutor that the latter had his tooth
extracted and would not be in a position to appear at the hearing. What made the manner of postponement worse was
that Atty. Galimpin, the private prosecutor, informed the trial court that he
saw Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the Office of the Clerk of Court, which
is located at the first floor of the same building where the trial court sits.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 3(f) of Rule 119 is also misplaced as
nowhere in the Orders granting continuance did respondent Judge set
forth that his order was based on findings that “the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in
a speedy trial,” as required under the law and the Rules of Court. To the contrary, the successive continuances
granted by the trial court were compelled by the repeated absence of the public
prosecutor or his refusal to proceed with the pre-trial and trial. The orders of the court contained repeated
warnings that "[i]n the event that
there will again be no appearance from Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the next
scheduled hearing, the Legal Department of the COMELEC shall then make its
appearance and take over the prosecution of this case." In its September 4,
2001 Order denying private respondents' oral motions to dismiss and giving the
prosecution another chance to prosecute the cases by resetting the hearings to
October 3 and 15, 2001, the trial court gave an admonition that the
prosecution's failure to appear will be dealt with accordingly. Even when Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo
appeared on
The Court notes the petition for certiorari that Prosecutor Bagabuyo
filed before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-GR SP No. 65966 questioning
the propriety of [the] June 15, 2001 Order of this Court and the Honorable
Court of Appeals dated August 16, 2001 dismissed the petition outright. It also notes the resolution of the said Court
dated
Petitioner also contends in the instant petition that respondent Judge's decision declaring the 321 Informations against private respondents for violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 as only one Information, the arraignment of the accused to only one information and his Decision dismissing the "case" against private respondents give rise to the following questions: 1) Which one of the 321 Informations did private respondents plead "not guilty" to? and 2) What case did Judge Hernandez dismiss when he stated that "this case is dismissed"?
The contention is unavailing. Contrary to petitioner's claim, a reading of
the
Pursuant to the Order of
What this
argument reflects is petitioner's stubborn insistence not to recognize the
trial court's interlocutory Orders dated
A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate
court has once declared the law in a case, such declaration continues to be the
law of that case even on a subsequent appeal.
The rule made by an appellate court, while it may be reversed in other
cases, cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case. The “Law of the Case,” as applied to a former
decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of the courts in
refusing to reopen what has been decided.
Such a rule is "necessary to enable an appellate court to perform
its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a
question, once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the
same case upon any and every subsequent appeal." Again, the rule is
necessary as a matter of policy in order to end litigation. "There would
be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals,
compel a court to listen to criticisms on their opinions, or speculate of
chances from changes in its members."
Petitioner's contention that the prosecution was clearly deprived of its day in court when it was not afforded the right to be present during the private respondents' arraignment and to proceed to trial cannot stand scrutiny. Again, the issue of the validity of the arraignment of the private respondents without the presence of Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo has already been established with finality in the prosecution's previous appeal with the CA in CA-G.R. SP. No. 65966 and with this Court in G.R. No. 150317 and, thus, constitutes the law of the case between the parties. Petitioner cannot re-raise said issue in this petition. Moreover, petitioner's failure to proceed to trial, as clearly shown by the events that transpired in the trial court, was due to its own fault.
In order that a judgment or order of acquittal may be successfully challenged in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioner must prove that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely errors of judgment, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[67] No such grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to respondent Judge in dismissing the instant cases for the denial of private respondents' right to speedy trial.
A
last note. The first and the foremost state
principle announced in our Constitution is that “the
IN
VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied.
The Joint Decision dated
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
(on leave)
RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] Dated
[2] Dated
[3] Section 27. Election Offenses.- In
addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in Sections
261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be
guilty of an election offense: x x x
b) Any member of the board of election inspector
or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received
by a candidate in any election or any member of the board, who refuses, after
proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such
tampered votes.
[4] Pimentel v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133509,
[5] CA-G.R. SP No. 69703 Rollo,
pp. 64-65.
[6] Order dated
[7]
[8]
[9] It appears that prior to Senior
State Prosecutor Bagabuyo's appearance,
it was Jose Balbuena, Director IV of the COMELEC's Law Department, who acted as
government prosecutor. On
[10] Dated
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, p. 56.
[14]
[15] CA-G.R. SP No. 69703 Rollo,
pp. 129-149.
[16]
[17]
[18] Rollo, pp. 65-74.
[19] CA-G.R. SP No. 69703 Rollo,
p. 62.
[20] Rollo, pp. 65-70.
[21] CA-G.R. SP No. 69703 Rollo,
p. 216.
[22]
[23] Rollo, pp. 163-164.
[24]
[25]
[26] Resolution dated
[27] CA-G.R. SP No. 69703 Rollo,
pp. 233-320.
[28] SC Resolution (Third Division)
dated
[29] SC Resolution (Third Division)
dated
[30] Order dated
[31] CA-G.R. SP No. 69703 Rollo,
p. 330.
[32] Rollo, pp. 165-172.
[33] CA-G.R. SP No. 69703 Rollo,
pp. 614-633.
[34]
[35] Rollo, p. 91.
[36]
[37]
[38] CA-G.R. SP No. 69703 Rollo,
p. 332.
[39] CA-G.R. SP No. 68922 Rollo,
p. 8.
[40]
[41]
[42] See
notation, CA-G.R. SP No. 69703 Rollo, p. 312.
[43] Rollo, p. 46.
[44] Citing
Acebedo v. Sarmiento, No. L-28025,
[45] 97 Phil. 28 (1955).
[46] Rollo, p. 19.
[47] G.R. No. 127444,
[48] See
People v. Velasco, supra, p. 238.
[49] See
Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme,
L-54904,
[50] People
v. CA, G.R. No. 132396,
[51] See
People v. Tampal, G.R. No. 102485, May 22, 1995, 244 SCRA 202; Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy,
G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 94, 107, citing People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, 8 December 1994, 239 SCRA
48; People v. Declaro, G.R. No.
64362, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 142; People
v. Quizada, L-61079-81, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 516.
[52] See
Lagunilla v. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1020 (1961); Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium Vol. II (2001), p. 494; Agpalo, Handbook on Criminal Procedure
(2001), p. 396.
[53] See
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium Vol. II (2001), p. 503.
[54] Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[55] Angeles
v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 142612, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 106,
113-114 (citations omitted).
[56] Section 14(2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides that the accused "shall enjoy the right x x x
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial." Section 16, Article III of
the Constitution likewise states that "[a]ll persons shall have the right
to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies."
[57] Section 17 of R.A. No. 8493;
Section 15, SC Circular No. 38-98; Section 10, Rule 119, 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
[58] Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. People,
G.R. No. 140863, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 511, 520, citing Joaquin G. Bernas, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, Vol. I (1987),
p. 421; See also Caballes v.
CA, G.R. No. 163108, February 23,
2005, 452 SCRA 312, 332, citing Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 294.
[59] Supra.
[60] Rollo, pp. 89-90.
[61] Citing
Acebedo v. Sarmiento, No. L-28025,
[62] Citing
People v. Abaño, 97 Phil. 28 (1955).
[63] Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[64]
[65]
[66] 39 Phil. 747, 749-750 (1919), as cited in Padillo v. CA, G.R. No. 119707, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA
27, 41.
[67] People
v. CA, G.R. No. 128986,
[68] Section 1, Art. 11, 1987 Constitution.