FIRST
DIVISION
EDGARDO V. GUEVARA,
Petitioner, - versus
- BPI SECURITIES CORPORATION, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 159786 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53379, dated 21 March 2003,[1]
dismissing Civil Case No. 95-624, filed by herein petitioner, Edgardo V. Guevara,
against herein respondent, BPI Securities Corporation. Likewise assailed is the Resolution[2]
dated
Culled
from the records of the case are the following factual and procedural
antecedents:
Guevara
was hired by Ayala Securities Corporation in 1958. He was later detailed to the
Philippine Investment Corporation (PHILSEC, later named as BPI Securities
Corporation), where he acted as its president from
Meanwhile,
a certain Ventura O. Ducat obtained separate loans from Ayala International
Finance Limited (AIFL) and PHILSEC in the amount of US$2,500,000.00[4] as
of P14,088,995.00.
To satisfy the indebtedness, Ducat
made arrangements with 1488, Inc. (1488), a United States (U.S.)-based
corporation, through its president, Drago Daic, to transfer by way of dacion en pago, a 72.21-acre tract of land in
Harris County, Texas, U.S.A. (subject property), in favor of PHILSEC and AIFL.
Ducat, in turn, was to convey to 1488 the same shares of stocks used as
security for his loans with PHILSEC and AIFL.
The latter, however, had no desire to purchase the land; but they were
willing to extend a loan to Athona Holdings, N.V.
(ATHONA), a corporation based in
In an agreement[6]
executed in
Sometime thereafter, ATHONA failed to
pay the interest on the balance of US$307,209.02, hence, the entire amount
covered by the promissory note became due and demandable. Consequently, 1488 filed
a collection suit in the
While
the case was pending before the U.S. courts, PHILSEC, AIFL and ATHONA filed, on
10 April 1987, a civil suit against 1488, Daic, Ducat
and Craig for the annulment of the Agreement due to fraud. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 16563 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of P8,000,000.00
representing the value of stocks liquidated and remitted to 1488, plus
litigation expenses and attorney’s fees. Ducat filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens[10]
due to the pendency of Civil Action No. H-86-440
before the
The
trial court, on
On 13 March 1990, the U.S. District
Court ruled in favor of 1488, and motu proprio dismissed the counter-complaint against Guevara
on the ground that he was impleaded simply to
humiliate and embarrass him.[13] The U.S. District Court also imposed jointly
and severally against PHILSEC and AIFL a penalty of US$49,450.00 in favor of
Guevara in accordance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Court.[14]
PHILSEC and AIFL elevated the matter to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit which remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for further
proceedings, but finally affirmed, on
On
A Motion to Dismiss the amended
Complaint was later filed by 1488, Ducat and Daic.
The Resolution of the said Motion was, however, deferred pending the resolution
by the Supreme Court of G.R. No. 103493[17]
which involved Ducat’s earlier Motion to Dismiss the original complaint in
Civil Case No. 16563.
On 22 April 1992, while G.R. No.
103493[18]
was still pending with this Court, 1488 and Daic
filed a Petition for the enforcement of the judgment of the U.S. District Court
with the Makati City RTC, Branch 134, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-1070.[19]
On 28 May 1992, Guevara filed a case
against BPI Securities Corp. (PHILSEC was already renamed), for enforcement of
the judgment of the U.S. District Court ordering PHILSEC and AIFL to pay him
US$49,450.00 as penalty in accordance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Court. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 92-1445 with the Makati City RTC, Branch
137.[20]
On 24 April 1995, Guevara filed
another Complaint against BPI Securities Corp. seeking the recovery of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees in the aggregate amount of P11,900,000.00
as indemnity for the expenses and annoyance of litigation, arising from his
being wrongly impleaded as a party-defendant in the
U.S. case. Guevara banked on the ruling of the U.S. District Court that the
counter-complaint filed by PHILSEC, AIFL and ATHONA was frivolous and dilatory.[21] This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-624 with the Makati City RTC, Branch 135.[22] A Motion to Dismiss was filed by BPI
Securities Corp. alleging forum shopping for Civil Case No. 16563 was still
pending before the Makati City RTC, Branch 61.[23] The Motion was denied by the trial court in
its Order dated
January
1998, the ruling of the trial court.[26]
The said Decision thereafter became final and executory.
Subsequently, BPI Securities Corp.
filed another Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 95-624 based on
prescription. It alleged that the
summons from the U.S. District Court was received by Guevara on
In the meantime, G.R. No. 103493,[27]
which involved Ducat’s Motion to Dismiss the original complaint in Civil Case
No. 16563, was finally resolved. In a Decision dated 19 June 1997,[28]
this Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial
court for continuance and consolidation of Civil Case No. 16563 with Civil Case
No. 92-1070, then pending with the Makati City RTC,
Branch 134. In the same Decision, this Court also allowed Civil Case No.
92-1445, pending with the Makati City RTC, Branch
137, to proceed as the judgment sought to be enforced therein is severable from
the main judgment under consideration in Civil Case No. 16563.
Consequently, in a Resolution of the Makati City RTC, Branch 134, dated
As
to the second Motion to Dismiss filed by BPI Securities Corp. in Civil Case No.
95-624, the Makati
RTC, Branch 135, found the action as having prescribed and granted the said
Motion in an Order dated 12 October
1998.[30]
In a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing order filed by Guevara, he
argued that the prescriptive period of the action should be counted from the
date of finality of the Decision of the U.S. District Court, following the
ruling in Drilon v. Court of Appeals.[31]
Acting favorably on Guevara’s Motion, the trial court in an Order dated 18
February 1999,[32] set
aside its earlier Order dated 12 October 1998 and calendared Civil Case No.
95-624 for pre-trial.[33]
BPI
Securities Corp. filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, dated
4.01. Whether or not the pendency of the [Civil Case No. 95-624] before respondent court is barred by the principles of litis pendentia or forum shopping due to the pendency of the [Civil Case No. 16563] and the [Civil Case No. 92-1445]?
4.02. Whether or not the [Civil Case No. 95-624] is barred by prescription? Stated in a slightly different matter the issue is: Whether or not the public respondent erred in ruling that the complaint in the [Civil Case No. 95-624] was for “malicious prosecution” (not quasi-delict as contended by petitioner) so that the prescriptive period for such action started to run only after the judgment in the Houston Case became final (and because of this the action was filed on a timely basis)?
BPI
Securities Corp. submitted that Civil Case. No. 16563 bars the filing of Civil
Case No. 95-624 under the principle of litis
pendentia.
It is noteworthy, BPI Securities Corp. asserted, that the consolidated
Cases No. 16563 and No. 90-1070 would determine whether the judgment rendered
by the U.S. District Court is enforceable in the
Although the Court of Appeals, in its
Decision dated
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied and the assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, is hereby affirmed with the modification that the claim for damages due to the suit filed against Guevara in the United States is DISMISSED due to the existence of another action pending between the same parties involving the same cause of action in Civil Case No. 92-1445. Costs against petitioner.[37]
Aggrieved
by the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53379, Guevara filed
a partial motion for reconsideration and in a Resolution,[38]
issued on
Guevara,
thus, filed before this Court the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari [39]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, based on the following assignment of
errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUE RAISED THEREIN WAS ALREADY PASSED UPON IN CA-G.R. NO. 40303
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT CIVIL CASE NO. 624 (SIC) SHOULD BE DISMISSED BASED ON THE GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA.
On one hand, petitioner Guevara
argues that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition of BPI
Securities Corp. in CA-G.R. SP No. 53379 as the issue of litis pendentia and forum shopping was already passed upon by the
same court in CA-G.R. SP No. 40303. In
its Decision in the latter case, the Court of Appeals made the following
pronouncements:
8. And, finally, Civil Case 95-624 is not similar to Civil Case 16563, and forum-shopping does not exist, in line with International Container Terminal Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 389, holding that forum-shopping exists when both actions involve the same parties, the same subject matter, the same essential facts and circumstances, and the same identical issues. Civil Case 16563 and Civil Case 95-264 do not have the same parties as Edgardo V. Guevara is not a party in Civil Case 16563 and that the two cases do not have the same facts nor do they raise the same identical causes of action.[40]
According to Guevara, since the Court
of Appeals had ruled before on the issue of litis
pendentia and forum shopping in a decision that had become final and
executory, the judgment therein constitutes the law of the case between the
parties. Also, the cause of action in
Civil Case No. 95-624 is not the same as that in Civil Case No. 92-1445 and
therefore, there can be no litis pendentia. Civil Case No. 95-624 involves claims for
actual, moral and exemplary damages arising out of the malicious inclusion by
BPI Securities Corp. of Guevara in a counter-complaint filed in the U.S.
District Court; while Civil Case No. 92-1445 involves the enforcement of a
Decision of the U.S. District Court awarding in his favor penalty in accordance
with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Procedure.
The former is based on the Civil Code of the
On the other hand, respondent BPI
Securities Corp., in its Comment,[42]
contends that when the Makati City RTC, Branch 61,
admitted the amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 16563, which impleaded Guevara as an additional defendant, and Guevara
filed his Answer thereto, there became legal ground for BPI Securities Corp. to
raise the issue of litis pendentia in
Civil Case No. 95-624. The ruling in
CA-G.R. SP No. 40303 could not be applied as the law of the case herein because
when that case was decided, Guevara was not yet a party in Civil Case No.
16563. The ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 40303,[43]
thus, relied on a different factual premise from the case presently before this
Court.[44]
BPI Securities Corp. further argues
that the filing by Guevara of Civil Case No. 92-1445 also barred him from
filing Civil Case No. 95-624, again on the principle of litis pendentia.[45] Both cases are based on the single fact that
Guevara was wrongly impleaded as a defendant in the
In sum, the issues raised before this
Court for resolution are as follows: (1) whether or not the final and executory
ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 40303 serves as the law of the case herein; (b)
whether or not Civil Case No. 95-624 should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia; and (c) whether or not
Guevara’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 95-624 has already prescribed.
We rule to dismiss the Petition.
Petitioner Guevara argues that the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40303 constitutes the law of
the case between the parties herein and cannot anymore be altered by any court
as the same had already attained finality.[47] Let it be recalled that in the said decision,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the elements of litis pendentia are not present in Civil Case No. 16563 and Civil
Case No. 95-624. Therefore, the two
cases can co-exist.
It
is a basic legal principle that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the case
continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue
to be the facts of the case before the court. [48]
This principle generally finds
application in cases where an appellate court passes on a question and remands
the case to the lower court for further proceedings. The question there settled becomes the law of
the case upon subsequent appeal. Consequently, the court reviewing the
succeeding appeal will not re-litigate the case but instead apply the ruling in
the previous appeal. This enables the appellate court to perform its duties
satisfactorily and efficiently which would be impossible if a question, once
considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case and
upon any and subsequent appeal.[49]
Clearly,
the principle of law of the case cannot be applied herein. The facts from which the ruling in CA-G.R. SP
No. 40303 was predicated no longer holds true in this case.
When
Civil Case No. 95-624 was filed by Guevara on 24 April 1995, respondent
BPI Securities Corp.’s amended Complaint, impleading
him as party-defendant in Civil Case No. 16563, was not yet acted upon by the
trial court as proceedings therein were suspended pending resolution by this
Court of G.R. No. 103493 involving the Motion to Dismiss the
original complaint in Civil Case No. 16563. When BPI Securities Corp. then
filed its first Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 95-624, on
Guevara
only became a party in Civil Case No. 16563 on
When respondent BPI Securities Corp.
therefore filed its second Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 95-624 based again
on litis pendentia,
Guevara has already become a party in Civil Case No. 16563. With this
significant change in the factual scenario, the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 40303
cannot serve as the law of the case in CA-G.R. SP No. 53379, subject of the
instant appeal.
Will the pendency then of Civil Case
No. 16563, where Guevara is now one of the defendants, bar him from filing
Civil Case No. 95-624?
We rule in the negative.
There is litis pendentia or another action pendente lite if the
following requisites are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.[50]
Civil
Case No. 16563 is for the annulment of the P8,000,000.00 representing the value of stocks liquidated and
remitted to 1488, plus litigation expenses and attorney’s fees. Meanwhile, Civil Case No. 95-624 is for
Guevara’s recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
in the aggregate amount of P11,900,000.00 as indemnity for the expenses
and annoyance of litigation, arising from Guevara’s being maliciously and
wrongly impleaded as a party-defendant in the
Consequently,
Guevara’s compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. 16563 could not be the same
as his cause of action in Civil Case No. 95-624. The wrongful acts committed by
the BPI Securities Corp. which gave rise to Guevara’s cause of action were
different in the two cases. A compulsory
counterclaim is one which arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.[51] Guevara’s compulsory counterclaim in Civil
Case No. 16563 arises out of his being impleaded in
the annulment of contract case. In comparison, Guevara’s cause of action in
Civil Case No. 95-624 springs from his being maliciously and erroneously impleaded as a defendant in the
Although
the pendency of Civil Case No. 16563 does not
constitute litis pendentia and
cannot preclude the filing by Guevara of Civil Case No. 95-624; nevertheless,
this Court states and so rules that Civil Case No. 95-624 is barred by Civil
Case No. 92-1445 on the ground of litis pendentia.
Guevara
tried to convince this Court that the causes of action in Civil Cases No.
92-1445 and 95-624 are different and distinct from each other. While the former was for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment, the latter was a suit purely for damages. A perusal, however,
of the records reveals that the award by the U.S. District Court based on Rule
11 of the Federal Rules on Civil Procedure sought to be enforced in the
Philippine courts by Guevara in Civil Case No. 92-1445, was founded on the same
set of facts that were alleged as the basis for the prayer for damages in Civil
Case No. 95-624. They are both founded on the
A reading
of the allegations of the respective complaints in both actions shows that the
asserted rights are founded on an identical set of facts which gave rise to one
basic issue in both cases, that is, whether or not Guevara may recover damages
out of his involvement in U.S. case.
In Civil
Case No. 92-1445, Guevara averred in his Complaint
that the judgment of the U.S. court based on his erroneous and malicious
prosecution in the U.S. case be enforced and prayed that damages be awarded in
his favor, in this wise:
3.
Prior to the said merger on
4. Plaintiff filed his Answer in the above case, specifically denying all the allegations in the counter-complaint, assailing them as deliberate falsehoods, and stating the true facts. Plaintiff further alleged that Philsec clearly had no cause of action against him as it should have been only Athona Holdings, Inc., which purchased the land, that could properly allege the cause of action against him.
5.
After due hearing before the District Court, the said Court dropped the plaintiff as counter-defendant and dismissed
the case against him. Plaintiff then made an oral motion in open court and filed
the proper affidavit of expenses under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. After some thirty (30) days from the date of the oral motion by
plaintiff, the said court imposed sanction on Philsec
Investment Corporation a.k.a BPI Securities Corporation
and Ayala International Finance Ltd. in its Order dated
6. Rule 11 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“Rule 11. Signing
of Pleadings, Motions and Other Papers, Sanctions:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the party’s pleading, motion or other paper and state the party’s address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party, constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleadings, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
7. Philsec/BPI Securities Corporation appealed said Order of March 13, 1990 (Annex “A”) to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which after due hearing remanded the issue to the District Court to give the latter another opportunity to respond to herein plaintiff’s motion for the Rule 11 sanction.
8. After proper proceedings with due notice by the District Court, where Philsec/BPI Securities Corporation was given full opportunity to be heard and submit its brief, as directed by the Court of Appeals, the District Court issued an Order dated December 30, 1991 concluding that the judgment previously entered was appropriate and reinstating the judgment of March 13, 1990. A photocopy of a certified true copy of the said Order is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex “B”.
9. Philsec/BPI Securities Corporation did not appeal the said
Order (Annex “B”) dated
10. Plaintiff made written demands upon defendant for the latter to comply with the above judgment by paying to the plaintiff the amount of US$49,450.00 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos. However, defendant failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to pay said amount without any valid reason whatsoever. A photocopy of a demand letter sent by the plaintiff is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex “C”.
11. Plaintiff is therefore constrained to
file the instant case thru counsel and to incur attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation of some P250,000.00. That for its refusal to pay its just and
clear obligation, defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff exemplary
damages of P200,000.00[52]
(Emphases supplied.)
In the same vein, Guevara, in Civil
Case No. 95-624 claimed actual, moral and exemplary damages as indemnity on the
account of his frivolous and malicious inclusion as a party-defendant in the
14. Plaintiff repleads and incorporates herein all the foregoing allegations.
15. Because of the malicious filing of the baseless counter-complaint in Houston-Texas by Philsec, plaintiff was compelled to spend time, effort and money to prepare for and pursue his defense.
16.
In April, 1989, plaintiff had to go to
17.
Plaintiff then proceeded with his wife to
18. Thereafter, plaintiff was compelled to go to
19.
For all his above travel to P300,000.00, which defendant should reimburse to
him.
20. Plaintiff repleads and incorporates herein all the above allegations.
21. Plaintiff is a member of the Philippine Bar, he has a good reputation in the community, and is respected by his colleagues as a lawyer and businessman.
22.
Plaintiff served Ayala Corporation and its subsidiaries, including
defendant, from 1958 until his voluntarily retirement on
23. After his retirement from Ayala Corporation, he organized Intra-Invest Securities, Inc., which is engaged in stock brokerage. He became a member and Governor of the Manila Stock Exchange, and he enjoys a high reputation in the stock brokerage industry.
24.
Despite his physical weakness, as a result of his operation (which were
known by defendant and its lawyer) he was forced to travel to
25.
In filing and presenting its counter-complaint in Houston, Texas against
plaintiff and including him in Civil Case 16563 (RTC-Makati)
as above alleged, and in forcing him to defend himself and protect his rights
and interest, defendant caused plaintiff and his family great embarrassment,
mental and physical suffering, anxiety and anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation, for which defendant
should pay him moral damages of at least P10,000,000.00.
26. Plaintiff repleads and incorporates herein all the foregoing allegations.
27. Defendant has acted against plaintiff viciously and maliciously in utter disregard of the true facts obvious and known to it and of the past services rendered by the plaintiff to Philsec and the Ayala Group of which defendant is a member.
28.
For recklessly trifling with the good name, honor and feelings of
plaintiff, and as an example for the public good, defendant should be ordered
to pay plaintiff exemplary damages of at least P1,000,000.00.
In the handling of this case,
plaintiff has been forced to engage the services of counsel and to pay them P400,000,00
as attorney’s fees.[53]
Considering that two actions are
rooted in the same transgression committed by BPI Securities Corp. against
Guevara, to allow these two cases to proceed separately could give rise to a
situation where there would be two conflicting decisions on one cause of action
arising from the same set of facts.
Thus, should the Makati City, RTC Branch 137
in Civil Case No. 92-1445, allow the enforcement of the foreign judgment based
on malicious inclusion of Guevara in the U.S. case, then a finding by the Makati City, RTC Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 95-624 that
Guevara should not be entitled to an award for damages because he was not
maliciously prosecuted in the U.S. case, would undoubtedly be conflicting and
irreconcilable. Conversely, should the Makati City,
RTC Branch 137, repel the foreign judgment sought to be enforced herein by
evidence of clear mistake of law or fact[54]
committed by the U.S. courts, and instead find that Guevara was not maliciously
impleaded as a party-defendant in the U.S. case; then
it would necessarily be inconsistent with a decision by the Makati
City, RTC Branch 135, finding malice and bad faith in the inclusion of Guevara
in the same U.S. case.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a
civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between
the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action
becomes unnecessary and vexatious.[55] Indeed, the elements of litis pendentia are obviously present in Civil Cases No. 92-1445
and 95-624. The parties are the same;
the reliefs prayed for by Guevara are likewise the same; and the award or
non-award in the first case will bar by res
judicata the award in the second case.
Guevara is even guilty of forum
shopping by filing these two cases successively. The facts reveal that on
Forum shopping is a deplorable
practice of litigants of resorting to two different fora
for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, to increase his or her chances of
obtaining a favorable judgment. What is
pivotal to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by a person who asks
appellate courts and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related
causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same relief, in the
process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by the different
courts or fora upon the same issues. There is forum shopping where the elements of
litis pendentia are present and where
a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other.[56]
The grave evil sought to be avoided
by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals
of two separate, and contradictory decisions.
Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent
tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the
resultant confusion, this Court adhere strictly to the rules against forum
shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a case.[57]
Considering
that Civil Case No. 95-624 has already been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia,
this Court no longer finds it necessary to rule on the issue of prescription.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition is hereby DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 53379, dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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|
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino with Associate Justices Buenaventura J.
Guerrero and Mariano C.
[2]
[3] Records, Vol. I, p. 2.
[4]
[5]
[6] Id at 66-78.
[7] Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493,
[8]
[9]
[10] A principle in Private International Law where some courts may refuse to entertain a conflicts case on the belief that the matter can be tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case transpired in foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there. (Salonga, Private International Law [1995 ed.], p. 56.)
[11] Rollo of G.R. No. 103493, pp. 47-54 (Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 7).
[12]
[13] Records, Vol. I , p. 331.
[14] Rule 11
of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions and Other
Papers, Sanctions:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record
in the attorney’s individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign the party’s pleading, motion or other paper and state the party’s
address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in
equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the
testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating
circumstances is abolished. The
signature of an attorney or party, constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleadings, motion, or other paper; that to the best of
the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that
it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee.” (CA rollo, p. 485.)
[15] Records. Vol. I, p. 71.
[16]
[17] Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7.
[18]
[19] Records, Vol. I, pp. 329-334.
[20] Rollo, pp. 63-68.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7.
[28]
[29] Rollo, pp. 186-188.
[30]
[31] 336 Phil. 949 (1997).
[32] Records, Vol. II, p. 643.
[33]
[34]
[35] CA rollo, pp. 2-32.
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39] Rollo, pp. 18-30.
[40]
[41]
[42] Rollo, pp. 154-181.
[43] BPI Securities Corp. v. Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court and Eduardo V. Guevara, CA-G.R. SP No. 40303, 26 January 1998. Amended Complaint was
filed on
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48] Samson v. Cabanos,
G.R. No. 161693,
[49] Ariola v. Philex Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 147756,
[50] Jaban v. City of
[51] RULES OF COURT, Rule 6, Section 7.
[52] Records, Vol. I, pp. 330-332.
[53]
[54] Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
[55] Guaranteed Hotels Inc. v. Baltao, G.R.
No. 164338,
[56]
[57]